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iIntroduction
This book is intended to explain elementary knowledges on the trust law of Japan,
and theoretically to consider its interpretation problems.
As for the Trust Act of Japan, there had been not much discussion on it for a long
time since Taisho 11 (1922) when the statute was established. But it has suddenly got
notices from legal students and practitioners since a judgement of Japanese Supreme
Court in Heisei 14 (2002) which referred to a general theory of trusts. In addition,
there have been established the amendment of Trust Business Act in Heisei 16 (2004)
and the revision of the Trust Act at the end of Heisei 18 (2006) sequentially, so
that the number and volume of provisions and rules in the Trust Act and its related
statutes have been exploded. Especially, in the body of the Trust Act far more
detailed provisions than those in the predecessor have been contained with explicit
form. The provisions are so detailed that if you write down whole the text of the
statute in the form of normal sentences, you could get a trust law book of standard
volume as a textbook on the subject.
But, whatever detailed provisions are introduced, theoretical possibilities of inter-
pretation of trust law shall be beyond the expectation of the legislator. And there are
certainly left some interpretational problems, including fundamental ones, out of the
scope of usual arguments up to the legislation. So, in learning and studying law of
trusts it is necessary to consider how theoretically to grasp the trust relation and from
what point of view the interpretation should be done, without sticking to the verbal
text of the Trust Act, as well as to try to systematically understand the concrete
contents of the provisions and the relations among them. It is nothing but a contin-
uation of the most fundamental mission of the legal study in general, not restricted
to the area of trust law, that is, to investigate the theoretical foundation provided in
the provisions to give resolutions on conicts, so as to give a basic orientation for the
interpretation in case of some unexpected problems.
Considering all described above, in this book I tried to explain the elementary facts
on the provisions of the Trust Act and to unite arguments from theoretical points of
view on Trusts with the interpretations of those provisions. Whether, by doing so, the
law of trusts is made easier or harder to understand should be left to the criticisms by
each reader. By the way, I published a dissertation \Theories on the Law of Trusts
and Their Applications" (Yutaka Hishino: Shinzansya 2004). Although that book
is for the interpretations of the obsoleted Trust Act, it contains considerations on
the mutual relations between theoretical points of view on trust relationship and the
concrete interpretational problems of the provisions. When you want to study deeper
the contents of this book or are interested in the relation between Trust Theories and
Trust Law, please refer that dissertation, too.
Besides, while the text of the Trust Act quoted in this book is current at the time
of the publication, Heisei 23 (2011), as for the amendments and additional issues to
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happen after then, please refer the introductory supplementary article titled \星野豊
『信託法』(信山社、2011 年)【INTRODUCTIONS & APPENDIX】" on \Tsukuba
Repository" Site administered by Tsukuba University Library, which shall be updated
as necessary. The URL is:
http://hdl.handle.net/2241/113144
The content of this book is newly written, but its base and presuppositions have
been founded on my experience as a lecturer in the Training Lesson Plan on Law of
Trusts operated at Mitsui Trust Bank run from Heisei 3 (1991) to Heisei 6 (1994)
and the lectures and exercises on Law of Trusts given at Social Science Group and its
graduate school in Tsukuba University. In addition, I have got much benet from the
discussion at the periodical meetings for studying Law of Trusts operated together
with Mizuho Trust Bank (named Yasuda Trust Bank at the start time of the meeting)
since Heisei 7 (1995). Further, from Naohiro Sakurada, Yasuo Kondo, Masahiko
Nakayama and Satoshi Niibe, I could get many theoretical and/or practical advices
on the draft of this book. I wishes to thank again the students and practitioners who
patiently followed my never easy to understand discussion. I hope the publication of
this book can pay some part of the debts to those people. Finally, special thanks are
due to the Shinzan-Sha and the stus who continuously encourage and support my
writing during the long time it has taken from the planing to the publication of this
book.
*[Acknowledgement for English translation] As for the current legal provisions, the
English translation of Japanese Law by Japanese Law Translation Council at Ministry
of Justice of Japan is made use of throughout this translation with small nominal
modications. The source is publicly available from here through the internet.
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Chapter 1
The Denition and Nature of
Trusts
1.1 Denition of Trust
(1) Wide Variety of the Denitions of Trust
\What is Trust?" This problem is the starting point and, at the same time, the
ultimate goal for the study on Trusts. Most legal concepts have usually their generally
accepted denitions, even if there may be room for some objections to them. But as far
as Trust Law is concerned, as we will see below, the aspect of the argument radically
varies according to from which side the institute is considered for what purpose. One
of the causes that are making the arguments on trusts dicult to understand is, we
may say, the fact that there are several denitions of trust, of which we cannot select
logically the best.
We can classify the theoretical points of view concerning the denition of trust
roughly into three. The rst is a thought to focus on the wills of the parties to
form a trust in analyzing their actions in the formation process of the trust. The
former Trust Act had adopted such a view in its denition of trust. The second is a
thought to focus on the structure of the rights and duties already formed among trust
parties. The Restatement of Trusts of the USA is adopting such a view. The current
Trust Act of Japan also could be said to belong to this latter class. The third, and
with a bit dierent nature from the other two, is a thought to focus on the objectively
appropriate legal relations concerning a specied property, for the realization of which
a court has given the remedies to a party from the view of the social ethics or justice
irrespective of the actual situation of the rights and obligations which the parties
formed and activated. The traditional concept of Trust in England has been formed
on this thought.
Those three ways of thought above are not explicitly contradictory with each
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other. But which stand point one adopts will make a big dierence in the direction
of interpretation concerning the denition and the theoretical nature of trust.
From the rst point of view, what is theoretically the most important is the
agreement to settle the trust relation among the trust parties, especially between the
settlor and the trustee, so that the determination of the content of the agreement
formed by the trust parties would be principally sought for in interpreting the trust
relationship by a court of justice. Therefore, from this view point, since a trust is
formed by the wills of the trust parties, even in the case in which some lacks are
recognized in the wills of the parties, analogical application of the provisions of Trust
Act would be unallowable as a rule.
From the second point of view, since whether a trust has been formed depends
on the objective structure of the already existing rights and duties relation between
the relevant parties, for the denition of trust how that legal relationship would be
formed is not important. It is true that it is necessary to interpret the wills of the
parties when the existing rights and duties relations was formed according to the
wills. However, in the cases where the conditions of the rights and duties relation
between the present trust parties have been discrepant from the wills of the parties
at the time of settlement of the trust (even such a case is not rare that the parties at
settling time and those at running time are dierent), the interpretation should not
stick to the wills of the parties at the settling time, but take, rst of all, the present
condition of the rights and duties relation into consideration. In addition, under this
view, even though the existing rights and duties relation has never been based on
the wills of the trust parties, rules of trusts may be applicable to such cases. On the
other hand, it is, as a rule, not allowable for a court to force on the trust parties any
legal relation dierent from the existing rights and duties between the parties.
In contrast to all above, under the third point of view, it is a court that decides
whether a legal relationship constitutes a trust or not. A court would conrm an
appropriate legal relationship on the disputed property guided by the thought of
ethics or justice and force it to the trust party. But, in such considerations, whether
the legal relation between parties was built according to the wills of the parties, or
what is the structure of the legal relationship existing among the parties is quite
irrelevant. In other words, from this point of view, the trust relation is set not by
the trust parties, but by the court, where the conrmation of the trust by the court
is everything. The reason why it is allowed for trust parties to set the trusts or why
legal relations like a trust have existed, is nothing but the fact that the court has
conrmed that to be suitable from the thought of ethics or justice. In sum, this stand
point sees the trust institute as a mean to realize legal relationships appropriate in
ethical or justiable thought. In this sense, this point of view is qualitatively dierent
from the rst or second view point.
As we will see below, Japanese Trust Act has had the provisions explicitly dening
a trust since the old Trust Act in Taisho era. So, if one takes the terms of the
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provision as the absolute denition of trust, there would be no need to discuss about
denitions of a trust. However, in such a situation that some disputations on the
denition of trust happen, the parties cannot reach some new agreement based on the
relationship of their mutual condence, as they are disputing one another on whether
some legal relationship belongs to the trust relation or not. Under such a condition,
the interpretation of the provisions on the denition of trust would considerably
change in the orientation depending on which of the view points described above the
interpreter adopts to dene a trust. In addition, as described above, the third view
point is surely dierent in the orientation of the thought from the rst and second
ones. When one stands on the third stand point, a trust should be made use of, in
eect, as a means to establish legal relationships appropriate in ethics or justice since
Law or legal study should aim at the realization of Social Justice in the end, so that
the denition of trust itself would be considered as a mere means. There seems to
be no reason in theory to exclude such a stand point. For example, allowing Family
Court rather wide range of discretion by analogical interpretations of trust law on
the problem of family property administration would be practically suitable in many
cases, although such problems are not fully discussed in Japan.
Anyway, as we have seen, we should be conscious through discussions on problems
of trusts to the facts that there coexists plural stand points on the denition of trust
and that the orientation of interpretation depends on which point one stands on.
(2) The Provisions Dening a Trust in Trust Act
The former Trust Act before the amendment in Heisei 18 (2006) dened a trust as \to
do transfer or the other disposition of certain property rights so as to have the other
parson administer or dispose of the property in accordance with a certain purpose"1.
This denition gives attention to the fact that the settlor establishes the trust relation
through the transfer or the other disposition of the property right and has the trustee
as \the other party" administer the property in accord with the purpose of the trust,
namely, to the settling act of the trust relation by the settlor with the trustee. In
this meaning, the stand point of this denition is similar to the rst point of view
described above. This denition has been kept since the establishment of Japanese
Trust Act in Taisho 11 (1922) until the major amendment of the statute in Heisei 18
(2006). By the way, the denition was based on the jus-in-personam theory of Trust
(for details including contents of the other trust theories, see Chapter 1 Section 4),
which was strongly insisted in England and in the United States of America at the
time of the preparation for the legislation. Since ago, they had pointed out some
1Article 1 of the former Trust Act Trust in this statute means to do transfer or the other
disposition of certain property rights so as to have the other person administer or dispose of the
property in accordance with a certain purpose.
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problems in the denition in the former statute that took the process of the settling
the trust between the settlor and trustee, like following.
First, since the trustee was prescribed as \the other person", whether a \declara-
tion of trust (Self Trust)" was doubtful to be called a trust in the former provision.
For in a declaration of trust the settlor declares that a part of his/her own properties
be the trust property and the settlor him/herself administers the property as the
trustee.
Second, since the provision prescribes to do \transfer or the other disposition
of certain property rights", one inuential opinion insisted that there must exist
certain trust properties at the time of the settlement of the trust and that a trust
couldn't be established by a mere agreement settling the trust. According to the
opinion, the timing of the settlement in a certain type of lage scale investment trust
would be delayed until the real payment of the whole capital money, so that there
happens interpretational debates on how the rights of already paying investors could
be protected. For many investors would take part in such a trust so that it usually
takes long time to collect all the capitals.(see Chapter 2 Section 1 (1))
Thirdly, in view of the clause saying that the settlor does transfer or the other
disposition of \property rights", a doctrine inuentially insists that the property
constituting a trust should be, as a rule, restricted to certain positive properties
and that the negative properties in trust property, if any, should be exceeded by
the positive properties there in the sum. According to the opinion, when the trust
property consists of whole assets of an enterprise or of a heritage, since such assets are
usually a mixture of positive and negative properties so that a considerable amount
of recalculations is needed to make the nancial conditions clear, the settlement of a
trust with such asset would be practically very dicult.(as for positive and negative
properties, see Chapter 2 Section 2 (3))
In contrast to all above, the current Trust Act amended in Heisei 18 (2006) denes
a trust as that \a specic person, by employing any of the methods listed in the
items of the following Article, administers or disposes of property in accordance with
a certain purpose ... and conducts any other acts that are necessary to achieve such
purpose"2. As for the methods to settle a trust, a conclusion of a trust contract, a
will to settle a trust and a notarial deed of a declaration of trust are enumerated3.
2(Denition)[Excerpt] Article 2 ¬ The term \trust" as used in this Act means an arrangement in
which a specic person, by employing any of the methods listed in the items of the following Article,
administers or disposes of property in accordance with a certain purpose (excluding the purpose of
exclusively promoting the person's own interests; the same shall apply in said Article) and conducts
any other acts that are necessary to achieve such purpose.
3(Methods to Create a Trust)
Article 3 A trust shall be created by any of the following methods:
1. by concluding an agreement with a specic person to the eect that the person will be
assigned property, that the person will be granted a security interest in property, or that property
will otherwise be disposed of to the person, and that said specic person should administer or dispose
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Comparing the denition with the former denition, except for the restrictions on
the method to settle a trust by the paragraphs of Article 3, the present states of the
administration of the trust property according to the trust purpose by the trustee
is paid the exclusive attention in Article 2 paragraph 1 that directly prescribes the
denition of Trust. So, we can say this denition stands on the second stand point
described in the previous page.
If so, the interpretation problems in the former provision would be solved in the
current one like following.
Firstly, as for a declaration of trust, it is conrmed as one of methods to settle
a trust in Article 3 item 3. In addition to that, viewing from the wording structure
of the denition in Article 2 paragraph 1, there is no need for the trustee to be a
dierent person from the settlor. So, we can conclude that a declaration of trust
should be included in Trust.
Secondly, as for the timing of the establishment of a trust, since Article 2 para-
graph 1 concentrates on the state where a trust has already been established, the
timing itself cannot logically deduce from the provision. In view of such a condition,
the current statute sets explicit provisions on this timing problem, in which the tim-
ing of the establishment of a trust is: at the time of the conclusion of the contract as
to a trust contract, at the time of taking eect of the will as to a trust settling will,
and at the time of drawing the notarial deed up as to a declaration of trust4.
of such property in accordance with a certain purpose and carry out any other acts that are necessary
for achieving such purpose (hereinafter referred to as a \trust agreement");
2. by making a will to the eect that property will be assigned to a specic person, that a specic
person will granted a security interest in property, or that property will otherwise be disposed of
to a specic person, and that the specic person should administer or dispose of such property in
accordance with a certain purpose and carry out any other acts that are necessary for achieving
such purpose; or
3. by manifestation of an intention for a specic person to administer or dispose of a certain
portion of the property that the person holds in accordance with a certain purpose and for the
person to conduct any other acts that are necessary for achieving such purpose by the person, with
the manifestation of such intention being evidenced by a notarial deed or any other document or
electromagnetic record (meaning a record made in an electronic form, a magnetic form, or any
other form not recognizable to human perception and which is used in information processing by
computers as specied by Ordinance of the Ministry of Justice; the same shall apply hereinafter) in
which said purpose, the matters necessary for specifying said property, and other matters specied
by Ordinance of the Ministry of Justice have been stated or recorded.
4(Eectuation of a Trust)
Article 4 ¬ A trust created by the method set forth in item 1 of the preceding Article shall become
eective when a trust agreement is concluded between the person who is to be the settlor and another
person who is to be the trustee.
­ A trust created by the method set forth in item 2 of the preceding Article shall become eective
when the will takes eect.
® A trust created by the method set forth in item 3 of the preceding Article shall become eective
when the events specied in the following items take place for the cases listed in the respective items:
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Thirdly, as for the component ratio of the positive and negative properties, there
is no mention in the denition in Article 2. Therefore, a trust will be valid whenever
the settlement has been done by a method prescribed in Article 3 irrespective of the
component ratio of positive and negative properties in the trust property. However,
on the other hand, such a trust would have problems concerning the continuation
and termination of trust regulated by Trust law. In practice, a trust in which the
negative properties exceeds the positive properties of the trust property in sum would
be applied to the bankruptcy proceeding according to Chapter 10-2 of Bankruptcy
Act (Article 244-2 and after), so that the trust relation will be terminated at the time
of the bankruptcy order5.
By the way, the denition of trust in the current statute has following characters
and problems.
First, as described above, the current provision denes a trust merely for the
trustee to administer the trust property according to the trust purpose. So, any
structural relations of rights and duties between the trust parties would be allowable
by the trust denition. That is the most distinct character of the current denition
compared with the former one which was based on the jus-in-personam theory so
that there might be theoretical conicts between the provisions and the other trust
theories than the jus-in-personam theory. Such a character of the current statute
might lead to a kind of \legal stability". For it allows for the provisions of the Trust
Act to be applied to wide varieties of \trust relations" existing in practice so that the
most part of the practical problems could be administered with the very provisions.
However, at the same time, as the current provision allows in the nature all kinds of
legal relations on trust, the fundamental legal theoretical constructs of Trust cannot
be logically decided from it, so that the theoretical distinction between trust and
the other legal relations is blurred. We should note that it could lead to serious
1. where the trust is created by means of a notarial deed or any other document or electro-
magnetic record authenticated by a notary (hereinafter referred to as a \notarial deed, etc." in this
item and the following item): when the notarial deed, etc. is executed; or
2. where the trust is created by means of a document or electromagnetic record other than a
notarial deed, etc.: when notice is given by means of an instrument bearing a xed date to the third
party designated as the person who is to be the beneciary (if there are two or more such third
parties, to one of them), with regard to the fact that the trust has been created and the contents
thereof.
¯ Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding three paragraphs, when a trust is subject to
a condition precedent or a designated time of commencement by the terms of trust, said trust shall
become eective when the condition precedent is fullled or when the time of commencement arrives.
5(Causes of Termination of a Trust)[Excerpt]
Article 163 In addition to cases under the provisions of the following Article, a trust shall terminate
in the following cases:
...
7. where an order for the commencement of bankruptcy proceedings has been entered against the
trust property;
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diculties.
The next problem is whether the methods to settle a trust prescribed in each
paragraph of Article 3 are so exclusive that no exceptional method could be allowed in
relation to the denition of trust. This book stands on the position that the prescribed
methods should be interpreted as subsidiary because the administration of Trust
property by the Trustee according to the Trust Purpose should be the most important
part of the denition of trust, which will be argued more detailed in Chapter 1 Section
4 (3) below. Then, the Trust Act should be at least analogically applied even to the
case in which the trust was established not by the will of the \settlor" as far as the
legal relation on which a administrator administers certain property according to a
certain purpose is conrmed. Instead, if one thinks that the methods of settlement in
paragraphs of Article 3 are indispensable parts of the denition of trust, it would be
considered as generally unallowable to apply by analogy the provisions of the Trust
Act to legal relations which were set not by the intention of a settlor.
Anyway, as referred to above, the current statutory denition of trust as well
as the former one has its own characteristic and problems. Any explicit provision
couldn't exclude the room of questions nor the need of arguments. It may be rather
proper to think that the current provision tends to cause interpretational diculties
more than the former since it has made the domain of a trust broader and thiner at
the same time in the respective senses.
As we have seen above, there can be no denitive denition of trust. The current
statutory denition of trust is also never providing a theoretically complete answer.
So, as implied at the beginning of this book, we should consider throughout this book
how to dene a trust. Therefore, in following, we will proceed with the discussion
on the standing point that the theoretically most important character of Trust is
the fact that the administration acts of the trust property are bound by the trust
purpose(Chapter 1 Section 4 (3)) , although paying full considerations to the denition
of trust in Article 2 of the current Trust Act.
1.2 History of Trust and Trust Institute
There are various doctrines on the historical origin of Trust. However, we can say
it is the case law having been formed in England and the United States of America
that was most directly inuential to the establishment of the Japanese Trust Law.
Since we will mostly concentrate on the Japanese Trust Law as the object of the
considerations in this book, we will give some review on the history of the forming
and development of the trust institute in England and the United States as far as it is
necessary for our discussion on the Japanese law. Then, we will consider the former
and current Japanese Statutes of Trusts (Trust Act) in their characteristics as legal
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institutes6.
(1) Formation of Trust Institute in England
The fundamental denition of trust in England and the United States of America
denes a trust as a relation with respect to certain property subjecting the trustee who
holds title to the property to equitable duties and responsibilities for the beneciary
who should get the benets from the property7. Contrary to the current trust institute
in Japan, there has been traditionally coexisting Common Law that is case law and
Equity that pursuit to resolve cases by concrete justice and fairness, the historical
origins of which are quite dierent. The trust institute denable like above could
be seen to have been generated from certain conicts of judgements among such two
dierent justices belonging to the two dierent legal institutions respectively.
That means: A Common Law Court judges that the trustee holds the title of
certain trust property. Against which, the Equity Court (Chancellor) issues a decree
that orders the trustee, the title holder of the property, to keep the property for the
benet of the beneciary from the viewpoint of justice and equity. Then, owing to
such contradictory judgements, the equitable interests of the property belongs to the
beneciary, separated from the Common Law title of it which belongs to the trustee.
Such conditions have historically generated Trust Relation.
Such case institute as Trusts is said to have been formed by the time around the
fteen century in England. We should note the following natures in such a traditional
case law.
First, it was only after the sixteenth century that various cases concerning equity
began to be collected as the \case book" and systematized. The conict resolutions
in Equity Court could be said an accumulation of various concrete decisions in its
theory. Therefore, excepting the later ages where the case book collection has been
established, it would be wrong to say as if early judgement in each case concerning
equitable institutes had been decided in prospect of the future establishment of the
institute.
Second, from the viewpoint of the denitions of a trust described above, decrees
by Equity Court have been playing the most important part for the creation of the
traditional trust relation. That directly represents the third stand point of the deni-
tion of Trust (see Section 1 (1)) which denes a trust for Court to force the preferable
rights and duties relation on certain property from the viewpoint of the justice and
equity, irrespective of the existing right-obligation relationship formed by the parties.
So, in the traditional case law of England, a trust was nothing but the relation that
the court judged is \appropriate for being a trust relation" and it was not until later
6As to details of the following descriptions, see Hoshino\Theory of Trusts"Chapter 1 and 2.
7Restatement (3rd) of Trusts, s.2. *The wording was modied a little.
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that the settlement act of the trust relation by the trust parties came to be taken as
important.
In sum, in the historical origin of the trust relation in Enland law there are its
peculiar legal system and characteristic split of the role of Courts, which are qualita-
tively dierent from the foundation of the current Japanese legal system. So, it is a
matter of course that the traditional case law of England was directly incorporated
into Japanese legal system without any modications at the time of the establishment
of Japanese Trust Act. In reality, even in England or the United States of America,
the theoretical characteristics of Trusts have been considerably changed especially in
and after the nineteenth century.
(2) Judicial Reform and the Historical Roll of the Jus-In-
Personam Theory
In \English Legal System" coexist plural laws, Common Law and Equity, of which the
respective courts have the jurisdictions. However, such a legal system had become
criticized in various respects as the social relations was developed especially since
the nineteenth century. Some examples of the criticisms to Equity Court were : ¬
The dilation of the number of applications and the short of the judges are causing
terrible delay of the procedures there. ­ The expensiveness of the procedure fees and
the corruption of the court clerks. ® The indeniteness and incoherence of equity
institutes itself. Those defects were mutually so connected that the abuses got worse.
As the result of the judicial reform having lasted over the nineteenth century,
the Judicature Act of 1873 integrated Equity Court into Common Law Court, the
jurisdiction on Trusts has been shared with Common Law Court. A common ex-
planation of the reason of the reform is the fact that the eciency of the procedure
in court has become required by the social development and, especially, the growth
of the commerce. However, in view of the fact that the \abuses" in Equity Court
was so strongly accused as to get to the abolishment of the court, the source of the
criticisms should be not merely the ineciency but rather some strong doubts to the
very justice and equity in the procedure of Equity court.
If so was the real situation, some theoretical reconstruction concerning the tradi-
tional characteristics of the case institute of Trust referred to above would be con-
sidered necessary. The traditional case institute was seen as a accumulation of the
judgement based on the considerations of the justice and equity in each concrete case.
However, since the very legitimacy of judgements by the court was thought dubious,
the radical reconsideration of the fundamental theoretical constitution of the trust
relation became necessary to give the institute a legal theoretical legitimacy. It was
the jus-in-personam theory of Trust by F. W. Maitland that fullled such a part as
a trust theory. The theory gave a great inuence also on the former statutory trust
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theory of Japan.
The basic thought of the jus-in-personam theory is, in short, that it is the will of
the settlor to settle the trust and the acceptance of it by the trustee, and that such
will is the most important in theory for the formation of the trust relation, so that the
conrmation of the trust by a court is a mere recognition of the agreement between
the settlor and the trustee. The jus-in-personam theory gave a coherent explanation
of the case law at that time based on the above view point and concluded the already
formed trust institute to be still legitimate after the judicial reform. Though, the
explanation from the standpoint of the jus-in-personam theory is now rarely quoted as
a ground of the legitimacy of the Trust institute, for the condence in the judgements
of court has been restored after the judicial reform. So, the explanation that the
ground of the legitimacy of the Trust institute is the system of the justice and equity
built by courts is still powerful in England.
(3) Development of the Trust Institute in the United States
of America
The trust institute of the United States of America was inherited from England.
It was explicitly systematized by \Restatement of Trusts" edited since 1930's. The
third edition of the Restatement had been concluded with the chapter concerning the
obligations of trustees and the rights of beneciaries in 2007. However, the Trust
Institute of the United States has quite dierent theoretical characteristics from that
of England in the very fundamental part.
The fundamental characteristics of the Trust Institute of the United States are:
First, the practical phases of the usage of Trusts have been greatly modied such
as the growth of commercial trusts in large scale projects. Second, the way of un-
derstanding of the legal system concerning the relation between Common Law and
Equity and some fundamental legal concepts like \Property" or \Interest" have been
shifted as commercial trusts has grown, so that the trust institute has been devel-
oped taking such trust relations into considerations as pursuing an augmentation of
abstract economic benet not based on the property itself as a matter. Third, the
thought that situates a trust in the \Fiduciary Relationships" institute for the general
property administration similar to Trusts in the functionalities has been established,
without sticking to the strict historical origin.
The trust institute of the United States, in contrast to that of England, doesn't
rigidly rely on the roll sharing between Common Law and Equity. So it is not rare
that a conclusion of the court deviates from the principle of the traditional Equity. In
addition, not a few established conclusions of the traditional English trust institute
have been modied as a result of the considerations on the change of the economic
values of trust property during investment acts. Moreover, some doctrine insists even
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a wholly reconstruction of the interpretation of the legal system including the relation
of Trust with Contract or the other legal institutes, regardless of the historical origins.
In sum, the trust institute of the United States has been exibly changed according
to the realities of the society and commerce in the United States. We could say, trust
theories in the Unites States is playing the roll to provide theoretical points of view to
give some reasonable explanations to such changes. However, because of such exible
changes in accord with the social realities, the coherence and legitimacy of the Trust
institute would become dicult to be deduced from the contents of the case law.
So, some additional source of the theoretical foundation of Trust would be needed.
At present, most of the trust theories in the United States seems to be setting the
foundations on its economic rationality. But such a tendency also might be changed
as the change of the times. We should watch the trends.
(4) The Basic Features of the Former Trust Act of Japan
The earliest legislation on Trusts in Japan was \Act of Secured Corporate Bond Trust"
(Act no.52 of Meiji 38 (1905)). The former Trust Act established in Taisho 11 (1922)
was said to be legislated for putting the concept of Trust restrictively introduced in
the law theoretically in order. Torajiro Ikeda, the drafter of the statute, basically
supported in the drafting of the statute the jus-in-personam theory newly insisted
in England or the United States at the time. So, he put it on the center of the
construction of the theory that the settlor creates the trust relationship by doing
transfer or the other dispositions of the trust property to the trustee and that the
absolute title of the trust property belongs to the trustee. As the result, the nature
of the right of the beneciary became a right in personam. We could say, such a
fundamental idea of the former Trust Act was suitable to the purpose to place the
trust concept coherently in the Japanese legal system that is radically dierent from
that of England or of the United States.
Being based on such an idea, the former Trust Act had following features:
Firstly, while the absolute title of the trust property was given to the trustee, the
duties and responsibilities of the trustee was strengthened to the maximun and very
cautious regulations were put against the possibilites of the pursuit of self-interests
by the trustee. Those regulations later got the strong criticisms from practitioners of
trust banks that they impeded the exible trust relationship too mach, which led to
the recent amendment of the Trust Act. We will discuss that below.
Secondly, as related to the rst feature above, the distinction between the trust
property and the private property of the trustee was rigidly required as a reection of
the absolute title of the trust property of the trustee. Then, various provisions were
presupposing the independence of the trust property. Based on this characteristic,
in spite that the former statute explicitly adopted the jus-in-personam theory, the
trust-property-as-substantive-legal-subject theory that puts the independence of trust
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property in the center of the theoretical construction has got a strong inuence on
the arguments on Japanese trust theories.
Thirdly, as the former Trust Act had the purpose to give a theoretical unity of the
trust concept with Japanese legal system, it gave a general provision concerning the
fundamental idea of the trust relationship, which was applied to all kinds of trusts
irrespective of the mutual dierence of the purposes or forms of trusts. On the other
hand, nonprot trusts didn't spread in practical businesses and commercial trusts in
which trust banks as trustees pursued the played the central part of the trust business.
Such conditions had a great inuence on interpretations of the former Trust Act. As
the result, the provisions of the former statute that supposed also nonprot trusts,
especially those which greatly restricts the discretion of trustees concerning the duties
and responsibilities, were exposed to severe criticisms by practitioners of trust banks
as professional trustees.
(5) Fundamental Characteristics of the Current Trust Act
The former Trust Act had been kept with almost no major amendments until the
legislation of the current Trust Act, which is the major amendment of the former
Statute, took the place in Heisei 18 (2006). However, the criticisms to and the
demands of the reform of the former Trust Act from the trust bank practitioners as
referred to above had been grown further in Heisei era.
However, since the trust bank practitioners were supposing commercial trusts to
pursue economic prots through making use of trust property as described above, it
might have been an alternative to legislate \Commercial Trust Act" as a special law
of the Trust Act. But, in reality, the established current Trust Act are regulating
both of nonprot and commercial trusts, provided that only some technically pecu-
liar provisions in the former Trust Act concerning trust relationships having public
interests as the purposes are left current by giving them the form of a special law.
The current Trust Act is a rather large-scale code having totally 271 articles
classied in 13 chapters. Of the whole 13 chapters, chapters from 1 to 7 includes 184
articles concerning general matters in Trusts, chapters from 8 to 11 newly introduced
rules concerning exceptional matters in certain kinds of trust relationships, chapters
12 and 13 miscellaneous rules and penal regulations. From a simple comparison of
the numbers of articles, it has substantially about four times as many articles as the
former statute had totally 75 articles of which 65 articles concerning private interest
trusts were the objects of the amendment. Even when the comparison is restricted
on the general provision part from the chapter 1 to 7, 184 articles are three times as
many as the total article number of the former statute. The cause of such a bloating
of the number of articles is, in short, that the contents of the most articles have been
much more detailed than the former and rather many new provisions have been also
introduced. The bloating has happened not only on the number of the articles, but
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also on the content of each article. The former provisions were written very briey
including functionally important ones. By contrast, the current provisions rather
minutely dene the conditions of the applications intending to give rather concrete
solutions at the level of the law.
Taking all described above into consideration, we could think of the legal position
and characteristic of the current Trust Act like follows.
First, the current Trust Act could be seen having been maintaining since the
former statute the nature of the fundamental law of Trusts concerning the theoretical
view point on Trust institute as the scope of the regulations includes widely both
nonprot and commercial trusts, except for the some technical rules prescribed in
the special Act for public interest trusts. However, the current Trust Act is avoiding
any denition which may have anity with one of theoretical constructions of trust
so as to stick to the stand point of the \complete neutrality" to trust theories. So,
the current statute could be said to be a \colorless, transparent existence" in both
good and bad senses for theoretical interpretation problem like the fundamental legal
structure of Trust. That means, we might have to say, it lacks, in the bad meaning,
any theoretical base that may give the insights and orientations to the practitioners
facing practical problems.
Second, as we will see later in some details, the current Trust Act has incorporated
typical contract formats and practical conventions trust bank practitioners have cur-
ried out under the former statute according to their own judgements, directly into the
provisions in rather concrete forms. In this respect, the current Trust Act is, in con-
trast to the former statute, akin to a regulative law intimately connected to concrete
practices of trust banks, rather than a fundamental law of Trusts to provide the legal
theoretical standpoint. But, compared with many other nancial regulations, there is
almost no provision that delegates the details to Cabinet Orders in the current Trust
Act. Almost all details are concretely inscribed in the body of the Trust Act as the
provisions. We need to watch what eects such a characteristic of the current Trust
Act will have in the future.
Third, again as we will see later, the current Trust Act allows to extend very
largely the range of discretions on oce works concerning a trust only by an agreement
between the trustee and the beneciary, in contrast to the former statute. In other
words, the current statute is supposing that the beneciary will put condence in the
character and ability of the trustee, and basically refraining from legal interventions
in the trust relationship between parties, being contrary to the former statute. This is
a rather intended result responding to the criticisms and the demand of amendments
by trust bank practitioners to the former statute. But such a characteristic, coupled
with the fact that the current Trust Act doesn't provide any denite theoretical
perspective on Trust institute, may, anyway, dilute the signicance of the existence
of the current Trust Act to the existing trust relationships in the real world.
However, such an apprehension may be only theoretical. Since, for trust practi-
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tioners, many of the practical conventions and contract formats that had been built
on their own judgements and responsibilities now have been adopted as the statutory
provisions, practitioners would be positively evaluating the establishment of the cur-
rent provisions through the active utilization of the social signicance of the statutory
legitimization of their own practical conventions and contract formats in the current
law. So, this honeymoon situation between the current Trust Act and the trust bank
practice will continue for some time, unless further change of the social conditions
creates the demands from the practical business contradicting to the provisions of the
current Trust Act.
1.3 Trust and the Other Competing Institutes
One of helpful ways to think about the fundamental characteristics of Trust is the
comparison with the other similar legal institutes or institutions. In addition to
that, it will be also instructive to think about how some of recent cases concerning
property administration would be resolved by an application of the rules of trusts, or
to consider the interpretation problems in the case that similar legal conicts happens
concerning a trust relationship, in order to clearly understand the characteristics of
Trust.
In following, we shall compare trust with the other similar institutes at rst, then
discuss the possibility of the application of the trust law to the cases in which some
property administration troubles were brought into court8.
(1) Comparative Study of Trust with the Other Competing
Institutes
Institutes similar to trusts can be classied into three categories according to from
what point of view they are \similar" to trusts.
The rst category includes Agencies disclosed and undisclosed, Deposit, Commis-
sion and so forth. These institutes have the common nature in that the title holder
of certain property entrusts the administration of the property to the other person,
the administrator.
The second category includes Corporation, Union, Partnership, Unincorporated
Association and so forth. These institutes have the common nature in that the
administration of certain properties is done to accomplish some prescribed purpose.
The third category includes Mortgage and similar institutes. These institutes have
the common nature in that the outward title holders of certain property disagrees with
the substantial one.
8As for the descriptions following in this section, see Hoshino, Trust Law Theory ch. 4, sect. 3.
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In following, we will survey those institutes similar to trusts according to the
classication into three categories.
(a) Disclosed Agency
\Agency" means the legal position that is created by a statutory provision or del-
egating agreement between the parties, in which the legal eects of the acts of the
agent should belong to the principal.
As the dierences between Trust and Agency, the standard discipline enumerates
following three points. Firstly, while Trust concerns the administration or disposition
of certain specied property, the range of the power delegated to an agent will not be
necessarily restricted on the administration or dispositions of such specied property.
Secondly, while the legal eect of the acts of an agent directly aects the principal,
that of the acts of a trustee, as a general rule, will not aect the beneciary by default.
Thirdly, while it is a general rule that a trustee becomes the title holder of the trust
property, an agent will not become the title holder of the property for her/him to
administer based on the power delegated through the agency agreement.
Like above, the dierences between trusts and agency tends to be emphasized
based on the dierences in the contents of the condence relationships and the rights
and duties structures between the parties, although both have the common nature
in being based on a condence relation. However, supposing that we understand the
nature of the agency relationship as to make the legal eects of the acts of the agent
belong to the principal as referred to above, it is not theoretically impossible for trust
and agency relationships to coexist in one same legal relation. Such a consideration
may open up a new perspective concerning the rights and duties relation between a
beneciary and the third party (see Chapter 5 Section 3 (1)).
(b) Undisclosed Agency
\Undisclosed agency (indirect agency)" means to deal in the agent's name but in the
other person's account. It is called also \agency in economy". In undisclosed agency,
contrary to the disclosed agency (direct agency) referred to above, all of the legal
eects concerning the transferred property, at rst, belong completely to the agent,
then those eects will be transferred to the consigner. When the agent has gone
into bankruptcy before the transfer of the property to the consigner, the consigner
has the right of the return claim of the object property of the undisclosed agency
(Supreme Court Judgement, Showa 43 (1968) Sept. 11 (civil case collection vol. 22
no. 7 p.1462)). Also in a trust, the legal eects of the acts of a trustee belong to the
trustee her/himself or the trust property, but not immediately to the beneciary. And
at the time of the bankruptcy of the trustee her/himself, the trust property doesn't
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constitute a part of the bankruptcy assets9.
From those described above, usual arguments fully emphasized the resemblance
between Undisclosed Agency and Trust, so that the rule of the supreme court referred
to above is applicable by analogy to the return claim of the beneciary in case of the
bankruptcy of the trustee. Such arguments were in the end adopted in the current
Trust Act. However, in the case of the supreme court judgement, the administrator
of the bankruptcy of the agent explicitly admitted that the property in dispute was
substantially belonging to the beneciary. From the viewpoint of the legal natures,
whether the arguments on undisclosed agency institute could be applicable by analogy
to Trust institute should be a little more cautiously reconsidered taking also the other
relevant legal rules into consideration (see Chapter 4 Section 6 (2)).
(c) Deposit
\Deposit" means for a depositary, based on a contract between the depositary and
a depositor, to keep some property in the custody for the depositor. It is, on one
hand, similar to Trust in that it is established by a contract and the object property
is specied property. On the other hand, it is deferent from Trust in that the title
of the property is kept to the depositor, not transferred to the depositary, even in
the outward appearance. In addition, there are considerable dierences in the duties
and responsibilities between the legal position of a depositor to keep the deposited
property in the custody and that of a trustee to administer the trust property.
(d) Commission
\Commission" means a contract to entrust a commission agent with a juridical act or
a business by a commission giver based on a condential relation, not rarely endowed
with a power of a disclosed/undisclosed agency. The dierences of Commission from
Trust are similar to those of Disclosed Agency described above. First, the range of the
power from the commission contract would not be restricted on the administration of
certain specied property. Second, a commission agent would not, as a rule, become
the title holder of the property. But, as for the theoretical possibility, we could point
out the same thing as referred to in the paragraph for Disclosed Agency.
(e) Corporation
\Corporation" means such a juridical person with the purpose to make prots as
established according to the provisions of \Corporation Act" (Heisei 17 (2005) Act
9(Relationship between Trust Property and Bankruptcy Proceedings, etc. Against a
Trustee)[excerpt]
Article 25¬ Even where an order for the commencement of bankruptcy is entered against a trustee,
no property that belongs to the trust property shall be included in the bankruptcy estate.
1.3. TRUST AND THE OTHER COMPETING INSTITUTES 17
no. 86.). A corporation is an association to trade in its name and account pursuing
to make prots. It is required in both theory and law for it to have its own property
separated from those owned by each of its members. Therefore, a corporate is in its
nature quite similar to a trust in that it does trading actions concerning specied
property pursuing prots. So, whether certain asset management should be done in
the form of a trust or a corporation is often considered as alternatives in practical
businesses.
On the other hand, the often enumerated dierences between a corporation and a
trust are: First, a corporation has its own legal personality, but trust property doesn't.
Second, the ways of distribution of gains and of supervision of the management in
a corporation are regulated by rather concrete rules to protect the interests of the
shareholders or the creditors, while those in a trust are largely left to the wills of the
trust parties described in the trust contract. In those respects, there are concretely
prescribed provisions in the current Trust Act in contrast to the former. It is true, we
could conclude that in the basic point of view there is no big change in the current
statute from the past. But some careful considerations may be required whether, as a
legal system design in the future, no signicant discrepancy should be made between
a corporation and a trust or, instead, some explicit qualitative dierences between
Corporation and Trust should be introduced in the legal system to distinguish those
institutes.
(f) Union
\Union" is a contract to do a cooperative business based on the investments by few
persons. A union doesn't have the legal personality. The assets of a union are owned
jointly by the members. But in case of the bankruptcy of a union or the enforcement
auction on the assets of a union, the assets of the union are considered as substantially
separated from the personal properties of the members. In addition, since a union is
created by a contract, the rules concerning the way of administration or management
can be determined largely by a discretionary agreement among the parties. By the
way, while in a union of the Civil Code all members owe the unlimited responsibilities
for the obligations of the union, in a union of the commercial code only some specied
members owe the unlimited responsibilities and the other members owe only limited
responsibilities. A union of the commercial code is called \Anonymous Union".
As we saw, a union is, on one hand, considerably similar to a trust in that the
union's assets are separated from the personal assets of the members and that trading
actions are done based on the union's assets. On the other hand, the biggest dierence
between a union and a trust may be that the member of a union can get a refund of
the investment from the union when she/he withdraws from the union (Article 681
of Civil Code), while a beneciary cannot get a part of the trust property without a
special agreement to allow it in the trust contract even when the beneciary withdraws
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from the trust relationship. The only way for a beneciary of a trust to recover the
her/his own investment is to sell the benecial right.
(g) Partnership
\Partnership" means a legal relation in which few persons invest some capitals to
perform a business and an administrator selected among the parties has the power
as the executive and owes the responsibilities on the management. In Japanese legal
system, a partnership is interpreted as a kind of union, so that in the \Act on the
Contract of Limited Liability Union for Investment Business" (Act law no. 90 of
Heisei 10 (1998)), for example, a relation equivalent to a partnership is prescribed
as a kind of union. By the way, Partnership includes a \general partnership" all
members of which owe the unlimited responsibilities and a \limited partnership" in
which only some specied members owes the unlimited responsibilities and the other
member owes only the limited responsibilities. They could be thought corresponding
to a union of the Civil Code and an anonymous union of commercial code respectively
in Japanese legal system.
Still, in the usual legal doctrines of England and the Unites States, the duties and
responsibilities of a trustee are analogically applied to the management acts by the
executives of a partnership. Also in Japanese law, the analogical applications of the
regulations on a trust in the Trust Act to a partnership relation would be worth to
be considered in future, since the provisions of the Trust Act are far more detailed
than those of the Civil Code concerning Union.
(h) Unincorporated Association
\Unincorporated association" means a group associated under a certain purpose (as-
sociation) but not having its legal personality. In the case law, necessary conditions to
be recognized as an unincorporated association are: First, it has some denitiveness
as an association. Second, its ocial works and the decision making process are based
on the principle of decision by the majority. Third, its identity is kept unchanged
in spite of the changes of the members. The assets of a unincorporated association
have certain independency from those of the members. But since such an association
doesn't have its own legal personality, the right on an asset for which the registration
is required to hold should be registered in the name of all the members jointedly or
in the name of the representative in person.
As we can see, the asset management in an unincorporated association is very
similar to the property administration in a trust in that the association itself has
no legal personality, that the association has its own certain purpose and that the
property of the association is separated from the property of the member in person.
However, such interpretations concerning Unincorporated Association have been built
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as the case law and considerable details in both internal and external relations have
been made clear by many judgements by courts. But those decisions were based on
neither direct nor analogical application of the provisions of the Trust Act. Going
together with that, the predominant doctrine under the former Trust Act was negative
about the application of the Trust Law by analogy to the case of an unincorporated
association. As the result, there have not been sucient discussions concerning the
similarity between Unincorporated Association and Trust. However, to consider to
what extent the concrete provisions of the current Trust Act are applicable to the case
of an unincorporated association would give certain useful suggestion in thinking of
the consistency in the case law or in considering interpretation problems in the area
where there has been no judgement by a court yet.
(i) Mortgage
\Mortgage" means a type of security in which the title of the object property is
nominally transferred to the mortgagee based on the contract between the mortgagee
and the mortgager. Although there is no provision on Mortgage in Japanese Civil
Code, the validity has been admitted by courts since ago and Mortgage is still widely
utilized in practical business.
In the case law and legal disciplines before the Second World War, a mortgage
was understood as a relation in which an excessive right (the ownership), meaning
it exceeds the appropriate right in the situation (the right for security), is given to
the mortgagee by the agreement. Therefore, some doctrine tried to limit the power
of the mortgagee, calling a mortgage \a transfer in trust" in comparing to a trust
relationship in which a right (the ownership) which exceeds the right appropriate
to the situation (an administration right) is made belong to a trustee. In sum, the
similarity of Mortgage to Trust was remarked in that the outward assignment of the
legal title of certain property disagreed with the substantial economic assignment of
the title.
By contrast, at the present time the most inuential discipline insists that a
mortgage is just a security relation for a credit given by the mortgagee while a trust
is a legal relationship for the purpose of property administration for the benet of the
beneciary based on the condence relation between the parties. As for a mortgage,
since many case judgements have already made the contents of the legal relation
clear up to the details, it is only a few doctrines at present that claim the analogical
application of the trust law to a mortgage or that emphasize the similarity between
Mortgage and Trust.
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(2) Cases on Property Administrations and Application of
Trust Law
It is not rare that a property administration relation is tried in a court and it is more
often than not for a certain legal relationship similar to a trust to be disputed in a
court.
In followings, we will consider six types of cases as examples for the applications
of the law of trusts one by one. Those are: First, a question of to whom the account
exclusively for premiums of an insurance belongs; Second, a question of the nature of
the legal relation on the money in deposit for the expenses of the maintenance of an
apartment house; Third, an interpretation problem of, so called, \the disposition of
property to the next successor under a will". Fourth, a question of the power of the
administrator of inheritance to select the legatee; Fifth, an interpretation problem of
the act in conict of interest between a parent and the child; Sixth, a question of the
legal relation concerning a deposit of an advance payment for a public contract work.
(a) Assignment of an Account Exclusively for Premiums of an Insurance
An insurance agent that is concluding an agency contract with an insurance company
should keep the premiums got paid by insurance contractors in custody clearly sepa-
rated from its own assets according to the law concerning regulations on invitations
of insurance (Act no. 171 of Showa 23 (1948), abbreviated as LRII in following. This
law had been abolished by being incorporated into Insurance Business Act in Heisei
8 (1996)). In cases of Tokyo district court judgement Showa 63 (1988) March 29
(Hanrei Jiho (abbreviated as HJ in following) no. 1306 p. 121) and of Tokyo district
court judgement Showa 63 (1988) September 27 (Kin-yu Homu (abbreviated as KH
in following) no. 1220 p.34) it was disputed whether that deposited money belonged
to the bankruptcy assets in bankruptcy of an agent the accounts of which were set
for the payment of the premiums or substitutions of insurances in the name of \an
agent of... insurance company" or \an account of the indemnity insurance agent"
(the agent is common in both cases). Tokyo district court conrmed the return claim
by the insurance company of the money of the equivalent sum to the deposited one
against the bankruptcy administrator in both cases, grounded ¬ it was clear from
the account name that the deposited money in the specialized account was separated
from the general assets of the insurance agent; ­ the deposited money could not be
diverted for the general nancial purpose of the agent and, in fact, there seemed from
evidence to have never happened such a diversion; ® the part of substitutions by the
agent was made clear in that the sum agreed with that of delayed payments in the
balance sheet concerning unpaid premiums on the insurance; so that the deposited
money didn't belong to the general assets of the agent.
There are two types of interpretation on those judgements by Tokyo district court.
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One is that because of the fact that the deposited money in the specialized account
was clearly corresponding to the premiums of the insurances viewing from the name
or the substantial management conditions, the deposited money should belong to the
insurance company. According to this interpretation, the grounds of the armation
of the return claim of certain assets from the insurance company are, in short, that
the special assets are separately administered from the other assets and that the fact
is publicly noticed inclusively to the third party in some form. In contrast to that
interpretation, another is that because the eect of the LRII covers the creation and
administration of of a special account for premiums, the bankruptcy administrator
should return the money deposited in the account to the insurance company. Accord-
ing to this latter interpretation, the grounds of the armation of the return claim
by an insurance company are the existence of the public regulations in the LRII and
the duty of a bankruptcy administrator to comply the public law. Under this inter-
pretation, the rule by Tokyo district court couldn't be simply applied to the case of
Chiba district court judgement Heisei 8 (1996) March 26 (KH no. 1456 p.44), which
is similar to the cases of Tokyo district court described above but the return claim
on deposited money in a special account by a insurance company was tried before
the bankruptcy of an insurance agent, or to some cases where an asset management
is not under any public regulation like the LRII.
(b) Legal Relation Concerning Deposited Money for the Maintenance of
an Apartment House
The issue of the cases of Tokyo district court judgement Heisei 8 (1996) May 10 HJ
no. 1596 p.70 and of Tokyo high court judgement Heisei 11 (1999) August 31 HJ no.
1684 p.39 was whether the ownership of an bank account could be insisted against
the third party by simply giving it the account name implying the special usage when
there is no public regulation like the LRII. In both cases, a care-taking union of an
apartment house disputed the ownership of the deposited money in a bank account
against the management company (or its bankruptcy administrator) of the apartment
house. In which the management company was entrusted with the reserved money
for the the cost of the maintenances or care-takings of apartment houses from plural
care-taking unions and kept the money in custody in the name of the management
company with the apartment houses' name attached. Tokyo district court judged
that the deposited money in the account belonged to the management company as
the account holder since it could hardly say that the deposited money was separately
administered from the assets of the management company in person. On the other
hand, Tokyo high court judged that the deposited money belonged to the care-taking
union viewed from the nature of the care-taking cost reserves and the circumstances
of the management acts of the management company.
The fact that the disputed account was not separately handled from the other
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deposits of the apartment house management company may become a hinderance
for the care-taking union of the apartment house to execute its own right on the
account. But it may be strange that a sloppy handling of the account gives the
management company to use the money in the account for its own prots. So the logic
in the judgement of Tokyo district court was a little faulty. On the other hand, the
judgement of Tokyo high court conrmed the deposited money as specied property
grounded on the reason that the account was being handled by the management
company prima facie separately from the other assets since the name of the apartment
house was added to the account name. However, viewing from the facts that bank
account name can be freely set by the depositor and that the actual states on the
handling of a bank account cannot be easily know for the outside, whether it is
appropriate to determine the substantial depositor of a bank account based on if the
account is separately handled from the other assets seems to be still questionable.
(c) Interpretation of a Will to Dispose Property to the Next Successor
\Disposition of Property to the Next Successor under a Will" means a testamentary
gift including a paragraph like \bequeath goods to A, then, after A's death, the goods
be bequeathed to B". Since such a bequest that is trying to prescribe the assignment of
the inheritance even after the death of the legatee is clearly a restriction of the freedom
of disposition of good that the legatee could have, the present common opinion takes
such a will generally invalid. The paragraph like above is generally interpreted as an
expression of a mere hope of the testator. However, the supreme court judgement
Showa 58 (1983) March 18 Kasai Geppo (abbreviated as KG in following) vol. 36
no. 3 p.143 returned the case to the court of the original jurisdiction by ruling that
there were the other various possible way of interpretations on the will to dispose
property to the next successor than that as an expression of a hope of the testator, for
example, as an onerous legacy to the rst legatee, a legacy on a suspensive condition
to the second legatee or a legacy with an indenite term to the second legatee giving
the rst legatee only a usufructuary right on the property, so all possibilities of the
interpretations should have been tried in the consideration.
If one thinks the possibility to settle a trust on certain property in a legacy and to
\bequeath" the benecial right, the conclusion to be deduced could be considerably
dierent from that of the common opinion described above. That is: Trust Act itself
doesn't put any limitation on the contents of the benecial right. So a sequential
setting of a benecial right like \the benecial right is given to A at rst, then, after
the death of A, the right would be given to B, then, after the death of B given to
C", will be valid from the viewpoint of the trust law. Moreover, since the power
of the beneciary to dispose the trust property can be freely restricted by the trust
arrangement, the will of the testator concerning the belonging of the legacy could be
kept considerably longer after the death of the testator when a trust is settled on the
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legacy than when the property is directly transferred by a testament. However, the
argument means that any restrictions will not be deduced from the trust law only.
Whether such a trust relationship described above can be taken as valid without
reservation should be carefully considered from various respects.
(d) The Power of the Administrator of Inheritance to Select the Legatee
On a question whether a testator can delegate the power of selection of the legatee
to the executor of the will, there were a negative judgement of Daishin-in (Daishin-
in judgement Showa 14 (1939) October 13 Minji Hanreisyu (abbreviated as MH in
following) vol. 18 p.1137) and legal disciplines were also tend to be negative. Contrary
to that, the supreme court judgement Heisei 5 (1993) MH vol. 47 no. 1 p.1 judged
that a testament that described \all (the inheritance) shall be donated to public"
should be interpreted as a legacy to some association to pursuing public interests
as the purpose, so it was valid as a will to give the executor the power to select a
concrete legatee.
Since such a situation is possible that a testator cannot select appropriately the
legatee, it could be said reasonable for the supreme court to conrm the validity of
the power of the executor to select the legatee. But the judgement didn't mention
who could supervise the executor or how to regulate the juristic act of the executor in
a situation of a conict of interest. Moreover, there is almost no provision to regulate
the abuse of the power or to supervise the exercise of the power of an executor in
the part concerning the execution of a will in the Civil Code. So, in general thought,
it seems to be helpful to consider a possibility of application of the provisions in
the Trust Act to the execution of a will by analogy. However, the conclusions to a
problem may dier depending on how one thinks of the similarity of a trust to an
administration of an inheritance for an execution of a will.
(e) Interpretation of a Juristic Act in Case of a Conict of Interests
between a Parent and the Child
Family asset management, typically between parents and the children, is recognized
as a archetypical form for the trust institute to be applied to in England and the
United States. Trust has been fullling there a role in the social policy that intends,
on the one hand, to prevent an extravagance of a young or old who has not enough
ability for the asset management by restricting the disposing acts through a trust
purpose and, on the other hand, to protect such a young or old against exploitation
by the others. By contrast, Japanese Civil Code is giving parents (or a person with
parental authority) a comprehensive power to administer the assets of the child (the
Civil Code Article 824) but one provision (Civil Code Article 826) that prescrives
an assignment of a special agent in case of conict of interests between parents and
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the child. Viewing from that, restrictions or bindings on the power of parents in
the administration of the assets of the child are very weak in Japanese Civil Code.
In addition, although a juristic act as an agent in conict of interest is generally
considered as void as an act with no agency power in case law, the supreme court
judgement Heisei 4 (1992) December 10 MH vol. 46 no. 9 p.2727 ruled that when the
person with a parental authority provides only property of the child for a mortgage
to secure a credit to the third party who is a relative, since there is no explicit conict
of interests between the parent and the child, it shall not be an abuse of the parental
power as a rule.
The reason why a disposition by a parent in conict of interest is generally voided
as an abuse of the parental power is the objective high risk to harm the interest of
the child. So, it should be clearly more suitable to base the judgement whether it is
an abuse of a parental power, on an objective evaluation the probability to prot or
to harm the assets of a child in the course of the property management than on an
outward existence of a conict of interest. Then, it would be worth to consider the
possibility to apply the trust institute that restricts such a disposition by a parent
according to some purpose.
(f) The Legal Relation Concerning a Deposit of a Payment in Advance
for a Public Contract Work
The supreme court judgement Heisei 14 (2002) January 17 MH vol. 56 no. 1 p.20
judged that the advance money that a contractor of a construction of a public facility
was paid from a public organization with a security by an insurance business company
shall not belong to the bankruptcy assets of the contractor because a trust relation-
ship had been established on the advance money between the public organization,
the settlor and beneciary, and the contractor, the trustee. In a public construc-
tion which a public organization ordered, the cost needed for the construction can
be paid in advance provided such insurance company stands a security for it that
has got an authorized registration from Minister of Construction (now, Minster of
Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism) under the Act of Insurance Business
on Advance Payment in Public Construction (Showa 27 (1952) law no. 184). Ac-
cording to the public engineering contract ordered from a non litigant, Prefecture A,
it was stipulated that the sum of an advance payment shall be within the quarter of
the contract price, that an insurance contract complying with the Act of Insurance
Business shall be concluded so that the insurance certicate shall be deposited to
the ordering prefecture and that the contractor shall not expend the money paid in
advance for any other purposes than the necessary cost for this engineering work.
Moreover, in the provisions of the insurance contract concluded under the law of In-
surance business between the contractor, non litigant B, and the insurance company
Y, were prescribed the followings: ¬ When the contractor receives the advance pay-
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ment, the money should be deposited in a specialized account for an ordinary deposit
of the bank selected by the contractor among the banks that have concluded agency
contracts with the insurance company in advance; ­ The contractor owes the obliga-
tion properly to use the advance money according to the purpose prescribed in the
letter of application of the insurance, so that the contractor couldn't withdraw the
money in the specialized account unless the materials for showing the proper expen-
ditures are presented to and conrmed by the bank to which the money is deposited;
® The insurance company has the power of investigations concerning the engineering
contract to supervise the expenditure of the advance, so can ask the contractor or the
orderer for reports, explanations or proves of the expenditure; ¯ The insurance com-
pany can ask the bank to which the advance is deposited for freezing the specialized
account or taking the other measures when some inappropriate expenditure of the
money for the advance payment has been recognized. These typical provisions of an
insurance contract had been notied to every public organization at the prefecture
level from the Ministry of Construction at that date (in the present, Ministry of Land,
Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism).
The judgement at the rst trial rejected the claim for repayment of the money
for the advance payment from the bankruptcy administrator X of the bankrupt B
by an analogical application of the article 16 of the former Trust Act10on the ground
that concerning the money for the advanced payment paid by B to A prefecture,
there has been established, at least substantially, a legal relationship that can be
seen as a trust relationship. By contrast, the second jurisdiction, although it also
rejected the claim in conclusion, grounded the judgement on that the defendant Y
has the exemption claim of the money from the bankruptcy property because a right
of pledge on the named obligation or the other security right for the fulllment of
the insurance obligation had been established for Y on the advance payment. Then,
the supreme court rejected the appeal, as referred to above, on the ground that since
a trust contract had been settled on the advance payment money, a mere sending
money to the special account couldn't be the payment of the cost of the contract
work and since it would belong to the property of B as the payment of the cost of the
contract work only after B had withdrawn the money from the account, the advance
payment money shouldn't belong to the bankruptcy assets of B, and that the same
should be applied to the case in which a legal trust was existing after the termination
of a trust by article 63 of the former Trust Act11.
10Article 16 of the former Trust Act [excerpt]
¬ An Execution, attachment or interim order or compulsory sale on trust property shall not be
processed unless such a procedure is applied for a right whose cause was established on some trust
property before the settling of the trust or to collect the business cost of that trust.
11Article 63 of the former Trust Act [excerpt]
In terminating a trust, the trust shall be considered to be continuing to exist until the trust properties
have been transferred to the title holders.
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This case is remarkable in that the supreme court explicitly admitted an estab-
lishment of a trust relationship on the specied property bound to a certain purpose.
However, the interpretation of the provisions on trusts by the supreme court in the
case may cause not a few problems to be critically reconsidered. For instance, it is
true that there was a general provision concerning the binding purpose of the advance
payment money in the clauses of the contract concluded between the prefecture A
and the contractor B, but the way of the concrete dispositions of the money was
prescribed in the insurance contract between B and Y, so it is problematic whether
the content of a \trust contract" between A and B could be complemented by an-
other contract between B and Y. In addition, although the judgement was based on
an interpretation of the clauses of the contract concerning a public engineering work
under the laws of Local Autonomy and of Insurance Business, it is another problem
whether an establishment of a trust contract concerning certain property could be
recognized only by existence of a binding purpose of the property under certain dif-
ferent conditions where the contents of contracts are similar but under no statutory
regulations.
Moreover, the judgement of the supreme court that interpreted a property man-
agement contract that was not specially expressed as \a trust contract" to be a trust
contract may lead to an interpretational theory that whether a contract is a trust de-
pends on the objective conditions including existence of binding purpose concerning
the management of the property, not on the expression as \a trust" in the contract
by the parties. According to such a theory, a court may deny the establishment of
a trust relationship depending on the concrete situations of the management of the
property or the binding conditions on the property to the purpose even when the
contract is expressed as a trust contract by the parties.
1.4 Theoretical Characteristic of Trusts
(1) Relations between Denitions and Fundamental Struc-
ture of Trust
At least three persons, namely, the settlor, the trustee and the beneciary, are, mu-
tually or independently, forming respective legal relations in a trust relationship, so
that disciplinary disputations tend to occur over how theoretically to see the rights
and duties relations among the parties.
Roughly classied, there are four (substantially ve) representative trust theories
concerning the fundamental legal structure of trust. They are: double-ownership-
on-trust-property theory, jus-in-personam one, jus-in-rem one (as will be mentioned
later, this theory includes two substantially dierent theories) and trust-property-as-
a-substantial-legal-subject one.
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In following, we will discuss the outline and characteristic of each of those trust
theories concentrating on two aspects in which the characteristic of trust most vividly
appears. The rst of the two is the \inner relationship" of a trust. We will give
considerations there on the legal relationship among three persons, the settlor, trustee
and beneciary, especially on the legal nature of the benecial right given to the
beneciary in a trust relationship. The second is the \outer relationship" of a trust.
We will consider there a suppositional case in which some trust property is transferred
to a third party in a condition failing to comply the trust purpose (in breach of trust)
by the trustee, to discuss on the interest adjustment problem between the beneciary
and the third party.
(a) Double-Ownership-on-Trust-Property Theory
The \double-ownership-on-trust-property theory" thinks that the trustee and the
beneciary of a trust have mutually dierent kind of possessive rights on the trust
property. This theory adopts as the element of its theoretical construction directly
the historical development of the institute of trusts in which a trustee who is the title
holder on the property in common law is forced to administer the property for the
benet of the beneciary who has an equitable interest on the trust property by the
equity court that has the exclusive jurisdiction on equity. As the background, there is
the fact that there had been plural case laws applied independently by Common Law
Court and by Equity Court in England up to the nineteenth century. So, there seems
to be no legal doctrine directly supporting this theoretical construction as the trust
theory in Japan, for Japanese legal system is not seen as split into two, like Common
Law and Equity in England. However, if one could reinterpret a common law title
into a outward legal right and an equitable interest into a substantial right on the
principle of faith, the theoretical construction that the trustee and the beneciary are
doubly possessing the trust property would be reasonable enough as an interpretation
of a trust relationship even in Japanese trust law.
(b) Jus-in-Personam Theory
The \jus-in-personam" theory thinks that the right on trust property completely
belongs to the trustee and that the beneciary has a right not in rem but in personam
to claim against the trustee the benets from the property administration by the
trustee. This doctrine was advocated in the time from the end of the nineteenth
century to the beginning of the twentieth century almost at the same time in England
and the United States, and had been adopted by the drafter of the former Trust Act
of Japan as the theoretical basis, so that it was the common legal doctrinal opinion
under the former statute.
According to the jus-in-rem theory, a trust relationship is established by a will
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of the settlor to settle the trust and the acceptance of the trust relationship by the
trustee. However, there is a disagreement within this theory on whether the will
of the settlor and the acceptance by the trustee constitutes a \contract". By the
establishment of a trust, the trustee gets the complete title of the property and, at
the same time, an obligation to the beneciary to administer the property for the
benet of the beneciary. Viewing from such a theoretical construction of the jus-
in-personam theory, a juristic act for property administration in breach of trust by a
trustee would constitute a tort or a nonfulllment of the obligation by the trustee to
the beneciary, but the juristic act itself would be, as a general rule, valid irrespective
of the breach of trust since it is an administrative act by the complete title holder
of the property. Therefore, under the jus-in-personam theory, even in the case of the
in breach of trust disposition the beneciary cannot claim the eect of the benecial
right against any other person than the trustee in principle and that the voiding power
of the beneciary to make an act in breach of trust invalid is a right the trust law
exceptionally admits for the protection of the interest of the beneciary. However,
even under the jus-in-personam theory, when a third party is in bad faith concerning
the breach of trust, it is admissible for the beneciary to claim the third party the
benecial right since such a third party could be considered as cooperating with the
trustee in the breach of trust so that the third party could be regarded in the same
light as the trustee.
So, the theoretical construction of the jus-in-personam theory does not necessarily
lead to a conclusion that is insucient for the protection of interests of a beneciary
compares with the other trust theories. Rather, in some cases taking a benecial right
as a right in personam can lead to the better protection of the benecial right than
the other way of thinking. Some careful considerations are necessary to evaluate the
jus-in-personam theory as a trust doctrine.
(c) Jus-in-Rem Theory of England (beneciary-as-the-substantial-owner
doctrine)
The \jus-in-rem" theory says that a benecial right is a real right or a right in rem on
the trust property. However, the jus-in-rem of England and that of the United States
of America are mutually considerably dierent in their contents and characteristics.
We will explain the jus-in-rem theory of England rst.
The \jus-in-rem" theory of England thinks that the benecial right a beneciary
has on the trust property is substantially an ownership on the property. Viewing from
which, the theory might be better to be called the \beneciary-as-the-substantial-
owner" doctrine. According to this theory, a trustee is an only formal or outward
title holder on the trust property and has only a administrative power restricted
within the range given in the trust relationship. Therefore, when a trustee disposed
some trust property in exceeding the power given to it, such a disposition is invalid
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since it is not within the power, so that the beneciary can claim the eect of the trust
relationship on the property against a third party who got it from the trust property
in breach of trust. On the other hand, a trustee is the \title holder", although only
formally or outwardly, of the trust property, so when a third party who got certain
trust property in breach of trust was in good faith without negligence concerning the
breach of trust, the right the third party got on the trust property is exceptionally
protected so that the beneciary cannot claim the eect of the benecial right against
the third party.
In sum, under the theoretical construction by the jus-in-rem theory of England
(the beneciary-as-the-substantial-owner doctrine), when a trustee did an adminis-
trative act in breach of the trust which is invalid because it is unauthorized, to what
extent a third party who was the other party of the act should be protected is con-
sidered, so the protection of the benecial right of the beneciary as the substantive
owner of the trust property is thought as the ip side of the protection the third party
could get. By the way, the \jus-in-rem" theory of Japan thinks that trust property
belongs legally outwardly to the trustee, but economically substantially to the bene-
ciary, so that the benecial right should be thought to be the substantial ownership.
From this respect, the jus-in-rem theory of Japan could be said to be almost same as
that of England.
The characteristic of the jus-in-rem theory (the beneciary-as-the-substantial-
owner doctrine) is in that its theoretical construction tries to understand a trust
relationship economically substantially, not legally outwardly. Such a fundamental
policy of the interpretation will not cause any feel of incongruity by itself as far as
the purpose of a trust administration can be thought to be only to give the bene-
ciary the benets from the trust relationship. However, the problem to be carefully
considered is why the third party who is not a party of a trust relationship should be
forced to such an \economically substantial interpretation" of the trust relationship
presupposed by the jus-in-rem theory. In addition, an emphasis of the ownership of
a beneciary could diminish the dierence between trusts and the other competing
institutes like agency so that one may come close to the thought that the problem is
a interest adjustment between a beneciary as the \principal" and a third party in a
general asset management context. We should note that such a thought contradicts
the emphasis of the peculiarity of the trust institute.
(d) Jus-in-Rem Theory of the United States of America
The \jus-in-rem" theory of the United States thinks that all rights including ownership
that constitute trust property belong to the trustee and that although the benecial
right is dierent from the ownership, it is still a right in rem on the trust property. In
other words, under this theory, in spite that a benecial right is formally categorized
as a right in rem in the meaning that it is a right concerning the trust property, the
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substantial content of the right is some relative right on trust property to get the
benet from the trust relationship. According to this theory, the interest adjustment
between a beneciary and a third party in the case of a breach of trust is done like
following.
Since the trustee holds the ownership or the other rights that constitute the trust
property, a third party can validly get a transference of the rights from the trustee,
so that the third party gets a certain right on the trust property even when in breach
of the trust. On the other hand, the beneciary also has a certain right in rem,
namely, the benecial right, on the transferred trust property, which is parallel to
the rights of the trustee, so that both the beneciary and the third party have the
respective rights on the trust property. Therefore, the interest adjustment between
the beneciary and the third party in such case would be done through a weighing
various conditions concerning rights of the beneciary and the third party on the
trust property. According to a traditional case institute, the in-good-faith-for-value
principle, when the third party was in good faith with the transference in breach of
the trust by the trustee and got certain trust property for value, the right of the third
party has priority over the benecial right on the property and otherwise, namely,
when the third party was in bad faith with the transference in breach of the trust or
got some trust property for no value, the benecial right has priority to the right of
the third party.
The theoretical characteristic of the jus-in-rem theory of the United States is
essentially same as that of the trust-property-as-a-substantial-legal-subject theory to
be described in following, so we will explain it together with the trust-property-as-a-
substantial-legal-subject theory in the next paragraph.
(e) Trust-Property-as-a-Substantial-Legal-Subject Theory
The theoretical construction of the trust-property-as-a-substantial-legal-subject the-
ory is a little complicated but, in the gist, like following. A trust is a kind of the form
of property administration institute in which a trustee who has the title and the ex-
clusive administration power on the trust property that has its own legal personality
independent of those of both the trustee and the beneciary administers the property
according to the purpose of the trust. In such a relationship, the benecial right the
beneciary has is not an ownership of the trust property but a right in personam
toward the trust property as a substantial legal subject. However, it is also a kind
of real right in that it has a certain material correlation with the trust property. As
for the interest adjustment between a beneciary and a third party in the case of
a disposition of some trust property in breach of the trust, Kazuo Shinomiya who
proposed the trust-property-as-a-substantial-legal-subject doctrine argued as follows.
A juristic act exceeding the power of the trustee is invalid as in the jus-in-rem theory,
so the main problem to be considered is the grounds why the protection of the third
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party's interest is required. So, the protection of the interest of the beneciary is its
reective eect. In that it admits whole trust property the nature of a substantial
legal subject, the relation between trust property and the trustee seems to be thought
like that between a principal and the agent or between a corporation and the director.
As we have seen just above, the theoretical construction of the trust-property-as-
a-substantial-legal-subject theory is essentially same as that of the jus-in-rem theory
of the United States in that a benecial right in a trust relationship is thought to
be a kind of right in rem on the trust property other than the ownership, but to be
also, so to speak, a \right in personam toward the trust property" whose content is
to get benets from the trust relationship. Since a benecial right is thought not to
be the owner ship, when a third party got the ownership of a part of trust property
in breach of trust, an establishment of mutually exclusive double \ownerships" on
one property is denied. And, since the right a third party got does not necessarily
cause some legal contradicts with the benecial right of beneciary, there is no need to
think that the benecial right must shrink reectively by the fact that the third party
has got the title of certain trust property. Rather, under the theoretical construction
that benecial right is a kind of right in personam toward trust property, it seems
suitable to think like the jus-in-rem theory of the United States that the interest
adjustment between a beneciary and a third party should be done through weighing
of the rights and interests the beneciary and the third party have respectively on
the property transferred in breach of trust, from the viewpoint of the legal nature the
trust-as-a-substantial-legal-subject theory gives to a benecial right.
As explained above, the common characteristic between the jus-in-rem theory of
the United States and the trust-property-as-a-substantial-legal-subject theory is that
they put the importance in the theoretical constructions on the \trust property",
not the trust parties as persons. For example, the arguments for the institutional
purpose or functionalities of trusts in both of these doctrines have been developed
putting the interest sharing concerning trust property in the center, but not the
legal relationship between a trustee and a beneciary. As for the interest adjustment
between a beneciary and a third party in the case of breach of trust, the arguments
concentrate more on what a way to share the rights or interests that socially exist on
the transferred property would be suitable with the justice and fairness in the world
of business, rather than on what kind of rights the beneciary and the third party
have respectively in essence and how to treat the insuciencies of the concepts of the
rights. In other words, we could say both of the doctrines push such a thought toward
theoretically the most radically that Trust is a property administration institution
for the purpose of benetting the beneciary.
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(2) Relations between the Fundamental Structure of Trust
and the Characteristic of Trust Institution
Among the ve trust theories which we have seen up to here, three theories, namely,
the jus-in-personam theory, the jus-in-rem (beneciary-as-the-substantial-owner) the-
ory and the trust-property-as-a-substantial-legal-subject theory, may be important in
interpretation problems of Japanese trust law. So, we will comparatively consider
those three doctrines so as theoretically to discuss characteristics of the trust insti-
tute.
There are some ways of thinking on what part of the fundamental structure of
Trust should be emphasized.
If one hinks that the most important feature of trusts is placed on the settlement
of the property administration relationship by the agreement among the trust parties,
a trust would be an institute concerning certain property management relationship
that is based on the condential relation between the parties, so that there is no theo-
retically essential dierence in Trusts from Agency, Commission or the other property
management institutions in Japanese legal system. From this way of thinking, on one
hand, interpretation problems of the trust law would be those of the agreement be-
tween trust parties, and, on the other hand, the eect of the agreement between the
parties would not reach a third party as a general interpretational rule. Therefore,
as for the resolution of problems between a beneciary and a third party, it would
be considered to be important in the legal interpretation how the legal relation out-
wardly appeared to the third party. The most suitable construction to such a thought
is that of the jus-in-personam theory.
Instead, if one thinks that the most important feature of trusts is put on the
property management relation bound with a certain purpose concerning specied
trust property, a trust would be an institute regulating property management rela-
tions centered on the trust property, so that its similarity to Corporation would be
emphasized. Under this thought, it tends to be insisted that, since the interpretation
of a trust relationship should be thought as a problem about according to what cri-
terions the interests generated from the administration of the trust property should
be shared between the trust parties, objective criterions should be applied prior to
the contents of the agreement between the trust parties in the applications. And,
if such an objective criterion was applied, it will bind also a third party as a gen-
eral rule,　 oppositely to the case that the agreement between the parties would be
applied as the criterion. Therefore, in the resolution of the conict between a trust
party and a third party concerning the trust property, it is important whether the
disputed property objectively maintained its specicity as the trust property. The
most suitable theoretical construction to such a thought is that of the trust-property-
as-a-substantial-legal-subject theory.
On the other hand, if one thinks that the characteristic of trusts is in discrepancies
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between the form and substance in belonging of property rights, trusts would be
seen as an institute for protecting the substantial ownership of the beneciary, so
that the common property between Trusts and Mortgage would be emphasized in
the argument. Under this thought, it would become important to protect as much
as possible the substantial ownership of a beneciary who outwardly doesn't have
the ownership. And in the phase of the concrete interpretation problems, certain
objective criterions to protect the substantial ownership of a beneciary should be
obeyed rather than the agreement between the trust parties. However, whether an
application of such a policy is appropriate depends on whether there is any theoretical
ground for the protection of the interest of the beneciary that is stubborn enough to
appeal against the general rule that the eects of the judgements or acts by the formal
and explicit title holder should reach the implicit substantial owner, the beneciary.
In this respect, the mortgage would not meet so much diculty because there is
the generally accepted ground for protection of mortgagees that disadvantages of
mortgagees caused from mere lacks of the appropriate statutory measures for personal
property mortgages should be avoided. Contrary to that, as for trusts, the ground
for the protection of the interest of beneciary seems not to be enough in general
unless there is some special reason socially to protect the beneciary because of the
lack of the property management ability as the beneciary is an infant or mentally
retarded person or the like. By the way, the most suitable theoretical construction to
this thought described above is that of the jus-in-rem (beneciary-as-the-substantial-
owner) theory.
(3) The Standpoint Taken in This Book Concerning Char-
acteristics of Trust Theory
As we will see through this book in some detail, the theoretical oppositions among
the trust theories that have given essential inuences to the standard interpretational
argumentation on trust law in Japan have the main battle elds at the following three
questions.
The rst: Whether the theoretical ground of the establishment of trust rela-
tionship is in the agreement between the trust parties (jus-in-personam and jus-in-
rem[beneciary-as-the-substantial-owner] theories) or in the independence of the trust
property (trust-property-as-a-substantial-legal-subject theory). The part that would
most signicantly get inuenced from this respect is the judgement on the time of
establishment of a trust or the evaluation of the legal positions of the parties con-
cerning a trust. But, not only in that, the argument could also aects considerably
the way of interpretation of the ducial duties or the obligation of care.
The second: Whether trust property is thought to be independent of the legal
persons of the trust parties (trust-property-as-a-substantially-legal-subject theory)
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or to be belonging to someone of the trust parties (jus-in-personam and jus-in-rem
[beneciary-as-the-substantial-owner] theories). The most critical point in this re-
spect is the interpretation problem on the range and its dynamical change of the
trust property. In addition to that, an interpretation on the admissibility of the
set-o against trust property may also be aected.
The third: Whether the legal position of a beneciary is considered as the sub-
stantial owner of the trust property (jus-in-rem [beneciary-as-the-substantial-owner]
theory) or as a creditor or a benet taker (jus-in-personam and trust-property-as-a-
substantial-legal-subject theories). The most signicantly inuenced aspect from this
respect is the interpretational problem of the existence and the range of duties and
responsibilities, especially, of the beneciary against a third party concerning a trust.
In addition, this respect may cause some signicant dierence in interpretations in
the case of a trust with performance-based dividend type or in the conclusions on
interpretational problems of the responsibility of a beneciary to third parties based
on the information disclosure.
As we have just seen, the oppositional structure among the trust theories inu-
ential to Japanese trust law is not one dimensional. In addition, the eects of the
similarities and dierences among the theoretical constructions of the trust theories
are involutely intertwined in each interpretational respect. So, in interpreting trust
law, we must say, whichever of the trust theory one adopts, one cannot always de-
duce the best conclusion in all respects of interpretational problems compared with
the other theories in that it most suitably reects the characteristic of Trust institute
in the result.
If so, we may think that the most appropriate stand point to understand the
mutual relations among the trust theories would be that on which one can most
exibly treat of various types of trusts. In order to get to such a stand point, we
would abstract the common characteristic of all the trust theories as the essential
nature of Trust institute and reposition and reevaluate the trust theories evenly in
relation to the abstracted essential nature. At present, we can see as the commonly
accepted characteristic of trusts that the contents of the rights and duties or interests
and responsibilities of trust parties concerning the trust property are settled being
based on the trust purpose and regulated or restricted through the purpose. That
might be named \the purpose-boundedness of Trust". We think that the peculiarity
of the trust institute compared with the other competing institutes is also just in this
respect.
Seeing from the stand point described just above, the rights or interests of trust
parties concerning the trust property are some restrictive ones bound to the trust pur-
pose, which are alien to Japanese legal system where ownership with the absoluteness
and completeness is typical in property rights. Therefore, as for the positioning of
trust institute in Japanese legal system, we would say that trust institute gives trust
parties powers freely to create various exible legal relations that would be placed in
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a dierent sphere from already statutory prescribed rights.

Chapter 2
Settlement of a Trust and Trust
Property
In this chapter, we discuss interpretational problems concerning the settlement of a
trust and the trust property.
Problems around a settling of a trust include one concerning from what point of
view Trust should be distinguished from the other legal institutes. Those problems
have much to do intimately with the arguments concerning denitions and charac-
teristics of trusts that have been discussed in Chapter 1. By the way, Trust property
existing as certain specied property is one of the most remarkable characteristic in
doing outward comparisons with legal institutes other than trusts. How the provisions
in the Trust Act which prescribes some special treatments on trust property would
be positioned in the theoretical construction has a great inuence on the argument
concerning the fundamental structure or theoretical characteristics of trusts.
2.1 Settlement of a Trust
There are, roughly classied, three types in the interpretational problems concerning
settlement of a trust. The rst problem is whether some legal relationship could be
interpreted as a \trust relationship" at all. The second is when a legal relationship
between parties becomes a \trust relationship" so that trust law becomes applicable
to the rights and duties relation between the parties. The third is to what extent the
contents of a trust, especially the content of the right of the beneciary, can be freely
determined by the trust parties, especially by the settlor and trustee, in settling the
trust.
Among them, the rst problem has already been discussed in some degree at
the section for denitions of trusts in Chapter 1 when we argued there that allowable
methods for settling a trust may depend on how to concept the denition of trusts, but
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a declaration of trust which was questioned of the validity under the former statute are
now explicitly prescribed as a valid method to settle a trust by the trust denition
putting an importance on the relation between the trustee and the beneciary in
the current Trust Act. So, in following, we will mainly discuss the second problem,
namely, the time when a trust is established, and the third one, namely, the eective
power of the agreement between trust parties.
(1) Theoretical Considerations on the Time of Establishment
of a Trust
How to think over the time when a trust is established in theory depends on which
characteristic of trusts one put theoretical importance on.
First, when one thinks the feature of trust is in the existence of specied trust
property, the time when the trust property is specied to come into existence is the
time of the settling of the trust. Therefore, in all the cases of a trust contract, a
testament trust and a declaration of trust, a trust relationship will not be estab-
lished only by a conclusion of the contract, the death of the testator/testatrix or the
declaration by the settlor-trustee unless certain specied trust property comes into
existence. This way of thinking was dominant under the former Trust Act. While,
there were strong criticisms to it from the practical business world because there are
rooms of involutions of timing between the transfer of the property to be the trust
property to the trustee and the beginning of transactions according to the trust.
Second, when one thinks the feature of trust is in the will of the trust parties to
create a trust relationship, the establishment time of a trust relationship is simply
the time when the will to create the trust has been denitely expressed by the trust
parties. So it is the time of the conclusion of the contract in the case of a trust
contract, the time when the testament comes into eect in a testament trust and the
time of the declaration in a declaration of trust. The current Trust Act adopts almost
same solutions as these, with taking care of the notices to third parties1.
1(Eectuation of a trust)
Article 4 ¬ A trust created by the method set forth in item 1 of the preceding Article shall become
eective when a trust agreement is concluded between the person who is to be the settlor and another
person who is to be the trustee.
­ A trust created by the method set forth in item 2 of the preceding Article shall become eective
when the will takes eect.
® A trust created by the method set forth in item 3 of the preceding Article shall become eective
when the events specied in the following items take place for the cases listed in the respective items:
1. where the trust is created by means of a notarial deed or any other document or electro-
magnetic record authenticated by a notary (hereinafter referred to as a \notarial deed, etc." in this
item and the following item): when the notarial deed, etc. is executed; or
2. where the trust is created by means of a document or electromagnetic record other than a
notarial deed, etc.: when notice is given by means of an instrument bearing a xed date to the third
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Third, when one thinks the feature of trust is in the fact that it is a mean for
a court to realize the justice and fairness, the establishment time of a trust is when
the court conrms the establishment in the case where the parties dispute each other
concerning the existence of a trust relationship, irrespective of its concrete type of the
settlement. But, as we referred to in Chapter 1, there are only few doctrines in Japan
that support the philosophy this thought presupposes in considering the denition
of trust or the characteristic of trusts, so we will discuss only the rst and second
thoughts in following.
The fundamental dierence between the rst and the second thoughts is theoret-
ically in whether the existence of certain specied trust property is required at the
\establishment" time. But it is a rather critical problem in practical business.
For example, in a trust relationship in which a prot is shared being based on
balancing loss and gain after managing the trust property during a certain period,
the specication of the range of the trust property is practically not necessary strictly
at the time of the beginning of the managing transaction. There would happen no
problem if the prots to be shared is specied at the time of the balancing the account.
If the existence of certain specied trust property at the time of the beginning of the
trust is required also in such a case, it may be so restrictive that the mobility of
transaction could be unnecessarily hampered. In addition, in a trust relationship
in which the trust property is build through payments or transfers of assets from
indenite many investors, there are plural possibile interpretations concerning the
establishment time of the trust depending on whether one thinks the trust is wholly
established by the rst payment has been done and the succeeding payments are
additional investments to the already established trust, or each payment or transfer
of the asset establishes a new trust relationship individually with the investor and the
total invested assets are managed in combination or unication for the trust purpose.
However, some specied \trust property" could be admitted, at least conceptually,
at the time when a trust contract is concluded but no real payment nor transfer of
a asset according to the contents of the agreement is done yet. For if a creation of
the trust relationship is agreed and the settlor or the other persons are owing the
obligations to pay or transfer the asset promised in the agreement, then the trustee
would perform the rights to claim fulllments of the payments or transfers against
the settlor or other obligors. We can interpret, in the end, such a situation that
the rights to claim the payments or transfers promised in the agreement constitutes
the trust property there. So, the rst thought described above, namely, one that
party designated as the person who is to be the beneciary (if there are two or more such third
parties, to one of them), with regard to the fact that the trust has been created and the contents
thereof.
¯ Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding three paragraphs, when a trust is subject to
a condition precedent or a designated time of commencement by the terms of trust, said trust shall
become eective when the condition precedent is fullled or when the time of commencement arrives.
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requires the existence of specied trust property at the time of the establishment of
the trust are not causing so big obstacles to the practical business unless there is a
special paragraph in the trust contract or the other some special conditions by which
a priority should be put on the real payments or transfers of the promised assets to
the management acts targeted by the trust contract.
By the way, according to the philosophy of this book, namely, the thought that
the main feature of trust is its binding trust purpose, the establishment time of a
trust would be the time when the binding force of the trust purpose has taken eect,
namely, when the trust purpose is decided and eectuated by the agreement between
the trust parties. So, we would not require the existence of specied trust property,
at least, at the beginning time.
(2) An Eect of the Agreement between the Parties on the
Establishment of a Trust
A trust relationship is a legal relationship build formally by three persons, the settlor,
trustee and beneciary. Among them, it is the settler and the trustee that can make
their wills substantially reected into the relationship in settling a trust since a trust
contract is concluded by the agreement between the settlor. Moreover, the settlor
and the trustee are one same person in a declaration of trust, so the will of the
settlor-trustee would be directly reected in the content of the trust relationship.
A testament trust is legally settled being based on the will of the settlor, but the
acceptance by the trustee is required in order for the trust really to be carried out2,
2(Call to Undertake the Trust by Will)
Article 5 ¬Where a trust is created by the method set forth in Article 3, item 2, if the will contains
a provision designating a particular person to be the trustee, any interested party may specify a
reasonable period of time and call on the person designated as the one who is to be the trustee to
give a denite answer within that period of time with regard to whether the specic person will
undertake the trust; provided, however, that if the will designates a condition precedent or a time
of commencement for the provision, this may only be done after the condition precedent is fullled
or after the time of commencement arrives.
­ Where a call for an answer is made under the provisions of the preceding paragraph, if the
person designated as the one who is to be the trustee fails to give a denite answer to the settlor's
heir within the period set forth in said paragraph, it shall be deemed that such person does not
undertake the trust.
® For the purpose of the application of the provisions of the preceding paragraph in cases where
the settlor has no heir at the time in question, the phrase \the settlor's heir" in said paragraph shall
be deemed to be replaced with \the beneciary (if there are two or more beneciaries at that time,
to one of them, and if there is a trust caretaker at that time, to the trust caretaker)."
(Appointment of a Trustee by the Court in the Case of a Testamentary Trust)
Article 6 ¬Where a trust is created by the method set forth in Article 3, item 2, if the will contains
no provision concerning the designation of a trustee or if the person designated as the one who is
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so a trust relationship would be unavoidably terminated before the achievement of
the purpose if the to-be trustee will not accept the status3. So, in forming a trust
relationship, the trustee can also, in addition to the settlor, make its own will reected
in the trust relationship. In that meaning, a trust relationship could be said to be
substantially formed on the agreement between the two.
The problem there is to what extent the beneciary should be bound with the
content of the trust, especially concerning the content of the benecial right, that was
substantially determined by the agreement between the settlor and the trustee. For,
except for a \self-benet trust" in which the settlor becomes the beneciary, there
is no room for the beneciary to make his/her own will reected in the formation of
the trust relationship in the case of a \non-self-benet trust" in which the settlor is
another person than the beneciary.
Under the former Trust Act, the settlor who could make the will reected in
forming the trust relationship legally kept the supervising power rather widely on the
execution of the trust thereafter. So, even if the right of the beneciary had been
restricted in the agreement to settle the trust, there may happen no problem since
all the power and responsibility to correct the acts for the administration or pursuit
of the trust purpose belong to the settlor. However, under the current statute, the
status of a settlor is only a creator of the trust relationship and supervising power
over the execution of the trust or the attainment of the trust purpose is entrusted
to the trustee, so that the supervising power of the settlor can be excluded by the
terms of trust at the time of the settlement4. So, if it is allowed that the right of
the beneciary is freely restricted by the contents of the trust relationship that is
to be the trustee does not undertake or is unable to undertake the trust, the court may appoint a
trustee on the petition of an interested party.
­ The judicial decision on the petition set forth in the preceding paragraph shall include the
reasons for said decision.
® A beneciary or the current trustee may le an immediate appeal against a judicial decision on
the appointment of a trustee under the provisions of paragraph ¬.
¯ The immediate appeal set forth in the preceding paragraph shall have the eect of a stay of
execution.
3(Causes of termination of a trust)[excerpt]
Article 163 In addition to cases under the provisions of the following Article, a trust shall terminate
in the following cases:
1. where the purpose of the trust has been achieved or where it has become impossible to
achieve the purpose of the trust;
...
3. where the trust lacks a trustee and the oce has not been lled with a new trustee for one
year;
...
4(Settlor's rights, etc.)[excerpt]
Article 145 ¬ Terms of trust may provide for a settlor not to have all or part of the rights under the
provisions of this Act.
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formed substantially by the agreement between the settlor and the trustee, it might
become dicult to control the trustee's arbitrary trust operations since the settlor is
not planed to stand on the position of the supervisor.
Surely, it is possible and socially appropriate to stick to the interpretation that,
appart from rights to get benets from the trust property, the supervising power of the
beneciary over the trust operations cannot be restricted in the settling act in order
to secure the appropriateness of the execution of the trust. But the supervising power
of a beneciary includes those which may have so extensive eects to the rights of the
other beneciaries of the same trust that the rights of the beneciaries may conict
one another5. Taking such situations into account, putting some rational restriction
on the power of a beneciary may be desirable for a reasonable execution of the
trust to accomplish the trust purpose. In addition, much could not be expected for a
beneciary to operate the supervising power properly to secure the appropriateness of
the executive acts of the trust, especially in the case in which that beneciary doesn't
feel any its own interests or benets.
Taking all above into consideration, in contrast to the era under the former Trust
Act, it may be appropriate to force some limit on the freedom of the agreement
between the settlor and the trustee to restrict the contents of the rights of the bene-
ciary, although such restrictions cannot be completely inhibited as an interpretation
of the provision of the current statute. However, there is, surely, no such provision
in the current statute that is explicitly giving any ground or any clue for a criterion
to delimit a rational range of the freedom. So, we should make up for the lack by an
interpretational theory to get some rational criterion. But it is dicult to nd a theo-
retical ground that can legitimately have all the interested parties obey one standard
since how to restrict the right of a beneciary would deeply involves the interests of
all the trust parties and the conicts of interests and opinions could be supposed in
all respects, namely, between the settlor and the beneciary, between the trustee and
the beneciary and among plural beneciaries. According to the usual argument,
if we adopts the agreement of the interested parties as the theoretical ground, the
settlement of a trust should be reconstructed as if it consists of an agreement by three
persons including not only the settlor and the trustee but also the beneciary. But
such an interpretation would be too discrepant from the presupposition of the settling
methods prescribed in the current Trust Act. Since the feature of the independence
of the trust property would not lead, from its theoretical nature, to any restrictions
5(Rescission of acts conducted by trustee beyond the powers)[excerpt]
Article 27 ¬ Where an act conducted by a trustee for the trust property does not fall within the
scope of the trustee's powers, a beneciary may rescind such act, if all of the following conditions
are met:
...
® When any one of the two or more beneciaries has exercised the right to rescind under the
provisions of the preceding two paragraphs, the rescission shall also be eective for other beneciaries.
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on the prot sharing from the trust property or on the way to create rights and duties
relations on the property, such a feature also cannot be expected to provide any point
of view for the resolutions of the problems of this type.
In the end, there seems to be no other way than to interpret the problems based
on the fundamental philosophy of this book, namely, the thought that the essential
feature of trusts is in its restricted nature bound with the trust purpose. A trust
relationship is bound with the trust purpose. The binding eect extends over not
only the settlor and trustee but also the beneciary. So, why some restrictions on
the right of the beneciary are \rational" is because they are necessary and useful for
the accomplishment of the trust purpose, not because of the eect of the agreement
between the settlor and trustee. On the ip side, whether some restrictions that the
settlor and the trustee put on the benecial right being based on their substantial
agreement at the time of settling is \irrational" should be judged on a criterion
whether such restrictions on the rights of the beneciary to draw benets from the
trust relation or to supervise the execution of the trust are unnecessary and irrelevant
for the trust purpose.
A question to such an interpretation may be whether it is appropriate to separate
the purpose setting part in a trust agreement from the other contents of the agreement
since the trust purpose also, in the end, is set by the substantial agreement between
the settlor and the trustee. However, our interpretation doesn't meant to be an ob-
stacle to a free agreement between the settlor and the trustee on the trust relationship
but only to require the contents of the agreement to be logically consistent in rela-
tion to the trust purpose. This way of interpretation would, on the one hand, allow
a settlor and a trustee freely to create a exible trust relationship according to the
trust purpose and, on the other hand, make it possible to give reasonable resolutions
on the problems by pursuing certain theoretical consistency with the trust purpose
in case of inconsistent or unjustiable trust agreements in concrete conditions.
Similar arguments would be applicable not only to non-self-benet trusts but also
to self-benet trusts since the criterion of the problem resolutions described above is
deduced from a objective consistency with the trust purpose, not from the wills of
the parties.
2.2 Trust Property
(1) Concept of Trust Property
\Trust Property" means specied property that constitutes the object of a trust
relationship6. Viewing from the fundamental thought of this book, we could say,
6(Denition)[excerpt]
Article 2 ® The term \trust property" as used in this Act means any and all property which belongs
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\Trust property" means objective property bound with a trust purpose. According
to the denition, the concrete property that constitutes the trust property can include
any \property" irrespective of its kind whether its economic value can be estimated.
By the way, the former Trust Business Act enumerated restrictively the kinds of
the property that is allowed to be received as trust property for a business trustee.
Because of such restrictive provisions, some interpretational tricks were necessary to
include, for example, intellectual property or the like into trust property. But under
the current law, there is practically no restriction on possible trust property.
As we saw in Chapter 1, it is theoretically possible to see the main feature of trust
in the existence of certain specied trust property and, in fact, such a thought was
dominant under the former Trust Act. By contrast, the current Trust Act prescribes,
in connection with the denition of trust, simply that the trustee takes the respon-
sibilities of the administrative acts on the trust property in the already established
trust relationship to the beneciary7and that the eectuation of a trust occurs, in
short, at the time when the will to form the trust relationship takes eect8. So,
the specication of the trust property at the time of the settlement of the trust is
not required under the current statute. Therefore, a problem questionable under the
former statute, namely, whether a \trust relationship" is established just after the
to a trustee and which should be administered or disposed of through a trust.
7(denition)[excerpt]
Article 2 ¬ The term \trust" as used in this Act means an arrangement in which a specic person,
by employing any of the methods listed in the items of the following Article, administers or disposes
of property in accordance with a certain purpose (excluding the purpose of exclusively promoting
the person's own interests; the same shall apply in said Article) and conducts any other acts that
are necessary to achieve such purpose.
8(Eectuation of a trust)
Article 4 ¬ A trust created by the method set forth in item 1 of the preceding Article shall become
eective when a trust agreement is concluded between the person who is to be the settlor and another
person who is to be the trustee.
­ A trust created by the method set forth in item 2 of the preceding Article shall become eective
when the will takes eect.
® A trust created by the method set forth in item 3 of the preceding Article shall become eective
when the events specied in the following items take place for the cases listed in the respective items:
1. where the trust is created by means of a notarial deed or any other document or electro-
magnetic record authenticated by a notary (hereinafter referred to as a \notarial deed, etc." in this
item and the following item): when the notarial deed, etc. is executed; or
2. where the trust is created by means of a document or electromagnetic record other than a
notarial deed, etc.: when notice is given by means of an instrument bearing a xed date to the third
party designated as the person who is to be the beneciary (if there are two or more such third
parties, to one of them), with regard to the fact that the trust has been created and the contents
thereof.
¯ Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding three paragraphs, when a trust is subject to
a condition precedent or a designated time of commencement by the terms of trust, said trust shall
become eective when the condition precedent is fullled or when the time of commencement arrives.
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conclusion of a trust contract before promised assets are really paid or transferred to
the trust was resolved as a trust relationship is established at the time of the trust
agreement. So, it would be sucient that the payment or transfer of trust property
is done at any time unless the delay causes a trouble for the administration of the
trust.
However, at the same time, since Article 2 of the current statute takes as the
denition of trust the fact that the trustee has the obligation concerning \the ad-
ministration or disposition of trust property", a thing like a \trust relationship"
without trust property is not assumed under the current statute. Therefore, when
the promised payment or transfer of trust property by the settlor was, in the end, not
completed, or when the trust property was annulled by some cause and no compensa-
tion was done, the trust would be terminated as the accomplishment of the purpose
had turned out to be impossible9.
As we have just seen, the existence of trust property is still indispensable for
the establishment of a trust under the current statute but the doctrine that a trust
relationship doesn't exist before the existence of certain specied trust property, which
was the dominant theory under the former statute, should have been relaxed.
(2) Combined Administration of Trust Property
The concept of \trust property" has the signicance not only in the question, which
part of existing property constitutes the trust property and is bound with the trust
purpose, but also in the legal states of the rights and duties relations among the trust
parties. In fact, all powers or responsibilities of a trustee in a trust relationship con-
cern the trust property in that trust relationship, and all the rights of the beneciary
for getting benets or supervising also concern only the trust property from which the
beneciary can get benets in the trust relationship. Therefore, when there is a room
for dierent interpretations concerning concretely what range of property constitutes
the trust property in the trust relationship, the denitions of the contents of the rights
and duties relations among the trust parties may be involved in the dispute.
Typical situation in which such a dispute would occur is the case that properties
of plural trusts are put on the \combined administration" or the case of consolidation
of trusts or split of a trust where the range of the trust property may be changed.
Of the two, as for the consolidation and split of trust, we will explain the procedures
along with the relevant provisions of the current statute in Chapter 6, Section 1, so,
9(Causes of Termination of Trust)[Excerpt]
Article 163 In addition to cases under the provisions of the following Article, a trust shall terminate
in the following cases:
1. where the purpose of the trust has been achieved or where it has become impossible to
achieve the purpose of the trust;
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in following, we are going to discuss the interpretation problems on the range of the
trust property in a combined administration.
Combined Administration of trust properties is allowed as an exception of the duty
of separate administration a trustee has10. There is no question that it is possible to
allow it in the trust contract or the other agreement on the trust. But the problem
is the interpretation of the legal relationship concerning the combined administration
of the trust properties, namely, how to think the relation of the combined trust
property group with each \trust property" each settlor puts in the trust relationship.
The dierence of interpretation on this problem would lead to considerable dierence
of the results in following respects. Firstly, how to share the gain or loss from the
combined administration to each trust property would depend on how to interpret
the relation between the combined property and each trust property. Secondly, as
we mentioned above, since the range of the power of a beneciary to supervise the
trustee on the trust relationship is limited within the \trust property" on which the
beneciary has the benecial right, the valid range of the supervising power would
also depend on how to interpret the legal relation between the combined property
and each trust property.
With taking those above into consideration, we will discuss the legal relation
between the combined trust property and each trust property in the combined ad-
ministration. There are three possible interpretations.
The rst is the interpretation that in \combined administration" of trust proper-
ties, plural trust properties are respectively administered, but virtually simultaneously
according to one common administrative policy. Under this interpretation, \combined
10(Duty to segregate property)
Article 34 ¬ A trustee shall segregate property that belongs to the trust property from property
that belongs to the trustee's own property and that which belongs to the trust property of other
trusts by the method specied in each of the following items for the categories of property listed in
the respective items; provided, however, that if the terms of trust otherwise provides for the method
of segregation, such provisions shall prevail:
1. property for which a trust registration set forth in Article 14 may be made (excluding the
property set forth in item 3): by said trust registration;
2. property for which a trust registration set forth in Article 14 may not be made (excluding
the property set forth in the following item): either of the methods specied in (a) or (b) below for
the categories of property listed in (a) or (b), respectively:
(a) movables (excluding monies): by retaining property that belongs to the trust property
separately from property that belongs to the trustee's own property and the trust property of other
trusts in the manner whereby they can be distinguished from each other on sight; or
(b) monies and any property other than those set forth in (a): by clarifying the accounting
thereof; or
3. property specied by Ordinance of the Ministry of Justice: by a method specied by Ordi-
nance of the Ministry of Justice for the appropriate segregation of the property.
­ Notwithstanding the provisions of the proviso to the preceding paragraph, a trustee shall not
be exempted from the duty for trust registration set forth in Article 14 for the property set forth in
item 1 of said paragraph.
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property group" is a mere aggregation of plural trust properties, so that the gains and
losses as the results of the combined administration have the same character as those
from each trust administration. Therefore, the gains or losses from one trust property
that is administered in combination with the other trust properties should not aect
those from the other trust properties combined with it. In addition, according to this
interpretation, since the concept of \combined property group" as distinguished from
each trust property is not theoretically admitted, the supervising power of a bene-
ciary over the trustee, for example, the right to claim disclosure of the information
concerning management or disposition on the trust property is restricted within the
facts concerning the trust property on which the beneciary has the benecial right,
so that it doesn't reach the facts concerning the other trust properties administered
in combination with it. However, whether a trust property is administered combined
with other trust properties or not would be in itself decided as an administrative
judgement of the each trust, so the information disclosure could be claimed not only
for the policy of the combined administration but also for with which of the other
trust properties the trust property is administered in combination.
The second is the interpretation that, in combined administration of trust prop-
erties, one combined \trust property" is constructed so that each benecial right
becomes the right on this combined trust property. Under this interpretation, since
the combined trust properties are considered as one unied trust property, gain or
loss that occurs on a part of the trust property would aect all the benecial rights.
The supervising power of a beneciary over the trustee would comprehend the whole
combined trust property, so the range of the information disclosure claim would be
extended over all the combined administration acts.
The third is the interpretation that each trust property is invested in the combined
property group as a way of administration of each trust property, so that each trust
property, not its beneciary, gets the benecial right on the combined property. Under
this interpretation, when some gain or loss occurs in the combined administration,
that result is \shared" to each trust property through its own benecial right. So,
in contrast to the last two interpretations, whether, for example, the loss from the
combined administration should be borne by a beneciary depends not on the decision
by each beneciary but on the judgement by the beneciary of the combined trust
property, namely, the trustee of the each trust property on which each beneciary
has the benecial right. The benecial right of each beneciary doesn't reach the
combined trust property group. So, the supervising power of each beneciary is also
restricted to the propriety of disposition of each trust property, namely, whether it is
appropriate to invest each trust property into the combined administration, so that it
is not allowed to claim information disclosure on the combined administration itself.
Still less, there is no room for a beneciary to claim information disclosure concerning
the administration of the property that is administered in combination with the trust
property for the beneciary but belongs to another trust. By the way, this way of
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thought supposes a stratied trust relation for the property management. As for
the general problems properly coming from a stratied trust relation, we will discuss
them later in (4) of this section.
As described above, combined administration is allowed, as a general rule, freely
by determining in a trust contract or the other agreement. The legal ground of a
combined administration is the \agreement" between the parties, including implicit
but substantial one. Therefore, the appropriateness of those interpretations above
should be judged on the each concrete agreement in each trust. But a problem
dicult to be solved may be caused from that.
For instance, one problem is whether the \agreement" between the settlor and
trustee concerning a\combined administration of the trust property" exists as each
trust agreement between each settlor and the trustee, or should be considered as one
comprehensive \agreement" involving all the settlors taken like a settlor union and
the trustee. If one thinks like the former, a cancellation of the contract, for example,
could be freely done by the agreement between each settlor and the trustee, but,
when the contents of agreements vary with every trust agreement, very complicated
interpretational problem may occur in combined trust administration case. On the
other hand, the latter way of thinking may lead interpretations concerning the com-
bined trust administration to some stability, but it would be possible to criticize the
thought to construct a settlors union is too ctional.
Moreover, what interpretation one thinks is appropriate concerning the range of
the objects on which a disclosure claim is admitted or the way of the distribution of
the gain or loss in combined trust administration would depend on the stand point and
environmental conditions of the person. It is undecidable which interpretation brings
the optimal prot to which party in what situation. Therefore, for trust business in
which various and variable stand positions or interests distribution must be taken into
account, it would be no other way but to cope with concrete aspects of contractual
problem by foreseeing the eect of the act in every concrete situation, with taking
into consideration even how the act would be evaluated by third parties.
(3) Positive Property and Negative Property
\Positive Property" means the property of all kinds that augments the value of the
right or interest on it, in sum, another name of the right or interest. In contrast,
\Negative Property" means the property that diminishes the value of the right or
interest on it, or, so to speak, \minus assets", and its typical phenomenon is an
obligation or responsibility.
Under the former Trust Act, since the doctrine that saw the fundamental feature
of trust in the independence of the trust property was dominant, the interpretational
theory which insisted that a trust property at the establish time should consist only of
positive properties was very inuential. This opinion was supported by the political
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presupposition that the trust property should be secured for the sake of the bene-
ciary, so that the trust property could keep its stably positive value. However, as
the rigidity of the opinion had been questioned in the practical appropriateness and
there had appeared some negative judgements by the supreme court, the oppositional
opinion like following appeared.
It says that if the property in which both positive and negative properties are
mixed could be strictly never placed in trust, a real property with obligation to repay
the deposit or guaranty money could not be a trust property, and that, viewing
from the nature of a deposit or guaranty money, however, such an interpretation is
unrealistic. After such an opinion had become to nd many supports, there appeared a
judgement by the supreme court in which the supreme court admitted the entrustment
of a real property with obligation to repay the guaranty money prescribed in the
lease contract was valid so that the trustee was responsible for the repayment of the
guaranty money in the case of the bankruptcy of the settlor who was the lessor (The
supreme court judgement Heisei 11 March 25, HJ no. 1674, p.61). On the other hand,
even the doctrine that doesn't allow negative property as trust property was admitting
that trust property owes some obligation after its valid establishment. As the result,
the doctrine had almost lost the main merit that it would secure the stable value of
trust property. In fact, when one thinks about what the legal theoretical ground of the
opinion that it is undesirable for trust property to be charged with debts is at all, what
one could give as a sound ground would be the protection of the creditors on the trust
property or the prevention of the confusions at the insolvency of the trust property,
but even those could not be very strong supports of the appropriateness of the opinion.
For if only positive property of the settlor incorporated into the trust property, only
the negative property part would remain in the settlor's private property, so that it
would be unfairly disadvantageous to the creditors of the settlor. Moreover, also as
for the intrest adjustment at the insolvency, it is not the only solution to avoid the
establishment of the trust since there are other ways, for example, to consider the
trust as terminated by the unattainablity of the trust purpose after the establishment
or to keep the trust valid by the assumption of indebtedness by the trustee, so and
so. Therefore, it is not necessary for the trust that includes some negative property
always to be considered as void.
As to the problem discussed above, the current Trust Act provides an explicit
provision prescribing the range of the debts a trust property should owe, by which it
has become possible to place the property that includes some negative property into
a trust by the trust contract11. According to that, if a trust is thought as a legal
11(Scope of obligations covered by the trust property)[excerpt]
Article 21 ¬ Obligations pertaining to the following claims shall be obligations covered by the trust
property:
...
3. a claim arising against the settlor prior to the creation of the trust, for which it is provided
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relationship to give the beneciary prots from the trust property, the positive part
should, in eect, surpass the negative part in a trust property, but even when it has
turned out that the negative part surpasses the positive part in a trust property, the
trust relationship doesn't become void immediately, merely the trust may be possibly
liquidated through the bankruptcy procedure to be terminated. When a settlement of
trust including negative property constitutes a fraudulent conveyance to the creditors
of the settlor, the trust is voidable as a fraudulent trust12, so that the trust itself would
be voided. But the condition would be quite same if the trust property consisted of
only positive property, so it is no logical contradiction.
(4) Stratied Trust Relationship
A \stratied trust relationship" is build trough the process that a part or whole of
one trust property (called \basic trust" temporarily in this section) is entrusted to
another trust (called \higher trust" temporarily in this section) for the former basic
trust to get a benecial right to the latter higher trust. So, it involves plural trust
relationships, so that those two trusts are mutually related to in eect. In such a
stratied trust relationship, it is more often than not in practice that the trustee on
the higher trust and the trustee of the basic are one same person. However, as the
trust relationship in higher trust and that in the basic trust are formally independent
trust relationships, some complicated interpretation problem would occur concerning
the way to distribute the prot or loss to the benecial right of the basic trust, or the
range and the method of execution of the supervising power of the beneciary of the
basic trust.
This relation were called a \double trust" under the former statute and there was
a provision prescribing that the trustee cannot get the benet of such a trust unless
she/he is a co-beneciary13, so the validity of a stratied trust itself was questioned
and disputed in legal doctrines. However, to construct a stratied trust relationship is
by the terms of trust that the obligation pertaining to said claim is an obligation covered by the
trust property;
12(Cancellation of fraudulent trusts, etc.)[excerpt]
Article 11 ¬Where a settlor has created a trust with the knowledge that it would harm the settlor's
creditor, the creditor may, irrespective of whether or not the trustee had knowledge of the fact that
the creditor would be harmed, request the court for a rescission under the provisions of Article 424,
paragraph 1 of the Civil Code (Act No. 89 of 1896), with the trustee as the defendant; provided,
however, that this shall not apply where there are any beneciaries at the time, all or some of who
had no knowledge of the fact that the creditor would be harmed at the time when they became aware
that they had been designated as beneciaries (meaning being designated as an initial beneciary or
new beneciary after a change in the provisions of the terms of trust or as a result of the exercise of
the right to designate or change a beneciary prescribed in Article 89, paragraph 1; the same shall
apply hereinafter) or when they acquired benecial interests.
13Article 9 of the obsoleted Trust Act A trustee cannot get any benet in any name or title from
the trust unless the trustee is named as one of the co-beneciaries of the trust.
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useful to create a large scale trust in which exible and ecient investment activities
is made possible to the extent that would be impossible to attain in each small trust
administration. Moreover, through compensations of an accidental loss in investment
activities by prots from large scale operations of whole the trust properties, it would
become possible to provide certain stable prots to the beneciaries. For this reason,
the opinion that there is no problem in a stratied trust as a way of investment if it
is admitted in each trust agreement of the base trust was dominant even under the
former statute, in spite of the provision of the obsoleted article 9.
However, since the basic thought concerning the fundamental structure of a trust
under that opinion was constructed by placing the independent trust property into
the center of the legal relations, and thought that the trustee did not own the trust
property but only had a status of the administrator of each trust property. So, the
opinion supposed that even if the trustee is one same person both in the basic trust
and the higher trust, since the trust properties are dierent one another in those
trusts, there is no problem to establish certain legal relationship between those trust
properties. And if a stratied trust relationship was avoided by the obsoleted article
9, the stratied trust relation would be considered as theoretically non-existent, so
that each beneciary merely could directly benet from or exercise the supervising
right over the each original trust property being made use of as one of higher trust
property. So, it would not be especially disadvantageous to the beneciaries even
if a stratied trust relationship is allowed if its formation was agreed in each trust
agreement. It might have been one of the supports for the dominant opinion under
the former statute.
In contrast, the current Trust Act prescribes that a trustee can get the prot of
the trust if he/she is also the beneciary14so that the exception condition is relaxed
from a \co-beneciary" in the former provision to a \beneciary". As the result, a
stratied trust relationship has become, generally, not against the provision of the
statute also outwardly. By the way, the current Trust Act prescribes that if the trustee
have acquired whole the benecial right as the private property and the situation has
lasted for one year, the trust shall be terminated15. The acquisition of the benecial
right by the trustee in a stratied trust relationship doesn't fall under the termination
condition of the trust prescribed in the statute as far as the formation of such a trust
14(Prohibition on the Trustee's Enjoyment of Benet)
Article 8 No trustee may benet from the trust under any name, except where the trustee benets
from the trust as its beneciary.
15(Causes of Termination of a Trust)[excerpt]
Article 163 In addition to cases under the provisions of the following Article, a trust shall terminate
in the following cases:
...
2. where the trustee has continuously held all benecial interests in the form of the trustee's
own property for one year;
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relationship is agreed both in the basic and the higher trust acts. For, it is true
that the trustee and the beneciary may mutually agree in certain stratied trust
relationship. But the trustee acquires the benecial right not as the prive property
and still keeps the administrative power on the trust property as the administrator
in such a case.
However, allowing a free formation of a stratied trust relationship may, on the
one hand, heighten the exibility and eciency of the administration of the trust
property, but, on the other hand, the power of the supervision or enjoying benets
through the benecial right may become so indirect that the beneciary in a basic
trust relationship cannot help entirely relying on the faithfulness od the trustee, for
the basic trust property must be considered as constituting a part of another higher
trust property. How to evaluate such a situation would depend on what role in the
society one thinks trust relationships should play. And the evaluation may also change
depending on who is the beneciary in which concrete situation.
As we could see typically in this problem, the current Trust Act seems to presup-
pose like following. Namely, a benecial right is usually made use of for the economic
prots by the beneciary, so, since a beneciary and a trustee make a \mutual agree-
ment" in order to optimize their own prots respectively, it would be done based on
their free wills in their own responsibilities, so that the damages or responsibilities
coming from it should be appropriately shared between them. However, whether
such an \agreement" is really made by taking all probable risks of the stratied trust
relationship enough into consideration in a concrete case, it should be carefully ex-
amined with taking especially the character or ability of the beneciary into account.
Moreover, viewing from the condition that an execution of the supervising power of
the settlor can be excluded in the trust agreement under the current statute, one may
question whether a beneciary and a trustee can arrived at the \agreement" on an
equal footing at all. So, it may be emergent to establish theoretically some reasonable
standard of the interpretation of an \agreement" concerning a trust relationship.
(5) Changes of Trust Property
After the settlement of a trust the concrete goods that constitute the trust property
would be incessantly changed through trades or the like unless the trust aims at
the maintenance of the trust property. Especially in a trust relationship by which
economic prots are sought for, the trustee would be required to trade aiming at the
realization of the economically most valuable assets constitution. So, the incessant
changes of the trust property is rather suitable to the purpose of such a trust.
The legal theoretical construction for the changes of trust property is not greatly
changed depending on the way to understand the fundamental structure of trust.
They say, a change of trust property consists of a twofold process in which a part or
whole of the property which had constituted a trust property leaves the trust property
2.2. TRUST PROPERTY 53
and certain property which did not constitute the trust property comes into a part
of the trust property. Then, if a compensational or some other relation is recognized
between the having left property and the coming in property, the contribution of
positive or negative values on the trust property can be judged by considering only the
mutual relation between concrete properties, to which it is irrelevant how to think of
the legal theoretical construction of the rights and duties relation between the trustee
and the beneciary in the trust. The current Trust Act enumerates concrete legal
causes of the change of trust property16. But, since it is natural that changes of trust
property occur in most of trusts, as referred to above, suitably to the trust purposes,
a property in compensatory relation with another property leaving the trust property
should be granted to be a part of the trust property.
Practically rather important problem in the case of the change of trust property
is whether each concrete change is suitable to the trust purpose. Especially in a
trust relationship to pursuit economic prots, the change of the trust for the trust
purpose is frequent, so that the evaluation of the change is often put in question. In
following, as typical examples, we will consider the change of trust property for the
purpose to heighten the total income through making use of plural trust properties in
unication, and that for the purpose of the ecient pursuit of prots through making
an independently administered property by separating the part especially ecient for
the pursuit of prots from the whole trust property.
As there was no concrete provision concerning a consolidation or split of trust
property in the former Trust Act, the range of rights, interests or losses to be at-
tributed to each beneciaries had largely depended on what legal construction is
adopted. Thinking straightforwardly, the consolidation or split of trust property
could be thought as a combination of the termination of all or a part of the existing
trust with a settlement of a new trust. But if the existing trust should be terminated
once, certain legal problems are not avoidable, for example, how to treat the legal
relations including the creditors to the trust to be terminated or how to do the evalu-
ation on the trust property in the suppositional liquidation process. So, the \change"
16(Scope of Trust Property)
Article 16 In addition to property specied by the terms of trust as being among trust property, the
following property shall be among the trust property:
1. any property obtained by the trustee as a result of the administration, disposition, loss or
damage of, or any other events occurring to property that belongs to the trust property; and
2. any property that has come to be among the trust property pursuant to the provisions of the
following Article, Article 18, Article 19 (including cases where applied mutatis mutandis by replacing
the relevant terms and phrases pursuant to the provisions of Article 84; hereinafter the same shall
apply in this item), Article 226, paragraph ®, Article 228, paragraph ®, and Article 254, paragraph
­ (including any co-ownership interest that is deemed to be among the trust property pursuant to
the provisions of Article 18, paragraph ¬ (including cases where applied mutatis mutandis pursuant
to paragraph ® of said Article) and any property that is made to be among the trust property as a
result of the division under the provisions of Article 19).
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of the trust property had been selected in order to keep the continuity of the trust
conceptually by following measures: ¬ Administration through de facto consolidation
or split without legally formal consolidation or split of a trust property; ­ To concen-
trate trust properties to one trust through a transfer of property from another trust
in trade for the benecial right on the concentrated trust property; ® Settlement of a
new trust in the form of stratied trust relationship, by which the substantial prop-
erties are concentrated to the newly settled trust and the existing trust properties
get the benecial rights. In contrast to those, under the current Trust Act, rather
detailed provisions for consolidation and split of a trust property are provided (see
Chapter 6 section 1 (2)(3) for the details). However, the current statute categorized
a consolidation or split of a trust trust property as \change of trust", viewing from
which it is clear that the detailed prescriptions of the current statute has adopted the
doctrine in which the change of trust is considered as a combination of a termination
of existing trust and a settlement of a new trust. Since such a procedural complicacy
is the main problem for the practice, the practical problem will not disappear by the
current statute. In this meaning, the legislation of the current Trust Act is far from
the radical resolution of the problem in this respect, so that various endeavors of legal
constructions like described above will be still continued in practical business.
When one observe the change of a trust in detail at the level of each goods,
one will nd in most cases that all of concrete properties which constituted the one
trust property are transferred to another trust property and in exchange of which
the former trust property gets the benecial right on the trust property. In such a
case of the change of trust property, the balance between the value of the transferred
property and that of the benecial right would be important for creditors to the
preexisting trust. In practice it is mostly at the time of the bankruptcy of a trust
that the \value" of a benecial right is concerned. When the newly settled trust went
to insolvency, the value of the benecial right to that would rarely exceed the pure
value of the transferred property, so the switch of the concrete trust property to the
benecial right on the new trust property would be in most cases judged to diminish
the value of the preexisting trust property. In contrast, when the newly settled trust
relationship is not terminated yet, as the management cost for the benecial right
is mostly far lower than that for concrete properties, the benecial right may be
evaluated rather higher than the total sum of the values of the transferred concrete
properties.
So, the evaluation of the change of trust property is not really simple. This
problem is one of the typical unsolved problems in legal studies at present, namely,
how to think of \economic value" in legal interpretation problems. This problem
is critical in some trust theories, so we should pursuit a theoretical framework to
radically reconsider this problem in detail.
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(6) Seto Concerning Trust
A \seto concerning a trust" means a seto against a credit or a debt belonging to
a trust property. Oset is a simple method of settling two oppositional credits and
has an eective security for the credit. It has been widely used in practical business.
But osets concerning a trust requires certain technical interpretation on the legal
subject to which the credit belongs as well as the validity itself of the liquidation of
a credit in a trust property by a seto could be questioned in relation to the trust
property.
The former Trust Act had a provision explicitly to inhibit a seto concerning a
trust in a certain situation17, and there was an inuential doctrine that added cases
for a seto to be inhibited to the provisional one, so that a seto concerning a trust
was considered to be inhibited in rather wide area. This type of argument has two
characteristic points. The one is to consider the provision of the former article 17 as
prescribing only on the seto by law. That means, the inhibition provision would not
be applied as it is to the case of contractual seto. The two is to insist that if the
trustee gets some personal prots, even temporarily, from the seto, it may constitute
a violation of the ducial duty so that the seto should be invalid even when it is not
inhibited by the former article 17, whether the seto is contractual or by law.
That inuential doctrine under the former statute emphasizes the risk that the
trustee becomes with no means during the liquidation process by setos against the
trust property and that the trustee has the superior status for, though temporarily,
collecting substantially her/his own property through setos against the trust prop-
erty to the other creditors to the trust. In addition, the doctrine thought that the
inhibition of seto by the former article 17 should not be applied to the debt of the
trustee or the trust property to a third party, on the ground that the provision of the
former article 17 was not denite concerning the case and a debt generally should be
paid. As we can see from those above, the former statute and the inuential doctrine
basically didn't place any trust on the personality or means of the trustee, and, as the
result, they tied rstly to prevent the trustee from getting her/his personal prots by
means of seto.
However, there were criticisms from practical business under the former statute
that such an interpretation would lead to inappropriate conclusions in certain situa-
tions. In fact, that doctrine might lead to a conclusion by which the \interests" of a
trust property or a beneciary was not appropriately \protected", like following.
It is when the creditor whose credit will be liquidated lacks her measures that
the seto against such a creditor gives an advantage to a creditor who claims the
seto. It is quite dicult to foresee denitely at the time of trading when who may
possibly become with no measures. Under such a condition, if the interests of a
17Article 17 (the former statute) a seto shall not be allowed between a credit belonging to a trust
property and a debt not belonging to the trust property.
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trust property or a beneciary should be protected, it would be rather necessary
for the trust property to be able to prevent its own credit from becoming valueless
through exible use of setos by considering who in the debtors including the trustee
has the economically stable measures according to concrete situations. The former
article 17 and the doctrine that support a general inhibition of the seto concerning a
trust property cannot be said to \protect" the \interests" of the trust property or the
beneciary in the end. Moreover, while the doctrine described above generally admits
a seto against a third parties credit to the trust property with a credit the trustee
personally has to the third party, the trustee gets personal benet, in reality, from
the seto when the third party fall into no measure situation, since the insolvency
of the credit of the trustee to the third party is avoided by the seto. The doctrine
didn't give any denite explanation to whether such a conclusion leads to the result
\for the trustee to get personal prots concerning the seto".
However, the mainstream in the practical business under the former statute was
critical to the doctrine. They thought that in the trust business, the the risk to fall in
short of measures was considerably higher on the side of third party who traded with
a trust than on the trust bank as the trustee, presupposing that since a trust bank
becomes a trustee as its business, it should be rare for a trust bank intensionally to
betray the beneciary or the trust property for its own private interests. We can see
that the image of the typical trustee or the economic point of view to an insolvency
risk is qualitatively dierent between the former statute or the former inuential
doctrine and the criticisms to those from the trust business. Although the image of
a typical trustee at the time of the legislation of the former statute in Taisho era
should not simply be compared to that at present time, if the substantial advantage
of a seto is thought to be the reduction of the risk of the credit collection at the
insolvency of the debtor, the criticisms from the trust business would be supportable
since an economic insolvency could, theoretically, occur on everyone.
The current statute still formally keeps the general inhibition of a seto concern-
ing a trust like the former article 17, but prescribes also an exception that a seto
concerning a trust property is valid when the trustee accepts it18. That provision has
18(Restriction on the seto claims etc. that are among the trust property)
Article 22 ¬ A person who holds a claim pertaining to an obligation which the trustee is liable
to perform only by using property that belongs to trustee's own property or the trust property of
another trust (referred to as the \trustee's own property, etc." in item 1) (such obligations shall be
referred to as \obligations covered by trustee's own property only, etc." in item 1 and item 2) may
not use said claim to set o the obligation pertaining to a claim belonging to the trust property;
provided, however, that this shall not apply in the following cases:
1. where, either at the time when a person acquired the claim or at the time when a person
assumed the obligation pertaining to a claim belonging to the trust property, whichever occurred
later, the said person who holds the claim pertaining to the obligation covered by the trustee's own
property only, etc. did not know and was not negligent in failing to know that the claim belonging
to the trust property did not belong to the trustee's own property, etc.; or
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certain consistency and reasonability from the viewpoint of the criticisms described
above, which have insisted that some exible permissions of setos concerning a trust
property are necessary since complicated trading relations between trust property
and the private property of the trustee occur more often than not in modern trust
bank business and, in addition, it is the trustee in person who has the administration
power of the trust property that do the concrete judgements on whether doing seto
is substantially advantageous for the trust property or the beneciary. However, since
the proof of the subjective condition that the other party didn't know the attribu-
tion of the credit without negligence or the ex post facto acceptance of the trustee
is necessary in order for the exceptional paragraph to be applied, the legal status of
the other party would unavoidably become unstable in each concrete situation. In
addition, we should note that the evaluation of the appropriateness of the judgement
of the trustee on the acceptance of a seto would be dicult in some cases since
economic conditions are incessantly changing so that an economic collapse may burst
out in the manner unforeseen at the time of the judgement.
(7) Independency of Trust Property
The \independency of trust property" means for a trust property to be treated as if
it belongs to a substantially dierent subject from the trust parties in relation to the
trust parties' own properties. Since the jus-in-personam theory was adopted as the
fundamental structure of trust in the former Trust Act, it was in relation to the private
property of the trustee that the independency of a trust property was considered19.
2. where, either at the time when a person acquired a claim or at the time when a person
assumed the obligation pertaining to a claim belonging to the trust property, whichever occurred
later, the person who holds the claim pertaining to the obligation covered by the trustee's own
property only, etc. did not know and was not negligent in failing to know that the obligation
covered by the trustee's own property only, etc. is liable was not an obligation covered by the trust
property.
­ The provisions of the main clause of the preceding paragraph shall not apply in the cases listed
in the items of Article 31, paragraph ­ in which the trustee has approved the set-o set forth in
said paragraph.
® A person who holds a claim pertaining to an obligation covered by the trust property (limited
to an obligation that the trustee is liable to perform only by using property that belongs to the trust
property) may not use said claim to set o against the person's obligation pertaining to a claim
belonging to the trustee's own property; provided, however, that this shall not apply where, at the
time when said person acquired the claim or when the person assumed the obligation pertaining to
the claim belonging to the trustee's own property, whichever occurred later, the person who holds
the claim pertaining to the obligation covered by the trust property did not know and was not
negligent in failing to know that the claim belonging to the trustee's own property did not belong
to the trust property.
¯ The provisions of the main clause of the preceding paragraph shall not apply where the trustee
has approved the set-o set forth in said paragraph.
19Former Article 15 Trust property shall not belong to the legacy of the trustee.
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Also under the current statute, explicite provisions concerning the independence of
trust property are provided only in relation to the private property of the trustee,
in the situations like the adjunction20or a confusion21between a trust property and
the trustee's private property , the seto concerning a trust property22, the execution
Former Article 16 [excerpt] ¬ An execution, attachment or interim order or compulsory sale on
trust property shall not be processed unless such a procedure is applied for a right whose cause was
established on some trust property before the settling of the trust or to collect the business cost of
that trust.
Former Article 17 a seto shall not be allowed between a credit belonging to a trust property and
a debt not belonging to the trust property.
Former Article 18 When a trust property is a property right other than the ownership, even if
the trustee acquired that objective property, the right shall not be extinguished by the merger of
estates.
Former Article 30 When adjunction, mingling or modication occurred on a trust property, pro-
visions of Civil Code from articles 242 to 248 shall be applied by considering as if the trust property
and the private property belong respectively to dierent owners.
20(Accession, etc. of property that belongs to trust property)
Article 17 Where property that belongs to trust property is joined by accession to or mixture with
the trustee's own property or any property that belongs to the trust property of another trust, or
where processing is conducted using these properties as materials, those properties that are among
the trust properties of the respective trusts and the property that belongs to the trustee's own
property shall be deemed to belong to their respective owners, and the provisions of Article 242 to
Article 248 of the Civil Code shall apply.
21(Special rules for the confusion of property that belongs to trust property)
Article 20 ¬Where ownership and any other real right existing on a single property have each come
to be among either the trust property and the trustee's own property or among the trust property
of another trust, such other real right shall not be extinguished, notwithstanding the provisions of
the main clause of Article 179, paragraph 1 of the Civil Code.
­Where any real right other than ownership and any other right for which the said real right is the
object have come to exist with respect to the trust property and the trustee's own property or among
the trust property of another trust, such other right shall not be extinguished, notwithstanding the
provisions of the rst sentence of Article 179, paragraph ­ of the Civil Code.
® In the following cases, the claim set forth therein shall not be extinguished, notwithstanding
the provisions of the main clause of Article 520 of the Civil Code:
1. where an obligation pertaining to a claim belonging to the trust property has vested in the
trustee (excluding the case where such obligation has become an obligation covered by the trust
property);
2. where a claim pertaining to an obligation covered by the trust property has vested in the
trustee (excluding the case where such claim has come to belong to the trust property);
3. where an obligation pertaining to a claim belonging to the trustee's own property or the
trust property of another trust has vested in the trustee (limited to the case where such obligation
has become an obligation covered by the trust property); and
4. where a claim pertaining to a trustee's obligation (excluding an obligation covered by the
trust property) has vested in the trustee (limited to the case where such claim has come to belong
to the trust property).
22(Restriction on the seto of claims, etc. that are among the trust property)
Article 22 ¬ A person who holds a claim pertaining to an obligation which the trustee is liable
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to perform only by using property that belongs to trustee's own property or the trust property of
another trust (referred to as the \trustee's own property, etc." in item 1) (such obligations shall be
referred to as \obligations covered by trustee's own property only, etc." in item 1 and item 2) may
not use said claim to set o the obligation pertaining to a claim belonging to the trust property;
provided, however, that this shall not apply in the following cases:
1. where, either at the time when a person acquired the claim or at the time when a person
assumed the obligation pertaining to a claim belonging to the trust property, whichever occurred
later, the said person who holds the claim pertaining to the obligation covered by the trustee's own
property only, etc. did not know and was not negligent in failing to know that the claim belonging
to the trust property did not belong to the trustee's own property, etc.; or
2. where, either at the time when a person acquired a claim or at the time when a person
assumed the obligation pertaining to a claim belonging to the trust property, whichever occurred
later, the person who holds the claim pertaining to the obligation covered by the trustee's own
property only, etc. did not know and was not negligent in failing to know that the obligation
covered by the trustee's own property only, etc. is liable was not an obligation covered by the trust
property.
­ The provisions of the main clause of the preceding paragraph shall not apply in the cases listed
in the items of Article 31, paragraph ­ in which the trustee has approved the set-o set forth in
said paragraph.
® A person who holds a claim pertaining to an obligation covered by the trust property (limited
to an obligation that the trustee is liable to perform only by using property that belongs to the
trust property) may not use said claim to seto against the person's obligation pertaining to a claim
belonging to the trustee's own property; provided, however, that this shall not apply where, at the
time when said person acquired the claim or when the person assumed the obligation pertaining to
the claim belonging to the trustee's own property, whichever occurred later, the person who holds
the claim pertaining to the obligation covered by the trust property did not know and was not
negligent in failing to know that the claim belonging to the trustee's own property did not belong
to the trust property.
¯ The provisions of the main clause of the preceding paragraph shall not apply where the trustee
has approved the set-o set forth in said paragraph.
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procedure on trust property23, the bankruptcy procedure on trust property24, the
23(Restriction, etc. on Execution, etc. Against Property that Belongs to Trust Property)
Article 23 ¬ Except where based on a claim pertaining to an obligation covered by the trust property
(including a right arising with respect to property that belongs to the trust property; the same
shall apply in the following paragraph), no execution, provisional seizure, provisional disposition, or
exercise of a security interest or an auction (excluding an auction for the exercise of a security interest;
the same shall apply hereinafter) nor collection proceedings for delinquent national tax (including a
procedure to be enforced pursuant to the provisions on collection proceedings for delinquent national
tax; the same shall apply hereinafter) may be enforced against property that belongs to the trust
property.
­ In addition to a creditor who holds a claim pertaining to an obligation covered by the trust
property, where a trust has been created by the method set forth in Article 3, item 3, if the settlor
has created the trust with the knowledge that it would harm settlor's creditor(s), notwithstanding
the provisions of the preceding paragraph, a person who holds a claim against the settlor (limited
to cases where the settlor is a trustee) which has arisen prior to the creation of the trust may
commence a execution, provisional seizure, provisional disposition or exercise of a security interest,
or an auction, or may commence collection proceedings for delinquent national tax against property
that belongs to the trust property; provided, however, that this shall not apply where there are
beneciaries at the time in question, and when all or some of those beneciaries did not know,
at the time when they became aware that they had been designated as beneciaries or when they
acquired benecial interests, of the fact that the creditor would be harmed.
® The provisions of Article 11, paragraph ² and paragraph ³ shall apply mutatis mutandis to
the application of the provisions of the preceding paragraph.
¯ The provisions of the preceding two paragraphs shall not apply when two years have elapsed
since the trust set forth in paragraph ­ was created.
° A trustee or beneciary may assert an objection to the execution, provisional seizure, provisional
disposition or exercise of a security interest, or auction that is being commenced in violation of the
provisions of paragraph ¬ or paragraph ­. In this case, the provisions of Article 38 of the Civil
Execution Act (Act No. 4 of 1979) and the provisions of Article 45 of the Civil Provisional Remedies
Act (Act No. 91 of 1989) shall apply mutatis mutandis.
± A trustee or beneciary may assert an objection to the collection proceeding for delinquent
national tax that are being enforced in violation of the provisions of paragraph ¬ or paragraph ­.
In this case, the assertion of the objection shall be made by entering an appeal against the collection
proceedings of delinquent national tax.
24(Relationship between Trust Property and Bankruptcy Proceedings, etc. against a Trustee)
Article 25 ¬ Even where an order for the commencement of bankruptcy is entered against a trustee,
no property that belongs to the trust property shall be included in the bankruptcy estate.
­ In the case referred to in the preceding paragraph, no distribution claim as a beneciary shall
be the bankruptcy claims. The same shall apply to a trust claim that the trustee is liable to satisfy
only by using property that belongs to the trust property.
® In the case referred to in paragraph ¬, discharge of an obligation pertaining to a trust claim
(excluding a trust claim prescribed in the preceding paragraph) based on a discharge order as set
forth in Article 252, paragraph ¬ of the Bankruptcy Act may not be asserted to the trust property.
¯ Even where an order for the commencement of rehabilitation proceedings is entered against a
trustee, no trust property shall be included in the rehabilitation debtor's assets.
° In the case referred to in the preceding paragraph, no distribution claim as a beneciary shall
be included in the rehabilitation claims. The same shall apply to a trust claim that the trustee is
liable to satisfy only by using property that belongs to the trust property.
2.2. TRUST PROPERTY 61
succession procedure on trust property25. However, the current Trust Act is not
± In the case referred to in paragraph ¯, a discharge of or modication to an obligation pertaining
to a trust claim (excluding a trust claim as prescribed in the preceding paragraph) by a rehabilitation
plan, an order for the conrmation of the rehabilitation plan, or discharge order set forth in Article
235, paragraph ¬ of the Civil Rehabilitation Act may not be asserted to the trust property.
² The provisions of the preceding three paragraphs shall apply mutatis mutandis where an order
for the commencement of reorganization is entered against a trustee. In this case, the term \reha-
bilitation debtor's assets" in paragraph ¯ shall be deemed to be replaced with \of reorganization
company's assets (meaning the assets of a company under reorganization as prescribed in Article 2,
paragraph ⑭ of the Corporate Reorganization Act or the assets of a company in reorganization as
prescribed in Article 169, paragraph ⑭ of the Act on Special Rules, etc. for Reorganization Pro-
ceedings for Financial Institutions, etc.) or the assets of a cooperative nancial institution under
reorganization (meaning the assets of a cooperative nancial institution under reorganization as pre-
scribed in Article 4, paragraph ⑭ of the Act on Special Rules, etc. for Reorganization Proceedings
for Financial Institutions, etc)," the term \rehabilitation claims" in paragraph ° shall be deemed
to be replaced with \reorganization claims or secured reorganization claims," and the phrase \re-
habilitation plan, an order for the conrmation of the rehabilitation plan, or an order of discharge
set forth in Article 235, paragraph ¬ of the Civil Rehabilitation Act" in the preceding paragraph
shall be deemed to be replaced with \reorganization plan or an order for the conrmation of the
reorganization plan."
25(Grounds for Termination of a Trustee's Duty as Trustee)[Excerpt]
Article 56 ¬ A trustee's duty as trustee shall terminate on the following grounds, in addition to the
completion of the liquidation of the trust; provided, however, that in the case of the termination on
the grounds set forth in item 3, if the terms of trust otherwise provides, such provisions shall prevail:
1. the death of the individual who is the trustee:
2. a ruling for commencement of guardianship or commencement of curatorship against the
individual who is the trustee:
...
(Duty of the Former Trustee's Heir to Give Notice and Retain Property, etc.)
Article 60 ¬ Where a trustee's duty as trustee has been terminated on any of the grounds listed in
Article 56, paragraph ¬, item 1 or item 2, if the former trustee's heir (if there is a statutory agent
at the time in question, the statutory agent) or guardian or curator of an adult trustee (hereinafter
collectively referred to as the \former trustee's heir, etc." in this Section) knows such a fact, the
former trustee's heir, etc. shall give notice of the fact to a known beneciary; provided, however,
that if the terms of trust otherwise provides for, such provisions shall prevail.
­ Where a trustee's duty as trustee has been terminated on any of the grounds listed in Article
56, paragraph ¬, item 1 or item 2, the former trustee's heir, etc. shall continue to retain property
that belongs to the trust property until a new trustee, etc. or an incorporated trust property
administrator becomes able to administer trust aairs, and shall carry out the necessary actions for
the transfer of trust aairs.
® In the case referred to in the preceding paragraph, if the former trustee's heir, etc. attempts to
dispose of property that belongs to the trust property, a beneciary may demand that the former
trustee's heir, etc. cease to dispose of the property; provided, however, that this shall not apply after
a new trustee, etc. or an incorporated trust property administrator becomes able to administer trust
aairs. ¯ Where a trustee's duty as trustee has been terminated on the grounds listed in Article
56, paragraph ¬, item 3, the bankruptcy trustee shall continue to retain property that belongs to
the trust property until a new trustee, etc. becomes able to administer trust aairs, and shall carry
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adopting, in contrast to the former statute, any trust theory, so possible disputes
involving trust property and the private properties of trust parties would not be
restricted to that with the trustee. For example, when a settlor settled a self-benet
trust by setting her/himself the only beneciary, there may happen some dispute on
whether some trust property should be considered as a part of the private property
of the settlor in reality. And if one thinks a beneciary is the substantial owner of
the trust property, some interpretation problem may occur on the relation between
the private property of a beneciary and the trust property.
It is the trust-property-as-a-substantial-legal-subject theory that gives the most
clear view on the independence of trust property. Since trust property doesn't belong
to anyone of the trust parties and is substantially independent property according to
this theory, it is natural for the current statute to have explicit provisions concerning
the independence of trust property in relation to the trustee. And, the substantial
independence of trust property should be attained also in relation to the settlor or
the beneciary as well as to the trustee according to that theory.
In contrast to that, the jus-in-personam and the jus-in-rem (beneciary-as-the-
substantial-owner) theories would give dierent interpretations on the signicance or
function of the provisions of the current statute concerning the independence of trust
property. Viewing from the stand point of the jus-in-personam theory, while trust
property belongs to the trustee, since the trustee has the duties to administer the
trust property conforming to the trust purpose, the trust property should be treated
dierently from the private property of the trustee, so the provisions concerning the
independence of trust property explicitly prescribes such conditions. But, according
to this theory, since trust property never belongs to the settlor or the beneciary,
there is no use to repeat \the independence" of trust property in relation to the settlor
or the beneciary. On the other hand, viewing from the stand point of the jus-in-
rem (beneciary-as-the-substantial-owner) theory, while trust property substantially
belongs to the beneciary, since the formal title holder of trust property is the trustee,
it becomes necessary to prescribe explicitly the relation between the trust property
and the private property of the trustee, so there are the provisions concerning the
out the necessary actions for the transfer of trust aairs.
° In the case referred to in the preceding paragraph, if the bankruptcy trustee attempts to dispose
of property that belongs to the trust property, a beneciary may demand that the bankruptcy trustee
cease to dispose of the property; provided, however, that this shall not apply after a new trustee,
etc. becomes able to administer trust aairs.
± The former trustee's heir, etc. or the bankruptcy trustee may demand reimbursement, from
the new trustee, etc. or from the incorporated trust property administrator, of expenses paid for
carrying out the actions under the provisions of paragraph ¬, paragraph ­ or paragraph ¯, and for
interest thereon accruing from the date of payment.
² The provisions of Article 49, paragraph ± and paragraph ² shall apply mutatis mutandis to the
right that the former trustee's heir, etc. or the bankruptcy trustee has pursuant to the provisions
of the preceding paragraph.
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independence of trust property. As for the beneciary, since trust property belongs
to the beneciary in substance, it is theoretically consistent that the current statute
has no provisions prescribing the independence of trust property in relation to the
beneciary.
As we have just seen, the interpretation of the provisions may be qualitatively
dierent depending on the base trust theory, especially concerning in relation to whom
the \independence of trust property" has its meaning. In fact, even on the signicance
of the provisions concerning the independence of trust property in the current statute,
each trust theory gives considerably dierent interpretation one another. Taking these
facts into consideration, we would say, the provisions concerning \the independence of
trust property" in the current statute have been somewhat carelessly inherited from
the former statute which based on the jus-in-personam theory. In this meaning, it
is questionable for those provisions to be able to give any practical interpretational
policy for solving concrete problems in trust business.
Anyway, since the current statute bases not solely on the jus-in-personam theory,
the meaning of \the independence of trust property" should be interpreted broader
than under the former statute. In this meaning, it would be appropriate, whether from
the viewpoint of a theoretical consideration or of a practical interpretational policy,
to consider that trust property is the property to be distinguished substantially not
only from the private property of the trustee as explicitly prescribed in the current
statute, but also from each private property of the settlor or of the beneciary even
though there is no provision concerning them.

Chapter 3
The Parties of Trust
A trust can be settled with arbitrary purpose unless it is prohibited by law or the
other decrees. However, in order to settle validly a trust and to attain the trust
purpose, certain qualications and an ability at certain level are to be required of the
trust parties. In this chapter, we will give an overview over the qualications and
abilities required of trust parties, so that we will see arguments on the fundamental
structure of trust from another side.
3.1 Trustee
(1) The Qualications for a Trustee
A trustee has the administrative power on the trust property and has the power and
duty to perform the trust works so as to attain the trust purpose, whether any trust
theory is followed. In ordinary trust relationship, the trustee holds the nominal title
of the trust property and has the outward appearance as the property right holder of
that property.
Viewing from those facts, we could enumerate as the necessary conditions to be
a trustee, rstly, the legal formal capacity to act as the holder of the administrating
power on a trust property and, in addition, certain real ability for property manage-
ment which is sucient to administer the trust property so as to attain the trust
purpose. Therefore, a dead person, a bankrupt or a outwardly legal parson that lost
the legal personality cannot be a trustee as well as an adult ward, a person under
curatorship and a minor. So, if the trustee fell under one of those categories after
the settlement of the trust, the duty of the trustee as the trustee will terminate1.
1(Grounds for Termination of a Trustee's Duty as Trustee)
Article 56 ¬ A trustee's duty as trustee shall terminate on the following grounds, in addition to the
completion of the liquidation of the trust; provided, however, that in the case of the termination on
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Although those regulations or restrictions on the power of property administration
of those persons prescribed in the other acts than Trust Act are principally target-
ing at the self management of its own property, since higher reasonable property
management ability would be required in a trust relationship than in a self property
management, a person who may lack an enough ability reasonably to manage its own
property is, in general, considered naturally to lack the actual ability for a property
management as the trustee. In addition, since a \person" should have the possibility
to become a subject to hold property rights, namely, the capacity to hold rights in
order to become even the nominal title holder or the outward property right holder of
a trust property, a dead person or a corporation that lost the legal personality cannot
be a trustee also from this respect.
the grounds set forth in item 3, if the terms of trust otherwise provides, such provisions shall prevail:
1. the death of the individual who is the trustee:
2. a ruling for commencement of guardianship or commencement of curatorship against the
individual who is the trustee:
3.an order for the commencement of bankruptcy proceedings against the trustee (excluding
cases of dissolution by an order for the commencement of bankruptcy proceedings);
4. the dissolution of the juridical person who is the trustee for reasons other than a merger;
5. the resignation of the trustee under the provisions of the following Article;
6. the dismissal of the trustee under the provisions of Article 58; or
7. any grounds specied by the terms of trust.
­ Where the juridical person who is the trustee has eected a merger, the juridical person that
survives the merger or judicial person that is incorporated through the merger shall take over the
trustee's duty. Where the judicial person who is the trustee has eected a company split, the same
shall apply to the juridical person that succeeds to the rights and duties of the trustee as a result of
the company split.
® Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding paragraph, if the terms of trust otherwise
provides for, such provisions shall prevail.
¯ Where the grounds set forth in paragraph ¬, item 3 occur, if the trustee's duty as trustee
does not terminate pursuant to the provisions of the proviso to said paragraph, the bankrupt shall
perform the duties of the trustee.
° A trustee's duty as trustee shall not terminate on the grounds that the trustee has been handed
an order for the commencement of rehabilitation proceedings; provided, however, that if the terms
of trust otherwise provides for, such provisions shall prevail.
± In the case prescribed in the main clause of the preceding paragraph, when there is a rehabili-
tation trustee, the right of the trustee to perform the trustee's duties and administer and dispose of
property that belongs to the trust property shall be vested exclusively in the rehabilitation trustee.
The same shall apply where there is a provisional administrator in charge of rehabilitation proceed-
ings.
² The provisions of the preceding two paragraphs shall apply mutatis mutandis where the trustee
is given an order for the commencement of reorganization proceedings. In this case, the phrase
\there is a rehabilitation trustee" in the preceding paragraph shall be deemed to be replaced with
\there is a reorganization trustee (excluding the period set forth in Article 74, paragraph ­ of the
Corporate Reorganization Act (including cases where applied mutatis mutandis pursuant to Article
47 and Article 213 of the Act on Special Rules, etc. for Reorganization Proceedings for Financial
Institutions, etc.))."
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Theoretical arguments of qualications for a trustee mostly concentrate on those
points described above. But since there are, in reality, various regulations on the
property management power or on a juridical subjectivity and it is practically dicult
to evaluate the actual ability for property management of a concrete person, it is not
rare for the qualication of a trustee to be disputed in practical business.
For example, when there are some regulations or legal restrictions on the legal
subject or the way of trading of a certain kind of properties, the judgement on the
qualication of a trustee as the trustee may delicately change depending on what
kind of properties the trust property includes. There may be various opinions also
on whether such regulations on the legal subject or administration of certain kind of
properties should aect on the benecial right that intends to get benet from such
properties. If one gives an armative answer to that, rather complicated problem
may occur like whether, when the trust property of trust B includes a benecial right
of trust A whose trust property includes a property on which there are regulations or
legal restrictions concerning the holder or the way of trading, the qualications for the
trustee of the trust B should be aected by those regulations or restrictions. There are
many instances of such regulations or restrictions in the areas of real property rights,
stock holding concerning certain kinds of corporation and also certain medical supplies
in many countries. Those regulations naturally vary in the methods and ranges from
country to country, so it is one of the problems for which enough attention should be
paid especially when settling an international trust relationship.
Moreover, especially when the trustee is an association, the eect of regulations
or legal restrictions on trading may become problematic in relation to the subject of
administration of trust property in settling the trust or in executing the trust works,
for the meaning of the property management ability of such an association would be
aected by whether it has the legal personality or whether having certain kind of
power to manage the property is suitable to the objectives of the association. For
example, as for an association without the legal personality, since it has not formal
legal personality, the property held by such an association is generally thought to be
entrusted to its representative, while the actual property management activities would
be done in many cases as if it had the formal legal personality. Under the current
law, an association without the legal personality cannot be appointed as a trustee as
a general rule. However, if we infer from the thought that the property of such an
association belongs to the representative in person by entrusting, it may be possible
even under the current law that, with making the representative the nominal title
holder of concrete properties, an association without the legal personality functions
as the substantial trustee. Such a separation between the nominal trustee and the
substantial trustee may be abused in order to avoid the eects of regulations or legal
restrictions since restrictions on the capacity to hold a property or to act concerning
an association will not aect the actions of a member in person of the association.
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(2) Joint Trusteeship
\Joint trusteeship" means the case in which there are two or more trustees in one trust
relationship. Under the former statute, so to speak, Gesammthand acts (meaning,
nearly, joint acts) were required to all the joint trustees, so that it was necessary for
the trustees always to act unitedly2. The essential merit of having plural trustees
would be that the most suitable way of the execution of the trust works to the trust
purpose can be expected through the deliberations among the trustees. So, except
for the case in which all of the plural trustees could act based on one same opinion,
it would be appropriate to determine in advance some policy of the actions as the
trustee according to some rational criterions in the situations in which the opinions
may contradict among the trustees.
Taking those facts into consideration, the current statute, while the attribution
co-ownership is still held in which3, has introduced the principle of the decision by
majority in the determination of the will of the joint trustees and, in addition, allows
to prescribe a way for exible distributions of the powers of the administration in
the terms of trust so that rational execution of trust works by joint trustees are
expected4. On the other hand, the liability of the trustee is, as a general rule, the
2Article 24 of the former statute ¬ When there are plural trustees in a trust, the trust property
is seemed to be held under co-ownership.
­ In the case of the last paragraph, unless some special rules are provided in the trust arrangement,
the handling of the trust aairs should be done unitedly by all the trustees. Provided that a
manifestation of intension to one of the trustees has the eect also to the other trustees.
3(Trust Property in Co-ownership Without Share Subject to Certain Restrictions on the Dispo-
sition of Shares)
Article 79 In the case of a trust with two or more trustees, the trust property shall be deemed to
be held under co-ownership without share, subject to certain restrictions on the disposition of their
shares.
4(Method of Trust administration)
Article 80 ¬ In the case of a trust with two or more trustees, decisions on the trust administration
shall be made by the majority of the trustees.
­ Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding paragraph, decisions on an act of preservation
may be made by each trustee independently.
®Where a decision is made on the trust administration pursuant to the provisions of the preceding
two paragraphs, each trustee may execute trust aairs based on such decision.
¯ Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding three paragraphs, where terms of trust contains
provisions concerning the division of duties among the trustees, each trustee shall make decisions on
the trust administration and execute those aairs pursuant to such provisions.
°With regard to an act to be conducted in the interests of the trust property based on a decision
on the trust administration made under the provisions of the preceding two paragraphs, each trustee
shall have the authority to represent the other trustee(s).
± Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding paragraphs, if the terms of trust otherwise
provides for, such provisions shall prevail.
² In the case of a trust with two or more trustees, it shall be sucient for a third party to make a
manifestation of intention to any one of them; provided, however, that if the terms of trust otherwise
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joint liability over all the trustees in relation to the beneciary or a third party. For
the determined policy for the trustees' actions should unitedly regulate the behaviors
of all the trustees even when the decision making process provided in the term of the
trust is exible5.
However, in the present trust business, there have been kinds of substantial \joint
trusteeship" which rigidly don't fall under the joint trusteeship in the statute. This
fact leads to interpretational problems in various respects.
First, consider the case in which a trustee A has gotten entrusted all the trust
property by itself at rst and, then, appoints B and C as the property administrators
and makes them administer a part of the trust property as the agents of A. In such
a case, it is only A who is the trustee in relation to the beneciary and B and C are
mere agents of A, so, considerably dierent legal eects would be led to compared
with the legitimate joint trusteeship case.
Second, consider the case in which a trustee A by itself is entrusted with the trust
property at rst, then entrusts B and C again with parts of the trust property so that
provides for manifestation of intention by a beneciary, such provisions shall prevail.
(Standing to Sue or to Be Sued of Trustees with Segregated Duties)
Article 81 In the case prescribed in paragraph ¯ of the preceding Article, each trustee shall stand
as a plainti or defendant with respect to duties of the said trustee in any action against the trust
property on behalf of the other trustee(s).
(Delegation to Other Trustees to Make Decisions on the Trust administration)
Article 82 In the case of a trust with two or more trustees, no trustee may delegate the other
trustee(s) to make decisions on the trust administration (excluding those falling within the scope of
the ordinary business), except where terms of trust otherwise provides for or there is a compelling
reason to do so.
5Article 25 of the former statute When there are plural trustees in a trust, the debt through the
act of the trust to the beneciary shall be borne jointly by the trustees. The same shall be applied
to the debt in in the course of administering trust aairs.
(Assumption of Obligations in Administering Trust Aairs)
Article 83 ¬ In the case of a trust with two or more trustees, where each trustee has assumed an
obligation to a third party in the course of administering trust aairs, these trustees shall be joint
and several obligors.
­ Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding paragraph, where terms of trust contain a
provision concerning the division of duties among the trustees, when either of these trustees has
assumed an obligation to a third party in the course of administering trust aairs pursuant to such
provisions, the other trustees shall be liable only by using property that belongs to the trust property
to perform the obligation; provided, however, that where the third party knew, at the time of the act
causing the assumption of the obligation, that said act was conducted in the course of administering
trust aairs and that there were two or more trustees for the trust, and did not know and was not
negligent in failing to know that the terms of trust contained provisions concerning the division of
duties among the trustees, the other trustee(s) may not duly assert such provisions on the division
of duties against the third party.
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B and C administer respective trust properties according to their own judgements.
In such a case, the beneciary of the rst trust doesn't have benecial rights in the
sequential trusts administered by B and C, so that the beneciary's supervising power
doesn't reach the administrative actions of B and C. In this meaning, the legal eect
in that case is quite dierent from that in the case in which B and C are the \joint
trustees" of Trust Act with A.
However, even in those cases described above, essentially same legal eect as when
A, B and C are appointed as joint trustees in Trust Act could be deduced in relation
to the beneciary of the rst trust through some reasonable interpretation of the legal
relationships among the trustee A and the property administrators B and C.
For instance, if we interpret the legal statuses of the property administrators B
and C as agents of the trustee A, if we can admit the direct legal relationship between
the agents and the beneciary with taking the agent theory into consideration, we
could think the supervising power of the beneciary has the direct eect over B and
C. By the way, it is possible to prescribe in the trust terms in advance the criterion
concerning what range of the trust property would be allowed to be entrusted to
the agents of the trustee. Then the judgement on whether some concrete property is
entrusted to an agent is an instance of the trust property administration actions of the
trustee. So, when some failure of B or C causes to any damage to the trust property,
the beneciary can ask directly B and C for the responsibility of the failure, as well
as A for the responsibility for the administration on whole the trust property. In such
a case, the responsibility of A, B and C would be interpreted as a joint responsibility
for the one same damage, so that the legal eect would be same as in the case of
formal joint trusteeship.
On the other hand, when the trustee A entrusted parts of the trust property
again to B and C, as far as stratied trust relationships is validly established, the
beneciary of the lower trust is not in the direct legal relationship with B and C. In
addition, since the prots from the properties administered by B and C belong only
indirectly to the beneciary through those benecial rights of the higher trusts that
are included in the trust property of the lower trust, if one thinks it would be better
to allow the beneciary to ask for the responsibility against B or C, the almost only
way to do so would be to argue that the higher trust relationship essentially forms a
part of the lower trust relationship. For instance, if B and C are substantially under
the supervision by A in their property administrations, the higher trust relationships
could be interpreted as principal-agent relationships in the essence, the same legal
eect as described in the last paragraph could be deduced by considering B and C as
agents of the trustee A in their legal substances. Besides, if one adopts concerning
the fundamental structure of trust the doctrine that the beneciary is the substantial
owner of the trust property, it would be possible to conclude that the eect of the
substantial ownership of the beneciary is extended over the sequential trust rela-
tionships, by considering the higher trust relationships as being substantially united
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with the lower trust relationships even if the trust relation ships are stratied, unless
one of those trusts is operated in the form of \combined administration" with still
another trust.
As a conclusion from what we have considered above, it is not necessarily impossi-
ble as an interpretation of the current statute to provide some theoretical stand point
from which essentially same legal eect can be deduced irrespective of what legal
construction is adopted to appoint the \joint trustees" whether formal or not formal
but substantial ones. But the more dicult problem is in that such a interpretational
policy may not necessarily be the best for the interest of the beneciary so that the
evaluation of the eect may depend on the concrete situations. For, the fact that
the supervising power of the beneciary reaches the administration actions of B or C
may, in turn, be taken as the cause of the responsibility of the beneciary her/himself
to a person other than those trust parties (see Chapter 5 Section 3). So, viewing from
the fact that the beneciary in the case like above mostly doesn't have the actual
chance to control the concrete administration actions in the trust relationships, to
expand the supervising power of the beneciary through an interpretation may result
to impose the beneciary a burden exceeding the merit that the beneciary can have
more alternatives for claiming the restoration of the loss of trust property.
In addition, the merits for which some trust parties try to create such forms
of property administration as deviate from the formal statutory one are completely
neglected if the legal eect is always essentially same as in the case of formal joint
trusteeship. Then, from the stand point of trust parties, it would become useless to
provide special clauses for the way of administration in the trust terms. Instead, such
an argument would be rather persuasive as insists that the legal eect the trust parties
actually intended could be deduced only through exible but logical interpretations
on the formal legal construction the parties intentionally prescribed in the trust terms
with enough regards for each actual situation. So, as for the beneciary or a third
party who is not involved against its intention like a victim of torts but enters by its
own intension into the legal relationship, the trust terms agreed by the parties after
the considerations and mutual adjustments should be out into the center of the legal
interpretation, which would be appropriate also from the viewpoint of the fact that
a trust relationship can be created by the free will of the trust parties to attain the
trust purpose.
After considering all the factors described above, we would conclude that what
is attached the greatest importance to in interpretation of the \joint trusteeship"
including informal but substantial one is how to interpret the \agreement" between
trust parties, typically the trust terms determined to regulate the legal relationship
among the parties. While such an interpretational policy is theoretically consistent
with the supposition that a trust relationship can be freely settled by the trust parties,
since actually possible situations under which some legal dispute may occur have an
innite variety, the trouble, cost and risk to estimate the eects of concrete trust
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terms in future possible conicts would become considerably high if not only each
wording but also all the possible combinations of the words or sentences in the trust
terms should be taken into consideration at the time of the settlement of the trust
terms in order to infer their future eects. Moreover, if such trust relationships are
set among plural parties in a complicated form, the content of the trust terms for
each individual trust may contradicts the conclusion of an interpretation of the terms
from the viewpoint of the common purpose to all the trust parties. So, we should
note, all that the policy of the interpretation can give may be only an unclear clue in
the phase of the application to concrete cases.
(3) Executor of the Power of Trustee on behalf of the Trustee
It is, of course, the trustee that the power and duty on the execution of the trust aairs
are attributed to. But as for the range of the actual works that should be handled by
the trustee her/himself, there may be various way of thinking. If the condence on a
trustee in person is emphasized in the settlement of a trust relationship, one would
think the trustee in the trust relationship was appointed as the very person who
should perform the trust administration, so that the trust administration should not
be delegated to another person unless there is some exceptional ground for it. Instead,
if one emphasizes that the fundamental ground of the creation of a trust is to attain
the trust purpose, one would think that the reason why the trustee was installed to
the status is because the settlor etc. thought the trustee her/himself is appropriate
to be appointed for the attainment of the trust purpose. Then, when there is another
person who is suitable to do the trust administration for the attainment of the trust
purpose, the trustee should willingly appoint such a person as the vicarious actor of
the trustee and the trustee her/himself should do the backing operations for the trust
works by the actor on behalf of the trustee.
Under the former statute, partly because the jus-in-personam theory was adopted
there, the power of the trustee should be exercised by the trustee in person, as a gen-
eral rule6. The current statute, while the concrete standard to allow the substitutive
performer itself has not changed form the former statute, has reconstructed the word-
ing of the provision presupposing that the substitutive performer can be appointed
in certain situations7. The general rule there is that the delegation condition can be
6Article 26 of the former statute [excerpt] ¬ The trustee may delegate the trust administration
to another person only if there is some ground to make it unavoidable unless otherwise prescribed
in the trust terms.
...
7(Delegation of Trust administration to a Third Party)
Article 28 In the following cases, a trustee may delegate the trust administration to a third party:
1. where it is provided by the terms of trust that the trust administration is to be or may be
delegated to a third party;
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determined freely in the therms of the trust including the supervising power of the
trustee over the delegate8.
As for the responsibility of the delegate of the trustee to the beneciary, on the
other hand, the direct responsibility to the beneciary was explicitly prescribed in
the former statute9. In contrast, there is no provision concerning this problem in the
current statute. However, the legal relationship between the trustee and its delegate
could be considered as a commission relation in Civil Code except for the case in
which the appointment of a delegate is forced by some legal provision. So, we can
conclude the delegate should take the direct responsibility to the beneciary within
the delegated works by analogical application of the provision concerning the direct
responsibility of the sub-agent in Article 107 paragraph­ of Civil Code. In fact, when
the appointment of the delegate of the trustee is allowed in the terms of trust, it is one
of the main duties for the trustee to select a suitable delegate who can perform the
appropriate property administration for the attainment of the trust purpose. Since
the duty of the assigned delegate is to perform the concrete trust aairs to attain the
trust purpose, it would be eective and ecient from the viewpoint of the supervising
over the trust administration that the delegate takes the direct responsibility to the
2. where the terms of trust does not contain any provisions concerning the delegation of the
trust administration to a third party, but delegating the trust administration to a third party is
considered to be appropriate in light of the purpose of the trust; and
3. where it is provided by the terms of trust that the trust administration shall not be dele-
gated to a third party, but delegating the trust administration to a third party is considered to be
unavoidable in light of the purpose of the trust.
8(Duty to Appoint and Supervise a Third Party when Delegating the Trust administration)
Article 35 ¬When delegating the trust administration to a third party pursuant to the provisions of
Article 28, the trustee shall delegate said administration to a suitable person in light of the purpose
of the trust.
­ A trustee, when the trustee has delegated the trust administration to a third party pursuant
to the provisions of Article 28, shall conduct the necessary and appropriate supervision of the third
party in order to achieve the purpose of the trust.
® When a trustee has delegated the trust administration to any of the following third parties,
the provisions of the preceding two paragraphs shall not apply; provided, however, that when the
trustee becomes aware that the third party is unsuitable or unfaithful or that the administration of
aairs by the third party is inappropriate, the trustee shall give notice to the beneciary to that
eect, cancel the delegation to the third party, or take other necessary measures:
1. a third party designated by the terms of trust; or
2. in cases where it is provided by the terms of trust that the trust administration shall be
delegated to a third party designated by the settlor or the beneciary, the third party designated
pursuant to such provisions.
¯ Notwithstanding the provisions of the proviso to the preceding paragraph, if the terms of trust
otherwise provides for, such provisions shall prevail.
9Article 26 of the former statute [excerpt]
...
® A person who performs the trust aairs on behalf of the trustee shall take the responsibility
equal to the trustee.
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beneciary or the trust property within the performance of the concrete trust aairs
while the trustee takes the responsibility for the appointment and supervision.
Now we have seen whole the general theory on the delegate of trustee. But a prac-
tically more important problem is whether the legal relationship of the trustee with
a concrete substitutional actor to administer the trust property could be interpreted
as the relationship with \a delegate of the trustee's power". For instance, imagine
the case that certain part of the trust property is entrusted to a third party by the
trustee so that the third party administers that part of the trust property as the
trustee. There is no direct legal relationship between the beneciary of the rst trust
and the trustee of the second trust, so that the only person to whom the trustee of
the second trust is in duty is the beneciary of the second trust, namely, the rst
trust property which the trustee of the rst trust administers.
However, in such a case, the trust property of the rst trust includes the benecial
right of the second trust relationship in exchange for the re-entrusted part of the trust
property, so that the trustee of the rst trust is administrating the benecial right of
the second trust as a part of the trust property. Viewing from the fact, it looks simply
logical for the beneciary of the rst trust not to have a direct legal relationship with
the trustee of the second trust. Moreover, in a case like above, the eect of legal
dispositions of the concrete trust properties in the second trust would aect on the
rst trust relationship only through the prots from the benecial right of the second
trust, so one may think that the beneciary of the rst trust shouldn't have the direct
controlling power over the property administration in the second trust and that it
is enough for the beneciary to be able to secure the prots from the benecial
right of the second trust that constitutes a part of the rst trust property. So, this
interpretation problem would become rather complicated.
On the other hand, in spite of the formal creation of the re-trust relationship, de-
pending on the contents of the trust agreement concerning concrete property admin-
istration actions or the actual conditions of the administration of the trust property,
there may be the cases in which the direct duty and responsibility of the administrator
to the beneciary of the rst trust should be armed by interpreting the legal status
of the administrator as a substitutive performer for the trustee in substance. In fact,
if one adopts concerning the fundamental structure of trust the standpoint that the
beneciary is the substantial owner of the trust property, it would be reasonable to
admit the direct legal relationship between the administrator who actually perform
the property administration and the beneciary who is the substantial owner of the
property whether the outward legal status of the administrator is a substitutive per-
former or the trustee of the second trust. However, we should note that the logically
eective range of such an interpretation is not restricted to the case of the execution
of the administrative power of the beneciary of the rst trust relationship over the
trustee of the second trust relationship. For example, it would have some eect also
on the case in which those duty and responsibility to a third party which occurred
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along the property administration in the second trust is claimed against the bene-
ciary of the rst trust as the substantial owner. So, it is worth being noted that such
a way of interpretation doesn't always lead to some advantageous conclusion to the
beneciary of the rst trust.
(4) Succession of the Status of the Trustee
A trustee should have an enough property management ability to perform trust af-
fairs, while the status is fundamentally based on the condence from other trust
parties. So, a trustee should resign the post when she/he loses the condence from
the persons concerned or the required ability of property management. However, a
trust relationship itself doesn't terminate merely by the termination of the duties of
the trustee or by the resignation of the trustee from the post unless the trust requires
that certain person to be the trustee for the attainment of the trust purpose. It keeps
the existence with the same purpose by assigning a new trustee.
Succession of the status of trustee means the change of the subjects to whom the
trust property belongs under the jus-in-personam theory the former statute adopted.
However, under any trust theory, the transfer of the administrating power on the
trust property and the distribution of the duties and responsibilities between the old
and new trustees are important matters both theoretically and practically. So, special
provisions for succession of the position of the trustee were provided by the former
status10, and there are rather detailed provisions provided by the current statute,
too11. However, as the current statute generally admits wide range of freedom of the
10Article 50 of the former statute [excerpt] ¬ When a change of the trustees occurred, the trust
property shall be considered to be transferred to the new trustee at the time of when the former
trustee's duties have been terminated.
Articla 52 of the former statute [excerpt] ¬When a change of the trustees occurred, the new trustee
shall take over the obligations to the beneciary the former trustee has borne by the act of trust.
11(Succession, etc. to Rights and Duties Concerning the Trust)
Article 75 ¬ Where a trustee's duty as trustee has been terminated on any of the grounds listed in
the items of Article 56, paragraph ¬, when a new trustee has assumed the duty, it shall be deemed
that the new trustee has succeeded to, at the time of the termination of the former trustee's duty,
the former trustee's rights and duties concerning the trust existing as of that time.
­ Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding paragraph, where a trustee's duty as trustee
has been terminated on the grounds listed in the items of Article 56, paragraph ¬, item 5 (limited
to the case under the provision of Article 57, paragraph ¬; excluding the case referred to in the
proviso to Article 59, paragraph ¯), it shall be deemed that the new trustee has succeeded to, at
the time of assumption of the oce by a new trustee, etc., the former trustee's rights and duties
concerning the trust existing as of that time.
® The provisions of the preceding two paragraphs shall not preclude the eect of any act car-
ried out by the former trustee, a trust property administrator, or an incorporated trust property
administrator within the scope of their powers before the new trustee assumes the oce as the new
trustee.
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agreement by the trust parties in the trust act, the concrete rules for the succession
¯ The provisions of Article 27 shall apply mutatis mutandis where the former trustee has carried
out any act that does not fall within the scope of the powers of the former trustee before the new
trustee, etc. assumes the oce as a trustee.
° Where the former trustee (including the trustee's heir; hereinafter the same shall apply in this
Article) has incurred liability under the provision of Article 40, or where a director, executive ocer,
or any other person equivalent thereto (hereinafter referred to as a \director, etc." in this paragraph)
of the former trustee who is a juridical person has incurred liability under the provision of Article
41, the new trustee, etc. or incorporated trust property administrator may make a claim against
the former trustee or its director, etc. under the provisions of Article 40 or Article 41.
± Where the former trustee may receive reimbursement of expenses, etc. or compensation for
damages, or where the former trustee may receive trust fees from the trust property, the former
trustee may make a demand of the new trustee, etc. or incorporated trust property administrator
for reimbursement of expenses, etc., compensation for damages, or payment of trust fees; provided,
however, that the new trustee, etc. or incorporated trust property administrator shall only be liable
for using property that belongs to the trust property to perform this obligation.
² The provisions of Article 48, paragraph ¯ and Article 49, paragraph ± and paragraph ² shall
apply mutatis mutandis to the right that the former trustee has under the provisions of the preceding
paragraph.
³ Execution, execution of a provisional seizure or provisional disposition, procedures for the
exercise of a security interest, or an auction which has already been commenced against property
that belongs to the trust property before a new trustee assumes the oce of trustee, may be continued
against the new trustee.
´ The former trustee may retain property that belongs to the trust property until the former
trustee receives satisfaction of the claim pertaining to the demand under the provisions of paragraph
±.
(Liabilities of the Former Trustee and the New Trustee for Obligations Succeeded To)
Article 76 ¬ Even where obligations pertaining to trust claims are succeeded to by the new trustee
pursuant to the provisions of paragraph ¬ or paragraph ­ of the preceding Article, the former
trustee shall be liable to perform the obligations thus succeeded to using the former trustee's own
property; provided, however, that this shall not apply if the former trustee is only liable for using
property that belongs to the trust property to perform such obligations.
­ Where the new trustee has succeeded to the obligations prescribed in the main clause of the
preceding paragraph, the new trustee shall only be liable for using property that belongs to the trust
property to perform those obligations.
(Transfer, etc. of Trust Aairs from the Former Trustee to the New Trustee, etc.)
Article 77 ¬ Where the new trustee, etc. assumes the oce of trustee, the former trustee shall,
without delay, settle the accounts on trust aairs and request approval for the settlement of accounts
from a beneciary (if there are two or more beneciaries at the time in question, from all of them; if
there is a trust caretaker at the time in question, from the trust caretaker), and shall transfer trust
aairs as required in order for the new trustee, etc. to administer them.
­ Where a beneciary (if there is a trust caretaker at the time in question, the trust caretaker;
the same shall apply in the following paragraph) has approved the settlement of accounts set forth in
the preceding paragraph, the former trustee shall be deemed to have been released from the liability
to the beneciary to transfer trust aairs under the provisions of said paragraph; provided, however,
that this shall not apply if the former trustee has committed misconduct in the course of the duties.
® Where a beneciary has not made any objection within one month from the time when the
3.1. TRUSTEE 77
of the status of the trustee would be determined by the agreement in practice. In
this meaning, the dismissal of a trustee by a court for the reason of the loss of
the condential relationship between trust parties also would be done depending, in
essence, on the manifestation of the will to dismiss the trustee by the settlor or the
beneciary12.
It is concerning a way of distribution of the duties and responsibilities rather than
of the powers that practical problems tend to happen in the succession of the status
of trustee. If there happens some trouble on the distribution of the power of the
trustee, it would be in the case where already resigned trustee concludes a trading
contract or the like on the trust property with a third party, then the third party
claims the obligation on the trust property applying the apparent agency institute,
or in similar cases. But to such cases the arguments for the institute of the apparent
agency without authority could be applied without modication, so the fact that it
happens concerning a trust relationship would add nothing to the complication of
the problem. In contrast to that, as for the duties and responsibilities of the trustee,
the causes have occurred before the resignation of the former trustee but the eects
beneciary was requested by the former trustee to give an approval for the settlement of accounts set
forth in paragraph ¬, the beneciary shall be deemed to have approved the settlement of accounts
set forth in said paragraph.
(Transfer, etc. of Trust Aairs from the Former Trustee's Heir, etc. or the Bankruptcy Trustee to
the New Trustee, etc.)
Article 78 The provisions of the preceding Article shall apply to the former trustee's heir, etc. in
cases where the trustee's duty as trustee has been terminated on the grounds set forth in Article 56,
paragraph ¬, item 1 or item 2, and to the bankruptcy trustee in cases where the trustee's duty as
trustee has been terminated on the grounds set forth in Article 56, paragraph ¬, item 3.
12(Dismissal of the Trustee)
Article 58 ¬ The settlor and the beneciary may, based on an agreement between them, dismiss the
trustee at any time.
­ When the settlor and the beneciary have dismissed a trustee at a time that is detrimental to
the trustee, the settlor and the beneciary shall compensate the trustee for any damages; provided,
however, that this shall not apply if there was a compelling reason for such dismissal.
® Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding two paragraphs, if the terms of trust otherwise
provides, such provisions shall prevail.
¯ When the trustee has caused a substantial detriment to the trust property through a breach of
the duties or where there are other material grounds, the court may, upon the petition of a settlor
or a beneciary, dismiss the trustee.
° Before dismissing the trustee pursuant to the provisions of the preceding paragraph, the court
shall hear a statement from the trustee.
± The judicial decision on the petition for permission set forth in paragraph ¯ shall include the
reasons for said decision.
² A settlor, trustee or beneciary may le an immediate appeal against a judicial decision of
dismissal under the provisions of paragraph ¯.
³ The provisions of paragraph ¬ and paragraph ­ shall not apply where there is no settlor at
the time in question.
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appeared after the succession in most cases. Is sometimes happen that the acts of
both the former trustee and the new trustee convolutedly contribute to the eects.
So, the distribution of the responsibilities between the former and new trustees are
to be disputed.
The most clear-cut interpretation of this problem would be like following. The
responsibility of trustee is that of each trustee in person, rather than of the status.
So, if the liability is the eect of the behavior of the former trustee, the former trustee
should take it even after the resignation from the post of the trustee, and the new
trustee takes no responsibility for that. This thought theoretically supposes that the
trustee in person is the object of the condence in the trust relations and that the legal
liability of the trustee comes from the personal judgement of the trustee. However,
under this way of thinking, the beneciary should estimate at the time of the succes-
sion of the status of trustee the probability of the occurrence of any damage caused by
the acts already done by the former trustee before the succession. Besides, the bene-
ciary must always take the risk for the claim against the former trustee to become
dicult to be collected or even practically worthless by the death or bankruptcy of
the former trustee. Moreover, some of beneciaries may have not the beneciary yet
at the time of succession in some cases. Therefore, careful considerations would be
necessary on whether we can suppose the beneciary could watch and control over
the process of the succession of the status of trustee, except for such a case as the
former trustee is dismissed by the application of the beneciary. However, according
to the thought, when the acts of the former and new trustees concurrently generated
some harmful results, the former and new trustee should jointly take the responsi-
bility. When there is some interval between the causing action and the occurrence
of the harmful eect, the new trustee would also have some part in the trust works
that led to the damage, so, in most cases, the beneciary could call for the compen-
sation of the damage against the new trustee as one of the joint obligors. Then one
could expect that the probability for the beneciary to lose the chance to get the
compensation of the damage will be actually not so high.
On the other hand, if one considers the responsibility of trustee, not as that of
the concrete trustee in person, but as that associated with the legal status of trustee,
the trustee should claim the compensation of the damage against the trustee at the
time of the occurrence of the eect. This conclusion is still a clear-cut one, although
in opposite direction to the thought described above. However, this way of thinking
would lead to an unexpected result from the stand point of the new trustee, for the new
trustee might be claimed the compensation of the damage whose cause was wholly
the action of the former trustee before the succession of the status. So, the to-be
trustee must scrutinize very carefully the conditions of the trust in succession of the
status of trustee. In addition, from this opinion's point of view, the legitimacy of the
legal status of trustee would be grounded not only on the condence from the other
trust parties but also on the enough funds or some abstract nancial reliability of the
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trustee, so there may happen some contradictions to the theoretical construction of
the fundamental structure of trust.
3.2 Beneciary
(1) The qualications for Beneciary
A beneciary is a person who is to get the benet from the administration of the
trust property. But a beneciary has no authority to administer the trust property
unless she/he is also the trustee at the same time. Therefore, a beneciary, as a
general rule, doesn't bear the duty or responsibility of the failure in administration
of the trust property or the damage from the failure of the trust property. As for
the benets a beneciary could get, there is no need for the beneciary to have the
ownership or the other property right on the benets and it is enough for the prots
to be legitimately held or consumed by the beneciary, so a beneciary doesn't need
to have even the capacity to hold rights in some cases. Viewing from those facts, as
for the qualications for beneciary, the ability to administer property or the capacity
for liability is not required, in contrast to the case of trustee, so that the capacity
or situation to make the benets from a property administration available for the
beneciary is enough.
In addition, it is a part of the judgements for the trust property administration
when a beneciary could get what benet from the trust property. Therefore, as far
as the trustee are performing appropriately the duties, there is no problem even if
the prots from the administration was not paid at once to the beneciary. It would
be enough that the actual payment is done in the course of the trust administration
later when it has become possible according to the calculation. The argument above
would be unaected even if some concrete prescriptions are provided in the terms of
trust or the other agreements.
So, it is not necessary that the person/s to be the beneciary/beneciaries is/are
dened and actually ready to get the benets from the trust at the establishment
time. In fact, under both the former and current statutes, the provision only pre-
scribes that the person determined to be the beneciary in the terms of trust can by
operation of law acquire the benets from the trust and there is no provision con-
cerning the qualications for beneciary13. Moreover, both statutes doesn't contain
13Article 7 of the former statute A person designated by the provisions of terms of trust as one
who is to be a beneciary shall acquire a benecial interest by operation of law, provided, however,
that if the terms of trust otherwise provides, such provisions shall prevail.
(Acquisition of Benecial Interest)
Article 88 ¬ A person designated by the provisions of terms of trust as one who is to be a beneciary
(including a person designated as an initial beneciary or as a new beneciary after a change as a
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any provision to require the actual denite existence of the beneciary at the time of
the establishment of the trust. Therefore, we could conclude, as the interpretation of
the current statute, that the denite existence of the beneciary is not necessary at
the time of the establishment of trust and that a person, a corporation or even an
association without legal personality could be a beneciary as far as it is suitable to
the trust purpose.
Since the legal theoretical precondition of the inference described above is only the
fact that a beneciary doesn't need the power to administer the property, the conclu-
sion would be same under any theoretical construction concerning the fundamental
structure of trust. However, from the viewpoint of the doctrine that the beneciary
is the substantial owner of the trust property, the lack of the existence or deniteness
of the beneciary who should be the actual center of the trust relationship may cause
some instability of the establishment of the trust at rst glance. But since the trustee
who is both the administrator and the nominee of the trust property exists, as far
as a system to make the prot readily available after the beneciary is specied is
prepared, the non-existence or indeniteness of the beneciary itself doesn't aect
the validity of the trust relationship.
However, that the beneciary is not specied in spite of the establishment of the
trust brings about the situation that the prots which belong to none continue to exist
until the beneciary is specied. So, in such a case that a conict of interests among
the parties concerned occurred on the specication of the beneciary, or under the
legal system where the taxation is solely based on the actual income of the beneciary
so that there is no incentive to hasten the specifying of the beneciary, the beneciary
may be kept unspecied for considerably long time.
However, as for the conict of interests among the parties concerned, a speedy
specication of the beneciary would not resolve the problem. Rather important
concern is to protect the prots from some unjustied consumption by the other
persons. From this oint of view, it might be rather desirable to have the trustee
administer the prots in the established trust relationship. As for the taxation system
problem, since the determination of the concrete form of the enjoyment of the benets
by the beneciary is entrusted to the terms of trust or the other agreement based
on the free wills of the trust parties, it would be dicult to repress completely some
strategic operation by the parties concerned with the terms of trust in order to lighten
the tax in some degree. An only possible way may be legislate a taxation institution
result of the exercise of the right to designate or change beneciaries as prescribed in paragraph ¬
of the following Article) shall acquire a benecial interest by operation of law; provided, however,
that if the terms of trust otherwise provides, such provisions shall prevail.
­ If a person designated as one who is to be a beneciary as prescribed in the preceding paragraph
does not know that the person has acquired a benecial interest pursuant to the provisions of said
paragraph, the trustee shall notify such person to that eect without delay; provided, however, that
if the terms of trust otherwise provides for, such provisions shall prevail.
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to impose a tax on the trustee or the trust property itself in the trust relationship
whose the beneciary is non-existent or indenite14.
Therefore, even though the concrete determination of the beneciary takes some
time and costs, the establishment of the trust doesn't need to be delayed until the
specication of the beneciary, and even if the some long time has passed in the state
of the absence or indeniteness of the beneciary, the trust cannot be taken as invalid
only by the fact, at least in theory. Rather, in such a trust relationship in which the
state of the absence or indeniteness of the beneciary continues for a long time,
the probability of the attainment of the purpose of the trust would be considered as
quite low, which may well be picked up in the legal interpretation as the cause of the
termination of the trust.
By the way, the arguments described above are, as mentioned at the beginning of
this section, theoretically based on the supposition that a beneciary has not admin-
istration power on the trust property. However, as for the possible responsibility of
beneciary to a third party, one could ground it on the very fact that the beneciary
is to get benets from the trust property, whether the beneciary has the administra-
tion power on the trust property. As for the detail of this argument, we will discuss
it in Chapter 5 Section 3.
(2) Co-Beneciaries  Sequentially Ordered Beneciaries
When there are plural beneciaries in one same trust relationship, those beneciaries
are called \co-beneciaries". If it is determined in terms of trust that the termination
of the enjoying the benet for one of the co-beneciaries causes the beginning of the
enjoyment of the benets for another of the co-beneciaries, these beneciaries are
called \sequentially ordered beneciaries". From the viewpoint of those denitions,
\co-beneciaries" would be the upper concept of \sequentially ordered beneciaries".
But in practical business, \co-beneciaries" case means exclusively the situation in
which plural beneciaries in one trust relationship are enjoying at the same time
the benet from the trust property and is mostly laterally distinguished from the
sequentially ordered beneciaries case. Following explanations will follow the practical
convention.
14(Special provisions for the trust etc. without the beneciary etc.)[excerpt]
Article 9-4 of Inheritance Tax Act ¬ When the trust lacking the beneciary etc. takes eect, if
a person to be the beneciary etc. of that trust falls under those determined as the relatives of
the trustee of that trust by a governmental order (called \relatives" thereafter in this and the next
articles) (in the case in which a person to be the beneciary in the trust is not clear, if the relatives
of the trustee are to get the transfer of the trust property when the trust terminates), the trustee of
that trust is considered to get the right concerning the trust from the settlor by gifts (if the trust is
to be eectuated by the death of the settlor, by testamentary gifts) at the time of the eectuation
of the trust.
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It is when there are some conict of interests among the plural beneciaries that
legal trouble occurs on the trust relationship, whether it is the case of co-beneciaries
or of sequentially ordered beneciaries. The current Trust Act prescribes that, in the
case of a trust with plural beneciaries, the trustee should perform the duties \equi-
tably" for those beneciaries.15. But since there is no prescription on the denition
of the \equitably", it is impossible to draw some concrete standard for resolutions of
the conict only from this provision.
Generally speaking, the prots a trust property can yield are limited, so, since
there are plural beneciaries in a trust relationship, conicts of interest among those
beneciaries necessarily occurs. Especially in a co-beneciaries case in which plural
beneciaries get the benets at the same time from the trust property, some direct
collision of interests among the beneciaries tend to happen concerning the concrete
sharing of the prots. In a sequentially ordered beneciaries case, the timings of
the enjoyments of the benets are shifted, so that the conict of interests would not
easily come to the surface. But considering in some long period, one could usually
realize that there is some clear conict of interests among the beneciaries also in a
sequentially ordered beneciaries case.
Anyway, since the concrete form of the enjoyment of the benets from the trust
property by the beneciaries is based on the agreement between the trust parties, the
policy of the resolution of the conict of interests among the beneciaries should be
also on the interpretation of the agreement between the trust parties with putting the
trust purpose on the theoretical center. Therefore, in both cases of co-beneciaries
and of sequentially ordered beneciaries, the points to be in mind for the conict of
interests among beneciaries are: Firstly, if there is some explicit provision in the
terms of trust or any other clear agreement between the trust parties concerning that
problem, it should be obeyed rst. Secondly, if there is no explicite provision in the
terms of trust or the like, one should interpret the terms of trust suitably to the trust
purpose. Thirdly, if any clear conclusion could not be drawn by the rst and second
interpretational policies above, each beneciary should share the benets or interests
in equal ratio.
The argument concerning a co-beneciaries or sequentially ordered beneciaries
case described above supposes \one same trust relationship" in which the plural bene-
ciaries enjoy the benets at the same time or sequentially. But the practical problem
in actual cases is whether the beneciaries in mutually legally dierent trusts can be
treated essentially same as those among whom there is legally a \co-beneciaries" re-
lationship, when those trusts are actually performed in unication. A similar problem
would happen also for the \sequentially ordered beneciaries" relationship when the
15(Duty of Equity)
Article 33 In the case of a trust with two or more beneciaries, the trustee shall perform duties of
the trustee equitably on behalf of these beneciaries.
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timings of the enjoyments of the benets are shifted sequentially among the plural
beneciaries in plural trusts administered in unication.
There is no established doctrine for the interpretation of the legal relations among
plural trust properties administered in combination. There are various possible ways
of interpretation. For example, one could interpret it simply as mutually independent
plural trust relationships. Or, one could consider the trust properties in combined
administration as substantially one unied trust property and try to deduce some
unied conclusion wholly on the combined trust property. Or, one could think that
there is established a stratied trust relationship among the properties in the plural
trusts or between the combined trust and each individual trust, so that, while keeping
formal distinction between the each trust property and the combined property, the
legal eects from all the individual trust properties should be substantially related
with each other through the benecial rights. However, after all, since the grounds
that necessitate the combine administration of trust properties or the purposes of the
individual trusts would have very rich variety, an interpretation cannot help sticking
to the agreement in each trust relationship.
Similarly, the cause of the practical necessity to create substantial but informal
co-beneciary or sequentially ordered beneciary through an actually unied admin-
istration of the properties of mutually dierent individual trusts would be various as
well as the purposes of individual trusts. Therefore, any way of thinking has a reason
in some degree whether the importance is put on the formal legal individuality of
each trust or on the actual united administration of all the trust properties. So, there
is practically no need to decide denitely whether that trust should be taken as a
co-beneciaries case or a sequentially ordered beneciaries case or neither. However,
viewing from this stand point, if the purposes or terms of the individual trusts　 are
not congruent with each other, the interpretation of the trust relationships as a whole
may become so complicated that it would be dicult for the parties concerned to an-
ticipate the resolution of some conict of interests. But, since the purpose or terms of
trust is concluded being based on the intentions and acceptance of the trust parties,
it cannot be helped that the trust parties must shoulder certain actual disadvantages
from the complication of the interpretation at the time of the dispute.
(3) Candidate for Beneciary
As we referred to in describing the qualications for a beneciary, it is not required
for all of the beneciaries to be specied and exist at the time of settling of the trust.
Under the situation that the trust relationship has been continued for some time,
there may appear someone who is not the beneciary yet but may possibly satisfy
the conditions for being the beneciary in some future. Whether such a not yet but to
be beneciary, namely, a candidate for the beneciary should be treated as a kind of
beneciary is a rather complicated problem. By the way, the candidate for beneciary
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here means the one who has the possibility never to satisfy the condition to be the
beneciary. So, the candidate for beneciary has theoretically quite dierent property
from the \beneciary in future" who is not a beneciary at present but planed to be a
beneciary in future, or the \sequent beneciary" or the \following beneciary" who
is planed to become a beneciary after the termination of benetting of the former
beneciary. For the beneciary in future or sequent or following beneciary already
satises the condition to be the beneciary in the trust relationship but merely the
beginning of the enjoyment of the benets is postponed to the future time.
As a general legal principle not restricted to the trust institute, it is after the
establishment of the legal relationship and the legal positions between the parties
that the right and duty relationship between them are validly eectuated. Therefore,
even when a candidate for beneciary considerably is expected to be the beneciary in
near future with considerably high probability, as far as the legal status is uncertain,
the creation of the right and duty as a beneciary for the person is only after the
assumption of the status of the beneciary by the person. Therefore, a mere expected
interest, whether legally, as \a candidate for beneciary" cannot be the ground for the
execution by the candidate for beneciary of the supervising power as the beneciary
over the concrete actions for the trust administration, but only for not being unfairly
or illegally treated concerning the judgement of the qualications of the person for
the beneciary.
The problem here is whether a candidate for beneciary has some legitimate inter-
est to ask for the continuing of the trust relationship until the candidate is ready to
be judged to satisfy the condition to be the beneciary. In fact, there may be certain
conict of interests between a candidate for beneciary and the present beneciary
who has already enjoyed the benets, in some respects. On can imagine a situation
that the present beneciary agrees that the trust should terminate, so that the ex-
pected interests of the candidate for beneciary to enjoy the benets in a future are
spoiled. For example, in the case of a trust relationship whose purpose is to supply
the pensions to the retired employees of an organization, if the installments paid by
the employees who are candidates for the beneciary serves partly the costs to ad-
minister the funds as the trust property, the situation that the trust is terminated
according to the agreements only by the present beneciaries, namely, the retired
employees and the liquidation of the trust property is processed would lead to the
result that the payments of the pensions for the retired employees are secured at the
cost of the present employees. This appears unfair.
The reason why it appears unfair would be because it is natural for the candidates
for beneciary to suppose their payments of the installments would be the funds for
their future rights to enjoy the benets as the beneciary of the trust, even if there is
almost no economically substantial link between those payments and benets. This
supposition is consistent also from the viewpoint of a principle that an individual
person will act for the self-interests in its private legal behavior and it would be
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congruent with the substantial intent of a candidate for beneciary in entering into
the trust relationship with the purpose of supplying pensions, for she/he are willing
to pay the installment because it would be protable to her/himself.
However, since the payments of installments by candidates for beneciary should
be done in advance to become the true beneciary by the very structure of the con-
tract, the risk of insolvency of the funds is inevitable in theory. So, unless the employ-
ees are actually forced to enter the pension trust or there is almost no explanation
of the rights and duties of the pension contracts to the employees, it is, at least
within the present legal frame, dicult to allow the candidates for beneciary some
substantially equivalent rights and powers to the true beneciary only by the fact
that the termination of the trust relationship at certain time causes a damage to the
substantial interests of the candidates for beneciary who were expecting to take the
post of the beneciary.
Therefore, if the expectation of a candidate for beneciary to get the benets
from the trust property after taking the post of the beneciary in a future should
be protected, there should be some institutional machinery that would protect such
expectations so as to secure the condence on such a trust relationship from the
parties concerned. Concretely, a plan to select a trust manager as the representative
of the interests of the candidates for beneciary and to make clear the entrustment
relation with the candidates for beneciary would be appropriate viewing from the
general theory of trusts or the eciency of the practical works for the administration
of the trust property.
(4) Holder of a Vested Right
\Holder of a vested right" means a person to whom the rest of the trust property
belongs after the liquidation process by the termination of the trust is completed. The
holder of a vested right is a status to get the benets from the trust property, though
after the termination of the trust, so, in this meaning, we could say it is actually
the \last" beneciary of the trust. If one thinks like above, the holder of a vested
right has the interest as actual \beneciary" on the plan to determine when the trust
terminates and how the liquidation of the trust property is processed. Instead, if one
thinks that the right and power of the \beneciary" of a trust continue to exist only as
far as the trust relationship exits and that the holder of a vested right is a repository
of the rest of the trust property selected from the parties concerned in order to avoid
the no-owner situation of the rest of the trust property after the liquidation, then the
right of a vested right holder to get a part of the trust property in future is only an
interest in expectation, so that even when some action which is disadvantageous to
the person to be the vested right holder is done in the course of the liquidation of
the trust property, the to be vested right holder has no means to lodge an objection
against the action. The current Trust Act prescribes that a holder of a vested right
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is deemed to be a beneciary during the liquidation of the trust16, so two ways of
thought described above are mixed in the statute.
Who will become the holder of a vested right is determined according to the
provision of the terms of trust, if any. Otherwise, the settlor or the successor(s) will
become the holder of a vested right. When the holder cannot be specied in spite
of all above, the trustee who executed the liquidation of the trust property will be
the holder of a vested right17. According to the common opinion under the former
statute, the reason why the settlor or the successor becomes the holder of a vested
right when there is no special provision in the terms of trust is because the trust was
originally settled by the intension of the settlor so that it would be a natural intension
to revert to the situation as similar as possible to that before the settlement of trust,
namely, to make the rest of the trust property belong to the settlor or the successor
unless a special intension to make the rest of the trust property belong to another
person is expressed in the terms of trust. However, that theory is supposing that a
trust relationship is settled by the intentions of the settlor and the eect of the will
should reach even to the termination time of the trust. It may be consistent when one
puts an importance on the intension of the settlor and the acceptance of the trustee
at the time of the settlement of the trust in interpreting the trust relationship. But
when one thinks what is important in a trust relationship is a condential relationship
between the trustee and the beneciary, the settlor would not take part in the trust
relationship except for the settlement, so that the former common opinion loses its
ground. On the other hand, the current statute prescribes that if the terms of trust
contains no special provision concerning the designation of a beneciary for residual
assets, it is deemed to be provided in the terms of trust that the settlor or the
16(Holder of a Vested Right)[excerpt]
Article 183 ...
± A holder of a vested right shall be deemed to be a beneciary during the liquidation of the
trust.
17(Vesting of Residual Assets)
Article 182 ¬ Residual assets shall vest in the following persons:
1. the person designated by the terms of trust as the person who is to be the beneciary in
relation to distribution claim as a beneciary involving the distribution of residual assets (referred
to as the \beneciary for residual assets" in the following paragraph); and
2. the person designated by the terms of trust as a person in whom residual assets should be
vested (hereinafter referred to as the \holder of a vested right" in this Section).
­ Where the terms of trust contains no provisions concerning the designation of a beneciary
for residual assets or holder of a vested right (hereinafter collectively referred to as a \beneciary
etc. for residual assets." in this paragraph) or where all persons designated by the provisions of the
terms of trust as beneciaries for residual assets, etc. have waived their rights, it shall be deemed
as having been provided by the terms of trust that the settlor or settlor's heir or other universal
successor is to be designated as the holder of a vested right.
®When the vesting of residual assets is not determined pursuant to the provisions of the preceding
two paragraphs, residual assets shall vest in a liquidation trustee.
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successor is to be designated as the holder of a vested right18. In eect, the current
statute is trying to ground the result that the settlor or the successor becomes the
holder of a vested right on the ctional designation in the terms of trust. However,
the supposition that the settlor has such an intent is inconsistent with the way of
treatment of settlor in the other provisions of the current Trust Act, so that it is
dicult to give a clear cut explanation for this problem.
(5) Beneciary after the Extinction of the Benecial Right
A typical problem concerning the relation between plural beneciaries in one trust
relationship is how to treat in the trust relationship the beneciary for whom the
benets or especially economic prots intended in the terms of trust is extinct. On
the other hand, the theoretical explanations for it are rather clear. In the end, the
orientation of the interpretation is determined by how to think of the nature of the
beneciar right the beneciary has in the trust relationship.
If one thinks that the nature of the benecial right is the enjoyment of the concrete
economic benets from the trust property or especially to get the share of the prots
from the property management with the trust property as the funds, then, since
the beneciary has gotten all the prots she/he could get after the extinction of the
\enjoyment of benet", the most natural thought would be that the beneciary loses
the meaning to stay the post after the extinction of the enjoyment of the benet
so that she/he would break away from the trust relationship. So the ex-beneciary
now has no legal relation to the trust relationship, she/he would not have any intrest
on the loss or damage to the trust property after the breaking away, so that no
adjustment including her/him would be necessary unless the benets she/he got in
the past was illegal. On the other hand, that ex-beneciary has lost also the rights
and powers on the trust property after the breaking away, so there is no room for the
ex-beneciary to complain any unfair treatment with the other beneciaries after the
breaking away. A typical case for such a situation is that after a beneciary left from
the trust relationship by the extinction of the benecial right, a part of the terms of
trust or the administration policy of the trust property is changed by an agreement
between the trustee and the rest of the beneciaries.
Instead, if one thinks that the nature of benecial right is the substantial own-
18(Vesting of Residual Assets)[excerpt]
Article 182 ...
­ Where the terms of trust contains no provisions concerning the designation of a beneciary
for residual assets or holder of a vested right (hereinafter collectively referred to as a \beneciary
etc. for residual assets." in this paragraph) or where all persons designated by the provisions of the
terms of trust as beneciaries for residual assets, etc. have waived their rights, it shall be deemed
as having been provided by the terms of trust that the settlor or settlor's heir or other universal
successor is to be designated as the holder of a vested right.
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ership of the trust property or that the supervising power of beneciary should be
executable over the individual actions by the trustee for the administration of the
trust property, then, even after the right for a beneciary to enjoy the benets from
the trust property extinguished, the nature of the benecial right is unaected, so
there is no reason to deprive the beneciary of the status of a beneciary unless there
is some agreement to do that and beneciary shouldn't be thought to break away
from the trust relationship. In this care, since the beneciary after the extinction of
the benet is still a beneciary of the trust equitable treatments of the beneciaries
including one who still enjoy the benets would be naturally required in all cases.
So, the beneciary whose right to enjoy the benets was extinguished may exercise
its supervising power over the administration actions of the trust property. On the
other hand, as far as the beneciary after extinction of the benets is still one of the
beneciaries, that beneciary may have to bear the responsibility as a trust parties
when the liability as the trust party is claimed, for instance, when the past enjoyment
of the benet by the beneciary illegally harmed a third party or when the bene-
ciary got unfairly much benets in the past at the expense of the other beneciaries.
In such cases, the return of the benets that beneciary got in the past and/or the
compensation of the damage would be claimed against that beneciary.
As we just have seen, the interpretation on the status of the beneciary after
extinction of the enjoyment of the benets changes depending on the way of thinking
on the nature of benecial right. In addition, as for the conclusions on concrete
problems, any one of them is not always advantageous to that beneciary. In the end,
we should consider the purpose of that trust and the interpretation of the nature of the
benecial right in the terms of that trust in detail. But, even if we put an importance
on the interpretation of the concrete trust terms, there is still left a problem. For
in the trust relationship in which the equitable treatments of the ex-beneciary and
the current beneciary is concerned, there are two dierent types of beneciaries,
so that a congruent \nature" of the benecial right may not be deducible for all
the beneciaries. Then, we would confront with a very dicult problem, namely, on
what standard we should judge the \equitableness" in dispute among the beneciaries
who have the benecial rights of mutually dierent natures. From the stand point
described above, there is no way but to deduce the conclusion from the interpretation
of the purpose of the trust even in such cases. But such a stand point may make it
dicult to anticipate what interpretational policy will be taken in a future dispute.
So, practically, it would be needed to provide explicit provisions in the terms of trust
to settle the policy of the interpretation in case of conict.
(6) Assignee of Benecial Right
Since a benecial right is a kind of property right whose content is to enjoy the various
benets from the administration of the trust property, it can be assigned to another
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person like the other property rights unless the assignment is prohibited by law or
the other orders. A possible problem in the assignment of the benecial right is what
is the content of the right or power the assignee has gotten.
In principle, the content of the right or power the assignee of the benecial right
would get is same as that of the benecial right the assignor had unless the terms
of trust provide some provisions which prescribes some changes of the content of the
right by assignment. It is naturally consistent with a major principle that none can
assign the right or power one doesn't hold to the assignee.
Then, a practical problem is whether the assignee should be bound with the terms
of trust when there are various restrictions on assigned benecial right in the terms of
trust. For instance, imagine the case that in order to create a trust relationship with a
third party as the beneciary, a self-benet trust with the trustee as the beneciary is
settled at rst but with various restrictions on the benecial right, then the benecial
right is assigned to the third party. A practical interpretation problem in such a case
is whether the latter trust relationship is valid as if it were a trust relationship with
the third party as the beneciary from the beginning.
The background thought of this problem is that allowable extents of the restriction
on the content of the benecial right would be dierent between a self-benet trust
and a non-self-benet trust. The reason of the thought is like follows. On the one
hand, in the case of a self-benet trust, the beneciary is the settlor in person, so,
however the benecial right is set or what restrictions are imposed on the benecial
right in the terms of trust, the inconvenience or damage from those are to be borne
by the settlor her/himself. Therefore, any restrictions could be taken as valid in a
self-benet trust. On the other hand, in the case of the non-self-benet trust, it is a
third party who enjoy the benets from the trust property, and placing restrictions
on the contents of the benecial right in the terms of trust may create a kind of
\sanctuary" within the trust property in the meaning that any execution of the right
or the power by anyone cannot interfere in that area. So, in a non-self-benet trust,
the allowable extent of the restrictions on the contents of the benecial right would
require the more careful considerations (see Chapter 2 Section 1).
The thought like above is supposing that the contents of the benecial right in a
non-self-benet trust should be, in principle, same as those of the ownership or any
other legally dened property right without any trust relationship. However, it is not
rare to place various restrictions on the benecial right in the terms of trust in order to
realize the legal eect which would not be attainable through any other property right
or legal construction than a benecial right of the trust, although, surely, the benecial
rights of many trusts have essentially same contents as some ordinary property right.
A typical example is to restrict or to prohibit the assignment of the benecial right
in order to to prevent the trust property from being scattered, which is valid in
trust law unless the purpose could be seen as violating public order or standards of
decency. Therefore, it is rather natural in the trust relationship in which it is put
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on the center for all the parties concerned to be bound with the result of the trust
property administration according to the purpose of the trust, that the contents of a
benecial right is restrictive compared with the ownership or the other property right
in relation to the trust property. The fact that the content of the benecial right can
be freely determined in the terms of trust including its restrictions is also one of the
fundamental characteristics of trust. In addition, if that thought described above is
intending to imply that creating so called legal \sanctuary" in a non-self-benet trust
leads to some social injustice, a self-benet trust also should have the same problem.
So there should be no reason to dierentiate a non-self-benet trust from a self-benet
one concerning the restrictions on the content of the benecial right. Therefore, we
conclude that there is no reason to give dierent interpretational conclusions on the
case in which a self-benet trust is settled rst and then the benecial right is assigned
to a third party, on the one hand, and on the case in which a non-self-benet trust is
settled from the beginning, on the other hand.
Generally, when a benecial right is assigned, the assignee should be assigned the
benecial right with knowing all the restrictions on that right prescribed in the terms
of trust. Then, even if there are some restrictions etc. which are inconvenient for the
assignee, such inconveniences should be reected in the price the assignee is to pay
for the benecial right to the assignor. This argument is surely supposing the case
in which the assignment of the benecial right is based on the contractual agreement
between the assignor and the assignee. But even when a benecial right is transferred
through an execution procedure or the like, since the content of the right or power
the beneciary had is not beyond that which is restricted by the terms of trust, there
is no reason for the purchaser who has got the benecial right to be able to have more
right or power than as it is, unless those restrictions on the benecial right in the
terms of trust constitute any obstruction of the execution procedure. Moreover, also
in a case in which a benecial right is transferred by inheritance, since a presumed
heir cannot exercise any concrete right or power over the content of the property right
to be inherited by the presumed heir, when the decedent settled a trust and put some
restrictions on the benecial right in the terms of trust, the presumed heir cannot
stop it. So the content of the benecial right the heir inherits should be congruent
with that restricted by the terms of trust.
So, our conclusion is like follows. Any restrictions on the content of the benecial
right in the terms of trust should be valid whether the trust is self-benet or non-self-
benet unless such terms of the trust themselves are deemed to be invalid because of
the violation of public order or standards of decency. And as far as a benecial right
becomes an object of transference, such restrictions on the content of the benecial
right should be unchanged before and after the transference unless that content is
susceptible to the character or property of the individual beneciary.
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3.3 Settlor
(1) Qualications for Settlor
A settlor is a person who settles a trust to create a trust relationship and transfers its
own property to the trustee, or who makes its own property to be the trust property
in a self trust. From this point of view, the qualications for a settlor will be, at
minimum, to own the property to be the trust property and to have the ability to
set the purpose of a trust and the power to transfer its own property to the trustee
or to change that to be the trust property. In addition, if one puts an importance on
the fact that the settlor sets the trust purpose, so that one thinks the settlor should
have the power to supervise or to decide the fundamental administration policy in the
trust relationship, then the settlor should possess the ability to exercise appropriately
the supervising power over the administration actions by the trustee. Moreover, If
one takes into consideration also the possibility that the settlor or the successors
may become the holder of a vested right when there is no provisions concerning it
in the terms of trust, then the qualications for a settlor would include those for a
beneciary.
Under the former statute, a settlor was the person to settle the trust and, at
the same time, had the supervising power equal to that of the beneciary and the
status of the holder of a vested right after the termination of the trust19. By contrast,
the current statute takes the status of the settlor to be a mere settlor of the trust
19Article 16 of the former statute [excerpt] ...
­ A settlor or the successor, beneciary or trustee may assert an objection to the execution,
provisional seizure, provisional disposition or exercise of a security interest, or auction that is being
commenced in violation of the provision of the last paragraph.
Article 23 of the former statute [excerpt] ¬ When, due to the special circumstances that were
unforeseeable at the time of an act of trust, the method of trust administration no longer conforms
to the interests of the beneciary, the settlor or the successor, the beneciary or the trustee can le
a petition of a modication of the trust to the court.
Article 27 of the former statute When any loss to the trust property occurred by an inappropriate
administration action by the trustee or when the trustee disposed of the trust property in violation
of the terms of trust, the settlor or the successor, the beneciary or the other trustee may claim the
compensation of the loss or the restration of the trust property against that trustee.
Article 40 of the former statute [excerpt] ...
­ The settlor or the successor or the beneciary may make the requests to inspect the documents
concerning the trust administration and ask the questions on the actions for the trust administration
to a trustee.
Article 62 of the former statute [excerpt] At the termination of the trust, where there is no holder
of a vested right dened in the terms of trust, the trust property shall belong to the settlor or the
successor.
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relationship and emphasizes by an explicit provision that the right or power of the
settlor could be restricted or deprived of by the terms of trust20, so that the current
statute very strongly restrains the status of the settlor as a supervisor or a holder
of a vested right. If one supposes, like the current statute, that the settlor should
participate in the trust relationship only at the settling phase, it would be enough
that the qualications for a settlor is satised at the time of the settlement, so that,
even if the settlor has lost the qualication after the settlement, it would have no
eect to the trust relationship.
In relation to the legal positioning of the status of the settlor in a trust rela-
tionship, we should discuss how the intensions of the trust parties are related with
the attainment of the purpose of the trust. Surely, if the settlor exercises a strong
supervising power over the administration of the trust property, the signicance of
the settlement of the trust may be almost lost in some case, for then there would be
substantially no dierence from the situation that the trust property owned by the
settlor. However, the will of the beneciary who is enjoying the benets from the
trust property isn't always congruent with the attainment of the purpose of the trust.
In this meaning, it is not necessarily unreasonable measures for the attainment of the
purpose of the trust to give a supervising power over the actions of the trustee to
the settlor who has no personal interest in the condition of the administration of the
trust. Viewing from the wording of the current provision, it merely prescribes that
the terms of trust may provide for a settlor not to have all or part of the rights or
powers, so the existence of right or power of the settlor itself is not wholly negated.
First of all, the settlor would participate as the party in the setting of the terms of
trust which contains provisions to restrict or deprive of the rights or powers of the
settlor. Taking those factors into consideration, as the meaning of the current provi-
sion, what should be emphasized is the fact that the trust parties have been given a
choice of the distribution of the rights and powers to attain the purpose of the trust.
So, we should not interpret the current provision as adopting one theoretical doctrine
for the status or qualications of the settlor.
(2) Succession of the Status of the Settlor
In the cases of the succession of the status of the settlor, a succession of the status as
the person who settled the trust relationship sometimes provides a practical problem
when the settlement process contains some failures or when the liability of the settlor
is claimed in relation to the settlement act of the trust. On the other hand, after
a trust relationship has been validly established, a succession of the status of the
settlor, in principle, doesn't cause any legal problem. Presumed heirs of the settlor
20(Settlors' Rights, etc.) [excerpt]
Article 145 ¬ Terms of trust may provide for a settlor not to have all or part of the rights under the
provisions of this Act.
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also have fundamentally no legal relation to the trust relationship except that they
may become the holders of a vested right at the time of the termination of the trust.
However, if one thinks that the settlor should have the supervising power over
the administration of the trust property or if the supervising power of the settlor is
actually admitted in the terms of trust, the problem of the succession of the status of
the settlor may come to the surface both theoretically and practically. As referred to
above concerning the status and qualications of the settlor, the possible ground of
the legitimacy for the supervising power of the settlor over the administration of trust
would be that the intension of the settlor should be respected in determining the policy
of the administration of the trust property. If so, since a heir of the settlor doesn't
inherit the intension itself of the settlor, it becomes theoretically questionable for such
an heir to succeed to the supervising power of the settlor over the administration of
the trust property and to exercise it quite equal to the late settlor. In fact, an heir
of the settlor has the status of a person to whom the trust property might have
belonged if there had not been the settling of the trust by the settlor. In addition,
where the holder of the rest of the trust property after the liquidation is not specied
in the terms of trust, an heir of the settlor may get the rest of the trust property
as the holder of a vested right. Taking those facts into consideration, an heir of
the settlor may think it more advantageous for her/himself to terminate the trust
relationship so as to execute the right as the holder of a vested right than to let the
trust property be administered according to the purpose of the trust. Then, it will
be surely questionable whether a person having such a partial interest is appropriate
for the supervisor over the administration of the trust property.
As a conclusion, as far as the attainment of the trust purpose is thought to be
important, we should be careful in allowing the heirs of the settlor to succeed the
supervising power which the settlor had over the administration actions on the trust
purpose.
3.4 The Other Parties
(1) Trust Caretakers
A \trust caretaker" is a person who has the supervising power over the administration
of the trust property to protect the interests of the present or future beneciaries
where there exists no beneciaries in the trust relationship at present or where there
is a possibility to occur some conict of interests among the beneciaries. A trust
caretaker stands on the status of the agent or representative of the beneciaries in that
she/he performs the supervising power on the trustee on behalf of the beneciaries.
But seeing from another side, since the trust caretaker never enjoys the benets from
the trust but exercises its supervising power on behalf of all the beneciaries, the
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status is rather similar to that of the trustee. Therefore, it would be inappropriate
for the qualications for the trust caretaker to be thought as conforming to those for
the beneciary. Rather, what is important on the qualications for the trust caretaker
will be an ability to properly exercise the supervising power over the administration
of the trust property.
However, the current statute prescribes a \beneciaries meeting" in which a reso-
lution of the general will through the discussion among the beneciaries and the de-
cision by the majority will be realized when there are many beneciaries in a trust21.
While, the provision concerning the trust caretaker gives only the case of the absence
of the beneciary as the example, so there is no provision which prescribes a set up
of the trust caretaker in the case that there are many beneciaries22. However, what
21Article 105 ¬ In the case of a trust with two or more beneciaries, the beneciaries' decisions
(excluding decisions on the exercise of the rights listed in the items of Article 92) shall be made with
the unanimous consent of all beneciaries; provided, however, that if the terms of trust otherwise
provides, such provisions shall prevail.
­ In the case referred to in the proviso to the preceding paragraph, if it is provided in the terms
of trust that beneciaries' decisions shall be made by majority vote at a beneciaries meeting, the
provisions of the following Subsection shall apply; provided, however, that if the terms of trust
otherwise provides, such provisions shall prevail.
® Notwithstanding the provisions of the proviso to paragraph ¬ or the preceding paragraph,
provisions of the terms of trust on the method of making decisions on release from liability under
the provisions of Article 42 shall be eective only if they are provisions to the eect that such
decisions are to be made by majority vote at a beneciaries meeting as provided for in the following
Subsection.
¯ The provisions of the proviso to paragraph ¬ and the preceding two paragraphs shall not apply
to exemptions from liability listed as follows:
1. a total exemption from liability under the provisions of Article 42;
2. a partial exemption from liability under the provisions of Article 42, item 1 (limited to
liability arising in cases where the trustee was willful or grossly negligent in the performance of the
duties); and
3. a partial exemption from liability under the provisions of Article 42, item 2.
22(Appointment of a Trust Caretaker)
Article 123 ¬ Provisions may be established in terms of trust to designate a person who is to be the
trust caretaker in cases where there is no beneciary at the time in question.
­ If the terms of trust contains provisions designating a particular person to be the trust caretaker,
any interested party may specify a reasonable period of time and call on the person designated as
the one who is to be the trust caretaker to give a denite answer within that period of time with
regard to whether the person will accept the oce; provided, however, that if the terms of trust
designates a condition precedent or a time of commencement to said provisions, this may only be
done after the condition precedent is fullled or after the time of commencement arrives.
® Where a call for an answer is made under the provisions of the preceding paragraph, if the
person designated as the one who is to be the trust caretaker fails to give a denite answer to the
settlor (if there is no settlor at the time in question, to the trustee) within the period set forth in
said paragraph, it shall be deemed that the person does not accept the oce.
¯Where there is no beneciary at the time in question, if the terms of trust contains no provisions
concerning a trust caretaker or if the person designated by the provisions of the terms of trust as
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will form the base of the decision of the beneciaries in a beneciaries meeting is an
accumulation of the individual wills of the beneciaries, so that such an individual
will inevitably contains a pursuit for the private interest, not only for the interest of
the trust relationship on the whole. In this respect, the decision making by the ma-
jority of the beneciaries in the beneciaries meeting has quite dierent legal nature
from the setting of the trust caretaker who exercises the supervising power over the
administration of the trust property on behalf of the future and present beneciaries
from a third party's stand point. In addition, the beneciaries who can attend the
beneciaries meeting are restricted to the present beneciaries, so in order to protect
the interests of the future possible beneciaries there is no way but to assign a third
party to the representative or agent and to send her/him to the meeting. By the way,
the \beneciary's agent" prescribed in the current Trust Act23is in eect an agent of
the \present beneciary", so, such an agent cannot be thought as representing also
the candidates of beneciary who are not yet the beneciaries.
Viewing from the considerations described above, it should be allowed that a
trust caretaker is freely set up by the act of trust wherever it is dicult for all the
beneciaries to get to an agreement and, on the other hand, it is inappropriate to
interpret the provision of the current statute as prohibiting the setting up of the trust
the one who is to be the trust caretaker does not accept or is unable to accept the oce, the court
may appoint a trust caretaker at the petition of an interested party.
° When a judicial decision on the appointment of a trust caretaker has been made under the
provisions of the preceding paragraph, it shall be deemed that the provisions set forth in paragraph
¬ were established in the terms of trust with regard to the appointed trust caretaker.
± The judicial decision on the petition set forth in paragraph ¯ shall include the reasons for said
decision.
² The settlor or the trustee, or the trust caretaker at the time in question, may le an immediate
appeal against a judicial decision on the appointment of a trust caretaker under the provisions of
paragraph ¯.
³ The immediate appeal set forth in the preceding paragraph shall have the eect of a stay of
execution.
23(Appointment of a Beneciary's Agent)
Article 138 ¬ Provisions may be established in the terms of trust to designate a person who is to
be the beneciary's agent, while specifying the beneciary or beneciaries whom the person is to
represent.
­ If an terms of trust contains provisions designating a particular person to be the beneciary's
agent, any interested party may specify a reasonable period of time and call on the person designated
as the one who is to be the beneciary's agent to give a denite answer within that period of time
with regard to whether the person will accept the oce; provided, however, that if the terms of
trust designates a condition precedent or a time of commencement to the provisions, this may only
be done after the condition precedent is fullled or after the time of commencement arrives.
® Where a call for an answer is made under the provisions of the preceding paragraph, if the
person designated as the one who is to be the beneciary's agent fails to give a denite answer to
the settlor (if there is no settlor at the time in question, to the trustee) within the period set forth
in said paragraph, it shall be deemed that the person does not accept the oce.
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caretaker for the case that there are many beneciaries.
(2) Mediator of Trading
As typical in the investment trust (collective investment scheme) the purpose of which
is captal investment, it is not rare in practical business that a professional mediator
intermediates the trading between the parties in the course of the settlement or ter-
mination of the trust or of the administration of the trust property so that she/he
performs necessary clerical works or transfers the investments or the prices. It is not
an easily solvable problem how to position theoretically the status of such a mediator
of trading in relation to the trust parties.
To whom of the trust parties could such a mediator be seen substantially equal?
Is she/he an agent of the settlor? Or an agent of the trustee? Or an agent of the
beneciary? Or, rather, not an agent of any trust party at all but an independent legal
subject? The answer may depend on the stand point or condition of the disputant.
Moreover, the intermediation actions by such a mediator has begun with the invitation
of the investors before the settlement of the trust and lasts up to the transfer of the
rest of the property after the completion of the liquidation at the termination of
the trust. That means, the legal relations among the parties concerned which one
need to consider include not only those during the trust relationship is being validly
maintained but also those before the settlement and those after the termination of
the trust. So the argument will be still more complicated. If the legal status of the
mediator is prescribed in the terms of trust, surely it may be useful for resolving
concrete problems in that trust relationship. But even then, since such terms of trust
cannot x the general position of the mediator theoretically in the legal structure of
trust, such a resolution may be not the denitive one but only a supercial one.
However, in the contrary, we could doubt the necessity of such a general theory
for the status of the mediator which is uniformly applicable to all possible cases,
for the roles of the mediators and the concrete contents of the contracts in actual
trading have really great variety. Moreover, where the mediator can be essentially
identied with one of the trust parties, the signicance of the general legal status
of the mediator would be discounted so that what in turn comes to the surface are
concrete problems involving the conditions of the legal relations coming from the past
trading, the interlocking relation with capital or other various factors.
Taking those above into consideration, we may conclude that practically more
appropriate resolution could be expected by allowing terms of trust or the other
agreement between the trust parties to dene freely the status of the mediator in
each trust relationship than by a general theory. If one still sticks to the general
theory for the mediator, one should interpret the status of the mediator consistently
with the purpose of that trust.
Chapter 4
Supervision and Administration of
Trust
In this chapter we give an overview on the rights and duties relations among the
trust parties in the course of the administration of trust property. If one thinks it
better to secure the variety of the forms of legal relationships or the purposes of
trusts, regulations by trust law on trust relationships should be restrained as far
as the trust property is satisfactorily administered and the purpose of the trust is
properly pursued, for too rigid regulations may lead to the prohibition of the trust
parties' creativity concerning certain type of legal relationship. On the other hand,
since the conict of interests among trust parties may be always possible to occur, it
may not always lead to a satisfactory result that all the aairs of the trust are left
entrusted to the free agreements by the trust parties. So, what to be discussed is how
and what extent the regulations by trust law should be forced on the actual concrete
trust relationships.
4.1 The Power of Trustee
(1) The Theoretical Grounds for the Power of Trustee
A trustee has the power to administer the trust property according to the purpose
of the trust1. However, the explanations on the theoretical grounds for the trustee
to have such a power will considerably dier depending on the way of the theoretical
construction of the fundamental structure of trust.
1(Scope of the Trustee's Powers)
Article 26 A trustee shall have the power to administer or dispose of property that belongs to the
trust property and to conduct any other acts that are necessary to achieve the purpose of the trust;
provided, however, that this shall not preclude such power from being restricted by the terms of
trust.
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If one thinks that the trustee is the owner of the trust property and the beneciary
has a claim to the trustee to have the beneciary enjoy the benets from the trust
suitably to the purpose of the trust, then the legitimacy of the power of the trustee
is deduced naturally from the ownership of the trustee on the trust property. In this
case, even if there are some restrictions on the power of the trustee, such restrictions
are a kind of obligations on the trustee, so the nature of the trustee as the owner of
the trust property will be fundamentally unaected by the restrictions. Therefore,
as we will discuss later, even if the trustee deviated the power given in the terms of
trust, since the trustee keeps the status as the owner of the trust property, such a
deviation is a mere nonfulllment of the duty which has been imposed on the trustee
through the act of trust, so, in the course of the argument in this theory, it will be
premised that the act of the trustee is generally valid even in such a deviation case.
Instead, if one thinks that the beneciary is the substantial owner of the trust
property, since the trustee administers the trust property entrusted from the ben-
eciary, the substantial owner of the property, the ground of the legitimacy of the
trustee's power is some proof of that entrustment of the power of the beneciary to
the trustee. A typical example of such a proof is the terms of trust, but any other
special agreement between the beneciary and the trustee will be enough, too. In
addition, when the entrusting of the original administration power of the beneciary
to the trustee is based on the other legal provisions, for instance, in the case in which
on behalf of a minor the beneciary a person with parental authority assumes the
trustee, such legal relationship on the other provisions would be the proof. In such a
case, the content of the power the trustee has will be determined by the provisions
prescribed in the terms of trust. But where there is no explicit provision in the terms
of the trust, the content will be determined by the special agreement between the
beneciary and the trustee, if any. And if there is no such agreement, the content
of the power will be determined within a reasonable extent to which the beneciary
would entrust the power to the trustee in relation to the purpose of the trust. In the
case in which there is another legal relationship between the trustee and the bene-
ciary and the relationship is the foundation of that trust relationship, the scope of
the power of the trustee will be decided within a reasonable extent inferred from the
interpretation of such another regal relationship. So, if the trustee deviates the scope
of the power dened in the terms of trust or inferred from a reasonable interpretation
on the purpose of the trust, since there is no ground for the legitimacy of such an act
by the trustee, the argument in that theory would assume that the deviating act by
the trustee is generally invalid.
Instead, if one thinks that a trust property is an independent entity, so that the
trustee has the power to administer the trust property according to the purpose of
the trust, then the ground of the legitimacy of the power is a proof that shows the
existence of the independent trust property and grants the power to the trustee. The
only factor that satises both conditions will be the act of trust. In this case, the
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content of the power of the trustee will be determined by the provisions in the terms
of trust, if any. Otherwise, the scope of the power will be within a reasonable extent
inferred from an interpretation of the purpose of the trust. Under this thought, the
right of the beneciary to enjoy the benets from the trust property is a kind of
claim in relation to the trust property. So, when the beneciary and the trustee
personally agree on the scope and contents of the power of the trustee, the eect of
that agreement is interpreted as a kind of personal obligation between the beneciary
and trustee unless the agreement constitutes a part of the act of trust. Therefore, in
this theory, when the trustee acted in violation of that personal agreement with the
beneciary, that act by the trustee is generally valid as far as it is within the limit of
the power determined in the terms of trust.
(2) Delegation of the Trustee's Power to a Third Party
As for the question whether the trustee can delegate its administration power over the
trust property to a third party, the principle has been completely changed between
the former and the current statutes. Under the former statute, since the trustee was a
person on whom the beneciary or the settlor put a personal condence, the trustee
had the duty to administer the trust property in person, as a general rule, and a
delegation of the administrating power to a third party was allowable only where
there was some reason by which it was unavoidable2. By contrast, the current statute
lists three reasons where the trustee is allowed to delegate the administration power
to a third party, namely, where the terms of trust allows it, where it is suitable to
the purpose of the trust and where there is some reason that makes it unavoidable,
so that the delegation of the administrating power is allowed in the principle for
the attainment of the trust purpose3. However, even under the former statute, to
delegate a part of the power of the trustee by the act of trust is allowed through
interpretational theory. So, the legislation of the current statute may have made no
big dierence practically to the standard of the conict resolutions compared with
2Article 26 of the former statute [excerpt]
¬ The trustee may delegate the trust administration to another person only if there is some
ground to make it unavoidable unless otherwise prescribed in the trust terms.
3(Delegation of Trust administration to a Third Party)
Article 28 In the following cases, a trustee may delegate the trust administration to a third party:
1. where it is provided by the terms of trust that the trust administration is to be or may be
delegated to a third party;
2. where the terms of trust does not contain any provisions concerning the delegation of the
trust administration to a third party, but delegating the trust administration to a third party is
considered to be appropriate in light of the purpose of the trust; and
3. where it is provided by the terms of trust that the trust administration shall not be dele-
gated to a third party, but delegating the trust administration to a third party is considered to be
unavoidable in light of the purpose of the trust.
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the situation under the former statute.
But as for the theoretical positioning of this problem, the orientation of the argu-
ment will be quite dierent between the current and the former statutes. For, while
the former statute took the problem as that of whether the trustee will be charged
with a liability, the current statute interprets the problem of a delegation of the
trustee's power to a third party as a kind of the execution of the trustee's power in
itself. Under the current law, since a trustee can delegate a part of her/his power to
a third party as far as it is within the power, a trustee should consider in the course
of the administration whether each concrete action would be done by her/himself or
delegated to a third party. When there occurred some loss on the trust property
as the result that a trustee did not appropriately delegate the execution of power
to third party, the trustee may be charged with the liability of the violation of the
duty of care as a bona de administrator because of the inappropriate execution of
the power. In this meaning, while outwardly the provisions of the current statute is
positioning the problem of a delegation of a trustee's administration power to a third
party to a part of the execution of the trustee's power, the current law substantially
imposes on the trustee the obligation to appropriately delegate a part of the power
to a third party as a part of the duty of a bona de administrator of the trustee. In
sum, the two sides principle of the power is recognizable also in this respect. That
is, the fact that an additional power is given to the trustee augments the concrete
factors the trustee should take into consideration in executing the power, so that the
probability of the occurrence of the liability of the trustee may be heightened.
As for the legal status of the third party who is delegated a power by the trustee,
various ways of legal construction are possible. But the plainest one among them
will be to consider the delegation of the power by the trustee to a third party as
a mandatary or agency relationship between the trustee and the third party. By
this thought, the third party will take the duties and responsibilities from the trust
relationship as an agent of the trustee within the power delegated. By the way, the
former statute provided that the third party who got the delegation of the power by
the trustee should take responsibility directly to the beneciary4. But even if there
were no such provisions, a similar conclusion could be deduced by an application of a
mandatary or agency relationship prescribed in the civil code (see Paragraph­ Article
107 of Civil Code). As for the trustee's responsibility in the case of the delegation
of the power to a third party, the common opinion thinks the responsibility will be
\limited" on the choice of and the supervision over that third party5. If one sticks
4Article 26 of the former statute [excerpt]
...
® A person who performs the trust aairs on behalf of the trustee shall take the responsibility
equal to the trustee.
5Article 26 of the former statute [excerpt]
...
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to the thought that such a third party is an agent or mandatary of the trustee, it is
dicult to judge that the trustee may avoid the responsibility as \the principal". But
when the third party violated the limit of the delegated power, the responsibility of
the trustee to choose or to supervise that third party will be asked in accordance with
the general principle of the employer's liability. However, since the ability to perform
concrete acts for the administration of trust property and the ability to to select an
appropriate third party and to supervise the actions in the case of the delegation of the
trustee's power are mutually qualitatively dierent things in practice, the expression
that the responsibility of the trustee is \lightened" or \limited" to the choice of or
the supervision over the third party is quite misleading. Rather, we would say, the
trustee takes a qualitatively dierent duties and responsibilities concerning the choice
and supervision in the case of the delegation of the trustees power.
On the other hand, as for the status of the third party who is delegated the
trustee's power, the theoretical construction like following could be possible. That is,
the trustee re-entrusts a part of the property to a third party, then the third party
administers that trust property as the trustee of the following trust. By this way of
thought, the execution of the power by the third party is based on the third party's
own power that was given to the third party as the trustee in the following trust,
so that the trustee of the original trust stands substantially as a representative of
the beneciary of the original trustee. So, the scope of the supervising power of the
trustee over the third party's execution of the power will be considerably reduced
compared with the case that the third party is taken as the agent or mandatary of
the trustee. Then, the liabilities of the trustee of the original trust will be reduced to
those from the inappropriate settlement of the following trust and the inappropriate
(non-)execution of the supervising power as the beneciary of the following trust. In
this meaning, the responsibility of the trustee would be \limited" within \the choice
and supervision", or rather, change its nature.
(3) Right of Reimbursement of Expenses
If a trustee has paid necessary expenses for the trust administration or has got damage
without the trustees negligence in the course of the trust administration, the trustee
can receive the reimbursement for such expenses or the compensation of the damages
from the trust property6. A trustee, on the one hand, administers the trust property,
­ In the case prescribed in the last paragraph, the trustee shall take the responsibility only on
the choice and supervision of that another person.
6(Reimbursement of Expenses, etc. from the Trust Property)
Article 48 ¬Where a trustee has paid, from the trustee's own property, expenses that are considered
to be necessary for the trust administration, the trustee may receive reimbursement for such expenses
and interest thereon accruing from the date of payment (hereinafter referred to as \expenses, etc.")
from the trust property; provided, however, that if the terms of trust otherwise provides for, such
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provisions shall prevail.
­ When a trustee needs expenses for the trust administration, the trustee may receive advance
payment thereof from the trust property; provided, however, that if the terms of trust otherwise
provides for, such provisions shall prevail.
® In order to receive advance payment of expenses from the trust property pursuant to the
provisions of the main clause of the preceding paragraph, a trustee shall give notice to a beneciary
of the amount of advance payment to be received and the basis for the calculation of such amount;
provided, however, that if the terms of trust otherwise provides for, such provisions shall prevail.
¯ Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph ¬ or paragraph ­, where a trustee has incurred
liability under the provisions of Article 40, the trustee may not receive reimbursement for expenses,
etc. or advance payment of expenses until after the trustee performs such liability; provided, however,
that if the terms of trust otherwise provides for, such provisions shall prevail.
° In the case referred to in paragraph ¬ or paragraph ­, a trustee shall not be precluded from
receiving reimbursement for expenses, etc. or advance payment of expenses from a beneciary based
on an agreement between the trustee and the beneciary. (Method of Reimbursement, etc. for
Expenses, etc.)
Article 49 ¬ Where a trustee may receive reimbursement for expenses, etc. or advance payment of
expenses from the trust property pursuant to the provisions of paragraph ¬ or paragraph ­ of the
preceding Article, said trustee may transfer monies that belong to the trust property to the coers
of trustee's own property, up to the amount receivable.
­ In the case prescribed in the preceding paragraph, when necessary, a trustee may dispose of
property that belongs to the trust property (excluding such property whose disposal would make
it impossible to achieve the purpose of the trust); provided, however, that if the terms of trust
otherwise provides for, such provisions shall prevail.
® In the case prescribed in paragraph ¬, if any of the items of Article 31, paragraph ­ apply, a
trustee may transfer property that belongs to the trust property other than monies, to the coers of
trustee's own property, instead of exercising the right under the provisions of paragraph ¬; provided,
however, that if the terms of trust otherwise provides for, such provisions shall prevail.
¯When proceedings are commenced for execution against or for the exercise of a security interest
in property that belongs to the trust property, the right that a trustee has pursuant to the provisions
of paragraph ¬ shall be deemed to be a monetary claim in relation to such proceedings.
° In the case referred to in the preceding paragraph, a trustee who has proved that the trustee
has the right prescribed in said paragraph by means of a document certifying the existence of said
right may also demand a distribution under the proceedings for execution or for the exercise of a
security interest set forth in said paragraph.
± The right that a trustee has pursuant to the provisions of paragraph ¬ with regard to expenses,
etc. for the preservation, liquidation, or distribution of property that belongs to the trust property,
which has been conducted in the common interest of creditors (limited to creditors who hold claims
pertaining to the obligation covered by the trust property; hereinafter the same shall apply in this
paragraph and the following paragraph) shall, in the proceedings for execution or for the exercise
of a security interest set forth in paragraph ¯, prevail over the rights of other creditors (in cases
where such expenses, etc. were not benecial to all creditors, those who did not benet from such
expenses, etc. shall be excluded). In this case, said right has the same rank in the order of priority
as a statutory lien prescribed in Article 307, paragraph ¬ of the Civil Code.
² The right that a trustee has pursuant to the provisions of paragraph ¬ with regard to the
expenses, etc. which fall under the following items shall, in the proceedings for execution against or
for the exercise of a security interest in the property set forth in the respective items, as set forth
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but, on the other hand, legally gets no prot from the trust administration itself, so, it
in paragraph ¯, prevail over the rights of other creditors for the amount specied in the respective
items:
1. the amount of expenses paid for the preservation of property that belongs to the trust
property or any other amount that is considered to be necessary for maintaining the value of such
property: such amount; and
2. the amount of expenses paid for the improvement of property that belongs to the trust
property or any other amount that is considered to be conducive to increasing the value of such
property: such amount or the amount of the increase in value at the time in question, whichever is
smaller.
(Subrogation of a Trustee through Performance of Obligations Covered by the Trust Property)
Article 50 ¬ Where a trustee has performed an obligation covered by the trust property by using
trustee's own property, when the trustee acquires the right under the provisions of paragraph ¬ of
the preceding Article through such performance, the trustee shall be subrogated to the creditor who
holds the claim pertaining to said obligation covered by the trust property. In this case, the right
that the trustee has pursuant to the provisions of said paragraph shall be deemed to be a monetary
claim in relation to such subrogation.
­ When a trustee is subrogated to the creditor set forth in the preceding paragraph pursuant to
the provisions of said paragraph, the trustee shall give notice to the creditor, without delay, to the
eect that the claim held by the creditor is a claim pertaining to an obligation covered by the trust
property and that the trustee has performed said obligation by using the trustee's own property.
(Reimbursement of Expenses, etc. and Simultaneous Performance)
Article 51 A trustee may, before the right that the trustee has pursuant to the provisions of Article
49, paragraph ¬ is extinguished, refuse to perform the obligation of distribution involving the trust
property to a beneciary or a holder of a vested right prescribed in Article 182, paragraph ¬, item
2 ; provided, however, that if the terms of trust otherwise provides, such provisions shall prevail.
(Measures for Trust Property that Is Insucient for the Reimbursement of Expenses, etc.)
Article 52 ¬ Where a trustee wishes to receive reimbursement for expenses, etc. or advance pay-
ment of expenses from the trust property pursuant to the provisions of Article 48, paragraph ¬ or
paragraph ­ but the trust property (excluding any property that may not be disposed of pursuant
to the provisions of Article 49, paragraph ­; the same shall apply in item 1 and paragraph ¯) is
insucient to provide such reimbursement or advance payment, the trustee may terminate the trust
if the trustee has given notice of the following matters to the settlor and the beneciary but has not
received reimbursement of expenses, etc. or advance payment of expenses from the settlor or the
beneciary even when a reasonable period of time set forth in item 2 has elapsed:
1. a statement to the eect that the trustee is unable to receive reimbursement of expenses,
etc. or advance payment of expenses due to the insucient trust property; and
2. a statement to the eect that the trustee will terminate the trust if the trustee is unable
to receive reimbursement of expenses, etc. or advance payment of expenses from the settlor or the
beneciary within a reasonable period of time specied by the trustee.
­ For the purpose of the application of the provisions of the preceding paragraph in cases where
there is no settlor at the time in question, the phrase \the settlor and the beneciary" and \the
settlor or the beneciary" in said paragraph shall be deemed to be replaced with \the beneciary."
® For the purpose of the application of the provisions of paragraph ¬ in cases where there is no
beneciary at the time in question, the phrase \the settlor and the beneciary" and \the settlor or
the beneciary" in said paragraph shall be deemed to be replaced with \the settlor."
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is natural from the viewpoint of equity that the trustee who paid the expenses as the
administrator or got some damage without the negligence can get the compensation.
However, as for the theoretical construction to explain the legal eect, there are
various possibility depending on the theory to be adopted concerning the fundamental
structure of trust. In addition, we should note that the conclusion on the question,
from whom the trustee would get the compensation, may vary even in the principle
corresponding to the way of thought concerning fundamental structure of trust.
First, if one thinks that the trustee owns the trust property, the expenses or
damage caused by the trust administration will be generally charged to the trustee
as the owner at rst. However, since the trustee does not get the benets from
the property administration, it may be inequitable that the trustee bears only the
expenses of the damage. So the trustee is allowed, according to her/his own judgement
and discretion, to get the reimbursement of those expenses or damage from the trust
property of the beneciary who get the benets from the trust administration by the
trustee. The the provision concerning the right for the reimbursement in Trust Act
embodies that principle of equity.
In contrast, if one thinks that the beneciary substantially owns the trust property,
the expenses or losses generally should be paid from the beneciary as the substantial
owner of the trust property, so, the trustee should not be left charged with those
expenses. Therefore, the expenses or damage the trustee has paid should be able to
be restored at the beneciary's cost. However, it will be practically convenient for the
expenses or damage to be compensated for from the trust property. The the provision
concerning the right for the reimbursement in Trust Act provides the concrete process
to adjust the expenses of damage which the trustee once has gotten but should nally
result in the charge of the beneciary.
On the other hand, if one thinks that the trust property is an entity substantially
¯ Where the trust property is insucient to provide for reimbursement of expenses, etc. or
advance payment of expenses pursuant to the provisions of Article 48, paragraph ¬ or paragraph ­,
or if there is neither a settlor nor a beneciary at the time in question, the trustee may terminate
the trust.
(Compensation for Damages Out of the Trust Property)
Article 53 ¬ In the cases listed in the following items, a trustee may receive compensation from the
trust property for the amount of damages specied in the respective items; provided, however, that
if the terms of trust otherwise provides for, such provisions shall prevail:
1. where the trustee has suered any damages in the course of administering trust aairs, in
the absence of trustee's own negligence: the amount of such damages; and
2. where the trustee has suered any damages in the course of administering trust aairs due
to an international or negligent act of a third party (excluding the case set forth in the preceding
item): the amount of compensation that may be demanded from such third party.
­ The provisions of Article 48, paragraph ¯ and paragraph °, Article 49 (excluding paragraph ±
and paragraph ²), and the preceding two Articles shall apply mutatis mutandis to the compensation
for damages from the trust property under the provisions of the preceding paragraph.
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independent of the trust parties, the trust property itself should be generally charged
with the expenses or damages caused from the trust administration. So, there is
no reason for the trustee who is the administrator of the property, as well as the
beneciary who gets the benets from the trust property, to be charged with the
expenses and damage without its own failure. Therefore, the trustee who has paid
the expenses and damages can generally claim the reimbursement against the trust
property, but not against the beneciary directly. The the provision concerning the
right for the reimbursement in Trust Act simply embodies this principle, in which
the trustee can get the reimbursement of the expenses or the compensation of the
damage from the trust property.
As we have seen, the dierence of the way of thinking on the fundamental struc-
ture of trust aects the basic conclusion on the question, who should be generally
charged with the expenses or damages caused from the trust administration, so who
should, in principle, become the other party of the claim of the reimbursement of the
compensation by the trustee. But since there is an explicit provision in Trust Act, the
claim of the reimbursement or compensation can be satised from the trust property,
anyway. However, since, as described above, the theoretical ground of the claim of
the reimbursement etc. by the trustee is dierent, the legal nature of the claim is
interpreted dierently, so that, for instance, as for the question whether a creditor of
the trustee can be subrogated to the reimbursement claim of the trustee and directly
claim the payment of the credit to the trust property, or the question such a creditor
can apply the seizure of the reimbursement claim and the exaction of the credit on
the trust property, there may be left some disputable points. In this type of problem,
the conclusion diers depending on the answer of the question whether the trustee
can give up the reimbursement right by her/his own discretion. If on thinks it is in
principle the trustee that should be charged with the expenses etc., the answer will
be negative, while, if one thinks instead it is the beneciary or the trust property
that the expenses etc. should nally fall on, the answer will be positive, so that the
execution of the right by the creditor of the trustee against the trust property will be
armed.
By the way, under the former statute, since the trustee could claim the reimburse-
ment of the expenses also against the beneciary7, some complicated considerations
7Article 36 of the former statute ¬ A trustee may, for the reimbursement of taxes and other
public charges or the other expenses that the trustee has paid concerning the trust property or the
compensation for any damages that the trustee has suered in the course of administration the trust
aairs in the absence of the trustee's own negligence, sell a trust property so as to collect the claim
in advance of the other right holders on the trust property.
­ The trustee may require the beneciary, as for the expenses or damages in the last paragraph,
to pay the value or to provide an appropriate security unless the beneciary is still unspecied or
not exist yet.
® Where the trustee has renounced the right in the last paragraph, the provision of the last
paragraph shall not apply.
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and arguments were necessary in order to explain theoretically that provision and to
determine the concrete range of the beneciaries who may get claimed the reimburse-
ment etc.. But the current provisions restricts the range of the target of the claim
to the trust property and newly prescribes the termination of the trust to liquidate
the trust property in case that the trust property is insucient to cover the value
of the reimbursement8. Concerning those provisions, from the stand point that the
beneciary is the substantial owner of the trust property, some explanation may be
necessary for the restriction of the target of the reimbursement claim to the trust
property. On the other hand, from the stand point that the trustee will adjust the
sharing of the cost in the course of the trust administration, one could value the fact
that those provisions have made practical dispositions simpler.
(4) The Eect of the Execution of the Power of Trustee
It is a matter of course that the eect of the execution of the trustee's power reaches
to the trust property. But as for the theoretical construction for that, the way of the
explanation varies according to the thought concerning the fundamental structure of
trust.
If one thinks that the trustee is the owner of the trust property, since a legitimate
execution of the power by the trustee is one by the owner of the trust property, it
is natural for the eect to reach throughout the trust property, in addition, it would
aect the legal condition of the trustee in person. Therefore, the right and duty
relationships created in the course of the administration of the trust property would
8(Measures for Trust Property that Is Insucient for the Reimbursement of Expenses, etc.) [ex-
cerpt]
Article 52 ¬ Where a trustee wishes to receive reimbursement for expenses, etc. or advance pay-
ment of expenses from the trust property pursuant to the provisions of Article 48, paragraph ¬ or
paragraph ­ but the trust property (excluding any property that may not be disposed of pursuant
to the provisions of Article 49, paragraph ­; the same shall apply in item 1 and paragraph ¯) is
insucient to provide such reimbursement or advance payment, the trustee may terminate the trust
if the trustee has given notice of the following matters to the settlor and the beneciary but has not
received reimbursement of expenses, etc. or advance payment of expenses from the settlor or the
beneciary even when a reasonable period of time set forth in item 2 has elapsed:
...
(4) Where the trust property is insucient to provide for reimbursement of expenses, etc. or
advance payment of expenses pursuant to the provisions of Article 48, paragraph ¬ or paragraph ­,
or if there is neither a settlor nor a beneciary at the time in question, the trustee may terminate
the trust.
(Compensation for Damages Out of the Trust Property) [excerpt]
Article 53 ¬ In the cases listed in the following items, a trustee may receive compensation from the
trust property for the amount of damages specied in the respective items; provided, however, that
if the terms of trust otherwise provides for, such provisions shall prevail:
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be established nominally as those between the trustee and the other parties, although
economically substantially between the trust property and the other parties. So, it
may become necessary to adjust the eects of the legal relationships in order to avoid
a too much complication of the legal relationships or to prevent any unfair gains by
the trustee.
Instead, if one thinks that the beneciary is the substantial owner of the trust
property, since an execution of the power by the trustee is one as the administrator,
not as the owner of the trust property, the eect of the juristic act by the trustee
reaches only the beneciary as the substantial owner of the trust property, so that the
legal condition of the trustee in person would not be aected by the act. therefore,
the right and duty relationships created in the course of the trust administration
are established between the beneciary and the other parties both nominally and
substantially, but nit between the trustee and those the other parties. So, where any
of the other parties expected to create the legal relationship with the trustee who was
the outward title holder of the trust property, some means for the protection of the
interest of the other party may become necessary.
On the other hand, if one thinks that the trust property is an entity independent
of the trust parties, since the trustee exercises the power as the administrator of the
trust property but not as the trustee in person, the eect of the juristic act by the
trustee aects only the trust property, but not the trustee in person. Moreover, from
this way of thinking, since the trust property is independent also of the legal status of
the beneciary, the legal eect of the administration act will not reach the beneciary.
Therefore, the juristic act by the trustee as an execution of the power of the trustee
has the eect only between the trust property and the other party of the act, and
it will not establish any legal relationship between the trustee or the beneciary and
the other party. So, where that the other party didn't know the existence of the
trust relationship, or where the trust property was insucient to be charged with
the obligation, some measures to protect the interest of the other party may become
necessary.
As we have seen, although the juristic act as the execution of the power of the
trustee has no doubt the legal eect on the trust property, it may be controversial
depending on the theoretical construction whether the act may establish a legal rela-
tionship with the trustee who is the legal title holder of the trust property or with the
beneciary who is the economically substantial owner of the trust property or with
neither.
Among them, a possibly practical problem is the interest adjustment between
the other party of the trading act of the trustee and the beneciary. For, where
the beneciary has drawn the substantial economic prots from the trust property,
that the other party may expect to be able to claim some against the beneciary.
For example, where the trust property fell into the lack of the funds because of the
enjoyment of the benets by the beneciary and where the trustee also didn't have
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sucient means to fulll the obligation to the other party, the possibility to allow
that the other party to claim the fulllment of the obligation directly against the
beneciary will be practically paid much attention to from the viewpoint of economic
substantial equity. Seeing from general legal principle, since the execution of the
power of the trustee was done with the existence of the trust relationship and the
content of the power of the trustee expressed, no legal relationship will be created
between the beneciary and the other party of the trading act of the trustee unless
one sticks to the doctrine that the beneciary is the substantial owner of the trust
property. But this thought itself stands only when one can judge that the fundamental
legal relationship between the parties is nothing but a \trust". In fact, as we will
see later in Chapter 5 Section 3 in detail in relation to the responsibility of the
beneciary, the cases in which the legal relationship between formal trust parties
is interpreted as not a trust relationship in reality or as some complex of a trust
and agency relationships will be never rare in practice depending on the concrete
legal situations around the trustee and beneciary. Theoretical consideration in the
discussions of trust are always supposing that the object relationship is denitely a
\trust" one. But how a legal relationships between certain parties is interpreted in
the practical world may be largely uncertain.
(5) The Eect of the Violation of the Act of Trust
How one should think of the legal eect of an administrative act by the trustee where
a trustee performs the administrative act in violation of the terms of trust will depend
on the ground for the power of the trustee. As we have seen in (1) of this section, what
one thinks is the ground of the power of the trustee depends on its way of thinking
on the fundamental structure of trust. Therefore, the explanation of the eect of the
violative administration act by the trustee will depend on the way of thinking on the
fundamental structure of trust.
If one thinks that the trustee is the owner of the trust property, the power of the
trustee is based on the legal status of the trustee as the owner of the trust property,
so that the concrete prescriptions on the scope of the power in the terms of trust
or various restrictions or prohibitions on the execution of the power are all taken
as a kind of obligations of the trustee in person. Therefore, even when the trustee
performed the trust administration in violation of the terms of trust, since the trustee
has the legal status of the owner of the trust property, such a violative act is valid,
as a general rule. However, since such a violative act constitutes a violation of the
obligation on the trust act by the trustee, where a third party who is the partner of
the juristic act by the trustee can be seen as essentially unied with the trustee in
their legal statuses, for example, if the third party has known the fact of the violation
of the trust or if such a third party is a successor of the trustee, then some pursuit of
the liability may be possible to the third party. In sum, under this way of thinking,
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the ground for the eect for the property which once left the trust property by the
trustee's violative act to be restored to the trust property or for the damages to
the trust property by the trustee's violative act to be compensated cannot be the
invalidness of the administrative act by the trustee. So, one must argue that the
violative act is surely a mere breach of the obligation by the trustee but the trustee
and the third party who is the other party of the violative act can be essentially
identied with each other.
Instead, if one thinks that the beneciary is the substantial owner of the trust
property, the trustee can exercises the power only within the limit set by the ben-
eciary as the substantial owner, so the trustee's act that deviates from the scope
of the power will be invalid as the act without the authority. However, If one sees
the situation from the stand point of the third party who was the other party of the
violative act by the trustee, the third party may have had a good reason to believe
that the execution of the power by the trustee fell within the legitimate power of the
trustee, then the expect and interest of the third party should be protected. There-
fore, if there is some legitimate reason to protect the third party, for example, where
the third party was in good faith without negligence at the time of the violative act
of the trustee, the invalidness of the violative act cannot be insisted in relation to
such third party. By the way, in this case, since the protection of the interest of the
third party is based on the legitimate reason of the third party to believe the outward
validity of the violative act by the trustee, so a possible negligence on the side of
the beneciary as the substantial owner of the trust property would not taken into
consideration. In sum, under this way of thinking, an act in breach of trust is invalid
in principle. By that reason, it should be possible to take back the property that
has left the trust property by the violative act. But where there is a good reason to
protect the expect and interest of the third party who was the partner of the violative
act, the invalidness of the act cannot be insisted to the third party. In addition, as for
that good reason to protect the third party, the situations only on the side of the third
party will be taken into consideration. And as the eect of the interest adjustment,
the result may be either that the third party gets the right on the property as if there
were no breach of trust and the beneciary is charged with the damage or that the
third party gets the damage by the invalidness of the act by the trustee.
On the other hand, if one thinks that the trust property is an entity independent
of the trust parties, since the power of the trustee is determined solely by the terms
of trust, the act by the trustee deviating the given power is invalid as an act without
authority. There may be surely some cases in which the expect and interest of the
third party should be protected because there is a good reason for the third party to
believe in the legitimacy of the trustee's execution of the power. But, under this way
of thinking, the beneciary also has the interest to enjoy the benets from the trust
property, and that interest is a kind of the right in person to but not the substantial
ownership of the trust property. So, as for the property that has outwardly left from
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the trust property by the violative act, the beneciary still keeps the right on that
property since the violative act was invalid. Moreover that right of the beneciary is
logically compatible with the existence of the right of the third party on that property.
Therefore, under this way of thinking, in the case in which the trustee performed
an act in breach of trust, the right of the third party who was the partner of the
violative act and the right of the beneciary are concurrent on the property which
has outwardly left from the trust property by the violative act of the trustee, so that
the situations on the both sides should be comprehensively taken into consideration
in the interest adjustment between the beneciary and the third party. In sum, under
this way of thinking, while the ground of the claim of return of the property having
left from the trust property by an act in breach of trust by the trustee will be the
invalidness of that violative act, since there occurs the concurrence of the rights of
the third party who was the partner of the violative act and of the beneciary on
that property, the interest adjustment between them should be performed by taking
comprehensively the situations on the both sides, namely, not only those on the third
party but also those on the beneciary into consideration. By the way, as for the
eect of the interest adjustment from this theory's stand point, not only either all or
nothing conclusion for the one party but also some distributive adjustments may be
admissible in theory, for instance, to set the order of priority between the beneciary
and the third party or to divide the value of the contents of the rights between the
beneciary and the third party. This is because the interest adjustment between the
beneciary and the third party has the meaning not only of the judgement on the
validity of an act in breach of trust but also of the adjustment between the concurrent
claims. In this meaning, this theory may allow certain arbitrative conclusion based
on a comprehensive consideration of the concrete situations.
However, the current statute prescribes that where the other party to the act
knew or was grossly negligent in failing to know, at the time of the act, that the act
did not fall within the scope of the trustee's powers, a beneciary may rescind such
act9. The interest adjustment between the beneciary and the third party deduced
9(Rescission of Acts Conducted by Trustee Beyond the Powers) [excerpt]
Article 27 ¬ Where an act conducted by a trustee for the trust property does not fall within the
scope of the trustee's powers, a beneciary may rescind such act, if all of the following conditions
are met:
1. that the other party to the act knew, at the time of the act, that the act was conducted for
the trust property; and
2. that the other party to the act knew or was grossly negligent in failing to know, at the time
of the act, that the act did not fall within the scope of the trustee's powers.
­ Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding paragraph, where an act conducted by a trustee
to establish or transfer a right for property that belongs to the trust property (limited to such
property for which a trust registration as set forth in Article 14 may be made) does not fall within
the scope of trustee's powers, a beneciary may rescind such act, if all of the following conditions
are met:
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from that provision can be interpreted as giving the standard for identifying the
statuses of the trustee and the third party, as prescribing the situations for the third
party to be protected and as giving the standard for the comprehensive interest
adjustment between the beneciary and the third party, all alike. So, any stand point
on the fundamental structure of trust will not be theoretically inconsistent with the
provision. We can see there the reinforced neutral position of the current statute to
the trust theories.
4.2 The Duties of the Trustee
(1) The Nature of the Duties of Trustee
Most of the trustee's duties are explicitly prescribed in Trust Act. But the relation
between the logical structure of those provisions and their practical meaning is rather
complicated.
For instance, while the duciary duty of trustee should generally regulate the cases
of the conict of interest between the beneciary or trust property and the trustee
so uniformly that there should be no special exemption from the duty according to
the concrete result of an act in violation of the duciary duty, in practice, where the
concrete result is protable for the beneciary or the trust property, since no damage
is caused by the violation of the duciary duty, the trustee will be exempted from
the responsibility from the violation of the duty. On the other hand, as is typical
in the case of the duty of care of a good manager of the trustee, whether there is
a violation of a duty depends on the degree of the care paid by the trustee at the
time of the questioned action, so, even if some damages occur on the beneciary or
the trust property in the course of the actual disposition of the trust property, the
occurrence of the damage itself would never be a cause of the violation of the duty
from the logical point of view. However, in practical world, one tends to think that,
since there have occurred some damages on the trust property, there must be some
breach of the duty by the trustee. As the result, the damage may be easily attributed
to some violation of the duty.
On the other hand, the duties of the trustee are usually prescribed in the form
of prohibitions of some types of act to the trustee so as to prevent the trustee from
unfairly beneting her/himself. Based on that, even if the beneciary asked the
trustee for doing some type of act for the self interest, where such an act constitutes
an violation of the trustee's duty, the trustee should reject to perform that act.
1. that at the time of the act, the trust registration as set forth in Article 14 existed with regard
to the property that belongs to the trust property; and
2. that the other party to the act knew or was grossly negligent in failing to know, at the time
of the act, that the act did not fall within the scope of the trustee's powers.
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Viewing this fact from another side, restrictions on the action of the trustee by the
duty of the trustee are also protecting the trustee against the excessive demand by
the beneciary to act for the maximum prots for the beneciary at the cost of
the burdens or damages of the trustee so as to make the trustee possible to avoid
unnecessary damages.
Largely, the duties of trustee is generally interpreted as to prevent the trustee
from seeking the self interest so as to secure systematically that the trustee performs
the actions suitable to the attainment of the trust purpose, by prohibiting in advance
the trustee from certain types of act. But, in the practical world, the results of the
acts of the trustee are tend to be taken as quite important, and there are actually
some cases in which the interest of the beneciary are substantially prevailing against
the statutory prohibitions or restrictions on the actions of the trustee. Therefore,
when one confronts the question to what degree the duties of the trustee may be
\lightened" by the act of trust, one should note that the answer may be a character
of a double-edged blade in that the wider the scope of the discretional power becomes,
the weaker is the protection of the trustee from unnecessary damages or burdens in
eect.
(2) The Fiduciary Duty of Trustee (Duty of Loyalty)
\The duciary duty of trustee" is, literally interpreted, to require the trustee as the
duty, not only to obey the purpose of the trust in the administration of the trust
property but also to be faithful to the benet of the beneciary (the duty of loy-
alty). Actually, the provision of the current statute is adopting such an expression10.
However, what does it that a trustee acts \faithfully" on behalf of the beneciary?
or, conversely, what may actions of the trustee constitute a violation of the duciary
duty? or what does the \behalf of" the beneciary mean at all on which the trustee
should act \faithfully"? Those questions are never answerable only from the words
of the provision.
Under the former statute, there was no explicit provision on the duty of loyalty.
The common opinion enumerated as the possible types of the violation of the duty
of loyalty, rstly, an act in a situation of the conict of interest between the trustee
and the beneciary or the trust property, secondly, an act of the trustee to pursue
also the self interest in the administration of the trust property and, thirdly, an act
of the trustee to benet a third party in the administration of the trust property.
And the common opinion thought that, as for these three types of the act, those
acts are generally prohibited whether some damages occur by the act or not, in
order to prevent such damages in advance. they thought it was pursued by that
10(Duty of Loyalty)
Article 30 A trustee shall administer trust aairs and conduct any other acts faithfully on behalf of
the beneciary.
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for the appropriateness of the administrative actions of the trust property to be
institutionally secured.
However, the common opinion concerning the duty of loyalty under the former
statute didn't put an importance on the concrete result of the act by the trustee,
and, in addition, didn't admit the possibility of the immunity of the trustee from the
duty of loyalty by the approval of the beneciary or by the permission by a court.
So, where, for instance, the biggest benet can be brought about to the beneciary
by an act in a conict of interests situation by the trustee, since that type of act
is generally prohibited because of the duty of loyalty of the trustee, the apparent
opportunity of the \benet" for the beneciary was lost at the same time by the
duty of loyalty of the trustee. In this respect, the common opinion under the former
statute concerning the violation of the duty of loyalty must be judged that it could
not provide any persuasive argument in the appropriateness of the conclusions for the
practical business, except for the theoretical consistency.
The current statute, in contrast to the former statute, provides the existence of the
duty of loyalty in an explicit provisions, as we has seen. And following that provision,
the current statute prohibits generally a trustee to act in conict of interest with the
beneciary or the trust property11and to perform an act that may be in a part of the
11(Restriction on Acts that Create Conicts of Interest)
Article 31 ¬ A trustee shall not carry out the following acts:
1. causing property that belongs to the trust property (including any right for such property)
to be included in the trustee's own property, or causing property that belongs to the trustee's own
property (including any right for such property) to be included in the trust property;
2. causing property that belongs to the trust property (including any right for such property)
to be included in the trust property of another trust;
3. carrying out an act for the trust property with a third party while serving as the third party's
agent; and
4. establishing a security interest on property that belongs to the trust property in order to
secure a claim pertaining to an obligation that the trustee is liable to perform only by using property
that belongs to the trustee's own property, or carrying out any other act with a third party for the
trust property which would create a conict of interest between the trustee or an interested party
thereof and the beneciary.
­ Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding paragraph, in any of the following cases, a
trustee may carry out the acts listed in the items of said paragraph; provided, however, that this
shall not apply in the case set forth in item 2 if it is provided for by the terms of trust that the
trustee may not carry out said acts even in the case set forth in said item: 1. where it is provided
by the terms of trust that the trustee is allowed to carry out said acts;
2. where the trustee has disclosed the material facts and obtained approval from the beneciary
for carrying out said acts;
3. where any right to property that belongs to the trust property has been included in the
trustee's own property by reason of inheritance or any other universal succession; or
4. where, in order to achieve the purpose of the trust, it is considered reasonably necessary for
the trustee to carry out said acts, and it is clear that said acts conducted by the trustee will not
harm the interests of the beneciary, or where there are justiable grounds for the trustee to carry
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trust administration on the account of the trustee's own property or of an interested
party of it12. The types of the acts prohibited in those provisions are essentially equal
to those having been enumerated as the illustrative types of the violative action to
out said acts in light of the impact of said acts on the trust property, the purpose and manner of the
acts, the status of a substantial relationship between the trustee and the beneciary which makes
the trustee an interested party, and other relevant circumstances.
® A trustee shall, when the trustee has carried out any of the acts listed in the items of paragraph
¬, give notice of the material facts concerning said act to a beneciary; provided, however, that if
the terms of trust otherwise provides for, such provisions shall prevail.
¯ Where the act set forth in paragraph ¬, item 1 or item 2 is carried out in violation of the
provisions of paragraph ¬ or paragraph ­, such act shall be void.
° The act set forth in the preceding paragraph shall become eective retroactively as of the time
of the act, if it is ratied by the beneciary.
± In the case prescribed in paragraph ¯, when a trustee has disposed of or carried out any other
act regarding the property set forth in paragraph ¬, item 1 or item 2 with a third party, a beneciary
may rescind the disposition or other act only if the third party knew or was grossly negligent in
failing to know that the act set forth in paragraph ¬, item 1 or item 2 was carried out in violation of
the provisions of paragraph ¬ or paragraph ­. In this case, the provisions of Article 27, paragraph
® and paragraph ¯ shall apply mutatis mutandis.
² Where an act set forth in paragraph ¬, item 3 or item 4 has been carried out in violation of
the provisions of paragraph ¬ and paragraph ­, a beneciary may rescind the act only if the third
party knew or was grossly negligent in failing to know that such act was conducted in violation of
these provisions. In this case, the provisions of Article 27, paragraph ® and paragraph ¯ shall apply
mutatis mutandis.
12Article 32 ¬ With regard to an act that a trustee may carry out in the course of administering
trust aairs based on the trustee's powers as a trustee, if the trustee's failure to carry out such an
act would be contrary to the interests of a beneciary, the trustee may not conduct such act on the
account of the trustee's own property or on the account of an interested party thereof.
­ Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding paragraph, in any of the following cases, a
trustee may carry out the act prescribed in said paragraph on the account of the trustee's own
property or on the account of the interested party thereof; provided, however, that this shall not
apply in the case set forth in item 2 if it is provided by the terms of trust that the trustee may not
carry out said act on the account of the trustee's own property or on the account of an interested
party thereof even in the case set forth in said item:
1. where it is provided by the terms of trust that the trustee is allowed to carry out said act on
the account of the trustee's own property or on the account of an interested party thereof; or
2. where the trustee has disclosed the material facts and obtained approval from the beneciary
for carrying out said act on the account of the trustee's own property or on the account of an
interested party thereof.
® A trustee shall, when the trustee has carried out the act prescribed in paragraph ¬ on the
account of the trustee's own property or on the account of an interested party thereof, give notice
to the beneciary of the material facts concerning the act; provided, however, that if the terms of
trust otherwise provides for, such provisions shall prevail.
¯Where a trustee has carried out an act prescribed in paragraph ¬ in violation of the provisions
of paragraph ¬ and paragraph ­, the beneciary may deem that said act has been conducted in the
interests of the trust property; provided, however, that this may not harm rights of any third party.
° The rights under the provisions of the preceding paragraph shall be extinguished when one year
has elapsed from the time of the act.
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the duty of loyalty in the former statute era. So, those provisions can be interpreted
as explicit prohibition provisions of the representative types of the violation of the
duty of loyalty.
Parallel to those, the current statute explicitly prescribes that an act by trustee
which falls under any of the types prescribed will not constitutes the violation of the
duty of loyalty where it is provided by the terms of trust that the trustee is allowed
to do an act of such types or where the trustee has disclosed the material facts and
obtained approval from the beneciary to do so. These provisions have been legislated
in respond to the criticism against the \inexibility" of the duty of loyalty so as to
establish an appropriate standard for conict resolutions13. The foundational thought
of these provisions takes the phrase \faithfully on behalf of the beneciary" in the
article 30 as meaning \for the interest of the beneciary in person" and is conforming
to a sense of equity which is typical in the case of the certain type of commercial trust
relationship, according to which what is a benet for a beneciary should be left to
the beneciary's own judgement.
In addition, the article 31 prescribes that an action of the type listed as a violative
one may not constitute a violation of the duty of loyalty when the legal relationship
has belonged to the trustee by an inheritance or when the action to create conict of
interest is reasonably necessary to achieve the purpose of the trust and it is clear that
the act will not harm the beneciary's interests or when there are some justiable
13(Restriction on Acts that Create Conicts of Interest) [excerpt]
Article 31
...
­ Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding paragraph, in any of the following cases, a
trustee may carry out the acts listed in the items of said paragraph; provided, however, that this
shall not apply in the case set forth in item 2 if it is provided for by the terms of trust that the
trustee may not carry out said acts even in the case set forth in said item: 1. where it is provided
by the terms of trust that the trustee is allowed to carry out said acts;
2. where the trustee has disclosed the material facts and obtained approval from the beneciary
for carrying out said acts;
Article 32 [excerpt]
...
­ Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding paragraph, in any of the following cases, a
trustee may carry out the act prescribed in said paragraph on the account of the trustee's own
property or on the account of the interested party thereof; provided, however, that this shall not
apply in the case set forth in item 2 if it is provided by the terms of trust that the trustee may not
carry out said act on the account of the trustee's own property or on the account of an interested
party thereof even in the case set forth in said item:
1. where it is provided by the terms of trust that the trustee is allowed to carry out said act on
the account of the trustee's own property or on the account of an interested party thereof; or
2. where the trustee has disclosed the material facts and obtained approval from the beneciary
for carrying out said act on the account of the trustee's own property or on the account of an
interested party thereof.
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grounds for the trustee to perform such an act evaluated from the synthetic point of
view14. This provision, in contrast to what we described above, permits a immunity
from the duty of loyalty from the viewpoint of a reasonable action as the trustee. It
leaves a room for the trustee to escape the liability even when the approval to the
act by the beneciary could not be obtained so as to have a function also to prevent
the beneciary from some excessive insistence on the liability to the trustee on the
ground of the violation of the duty of loyalty.
The current provisions on the duty of loyalty is intended to respond to the crit-
icisms to the duty of loyalty under the former statute and to solve the problems
concerning the duty of loyalty in various respects so as to give a practically appro-
priate conclusions. The intention of the legislation in itself can be also theoretically
supportable when one considers the equity between trust parties and the principle
that a trust relationship exists for the accomplishment of the trust purpose.
However, even the current statute still contains some uncertainty in the prescrip-
tion of the condition for the trustee to escape from the duty of loyalty, which may
cause some trouble in the interpretation. For instance, based on what facts one can
say \the material facts are disclosed"? In addition, the condition \the act which is
considered reasonably necessary for the trustee to carry out" also doesn't make the
concrete conditions clear in advance of the act. In these meaning, if one takes also
such a fact into consideration as that the situation in which the violation of the duty
of loyalty is disputed is usually some \marginal" one in which the condential rela-
tionship between the trustee and then beneciary has been completely broken, the
possibility of the immunity of the trustee from the liability by the violation of the
duty of loyalty through the provisions for it in the current statute contains, we must
say, considerable amount of uncertainties.
14(Restriction on Acts that Create Conicts of Interest) [excerpt]
Article 31
...
­ Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding paragraph, in any of the following cases, a
trustee may carry out the acts listed in the items of said paragraph; provided, however, that this
shall not apply in the case set forth in item 2 if it is provided for by the terms of trust that the
trustee may not carry out said acts even in the case set forth in said item:
...
3. where any right to property that belongs to the trust property has been included in the
trustee's own property by reason of inheritance or any other universal succession; or
4. where, in order to achieve the purpose of the trust, it is considered reasonably necessary for
the trustee to carry out said acts, and it is clear that said acts conducted by the trustee will not
harm the interests of the beneciary, or where there are justiable grounds for the trustee to carry
out said acts in light of the impact of said acts on the trust property, the purpose and manner of the
acts, the status of a substantial relationship between the trustee and the beneciary which makes
the trustee an interested party, and other relevant circumstances.
4.2. THE DUTIES OF THE TRUSTEE 117
(3) The Duty of the Care of a prudent Manager of Trustee
\The duty of the care of a prudent manager of trustee" (abbreviated as \DCPM"
following in this section) requires for a trustee to pay that care as a prudent manager
in administration of the trust property which is required in administrating another
person's property as the manager. While some theoretical stand point on the fun-
damental structure of trust thinks a trustee is the owner of the trust property, even
under that thought a trustee is obligated to obey the purpose and the terms of the
trust in the administration of the trust property, and a trustee in person never gets
the benets directly from the administration of the trust property. Therefore, the ad-
ministration of the trust property by a trustee is essentially equal to manage another
person's property irrespective of the way of thinking on the fundamental structure of
trust. So it is natural for a trustee to be borne DCPM. What is practically important
is the concrete contents of DCPM.
Although both the current and former statutes have the provisions to prescribe
the duty of care of a prudent manager15, the concrete contents are not prescribed in
the provisions, so that the judgement on whether a certain action of a trustee violates
DCPM must be left to the casuistic in each individual case. Since the same type of
action may or may not constitute a violation of DCPM depending on the concrete
situations, it is impossible to decide denitely in advance whether a concrete action
constitutes such a violation. But we may be able to say, as a minimun explanation
of the general principle, something like following.
First, the acts which are interpreted as not congruent with the purpose of trust
or those which are violating the prohibitions or restrictions prescribed in the terms
of trust will be deemed with high provability as violating DCPM. For example, so
is the case in which an investment for commercial products with so high risk as in
congruent to the purpose of the trust is done in a investment trust relationship with
the trust property as the fund. Second, the change of social or economic environ-
ments may convert an action of the type which was not a violation of DCPM into
a violative action of DCPM. Taking a judgement on an investment as the example,
such a behavior will be judged with high probability as a violation of DCPM as to
continue the investments mechanically based on a long xed standard without any
revisions corresponding to the changes of the investing environment. Reversely, there
may be a case in which the de facto change of the purpose of a trust makes an action
15Article 20 of the former statute A trustee shall administer trust aairs in line with the purpose
of the trust with the due care of a prudent manager.
(The Trustee's Duty of Care)
Article 29 ¬ A trustee shall administer trust aairs in line with the purpose of the trust.
­ A trustee shall administer trust aairs with the due care of a prudent manager; provided,
however, that if terms of trust otherwise provide, the trustee shall administer trust aairs with such
care as provided for by the terms of trust.
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that was previously incongruent with the purpose of the trust not violative to DCPM,
or moreover, not to do such an action violative to DCPM. For example, whether the
judgements on the investment actions should be entrusted to a third party expert
may be included in such problems. Third, in contrast to the duty of loyalty ex-
plained above, individual approvals by the beneciary to the each concrete action of
the trustee will not always give an immunity from DCPM. This is because it is the
trustee, not the beneciary in the basic legal structure of trust that has the nal deci-
sion authority in the administration of the trust property. However, for instance, in a
commercial trust for investment activities, if the beneciary gives some direction for
a concrete investment action, it will not necessarily unreasonable to allow the trustee
an immunity from the liability by the violation of DCPM based on the direction of
approval by the beneciary, from the viewpoint of a general principle that losses from
a failure of an investment activity should belong to the person who actually decides
that investment action.
As we have just seen, as for DCPM of the trustee, one same action may be
judged sometimes violative and sometimes not violative to DCPM depending on the
situations about the trustee. So, there is no absolute standard for the trustee to avoid
being claimed a liability of the violation of DCPM in advance. the usual situation
where a trustee is actually claimed the liability of the violation of DCPM is that
the planed prots could not be attained or even some losses on the trust property
has occurred through the administration activity of the trust property. Then the
practically important problem is to what extent the facts of such losses or shortage
of prots should (not) aect the concrete interpretational problems of the violation
of DCPM by the trustee.
From the theoretical point of view, DCPM presents only the level of the care the
trustee is required to pay at the time of the administrative action. So, as far as the
act by the trustee was done with a care at the required level, even if some losses or
shortage of prots occurred on the trust property as a result of that act, the trustee
should not be claimed a liability of the violation of DCPM. However, in the practical
world, it cannot be avoidable for the claimant's side to come to a thought of, so to
speak, the reverse inference, namely, the thought that as far as the losses of shortage
of the prots actually occurred, there should have been some breach of DCPM by the
trustee. If the trustee's side, against the thought above, tries to show that DCPM
was fullled, that one must show not only that the act by the trustee was reasonably
compliant to the purpose or the terms of the trust, but also that the losses etc. on the
trust property have occurred in spite of the trustee's fulllment of DCPM or that such
losses etc. would have occurred on any trust property administered by any trustee in
a similar situation. But such a proof would be quite dicult in most cases.
Although DCPM of the trustee is theoretically deemed as the standard of actions
in the administration of trust property, the possibility that the liability of a trustee is
claimed merely based on the loss or shortage of the prots cannot be actually denied.
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So, in order for a trustee to guard her/his own legitimate interest, it is desirable that
there is some criterion to judge in advance whether a certain act violates DCPM. The
possibility of immunity from the liability of the violation of DPCM on an approval
or direction by the beneciary should be worth to be considered further in depth.
(4) The Duty of Disclosure of Trustee
\The duty of disclosure of trustee" means the duty by which a trustee should dis-
close the information concerning the trust property to the trust parties, typically
to the beneciary, in the administration of the trust property. The current statute
prescribes, at rst, the general duty of trustee to report on the processing status of
trust administration, then provides very detailed provisions that prescribe the range
of the information to be disclosed, the procedure for the disclosure and the conditions
for the immunity of the trustee16. This duty of disclosure plays a very important
16(Duty to Report on the Processing Status Trust administration)
Article 36 A settlor or beneciary may request that a trustee to report on the processing status of
trust administration as well as the status of property that belongs to the trust property and the
obligation covered by the trust property.
(Duty to Prepare, Report On, and Preserve Books, etc.)
Article 37 ¬ A trustee shall prepare books and other documents or electromagnetic records relating
to the trust property, as provided for by Ordinance of the Ministry of Justice, in order to clarify the
accounts on trust aairs as well as the status of property that belongs to the trust property and the
obligation covered by the trust property.
­ A trustee shall prepare a balance sheet, prot and loss statement, and any other documents or
electromagnetic records specied by Ordinance of the Ministry of Justice, once each year, at a certain
time, as provided for by Ordinance of the Ministry of Justice. ® When a trustee has prepared the
documents or electromagnetic records set forth in the preceding paragraph, the trustee shall report
to a beneciary (if there is a trust caretaker at the time in question, to the trust caretaker) on the
content thereof; provided, however, that if the terms of trust otherwise provides for, such provisions
shall prevail.
¯ Where a trustee has prepared the documents or electromagnetic records set forth in paragraph
¬, the trustee shall preserve said documents (if electromagnetic records are prepared in lieu of said
documents by the method specied by Ordinance of the Ministry of Justice, such electromagnetic
records) or said electromagnetic records (if documents are prepared in lieu of said electromagnetic
records, such documents) for ten years from the date of their preparation (or until the date of the
completion of the liquidation of the trust if this occurs within said ten-year period; the same shall
apply in the following paragraph); provided, however, that this shall not apply where the trustee has
delivered said documents or copies thereof to the beneciary (if there are two or more beneciaries
at the time in question, to all beneciaries; if there is a trust caretaker at the time in question, to the
trust caretaker; the same shall apply in the proviso to paragraph ±), or has provided the beneciary
with information on the matters recorded in said electromagnetic records by the method specied
by Ordinance of the Ministry of Justice.
° Where a trustee has prepared or acquired a written contract relating to the disposition of
property that belongs to the trust property or any other documents or electromagnetic records
concerning the trust administration, the trustee shall preserve said documents (if electromagnetic
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records are prepared in lieu of said documents by the method specied by Ordinance of the Ministry
of Justice, such electromagnetic records) or said electromagnetic records (if documents are prepared
in lieu of said electromagnetic records, such documents) for ten years from the date of the preparation
or acquisition. In this case, the provisions of the proviso to the preceding paragraph shall apply
mutatis mutandis.
± Where a trustee has prepared the documents or electromagnetic records set forth in paragraph
­, the trustee shall preserve said documents (if electromagnetic records are prepared in lieu of said
documents by the method specied by Ordinance of the Ministry of Justice, such electromagnetic
records) or said electromagnetic records (if documents are prepared in lieu of said electromagnetic
records, such documents) until the date of the completion of the liquidation of the trust; provided,
however that this shall not apply where the trustee has, after ten years have elapsed from the date of
their preparation, delivered said documents or copies thereof to the beneciary, or has provided the
beneciary with information on the matters recorded in said electromagnetic records by the method
specied by Ordinance of the Ministry of Justice.
(Request to Inspect, etc. of the Books, etc.)
Article 38 ¬ A beneciary may make the following requests to a trustee. In this case, in making
such a request, the reasons therefor shall be specied:
1. a request to inspect or copy the documents set forth in paragraph ¬ or paragraph ° of the
preceding Article; and
2. a request to inspect or copy any object which shows the matters recorded in the electro-
magnetic records set forth in paragraph ¬ or paragraph ° of the preceding Article by a method
specied by Ordinance of the Ministry of Justice.
­ The trustee may not refuse a request set forth in the preceding paragraph when such a request
has been received, except where it is found to fall under any of the following cases:
1. where the person making such request (hereinafter referred to as the \requester" in this
paragraph) has made the request for purposes other than an investigation related to the securement
or exercise of the requester's rights;
2. where the requester has made the request at an inappropriate time;
3. where the requester has made the request for the purpose of disturbing the trust adminis-
tration or harming the common interests of the beneciaries;
4. where the requester operates or engages in a business which is eectively in competition with
business pertaining to the trust;
5. where the requester has made the request in order to inform a third party, for prot, of any
fact that the requester may learn by way of inspecting or copying documents or any other object
under the provisions of the preceding paragraph; or
6. where the requester has informed a third party, for prot, of any fact that the requester has
learned by way of inspecting or copying documents or any other object under the provisions of the
preceding paragraph within the past two years.
® The provisions of the preceding paragraph (excluding item 1 and item 2) shall not apply when
there are two or more beneciaries of a trust and the request set forth in paragraph ¬ is made by
all beneciaries, or when there is only one beneciary of the trust and the request set forth in said
paragraph is made by such beneciary.
¯ Where it is provided by the terms of trust that a request to inspect or copy documents or any
other object under the provisions of paragraph ¬ is to be restricted with regard to any information
other than the those listed below if a beneciary gives consent for such restriction, the beneciary
who has given such consent (including the beneciary's successor; hereinafter the same shall apply
in this Article) may not revoke the consent:
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roll to maintain the appropriateness of the trust administration and the condential
relationship among the trust parties through the disclosure by the trustee to the trust
parties the facts that the administration of the trust property is being performed in
accordance with the property of the trust and on behalf of the beneciary.
On the other hand, some cases in which the disclosure of the information is re-
quested by a beneciary may have some aspects whose nature is qualitatively dierent
from that of the duty of disclosure. As we have seen concerning the duty of loyalty of
trustee, the current statute prescribes that a trustee can escape from the liability of
1. information that is indispensable for preparing the documents or electromagnetic records
set forth in paragraph ­ of the preceding Article or any other material information concerning the
trust; and
2. information that is unlikely to harm the interests of any person other than said beneciary.
° Upon receiving a request to inspect or copy documents or any other object under the provisions
of paragraph ¬ from a beneciary who has given the consent as set forth in the preceding paragraph,
a trustee may refuse such a request, except for the part that falls under the information listed in
the items of the preceding paragraph.
± An interested party may make the following requests to a trustee:
1. a request to inspect or copy the documents set forth in paragraph ­ of the preceding Article;
and
2. a request to inspect or copy any object which shows the matters recorded in the electromag-
netic records set forth in paragraph ­ of the preceding Article by a method specied by Ordinance
of the Ministry of Justice.
(Request for the Disclosure of Names, etc. of Other Beneciaries)
Article 39 ¬ In the case of a trust with two or more beneciaries, each beneciary may request that
trustee disclose the following matters by an appropriate method. In this case, in making such a re-
quest, the reasons therefor shall be specied: 1. the names and addresses of the other beneciaries;
and
2. the content of the benecial interest held by other beneciaries. ­ A trustee may not refuse
a request set forth in the preceding paragraph when such a request has been received, except where
it is found to fall under any of the following cases:
1. where the person making such request (hereinafter referred to as the \requester" in this
paragraph) has made the request for purposes other than an investigation related to the securement
or exercise of the requester's rights;
2. where the requester has made the request at an inappropriate time;
3. where the requester has made the request for the purpose of disturbing the trust adminis-
tration or harming the common interests of the beneciaries;
4. where the requester operates or engages in business which is eectively in competition with
business pertaining to the trust;
5. where the requester has made the request in order to inform a third party, for prot, of any
fact that the requester may learn by way of the disclosure under the provisions of the preceding
paragraph; or
6. where the requester has informed a third party, for prot, of any fact that the requester
learned by way of the disclosure under the provisions of the preceding paragraph within the past
two years.
® Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding two paragraphs, if the terms of trust otherwise
provides, such provisions shall prevail.
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the violation of the duty of loyalty in a suspicious act where the trustee has disclosed
the material facts and obtained approval from the beneciary for the carrying out that
act17. Then, the problem here is how we should interpret the relation between \an
immunity of a trustee from the liability of the violation of the duty on the ground of
the information disclosure" and \the duty of the trustee to disclose the information".
Some opinion thinks those two aspects mixed into one with almost no care for the
dierence between them, so that it concludes the trustee is in the duty to disclose the
important facts concerning the duty of loyalty. That opinion bases on the supposition
that the range of the information to be disclosed and the timing when the disclosure
action is required are both quite similar in those two aspects. However, we should
not neglect the great dierence of the purposes of those two information disclosures,
that as the duty of the trustee and that in order for the trustee to avoid the blame
for the violation of the duty in another act. In fact, if the liability of a trustee should
be armed in the violation of the duty of loyalty while the information disclosure
concerning that has not appropriately done, that liability of the trustee is grounded
on the violation of the duty of loyalty itself. The trustee should be responsible for the
claim of the violation of the duty of loyalty not because the information disclosure
has not properly done.
We should note in addition that the range of the information to be disclosed or
the condition for the release from the duty of disclosure in relation to the other duties
is actually quite dierent between the disclosure as the trustee's duty and that for
the trustee's immunity from the liability.
On the one hand, the ground of the information disclosure as the fulllment of duty
of the trustee is the existence of the terms of trust or the provisions of the Trust Act
that prescribe the duty of the information disclosure. So, the range of the information
to be disclosed is dened by what is reasonably required to be disclosed by the terms
of trust or the legal provisions. More concretely, the range of the information to
be disclosed is limited within the aairs concerning the trust property in the trust
relationship as usual in the duty of the trustee. So, it is not allowed to request as
the carrying out of the duty of disclosure in a trust relationship the disclosure of the
information on the property belonging to another trust. In addition, the duty of the
information disclosure of trustee tends to conict with the duty to protect privileged
17(Restriction on Acts that Create Conicts of Interest)[excerpt]
Article 31
...
­ Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding paragraph, in any of the following cases, a
trustee may carry out the acts listed in the items of said paragraph; provided, however, that this
shall not apply in the case set forth in item (ii) if it is provided for by the terms of trust that the
trustee may not carry out said acts even in the case set forth in said item:
...
2. where the trustee has disclosed the material facts and obtained approval from the beneciary
for carrying out said acts;
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information which a trustee may be imposed toward the beneciary in the course
of the administration of the trust property. Since the duties of trustee should not
impose a trustee something impossible to perform, in the case of the conict between
the duties of the disclosure and of the protection of the privileged information, the
trustee should be released from one of the duties or, at least, one of the duty should
be relaxed for the trustee.
On the other hand, the ground of the information disclosure for the exemption of a
trustee from the duty of loyalty is not the terms of trust or the legal provisions ordering
to do so but the fact that it is necessary as the counterevidence to the suspicion of the
violation of the duty of loyalty. Therefore, the range of the information to be disclosed
for the exemption from the duty of loyalty is not restricted on the general matters
prescribed in the terms of trust or the provisions of the Trust Act but it should include
enough facts to convince the beneciary of the appropriateness of the administrative
actions by the trustee. In this meaning, the information to be disclosed will not be
restricted to the aairs on the relevant trust property. For instance, when a trustee
wants to prove her/himself not to intend to prot a third person, the trustee may
have to disclose the information on other trust property. As for the relation with the
duty to protect privileged information, since the information to be disclosed for the
exemption from the duty of loyalty is not a legal duty by itself, the conict between
duties in relation to that to protect privileged information will not occur. So, if some
information is protected as privileged, that information should not be disclosed for
the exemption of a trustee from the duty of loyalty.
So, we should keep it in mind that although both are called commonly as the
disclosure of the information by the trustee, there are great dierences between the
information disclosure as the fulllment of the duty of the trustee and that to be done
for the immunity from the liability caused from the duty of loyalty not only in the
legal theoretical nature but also in their practical treatments. Although it may be a
bit extreme opinion, it may be possible to think that the trustee has the power to
choose not to disclose an information to the beneciary in exchange of the liability
from the violation of the duty of loyalty. In fact, even though a trustee will be claimed
a liability to compensate the damage caused from the violation of the duty of loyalty,
if more serious damage could be avoided by not disclosing some relevant important
information, the decision not to disclose such information could nd certain supports
in practice.
(5) Duty of Trustee to administer Properties in Segregation
\The duty of trustee to administer properties in segregation" is the duty according
to which a trustee should segregate property that belongs to the trust property from
property that belongs to the trustee's own property or from that which belongs to the
trust property of other trusts in the trust administration. This duty of the segregated
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administration is prescribed for the proper execution of the supervising power by the
beneciary or the like by making clear distinctions among individual trust proper-
ties. For the confusion of the properties between the private property of the trustee
and the trust property or between trust properties of mutually dierent trusts tends
to lead to the trustee's personal benet from the trust property or the generation
of the hotbed for the unfair trading between trust properties. The former statute
also had the provision for the duty of the segregated administration18. The current
statute prescribes concrete methods for the segregated management of the properties
according to the types of the trust properties so that it aims further thoroughgoing
and clarication of the segregation of the properties in the administration19.
However, this duty of segregated administration requires, though the border of the
trust property will be made clear, a little complex practical treatment of the aairs
in the case of the combined administration of the properties in plural trusts. In
addition, there may be, though depending on the nature of the constituent properties
of the trust, actually not a few cases in which it makes more exible responses to
the changes of the value of the trust properties of certain types possible that the
segregation of the properties is left unclear and only the ratio of the shares among
the trust relationships on whole the assets is clearly maintained. Moreover, since the
disputes in practice on the loose segregation of properties happen usually under the
18Article 28 of the former statute A trustee shall administer the trust property in segregating
property that belongs to the trust property from property that belongs to the trustee's own property
or from the trust property that belongs to other trusts in the trust administration. Provided, as for
the money as the trust property, it is enough to make it clear in the account.
19(Duty to Segregate Property)
Article 34 ¬ A trustee shall segregate property that belongs to the trust property from property
that belongs to the trustee's own property and that which belongs to the trust property of other
trusts by the method specied in each of the following items for the categories of property listed in
the respective items; provided, however, that if the terms of trust otherwise provides for the method
of segregation, such provisions shall prevail:
1. property for which a trust registration set forth in Article 14 may be made (excluding the
property set forth in item 3): by said trust registration;
2. property for which a trust registration set forth in Article 14 may not be made (excluding
the property set forth in the following item): either of the methods specied in (a) or (b) below for
the categories of property listed in (a) or (b), respectively:
(a) movables (excluding monies): by retaining property that belongs to the trust property
separately from property that belongs to the trustee's own property and the trust property of other
trusts in the manner whereby they can be distinguished from each other on sight; or
(b) monies and any property other than those set forth in (a): by clarifying the accounting
thereof; or
3. property specied by Ordinance of the Ministry of Justice: by a method specied by Ordi-
nance of the Ministry of Justice for the appropriate segregation of the property.
­ Notwithstanding the provisions of the proviso to the preceding paragraph, a trustee shall not
be exempted from the duty for trust registration set forth in Article 14 for the property set forth in
item 1 of said paragraph.
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situation that it has turned out there is no property to be specied as corresponding
to each right of each trust party, there may be no need to prohibit or restrict such a
loose administration as far as the beneciary or other trust parties require the trustee
the more ecient way of administration with knowing such a risks as the situation
like described above.
If so, there may be some cases in which it is more rational from the viewpoint
of the purpose of the trust to allow special provisions in the terms of trust to dene
freely the content of the duty of segregated administration. Especially where massive
trades are done concentratedly in short time on the property of which the registration
is required on transfer, to require the trustee to complete the actual registration at
each time of the trade may cause some inexibility of the administration of the trust
property, and spoil the chance for saving the cost of the registrations. However,
the current statute provides rather restraint provisions by which the duty for trust
registration cannot be exempted from while free agreements on the concrete way of
segregated administration in therms of trust are allowed20.
By the way, we should keep it in mind the \appropriateness" of the execution of
the supervising power by the beneciary has some quite dierent meaning in practice
from what we have implicitly supposed up to there, which is based on the traditional
way of understanding. Namely, that the supervising power of beneciary etc. is
appropriately exercised traditionally means for the beneciary etc. to do the necessary
and sucient watch over the acts of the trustee so as to avoid the risk of unfair
administration by the trustee. But practically, the meaning of the\appropriateness"
has the restrictive side, namely, to restrict the scope of the trust property over which
the beneciary has the supervising power so as to prevent the beneciary from drawing
information on the trust property belonging to other trusts or the private property
of the trustee.
In sum, the existence of the duty of segregated administration has the function to
make clear for a beneciary the scope of the trust property over which a beneciary
has the supervising power, as well as the function on behalf of a trustee to guard the
private property of the trustee or the trust property in other trust relationships from
an abuse of the supervising power by a beneciary. So, it is overhasty to conclude
that the prescription of the duty of segregated administration as the duty of trustee
20(Duty to Segregate Property)[excerpt]
Article 34 ¬ A trustee shall segregate property that belongs to the trust property from property
that belongs to the trustee's own property and that which belongs to the trust property of other
trusts by the method specied in each of the following items for the categories of property listed in
the respective items; provided, however, that if the terms of trust otherwise provides for the method
of segregation, such provisions shall prevail:
...
­ Notwithstanding the provisions of the proviso to the preceding paragraph, a trustee shall not
be exempted from the duty for trust registration set forth in Article 14 for the property set forth in
item 1 of said paragraph.
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means simply a restriction on the methods of the administration which may conict
with an ecient handling of the work. If one takes the conditions described above
of the beneciary or a third person into consideration, the provisions of the current
statute which restricts the freedom of the terms of trust on certain matters may be
seen as reasonable in some degree.
On the other hand, to make clear the scope of the trust property in a trust
relationship by the segregated administration may lead to the result that, seeing from
the other side, it will become observable from the outside of the trust relationship
whether some property is belonging to the trust property. Then, a thought may
naturally occur by which even if not all of other legal requirements for public notices
are satised, where the segregated administration is properly done, it is enough for
the public notice of the trust relationship concerning the property segregated in the
administration. In fact, in a period under the former statute, responding to the
criticism from the practical business that the provisions for the public notice of a
trust relationship are somewhat inexible, such a thought has been legislated as to
take the trust administration in segregating the trust property from the trustee's
private property as the substitute for the registration of properties for the public
notice21.
However, that legislation itself was done without enough theoretical considerations
and had no practical base to promote an appropriate execution of the supervising
power, so that it has been almost neglected at present. But the provision had some
theoretical meaning in that it made clear the various aspects the duty of segregated
administration of the trust property may have. So, we will discuss this issue later in
the section dedicated for the explanation of the institution for the public notice of
trust (Chapter 4 Section 6).
(6) The Duty of the Co-Trustees
Where trust property is administered by plural trustees, namely, in the co-trustees
case, the duty of the co-trustees can be explained simply in theory. Under the former
statute, the general rule was the joint action of all the co-trustees22, and the liability
21Trust Business Act amendment in Heisei 10 (1998) Article 10 [excerpt]
¬ As for the securities a trust corporation holds as the trust property, notwithstanding the provision
of Article 3 paragraph ­ of the Trust Act, when those securities have been administered in segrega-
tion from the securities the trust company holds as the private property, the trust relationship on
the former securities may be asserted against a third party.
22Article 24 of the former statute ¬ Where there are plural trustees, the trust property is jointly
owned by the trustees.
­ In the case set forth in the preceding paragraph, unless there is no special provision prescribing
otherwise, the performance of the trust aairs shall be done jointly by the co-trustees. Provided, a
juristic act done toward one of the co-trustee shall have the eect also over the other co-trustees.
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as the result of the action was the joint and several liability of all the co-trustees23.
By contrast, the current statute has adopted the principle of the decision by majority
as the standard to determine the act in a co-trustees case and prescribed explicitly
the possibility of the division of the duties among individual trustees24. As the result,
under the current statute, in the case in which the division of the duties among
trustees is prescribed in the terms of trust as well as the case in which an act is
determined as of all the trustees by the decision by the majority, is has become
necessary to taking the behavior of each trustee into consideration in determining
the internal share or range of the joint and several liability on the trustees, so that
the rather complicated relations between the obligation covered the trustee's own
property and that covered only by the trust property are provided in the current
Trust Act25. However, whether under the former statute or the current statute, it
is rare at least in commercial trusts that plural trustees jointly administer the trust
23Article 25 of the former statute When there are plural trustees, an obligation which is taken in
the course of the trust administration to the beneciary shall be borne jointly and severally by the
trustees. The same shall be applied to an obligation concerning the disposition of the trust aairs.
24(Method of Trust administration)[excerpt]
Article 80 ¬ In the case of a trust with two or more trustees, decisions on the trust administration
shall be made by the majority of the trustees.
­ Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding paragraph, decisions on an act of preservation
may be made by each trustee independently.
®Where a decision is made on the trust administration pursuant to the provisions of the preceding
two paragraphs, each trustee may execute trust aairs based on such decision.
¯ Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding three paragraphs, where terms of trust contains
provisions concerning the division of duties among the trustees, each trustee shall make decisions on
the trust administration and execute those aairs pursuant to such provisions.
...
25(Assumption of Obligations in Administering Trust Aairs)
Article 83 ¬ In the case of a trust with two or more trustees, where each trustee has assumed an
obligation to a third party in the course of administering trust aairs, these trustees shall be joint
and several obligors.
­ Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding paragraph, where terms of trust contain a
provision concerning the division of duties among the trustees, when either of these trustees has
assumed an obligation to a third party in the course of administering trust aairs pursuant to such
provisions, the other trustees shall be liable only by using property that belongs to the trust property
to perform the obligation; provided, however, that where the third party knew, at the time of the act
causing the assumption of the obligation, that said act was conducted in the course of administering
trust aairs and that there were two or more trustees for the trust, and did not know and was not
negligent in failing to know that the terms of trust contained provisions concerning the division of
duties among the trustees, the other trustee(s) may not duly assert such provisions on the division
of duties against the third party.
(Special Rules for Trustee Liability, etc.)
Article 85 ¬ In the case of a trust with two or more trustees, where two or more trustees have
incurred liability under the provisions of Article 40 for an act that they have committed in breach
of their duties, these trustees who have committed such an act shall be joint and several obligors.
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property. Actually, the duties of trustee are rather nely divided into individual
trustees and, in addition, the division of the duties may be periodically revised in the
trust with a certain type of trust property. So, it is practically reasonable in some
degree that the current provisions prescribes the principle of the decision by majority
in contrast to the joint action principle of the former statute.
However, as we mentioned concerning Co-trustees case (Chapter 3 Section 1),
there are left some unclear parts even under the current statute concerning whether a
concrete trust relationship in which the trust property is managed by plural trustees
will be qualied as a \co-trustees" case in the Trust Act. In fact, it is only to the case
which is judged as a co-trustees one that the provisions concerning the duties and
responsibilities of the co-trustees in the current statute will be applied. So, practically,
it is reasonable to take also the possibility of the unintended interpretation by a court
into consideration in advance.
For instance, in the case in which the mutual relationship among the \trustees"
in a trust is interpreted as being equal to that between \the trustee" and \the actual
property administrator(s) who was(were) entrusted the management by the trustee",
there is only one trustee, so the provisions for the co-trustees case are not be applied.
In such a case, the trustee is assuming, as a general rule, whole the duty and respon-
sibility from the trust relationship in relation to the beneciary, while other actual
trust property administrators may get charged with the liability claimed directly by
the beneciary depending on the content of the division of the duties and responsi-
bilities of trustee provided in the terms of trust. Since the trust property in such a
case is, even though it is practically managed in division, jointly managed in theory,
the scope of the information disclosure claim by the beneciary will be stretched all
over the trust property.
On the other hand, in the case in which the trust relationship is interpreted as that
a part of the trust property is re-trusted, so the relationship among the plural trustees
is interpreted as being equal to that between \the trustee of the original trust" and
\the beneciary of the re-trust", the sharing of the duties and responsibilities among
­ For the purpose of the application of the provisions of Article 40, paragraph ¬ and Article 41
in the case of a trust with two or more trustees, the term \beneciary" in these provisions shall be
deemed to be replaced with \beneciary or the other trustee(s)."
® In the case of a trust with two or more trustees, if any of these trustees is released from liability
under the provisions of Article 40 or Article 41 pursuant to the provisions of Article 42, no other
trustee may le a claim to hold the person who would have incurred liability under the provisions
of Article 40 or Article 41 liable; provided, however, that if the terms of trust otherwise provides,
such provisions shall prevail.
¯ For the purpose of the application of the provisions of Article 44 in the case of a trust with
two or more trustees, the term \beneciary" in paragraph ¬ of said Article shall be deemed to
be replaced with \beneciary or the other trustee(s)" and the term \those beneciaries" shall be
deemed to be replaced with \those beneciaries or the other trustee(s)."
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the trustees will become still more complicated. For instance, \the beneciary" in
such a case is exactly \the beneciary of the original trust relationship" and not \the
beneciary of the re-trust relationship". \The beneciary of the re-trust relationship"
is \the trust property of the original trust relationship" or \the trustee of the original
trust relationship" as the administrator of that property. Therefore, \the beneciary
of the original trust relationship" has no direct trust relationship with \the trustee
of the re-trust relationship", so that the beneciary cannot exercise the supervising
power over \the trustee of the re-trust relationship". For the subject of the supervising
power over \the trustee of the re-trust relationship" is \the beneciary of the re-trust
relationship", namely, \the trustee of the original trust relationship". However, \the
beneciary of the original trust relationship" can claim the liability of \the trustee of
the original trust relationship" where there has been some failure by \the trustee of
the original trust relationship" concerning the way of the settlement of the re-trust
relationship or the supervision over the administration in the re-trust relationship. In
addition, as for the information disclosure claim, it is on \the trust property of the
original trust relationship" but not on \the trust property of the re-trust relationship"
that \the beneciary of the original trust relationship" has the claim as a beneciary.
So, the beneciary of the original trust relationship cannot request \the trustee of the
re-trust relationship" a disclosure of \the information concerning the trust property
of the re-trust relationship". She/He can request \the trustee of the original trust
relationship" only \the information about the trust property in the original trust
relationship", which may include the information concerning the losses or gains on
the original trust property as the results of the benets from the re-trust relationship.
Such being the case, as for the contents of the duties and responsibilities of co-
trustees, like many other respects in Trust Law, the most part must be left to the
interpretation of the concrete terms of trust since the ways of constitution or the
purposes of actual trust relationships are various. Therefore, it cannot be avoided
that rather complicated considerations may be required in the practical resolution of
a dispute in the case in which plural trustees are adopted.
(7) The Eect of the Violation of the Duty of Trustee
As for the eect of the violation of the duty of trustee prescribed in Trust Act or
terms of trust, problems may occur practically or theoretically in some respects.
The rst question is whether the act which violated the duty of trustee prescribed
in Trust Act or therms of trust should be invalid or valid on the face but avoidable.
This problem can be xed by the terms of the provision, but the interpretation of
the general principle may vary depending on the ways of thinking concerning the
fundamental structure of trust. If one thinks a trustee is the owner of the trust
property, since a trustee is a holder of the absolute right on the trust property, a
violative act by the trustee against the trust relationship constitutes only a violation
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of the obligation of the trustee in relation to the beneciary, so that the act by the
trustee is generally valid in itself unless explicitly prescribed otherwise by Trust Act.
Contrary to that, If one thinks that a beneciary is the substantial owner of the
trust property or that trust property is an entity independent of the trust parties,
then, since a trustee has been given the power only for doing actions necessary for
the administration of the trust property, an act which violated the duty of trustee is
invalid as an action out of the authority.
However, this argument is only for theoretical purpose and the discussion reaches
only the general rule. Some more complicated arguments will be required for appro-
priate resolutions of practical problems like in the case where interest of some third
party is involved in the violative administration of the trust property or the bene-
ciary gains some from the violative act, for in which to treat that violative act as
simply invalid is not necessarily advantageous for the trust property or the bene-
ciary. In fact, the provisions concerning the eect of the violative act by the trustee
in the current statute prescribes in the case of the violation of the duty of loyalty, for
instance, that an act creating conict of interests is generally void but can be made
retroactively valid by an approval of the beneciary26, and, on the other hand, that
the act for the interest of the trustee or a third party can be considered as conducted
in the interest of the trust property27. As we can see from those provisions, the act in
violation of a duty of trustee is not prescribed as simply void. We should note that,
among the various problems concerning the eect of the act in violation of a duty of
trustee, especially in the problem of the validness of that act, concrete results of the
act are taken together into consideration to some degree, so that the solution is not
simply deduced from the application of a general theory.
The second problem is how to restore or compensate the loss or the damages on
the trust property where the trust property or the beneciary got damaged or the
trust property suered a loss by an act of the trustee in violation of a duty of trustee.
It means what exceptional means the Trust Act explicitly provides to the principle
of the monetary compensation for damages in Civil Code (see Civil Code Article 417
and Article 772 paragraph 2).
26(Restriction on Acts that Create Conicts of Interest)[excerpt]
Article 31
...
¯ Where the act set forth in paragraph ¬, item 1 or item 2 is carried out in violation of the
provisions of paragraph ¬ or paragraph ­, such act shall be void.
° The act set forth in the preceding paragraph shall become eective retroactively as of the time
of the act, if it is ratied by the beneciary.
27Article 32 [excerpt]
...
¯Where a trustee has carried out an act prescribed in paragraph ¬ in violation of the provisions
of paragraph ¬ and paragraph ­, the beneciary may deem that said act has been conducted in the
interests of the trust property; provided, however, that this may not harm rights of any third party.
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The aim that Civil Code provides the monetary compensation principle for dam-
ages is to simplify the method for claiming a liability and to make use of the universal
currency of money in modern economic society. That general principle will be applied
to a trust relationship, too, since a trust relationship is one of juristic relationship.
So, where the trust property or the beneciary got damaged or the trust property
partly or wholly suered a loss by an act of the trustee in violation of a duty of
trustee, the amount of the damages or losses should be evaluated in terms of money
so as to have the trustee compensate for it in principle.
However, the most important ground of a trust relationship is not in the pursuit
of personal interests of the trust parties but in the accomplishment of the purpose
of the trust. So, if a trust relationship has been settled for pursuing commercial
prots, to evaluate all the damages or losses in terms of money will not inconsistent
with the purpose. But the existence and maintenance of a certain trust property is
indispensable for the attainment of the purpose of the trust in many cases, in which
the lack of the certain trust property leads immediately to the termination of the
trust relationship because of the impossibility of the accomplishment of the purpose
of the trust. If one stands on the position that a trust relationship which has been
established once should be maintained as far as possible, where the lack of some trust
property causes the termination of the trust relationship, it is clearly more reasonable
to claim for the restoration of the property than to demand the compensation with
money. In addition, when there is some method to injunct the act in violation of the
duty by the trustee in advance so as to avoid the termination of a trust relationship
because of the lack of a certain trust property, to make use of such a method will be
surely useful for the continuation of the trust relationship, namely, for an attainment
of the purpose of the trust.
Trust Act, both in the former and the current statutes, has the provision which
explicitly prescribes that a demand for the restoration of the state of the trust property
from the trustee is allowed where some loss or some change to the trust property
occurred28. In addition, as for an injunction claim in the situation in which there is
28Article 27 of the formal statute When a trustee caused any loss to the trust property due to any
failure of the administration, or when a trustee disposed of a trust property against the purpose of the
trust, the settlor or the successor, the beneciary or other trustee(s) may demand the compensation
of the damages or the restoration of the trust property from the trustee.
(Trustee Liability to Compensate for Losses, etc.)[excerpt]
Article 40 ¬ When any of the cases listed in the following items has occurred due to the trustee's
breach of the duties, the beneciary may demand that the trustee take the measures specied in
the respective items; provided, however, that this shall not apply to the measures specied in item
2, if it is extremely dicult to restore the trust property, if the restoration would require excessive
expenses, or if there are other special circumstances where it is inappropriate to have the trustee
restore the trust property:
1. where any loss to the trust property has occurred: compensation for such loss; and
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a fear for the trustee to do an act in breach of the duty while there was no explicit
provision for that in the former statute, the current statute has the provisions in
which such an injunction is explicitly admitted as the right of the beneciary29. The
existence of those provisions means that the basic policy of Trust Act concerning
the restoration from the damages due to the act in breach of a duty by trustee is
not only to make up for the economic loss but also to maintain a trust relationship
for the attainment of the purpose of the trust. Therefore, although those methods
are prescribed as \rights of the beneciary" in the statute, we should note that
those rights should not be exercised, in principle, only for the beneciary's personal
interests.
4.3 Right of Beneciary
(1) The Nature of the Right of Beneciary
A beneciary has the right to enjoy the benets from the administration of the trust
property. That right is called the \benecial right". The theoretical construction
concerning the fundamental structure of trust has been historically argued around the
problem, how to understand the nature of the benecial right. So, the way of thinking
of the nature of the benecial right varies depending on the thought concerning the
fundamental structure of trust.
If one thinks that the trustee is the owner of the trust property, the beneciary is
never the owner of the trust property but has a claim to demand the trustee for the
suitable trust administration to the purpose of the trust so as to enjoy the benets
from the administration of the trust property. So, this thought is usually called the
\jus-in-personam theory". Under the jus-in-personam theory, the benecial right is
a claim against the trustee in person and the ground of the benecial right is the
agreement between the trust parties in which the trustee has assumed that obligation
in relation to the settlor or the beneciary. The jus-in-personam theory was adopted
explicitly by the former statute. In addition, the theory is suitable to the appearance
of trust relationship in that a trustee holds the title of the trust property and performs
2. where any change to the trust property has occurred: restoration of the trust property.
...
29(Cessation of a Trustee's Acts At the Demand of the Beneciary)
Article 44 ¬ Where a trustee has acted or is likely to act in violation of laws and regulations or
the provisions of the terms of trust, if said action is likely to cause substantial harm to the trust
property, the beneciary may demand that the trustee cease said action.
­ Where a trustee has acted or is likely to act in violation of the provisions of Article 33, if
said action is likely to cause substantial harm to some of the beneciaries, those beneciaries may
demand that the trustee cease said action.
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the most of the powers as the owner of the property in relation to third parties. So,
the theory still nds the supporters up to present.
On the other hand, if one thinks that a beneciary is the substantial owner of the
trust property, the benecial right a beneciary has is nothing but the substantial
ownership on the trust property. So, this thought is usually called the \jus-in-rem
theory" since it takes a beneciary right as a right in rem. But, in order to express the
nature of benecial right clearer, it may be better to call it the \beneciary-as-the-
substantial-owner" theory. Under the beneciary-as-the-substantial-owner theory, a
benecial right is the entity into which all the rights concerning the trust property
are accumulated and the ground of a benecial right is the existence of the trust
relationship itself, which practically means the contract and other juristic acts for the
settlement of the trust. The beneciary-as-the-substantial-owner theory is a theoreti-
cal construction which shows straightforwardly the fact that the beneciary should be
able to enjoy the benets from the administration of the trust property. In addition,
this theory can give the fact that the beneciary has the supervising power over the
trustee a clear ground, namely, the substantial ownership of the beneciary on the
trust property. Due to these reasons, considerable numbers of supports can be found
for this theory under the current statute as well as under the former statute.
Instead, if one thinks that a trust property is an entity independent of the trust
parties, since a trust property never belongs to anyone of the trust parties as its own
property, a benecial right is not the ownership but a right to demand the enjoyment
of the benets coming from the trust property. However, on the other hand, under this
theory, the trustee also is never the owner of the trust property, in contrast to the case
of the jus-in-personam theory, so the counter party of the demand for the enjoyment of
the benet is the trust property itself as a substantially independent entity. As we can
see from the explanation, this theory is constructed by putting on the center not the
nature of benecial right but the independency or the substantial legal subjectivity of
the trust property in the meaning that the the trust property never belongs to anyone
of the trust parties. So, the theory is called the \trust-property-as-a-substantial-
legal-subject theory". Under the trust-property-as-a-substantial-legal-subject theory,
no \ownership" exists on the trust property, dierent from any usual property, but
many dierent rights and duties of the trust parties including the benecial right
have been set by the act of trust. So, the ground of the benecial right is same
as the ground of the existence of the trust relationship, concretely, the act of trust.
The trust-property-as-a-substantial-legal-subject theory had some peculiarities under
the former statute in that, for instance, it insisted denitions of concepts or the
interpretational conclusion which were clearly discrepant from the verbal meanings
of the statutory provisions. Moreover, for example, the insistence that there is no
ownership on the trust property clearly contradicts the general principle of Civil Code,
so this theory was criticized as hard to understand. However, the way of thought
that the trust property is not owned by a particular person of the trust parties but
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substantially independent existence is in itself suitable to the sense of practical trust
business in administrating trust properties, so that some deep-rooted supports can
be found in the world of practical trust business.
As we have pointed out in many places up to here, the current Trust Act prescribes
the denition of trust by abstracting common parts of all the theories concerning
the fundamental structure of trust, so that, also as for the various aspects of the
problem concerning the rights and duties relations in a trust relationship, it does
not stand on any one of the theories. So, in contrast to the former statute which
adopted the jus-in-personam theory, the current statute will not cause any serious
contradiction in provisions with any theoretical stand point concerning the nature
of benecial right. Viewing from the actual practices of trust, there exist all kinds
of trust relationships corresponding to the intensions and demands by various trust
parties, so that the most suitable interpretation of the nature of benecial right
necessarily varies depending on the purpose of each trust relationship. While to
admit various natures of benecial right may be convenient for the attainments of
various trust purposes, it may lead, at the same time, to frequent occurrences of
practical interpretational problems concerning the nature of benecial right.
In sum, although the current statute stands on the neutral position for theoretical
denitions of the nature of benecial right, To take such a position never gets rid
of the meaning of the discussion on the nature of benecial right. Rather, it would
augment the signicance of the argument on the nature of benecial right both in
theory and practice, for it leads to the co-existence of various kinds of benecial rights.
(2) Establishment of Benecial Right
Although the nature of benecial right can admit, as we mentioned above, of various
interpretations, the right is established theoretically as a matter of course associated
with that of the trust relationship. The mutual relation between the establishments of
a trust relationship and of the benecial right is explained under the jus-in-personam
theory that the acceptance of the trust relationship by the trustee establishes the
claim of the beneciary against the trustee, namely, the benecial right. On the
other hand, under the beneciary-as-the-substantial-owner and the trust-property-
as-a-substantial-legal-subject theories, an establishment of a trust relationship itself
modies the whole ownership structure on the trust property, so that the benecial
right is established as the substantial ownership on the trust property or the right to
demand the benet from the trust property, respectively.
By the way, under the current statute, it is possible to establish a trust relationship
without any provisions on the beneciary by the will of the settler. But a trust
relationship of this type is restricted in the period for establishment. In addition, it is
required to assign a trust caretaker when created by the method of a will. Moreover,
the power of the settlor over the trust property cannot be restricted by the terms of
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trust when created by the method of a contract30. Consequently, a trust relationship
30(Requirements for a Trust With No Provisions on the Beneciary)
Article 258 ¬ A trust with no provisions on the beneciary (including provisions on the method for
specifying a beneciary; the same shall apply hereinafter) may be created by the method set forth
in Article 3, item 1 or item 2.
­ In the case of a trust with no provisions on the beneciary, provisions on the beneciary may
be established by making a modication to the trust.
® In the case of a trust with provisions on the beneciary, such provisions on the beneciary may
not be abolished by making a modication to the trust.
¯ When a trust with no provisions on the beneciary is to be created by the method set forth
in Article 3, item 2, provisions to designate a trust caretaker shall be established. In this case, no
provisions may be established to restrict the trust caretaker's power to exercise the rights listed in
the items of Article 145, paragraph ­ (excluding item 6).
° In the case of a trust with no provisions on the beneciary which was created by the method
set forth in Article 3, item 2 and for which there are no provisions for designating a trust caretaker,
if there are provisions on the executor, the executor shall appoint a trust caretaker. In this case,
when the executor has appointed a trust caretaker, it shall be deemed that the provisions set forth
in the rst sentence of the preceding paragraph were established in the terms of trust with regard
to the appointed trust caretaker.
± In the case of a trust with no provisions on the beneciary which was created by the method set
forth in Article 3, item 2 and for which there are no provisions designating a trust caretaker, if there
are no provisions on the executor or if the person designated as the one who is to be the executor
does not appoint or is unable to appoint a trust caretaker, the court may appoint a trust caretaker
at the petition of an interested party. In this case, when a judicial decision on the appointment of a
trust caretaker has been made, it shall be deemed that the provisions set forth in the rst sentence
of paragraph ¯ were established in the terms of trust with regard to the appointed trust caretaker.
² The provisions of Article 123, paragraph ± to paragraph ³ shall apply mutatis mutandis to a
judicial decision on the petition set forth in the preceding paragraph.
³ In the case of a trust with no provisions on the beneciary which was created by the method
set forth in Article 3, item 2, the trust shall terminate where there is a vacancy in the position of
trust caretaker and the position has not been lled with a new trust caretaker for one year.
(Duration of a Trust with No Provisions on the Beneciary)
Article 259 The duration of a trust with no provisions on the beneciary may not exceed 20 years.
(Settlor's Rights in a Trust with No Provisions on the Beneciary)
Article 260 ¬ In the case of a trust with no provisions on the beneciary which was created by the
method set forth in Article 3, item 1, it shall be deemed as having been provided that the settlor
(if there are two or more settlors, all settlors) shall have the rights listed in the items of Article
145, paragraph ­ (excluding item 6) and that the trustee shall have the duties listed in the items
of paragraph ¯ of said Article. In this case, such provisions may not be changed by making a
modication to the trust.
­ In the case of a trust with no provisions on the beneciary which was created by the method set
forth in Article 3, item 2, if it is deemed, pursuant to the provisions of the second sentence of Article
258, paragraph ° or the second sentence of paragraph ± of said Article, that the provisions set
forth in the rst sentence of paragraph ¯ of said Article have been established, it is not allowable to
restrict the trust caretaker's power to exercise the rights listed in the items of Article 145, paragraph
­ (excluding item 6) by making a modication to the trust.
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without any provisions on the beneciary means practically that in which there is
temporarily no person who has the right to enjoy the benet from the trust property
just after the establishment of the trust relationship, so that the supervising power
over the administration of the trust property is exercised by the person other than the
beneciary, namely, the trust caretaker or the settlor on behalf of a future beneciary.
Therefore, we can suppose it is still a general rule under the current statute that a
benecial right becomes executable at the same time as the establishment of the trust.
However, as we explained concerning the establishment of a trust, the existence of
the trust property is not required at the establishment time of the trust relationship
and the actual execution of the benecial right becomes possible only after the time
when an actual beneciary is specied or selected and a concrete benecial right
belongs to the beneciary. A beneciary candidate who is not still assigned as a
beneciary or a person who does't satisfy some qualication for a beneciary shouldn't
be allowed to exercise the benecial right since any person is not a beneciary until
she/he has certainly gotten the status of a beneciary, even if that person is sure to
get the benecial right in near future (See Chapter 3 Section 2 (3)).
By the way, should a provisional remedy be allowed in order for a to-be beneciary
to secure a benecial right to be acquired in near future? The answer may depend
on the degree of certainty that the to-be beneciary actually gets the benecial right.
But, seeing from the balance with general expectation interests which associate with a
legal position, we conclude that it will be generally not allowed for a person to petition
a provisional remedy to secure the benets which the person expects to enjoy through
the benecial right before the person gets the status of a beneciary. However, where
the trustee or a third party intensionally gives damages to the trust property in
order to harm the future benets, even if the status of the future beneciary is not
a beneciary yet at the time of the wrongdoing, there seems to be enough room to
consider an establishment of torts against the future beneciary and the claim for
compensation of the damages against the trustee or the third party.
The current statute prescribes that where a person has acquired the status of a
beneciary by the establishment of the trust relationship or by satisfying the con-
ditions for being beneciary prescribed in the terms of trust, the person acquires
a benecial right by operation of law without the need of the manifestation of the
will to accept the status by the person31. Therefore, a trustee will bear the duties
31(Acquisition of Benecial Interest)
Article 88 ¬ A person designated by the provisions of terms of trust as one who is to be a beneciary
(including a person designated as an initial beneciary or as a new beneciary after a change as a
result of the exercise of the right to designate or change beneciaries as prescribed in paragraph ¬
of the following Article) shall acquire a benecial interest by operation of law; provided, however,
that if the terms of trust otherwise provides, such provisions shall prevail.
­ If a person designated as one who is to be a beneciary as prescribed in the preceding paragraph
does not know that the person has acquired a benecial interest pursuant to the provisions of said
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and responsibilities in the trust relationship to the beneciary from the time of the
establishment of the benecial right on. However, since the trustee may not know
the fact that someone has acquired the status of a beneciary just at the acquisition
time, the liability from the act by the trustee which, in eect, damaged the benet
for the beneciary should be reasonably restricted where the trustee didn't know the
existence of the beneciary, therefore, of the benecial right at the time of that act.
By the way, the risk of an actual hindrance of the administration actions because
the trustee cannot know the existence of the beneciary or the establishment of the
benecial right will be augmented in the case in which the trust act has provisions
not on the beneciary but on the person who has right to designate beneciaries.
Therefore, the current statute provides the provisions which make the necessary in-
formation concerning the procedure for the designation of beneciaries concentrate
on the trustee, so as to repress superuous disputes on that point32.
The fact that a benecial right is established by operation of law at the same
time as the establishment of the trust relationship has theoretically no relation to
the contents of the benecial right. The concrete contents of individual benecial
rights are determined corresponding to the individual purposes of the trusts, so the
powers of the beneciaries may, of course, vary depending on the purposes of the
trusts even if a beneciary acquires it by operation of law. The concrete content of a
benecial right can be freely dened in the act of trust taking the purpose of the trust
into consideration, as a general rule. By the way, the current statute prescribes that
certain types of the beneciary's right cannot be restricted or negated by the terms
of trust33. Most of those types of the right of beneciary fall under the supervising
paragraph, the trustee shall notify such person to that eect without delay; provided, however, that
if the terms of trust otherwise provides for, such provisions shall prevail.
32(Right to Designate or Change Beneciaries)
Article 89 ¬ In the case of a trust with provisions on the persons who have the right to designate or
change beneciaries, the right to designate or change a beneciary shall be exercised by manifestation
of intention to do so to the trustee.
­ Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding paragraph, the right to designate or change a
beneciary may be exercised through a will.
®Where the right to designate or change beneciaries is exercised through a will pursuant to the
provisions of the preceding paragraph, if the trustee does not know of such exercise, the acquisition
of the status of a beneciary through the exercise of said right may not be duly asserted against
such trustee.
¯ When the person who was a beneciary has lost benecial interest as a result of the exercise of
the right to change beneciaries, the trustee shall notify such person to that eect without delay;
provided, however, that if the terms of trust otherwise provides for, such provisions shall prevail.
° The right to designate or change beneciaries shall not be succeeded to through inheritance;
provided, however, that if the terms of trust otherwise provides for, such provisions shall prevail.
± For the purpose of the application of the provisions of paragraph¬ in cases where the person who
has the right to designate or change beneciaries is a trustee, the term \trustee" in said paragraph
shall be deemed to be replaced with \person who is to be a beneciary."
33(Prohibition by Provisions in the Terms of Trust of a Beneciary's Exercise of Rights)
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power of beneciary over the administration of the trust property, on which we will
explain again later.
Article 92 No restrictions may be imposed by the provisions of the terms of trust on the beneciary's
exercise of the following rights:
1. the right to le a petition with the court under the provisions of this Act;
2. the right to call for a denite answer under the provisions of Article 5, paragraph ¬;
3. the right to assert an objection under the provisions of Article 23, paragraph ° or paragraph
±;
4. the right to demand payment under the provisions of Article 24, paragraph ¬;
5. the right to rescind under the provisions of Article 27, paragraph ¬ or paragraph ­ (including
cases where these provisions are applied mutatis mutandis pursuant to Article 75, paragraph ¯);
6. the right to rescind under the provisions of Article 31, paragraph ± or paragraph ²;
7. the right to request a report under the provisions of Article 36;
8. the right to request to inspect or copy materials under the provisions of Article 38, paragraph
¬ or paragraph ±;
9. the right to demand compensation for a loss or restoration of the trust property under the
provisions of Article 40;
10. the right to demand compensation for a loss or restoration of the trust property under the
provisions of Article 41;
11. the right to demand a cessation under the provisions of Article 44;
12. the right to demand payment under the provisions of Article 45, paragraph ¬;
13. the right to demand a cessation under the provisions of Article 59, paragraph °;
14. the right to demand a cessation under the provisions of Article 60, paragraph® or paragraph
°;
15. the right to demand payment under the provisions of Article 61, paragraph ¬;
16. the right to call for a denite answer under the provisions of Article 62, paragraph ­;
17. the right to waive a benecial interest under the provisions of Article 99, paragraph ¬;
18. the beneciary's right to demand that the trustee acquire the benecial interest under the
provisions of Article 103, paragraph ¬ or paragraph ­;
19. the right to call for a denite answer under the provisions of Article 131, paragraph ­;
20. the right to call for a denite answer under the provisions of Article 138, paragraph ­;
21. the right to request the delivery of documents or provision of records under the provisions
of Article 187, paragraph ¬;
22. the right to request to inspect or copy materials under the provision of Article 190, paragraph
­;
23. the right to request that a matter be stated or recorded in the registry under the provisions
of Article 198, paragraph ¬
24. the right to demand compensation or payment of monies under the provisions of Article
226, paragraph ¬;
25. the right to demand compensation or payment of monies under the provisions of Article
228, paragraph ¬; and
26. the right to demand compensation for a loss under the provisions of Article 254, paragraph
¬.
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(3) The Supervising Power of Beneciary
The right of the beneciary can be roughly divided into two categories. The one
is the concrete interest to enjoy the benet from the administration of the trust
property, which undoubtedly belongs to the beneciary in person and is generally a
property of the beneciary. Another is the right for the beneciary's supervision of
the administration of the trust property. That \right" of the beneciary is to be called
rather \the power". The supervising power of beneciary is, seeing from the aim of the
trust institution, a juristic means which the Trust law gives a beneciary in order to
have the trustee keep the administration of the trust property suitable to the purpose
of the trust, although it has also an intimate relation with the personal interest of
the beneciary concerning the enjoyment of the benet through the benecial right.
Under the former statute, a settlor as well as beneciary held its own supervising
power, as a general rule. So, there was a room, also theoretically, to interpret that
the beneciary's supervising power could be exercised for the personal interest of the
beneciary, in contrast to that of the settlor. On the other hand, as we will discuss
later concerning settlor in Section 4, the current Trust Act cuts o the functionality of
settlor from the other trust parties in eect, so that it sets forth as the legislative policy
the eect that the power of settlor is greatly reduced. Therefore, the functionality
of the supervising power to orient the trust administration to the attainment of the
trust purpose, which the former statute intended by giving the power to a settlor,
must be generally entrusted to a beneciary.
As the result, concerning the supervising power of beneciary over the trustee
under the current statute, some new problems which did not exist under the former
statute may occur. Should it be allowed for a beneciary to make use of the supervis-
ing power for pursuing her/his own interest? Or should we think that a beneciary
should assume a de facto \duty" to exercise the supervising power appropriately for
the accomplishment of the purpose of the trust? Further, where the attainment of
the purpose of the trust became dicult or impossible or some damages occurred on
other beneciaries or on a third party because of the lack of the appropriate use of the
supervising power by a beneciary, may a beneciary, jointly with or independently
of the trustee, assume a liability of the compensation of the damages to the other
beneciaries or third party?
If one tries to interprets the provisions of the current statute verbally, one will
realize that the supervising power of beneciary is prescribed as a \right" of bene-
ciary concerning the \duty" of trustee in each relevant provision. Therefore, as far as
we view the problem from the fundamental principle concerning \right", a holder of
a right should be able to make use of the right for her/his own interest or to refrain
from the execution of the right based on her/his own judgement. As for the question
whether a right holder may assume a \duty" to make use of her/his own \right',
simply to hold the \right" is not enough as the ground of the \duty" to make use of
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the \right", so some further reason will be necessary to ground such a \duty". If a
\duty" of a right holder to make use of the \right" is not admitted, the general rule
is that any \liability" will not happen where there is no \duty". Viewing from these
general principles, a beneciary should be allowed to make use of the right for the
sake of her/his own interest and, since the supervising power is a \right" a beneciary
holds, the execution of the power is not a \duty" of the beneciary, so that even if for
the beneciary not to exercise appropriately the power causes some damages to other
beneciaries or third parties, the beneciary shouldn't need to assume the liability to
compensate for the damages.
However, the argument above are sticking to the provisional wording that a ben-
eciary has the \right" to the trustee and supposing that a trust relationship will
be created aiming only at the personal interest of the beneciary. In addition, \the
interest of the beneciary" in this meaning represents only actual prots which will
be generated by the administration of the trust property and which the beneciary
can get from the trust activity. So, this argument places the part of the enjoyment of
the actual prots from the trust property on the center of benecial right in the trust
relationship, so that the supervising power of a beneciary is looked as a subsidiary
right for the security of the actual prots from the trust property.
However, if one is going further in that direction, the one will meet the problem
haw to explain the provision of the current statute which prohibits the act of trust
from restricting the supervising power part of benecial right. As we have seen
above, what kind of the benets a beneciary can enjoy with the benecial right
is freely determined in the terms of trust with taking the purpose of the trust into
consideration, as a general rule. So, a supervising power which is only a subsidiary
means for that should be, of course, able to be determined freely by an agreement
between trust parties with considering the relation to concrete contents of the benets
a beneciary could enjoy. But then, why the statutory provisions restricts the freedom
of the terms of trust to determine the content of the supervising power of beneciary
which is merely a subsidiary means while a free agreement between the parties is
allowed on the essential body of benecial right, namely, the content of the benet
a beneciary can enjoy? To give a reasonable explanation for that, we should admit
that the supervising power of beneciary is intended to protect something which
shouldn't be changed by an agreement between the trust parties. So, a thought that
the supervising power of beneciary is a subsidiary means for the enjoyment of the
benet by a beneciary because a trust relationship exists for the personal interest of
the beneciary comes up against a dicult problem to explain the statutory provisions
in relation to the supposition that a beneciary should be able to freely dispose of its
own interest.
Instead, if one thinks that the reason of the existence of a trust relationship is in
the administration of the trust property being bound with the purpose, which is the
fundamental thought of this book, it is relatively easy to give a reasonable explanation
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for the supervising power of beneciary. The supervising power of beneciary has
theoretically a quite dierent nature from that of the benetting part of a benecial
right. It is the actual means for a beneciary to keep the administration of the trust
property appropriate in accordance with the purpose of the trust, so that it is a
means not for the personal interest of a beneciary but for the accomplishment of the
purpose of the trust. As we have seen, since the current statute, in contrast to the
former statute, has diluted the signicance of the existence of a settlor who had held
the supervising power over the trustee without enjoying the benet from the trust
property, it is none but a beneciary that the current statute expected to exercise
the supervising power over the trustee's actions in order to attain the purpose of the
trust.
Therefore, a beneciary should make use of the supervising power not as the
\right" to seek for the personal interests but, in eect, as a kind of \duty" for the
attainment of the purpose of the trust. Viewing from this stand point, where the
purpose of a trust became dicult or impossible to attain because the beneciary
didn't exercise appropriately the supervising power, the beneciary should assume
the \liability" to the result since the beneciary neglected the \duty" to make use
of the supervising power appropriately. Moreover, where such a negligence by a
beneciary causes damages to other beneciaries, the trust property or third parties,
the beneciary should compensate for the damages. According to this thought, while
the benetting part of a benecial right which intends to the personal interest of the
beneciary can be freely changed by an agreement as a property of the beneciary,
the supervising power over the trustee cannot be changed by the act of trust since
it is a \duty" of the beneciary for the attainment of the purpose of the trust. So,
the intention of the provision of the current statute can be now clearly explained. In
addition, we expect that it can give some reasonable standard to resolve problems
concerning how to exercise the supervising power where there are plural beneciaries
in a trust relationship, which is dicult to resolve from the stand point which sees
the benecial right as an accumulation of the personal interest of each beneciary.
(4) Assignment of Right of Beneciary
A benecial right is a property that belongs to a beneciary, so that it can be,
as a general rule, freely transferred unless the transfer is prohibited or restricted
by the terms of trust. By the way, among the contents of a benecial right, the
supervising power over the trustee is not for the private interest of the beneciary
but is should be taken as a kind of \duty" for the attainment of the trust purpose,
as we discussed above. However, the problems of the nature of supervising power
and of the transferability of a beneciary right are logically independent with each
other, so, where a benecial right is transferred, not only the part of the benecial
right which gives the beneciary the actual prots from the trust property but also
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the part which gives the beneciary the power to supervise the actions of the trustee
will be transferred to the transferee, and the transferor has lost all the interests and
the power and left from the trust relationship. As for the procedure of the transfer of
benecial right, since the substantive and procedural principles in Civil Code diers
between a right in person and a right in rem, the interpretation varies depending on
the thought concerning the fundamental structure of trust.
If one thinks like the jus-in-personam or the trust-property-as-a-substantial-legal-
subject theory that a benecial right is a kind of right in person, the transfer of a
benecial right should obey the procedure for the assignment of a claim and the trans-
fer can be validly done only by the agreement between the transferor and transferee.
However, in order to be able to assert the assignment against a third party or the
obligator, the requirement for the assertion equal to that of a claim prescribed in Civil
Code must be satised. If one interprets that the obligator stands for the trustee in
the case of trust, a notice to or an acknowledgement by the trustee is required as
the requirement for the assertion. If one interprets that the obligator stands for the
trust property as an entity, the requirement for the assertion will be still a notice
to or an acknowledgement by the trustee, but in this time, as the administrator of
the trust property. By the way, under these two theories, the trust property and the
benecial right are mutually independent properties, so to satisfy the requirement of
the public notice or the registration of the trust itself on the trust property, on the
one hand, and to satisfy the requirement for the assertion of the assignment of the
right to other trust parties or third parties, on the other hand, are mutually com-
pletely dierent matters. However, a public notice of the change of beneciaries by
way of the modication of the terms of trust at the opportunity of the registration
for the public notice of the trust relationship may satisfy also the requirement for the
assertion of the assignment of the benecial right since it also has the functionality
to give a notice of the change of beneciaries to the trust parties or third parties.
Instead, If one thinks like the beneciary-as-the-substantial-owner theory that a
benecial right is the substantial ownership or some right in rem on the trust property,
the transfer of a benecial right takes eect by the manifestation of the intention of
the transferor to transfer the right in rem, as a general rule. Under this thought,
the public notice of the fact that a property belongs to a trust property and that of
the benecial right which is the substantial ownership or, anyway, a property right
on the trust property are essentially unied to express that right to the trust parties
or third parties. So, as the requirement for the assertion of the assignment of a
benecial right, it is necessary to express clearly the change of the beneciary in the
public notice of the trust relationship and which will be enough. Actually, if the trust
property concerning the transfer of the benecial right is a property to be registered,
the terms of trust which should be attached to the le for the registration should
be replaced so as to express the assignment of the benecial right. When there is
no registration system for the trust property, the existence of the ownership or the
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property right should be conrmed in the position of the trustee who administers that
trust property, namely, the notication to or the acknowledgement by the trustee as
the administrator of the trust property will be required for the assertion of the change
of the beneciary.
Under the former statute, there was no provision concerning transfer of a benecial
right. Theoretically, since a benecial right is a kind of a property right in the broad
sense, the common opinion thought that the transfer of a benecial right itself was
possible unless it was prohibited or restricted by the terms of trust etc. However,
there were not detailed discussions on the concrete procedure for the transfer. As we
described above, the actual procedure or the requirement for assertion may be thought
dierently depending on the theory concerning the fundamental structure of trust.
But, in practice under the former statute, the terms of trust usually had provisions
which prescribed that the procedure of the transfer of a benecial right follows that for
the assignment of claim and the trustee's approval is generally required for a transfer
of a beneciary right. For the former statute adopted the jus-in-personam theory and
it was necessary to concentrate the information concerning the trust property at the
trustee.
By contrast, the current statute explicitly prescribes that a benecial right is
generally assignable to another person34and that the requirement for assertion of the
assignment of a benecial right is the notication to or the acknowledgement of the
trustee35. These provisions are basically following the method of the assignment of
the nominative claim. So, since the trustee's acknowledgement of the assignment of
a benecial right is a mere condition for assertion of the assignment of the benecial
right36, the assignment of a benecial right would be validly established only by the
agreement between the assigner and assignee without the trustee's acknowledgement.
By the way, the current statute provides detailed provisions for the pledge of a
34(Assignability of Benecial Interest)
Article 93 ¬ A beneciary may assign a benecial interest to another; provided, however, that this
shall not apply if the nature thereof does not permit assignment.
­ The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall not apply if the terms of trust otherwise provide;
provided, however, that such provisions of the terms of trust may not be duly asserted against a
third party who has no knowledge of such provisions.
35(Requirements for Perfection of the Assignment of Benecial Interest)
Article 94 ¬ The assignment of a benecial interest may not be duly asserted against a trustee or
any other third party unless the assignor gives notice of the assignment to the trustee or the trustee
acknowledges the same.
­ The notice and acknowledgement set forth in the preceding paragraph may not be duly asserted
against a third party other than a trustee unless they are made by means of an instrument bearing
a certied date.
36(Trustee's Defense Upon the Assignment of a Benecial Interest)
Article 95 A trustee may duly assert as a defense against the assignor any grounds that have arisen
in relation to the assignor before the notice or acknowledgment set forth in paragraph ¬ of the
preceding Article is made.
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benecial right and its eects37. But, since a benecial right is generally transferable,
it may be also an object of a mortgage, so that it may take in some dierent eects
from a pledge which is prescribed in the Trust Act, which we should note, too.
(5) Right of Co-Beneciary
Also in the case in which there are plural beneciaries, all described above concerning
the nature of benecial right should be valid as they are. The basic content of
benecial right is dened in the terms of trust in relation to the purpose of the trust.
And the interpretation of the nature of benecial right varies considerably depending
on the way of thought concerning the fundamental structure of trust. In addition, a
benecial right contains the supervising power over the trustee as well as the interest
to benet from the trust property. The supervising power should be made use of not
for the personal intrest of the beneciary but for the attainment of the purpose of
the trust. A benecial right can be transferred as a general rule.
37(Pledges of Benecial Interest)
Article 96 ¬ A beneciary may create a pledge on a benecial interest; provided, however, that this
shall not apply if the nature thereof does not permit such a pledge.
­ The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall not apply if the terms of trust otherwise provides
for; provided, however, that such provisions of the terms of trust may not be duly asserted against
a third party who has no knowledge of such provisions.
(Eect of Pledges of Benecial Interest)
Article 97 A pledge on a benecial interest shall exist against the following monies, etc. (meaning
monies or other property; hereinafter the same shall apply in this Article and the following Article):
1. monies, etc. that the beneciary who holds the pledged benecial interest has received from
the trustee as distribution involving the trust property;
2. monies, etc. that the beneciary who holds the pledged benecial interest receives by
demanding that the trustee acquire the benecial interest as prescribed in Article 103, paragraph
±;
3. monies, etc. that the beneciary who holds the pledged benecial interest receives through
the consolidation of benecial interests or splitting of a benecial interest as a result of a modication
of the trust;
4. monies, etc. that the beneciary who holds the pledged benecial interest receives through
the consolidation or split of trust(s) (meaning consolidation of a trust or split of a trust, the same
applies hereinafter); and
5. in addition to what is listed in the preceding items, monies, etc. that the beneciary who
holds the pledged benecial interest receives in lieu of such benecial interest.
Article 98 ¬ A person who has created a pledge on a benecial interest may receive monies, etc. set
forth in the preceding Article (limited to monies) and appropriate them for payment of a claim of
the person prior to other creditors.
­ Before the claim set forth in the preceding paragraph becomes due, the person who has created
the pledge on a benecial interest may have the trustee deposit an amount equivalent to the monies,
etc. prescribed in said paragraph. In this case, a pledge shall exist on such deposited monies.
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However, where there are plural beneciaries, some peculiar problems may also
occur. The rst problem is how to distribute the benets from the administration of
trust among the beneciaries. In such a case, we should consider the possibility of
the conict of interests among the beneciaries as well as between the trustee and
the beneciaries. The second problem is how for the beneciaries to make use of the
supervising power. This problem is more serious in relation to the personal interest
of each beneciary where there are plural beneciaries since the conict of interest
among beneciaries may occur.
As for the rst problem, since the general rule is that the basic content of a
benecial right is determined in the terms of trust, the content of a benecial right in
the case in which there are plural beneciaries should still be determined by following
the terms of trust. Therefore, for instance, the act of trust may set the priority order
among the beneciaries in the distribution of the gains or losses or prescribe some
xed ratio to divide the gains or losses among the beneciaries. Then, the problem
will be how to do where no standard for the benecial right is provided in the terms
of trust. As a general rule, we should consider all the benecial rights as equal, so
that the gains or the losses should be distributed equally to all the beneciaries. This
conclusion will be supportable whether the nature of a benecial right is thought as
a right in person or as the substantial ownership on the trust property.
On the other hand, as for the second problem, if it is allowed for all the beneciaries
to make use of the supervising powers for the individual personal interests, it is clear
that the administration of the trust property may be disordered. Therefore, the
principle for execution of the supervising power, which we described above, will be
still more appropriate for the case. That is, each co-beneciary should make use of
the supervising power reasonably for the sake of the attainment of the purpose of the
trust. Also the provisions concerning the decision of the will of the co-beneciaries
in the current statute38could be interpreted as based on that principle.
38Article 105 ¬ In the case of a trust with two or more beneciaries, the beneciaries' decisions
(excluding decisions on the exercise of the rights listed in the items of Article 92) shall be made with
the unanimous consent of all beneciaries; provided, however, that if the terms of trust otherwise
provides, such provisions shall prevail.
­ In the case referred to in the proviso to the preceding paragraph, if it is provided in the terms
of trust that beneciaries' decisions shall be made by majority vote at a beneciaries meeting, the
provisions of the following Subsection shall apply; provided, however, that if the terms of trust
otherwise provides, such provisions shall prevail.
® Notwithstanding the provisions of the proviso to paragraph ¬ or the preceding paragraph,
provisions of the terms of trust on the method of making decisions on release from liability under
the provisions of Article 42 shall be eective only if they are provisions to the eect that such
decisions are to be made by majority vote at a beneciaries meeting as provided for in the following
Subsection.
¯ The provisions of the proviso to paragraph ¬ and the preceding two paragraphs shall not apply
to exemptions from liability listed as follows:
1. a total exemption from liability under the provisions of Article 42;
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(6) Right of Sequentially Ordered Beneciaries
In contrast to ordinary co-beneciaries case in which several beneciaries enjoy the
benet from the trust property at the same time, in the case of the sequentially
ordered beneciaries, the subsequent beneciary cannot exercise the right unless the
preceding beneciary's right terminates or lapses. In this case, the problem is from
what time on the interest of the subsequent beneciary will be protected as the
right of a \beneciary". The answer may vary depending on the interpretations of
\sequentially ordered beneciaries".
Suppose that a trust relationship with \sequentially ordered beneciaries" is in-
tended to be continued for considerably long term and the reason of the sequential
ordering of the beneciaries is because the concrete conditions concerning the ben-
eting process from the trust property doesn't allow to give plural beneciaries the
benets at the same time, so that the sequential ordering should be set on the actual
beneting. Where such an interpretation is appropriate, each beneciary may be
restricted on the content of the right to enjoy the benet from the trust property in
actual benetting phase in order that the enjoyments of the benets by subsequent
beneciaries are secured to the certain degree. It may fall under an abuse of the ben-
ecial right, for instance, that a beneciary destroys the trust property with knowing
the existence of the subsequent beneciaries so as to make the subsequent benetting
impossible or that a beneciary easily gives the approval to the trustee's violative act
so as to have the trust property damaged. Such an abuse of the benecial right may
constitute a tort to the subsequent beneciaries.
Instead, suppose that a trust relationship seems to have sequentially ordered ben-
eciaries but the ordering is a mere accidental result of the individual trust acts on
individual beneciaries. In such a case, the subsequent beneciaries could enjoy the
benet from the trust property on the condition that there is left the rest of the trust
property after the termination or lapse of the right of the preceding beneciary. Then,
the preceding beneciary may make use of the benecial right exclusively for the sake
of her/his own interest. Even if the trust relationship has ended up to be terminated
due to the execution of the benecial right by a beneciary, that beneciary doesn't
need to assume the liability to subsequent beneciaries. Few provisions concerning se-
quentially ordered beneciaries in the current statute seem to be supposing, although
not properly, the case of the latter type39.
2. a partial exemption from liability under the provisions of Article 42, item 1 (limited to
liability arising in cases where the trustee was willful or grossly negligent in the performance of the
duties); and
3. a partial exemption from liability under the provisions of Article 42, item 2.
39(Special Rules for a Trust with Provisions on the Acquisition of Benecial Interest Upon the
Settlor's Death, etc.)
Article 90 ¬ In the case of the trusts set forth in each of the following items, the settlor under those
items shall have the right to change the beneciaries; provided, however, that if the terms of trust
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Of which type an actual trust relationship is will be determined, in eect, through
the interpretation of the trust purpose and the terms of trust. Therefore, the princi-
ple concerning the right of sequentially ordered beneciaries will become inevitably
indenable both theoretically and practically. Above all, we should pay a special
attention to the risk of the conict of interests among the trust parties, especially
among the beneciaries.
(7) Right of Future Beneciary and Holder of Vested Right
\A future beneciary" has no right to enjoy the benet form the trust property
at present but has the expectative right to enjoy the benet in the future. This
\expectative right to enjoy the benet in the future" is a present right. Therefore, in
the case of the future beneciary, in contrast to the case of the subsequent beneciaries
described above, the benecial right has been already established, so the problem left
is how actually to protect the interest.
Theoretically the most clear cut resolution will be the thought that a future bene-
ciary is only restricted on the part of the enjoying the benet from the trust property,
so can already make use of the supervising power over the trustee. However, under
this thought, the ground for a future beneciary to be able to exercise the supervising
power over the trustee at the present time will be to promote the accomplishment of
the purpose of the trust including the beneciary's own benet in the future but not
to protect the personal interest of the beneciary to enjoy the benet from the trust
property in the future.
On the other hand, a vested right holder, surely, stands on the status on which the
enjoyment of some benet in the future is expected, but the situation is quite dierent
otherwise provides for, such provisions shall prevail:
1. a trust with provisions that a person designated as one who is to be a beneciary is to acquire
a benecial interest at the time of the settlor's death; and
2. a trust with provisions that a beneciary is to receive distribution involving the trust property
at the time of the settlor's death or thereafter.
­ The beneciary set forth in item 2 of the preceding paragraph shall not have rights as a bene-
ciary until the settlor under said item dies; provided, however, that if the terms of trust otherwise
provides for, such provisions shall prevail.
(Special Rules for Trusts with Provisions on the Acquisition of New Benecial Interest by Another
Party Upon the Beneciary's Death)
Article 91 A trust with provisions that upon the beneciary's death, the benecial interest held by
said beneciary shall be extinguished and another person shall acquire a new benecial interest (in-
cluding provisions that upon the death of the predecessor beneciary, another person shall acquire a
benecial interest as the successor beneciary) shall be eective, in cases where any beneciary who
is alive when 30 years have elapsed since the creation of the trust acquires a benecial interest pur-
suant to said provisions, until such beneciary dies or until the benecial interest of such beneciary
is extinguished.
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from that of a future beneciary. The content of the right a vested right holder has is
\to enjoy the benet" from the rest, if any, of the trust property after the liquidation
process including creditors or other parties concerned on the trust property caused by
the termination of the trust. So, there is no relation between this right to enjoy the
benet from the trust property in the future and the accomplishment of the purpose of
the trust. Therefore, since a vested right holder never has the status of \beneciary"
in the trust relationship, it could not be allowed for a vested right holder to make use
of the supervising power to secure her/his own right to get the benet in the future
from the rest of the trust property after the liquidation.
(8) Right of the Assigner of the Benecial Right
A benecial right is generally transferable, as described above, and the content of
the right will not be changed before and after the transfer. This conclusion can be
naturally deduced from the fact that a benecial right is assignable as a kind of
property of the assigner. However, if one thinks that there may occur some change in
the content of a benecial right before and after the assignment, one should discuss
the reason including the right of what content the assignee could get.
Such a thought of the possibility of the change is supposing such a case as the
assignee of the benecial right cannot exercise the right freely enough because of the
restrictions on the conditions of the benet or the supervising power in the terms of
trust. Concretely, the ground of the argument is the fact that the range of the contents
of the benecial right which can be restricted in the terms of trust may be dierent
between a self interest trust and a non-self interest trust (See Chapter 2 Section 1).
So, the question is how to treat various restrictions on a benecial right which were
prescribed in the terms of trust supposing the self interest trust relationship after the
transfer of the benecial right to a third party. Should the benecial right assigned to
the third party be still kept to be restricted when the trust relationship has become
a non self interest one?
However, where the existence of the restrictions on the benecial right was ex-
plained to the assignee by the assigner and the assignee was accepted the conditions,
there would be no room for an objection theoretically or practically against the con-
clusion that the content of the benecial right will not change before and after the
assignment. In addition, even if the assigner didn't explain the restrictions on the
benecial right to the assignee, what the assignee can dispute is only the validity of
the assignment. If one insists that the content of the assigned benecial right should
be changed, one should give other ground for it than the insucient explanation by
the assigner.
Therefore, as an explanation for the case in which the content of a benecial right
practically looks like changed before and after the assignment, the content of the
benecial right is actually not changed by the assignment, but only the scope of the
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benecial right that the assignee in person can actually exercise is changed. That is,
the assigner of the benecial right should have assumed some personal restrictions
on the scope of the benecial right that the assigner could exercise through some
special agreement with the trustee or trust property. In such a case, the assignee
of the benecial right would not be bound by the assigner's personal restrictions, so
that the content of the benecial right looks broadened by the assignment. Such a
way of the explanation would be appropriate from the viewpoint of the stability of
the interpretation on the content of a benecial right.
(9) Right of Beneciary after the Termination of the Distri-
bution
In a trust relationship whose purpose is to distribute the prots from the adminis-
tration of the trust property to the beneciary, it may be a problem what content
the a benecial right has which doesn't include the claim of the repayment from
the fund after the completion of all the distributions. In this type of trust, it is
not rare that there are great many beneciaries, and, in addition, the change of the
scope of the power of beneciaries or the policy of the administration of the trust
property, which have been determined in the terms of trust with some exibility in
advance, may become actually necessary corresponding to the market condition in
rather high probability. So some questions may occur concerning what range of the
parties concerned should be treated as \the beneciaries".
One possible way of thinking of this problem is that since the distribution which
has been the purpose of the trust relationship has been terminated, the benecial
right should lapse by the extinction of the object and the beneciary would leave the
trust relationship. This thought takes \the purpose of trust" in the trust relationship
restrictively as to provide the beneciary with the distribution and treat the benecial
right as being terminated by the attainment of the object in relation to the trust
relationship since the distribution for the benecial right, which was the original
purpose, is completed. This thought is largely congruent with the common sense
in the practical trust business. By the way, a beneciary who has left the trust
relationship loses the power to supervise the administration of the trust property or
to give an approve the change of the terms of trust but, on the other hand, is generally
released from the responsibility accompanied with the enjoyment of the benet from
the trust property since she/he has been already unrelated to the trust relationship.
In this respect, this thought is suitable to the theory which takes a benecial right as
\a right in person" to the trustee or the trust property.
Instead, there is another thought according to which the supervising power part of
a benecial right over the trustee should not lapse only by the fact of the completion
of the distribution, so that the beneciary isn't be left from the trust relationship yet.
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This thought takes \the purpose of trust" as concerning whole the administration of
the trust property in the trust relationship and insists that a beneciary for whom
the distribution from the trust property was completed should still play the role in
order to attain the purpose of the trust. It is a very clear cut argument theoretically
from the viewpoint of the proper function of the supervising power a beneciary has.
In addition, under this thought, while the beneciary for whom the distribution of
the prots was completed can still exercise the supervising power over the trustee,
the beneciary may have to assume the responsibility concerning the past benetting
from the trust property or the exercise of the supervising power. In this respect,
this thought is suitable to the theory according to which a benecial right is the
substantial ownership on the trust property.
Practically, to prescribe in advance in the terms of trust the status of a beneciary
after the completion of the distribution will be one of eective measures against this
problem. But we should note still that the interpretation of \the purpose of the trust"
may be various depending on the viewpoint of the interpreter.
4.4 Power of Settlor
(1) Power of Settlor in the Trust Relationship
How to think of the status of the settlor in the trust relationship is, although there is
almost no provision concerning that in the current Trust Act, an important problem
both theoretically and practically.
There are two representative opinions concerning the status of settlor. The one
positions settlor on the status which is the establisher of the trust relationship and
forms the purpose of the trust by itself so that it plays the key role for the attain-
ment of the trust purpose. Another positions admits settlor only the status of the
establisher of the trust relationship as one of the trust parties and thinks that the
attainment of the trust purpose after the establishment of the trust relationship is
performed exclusively by the trustee and beneciary, so that the settlor substantially
leaves the trust relationship.
The argument concerning the status of settlor discusses, in sum, the role of a
settlor in relation to the accomplishment of the trust purpose after the establishment
of the trust relationship, that is concretely, of what range the settlor could exercise the
supervising power over the trustee. However one thinks of the nature of benecial
right, since the possibility of the additional exercise of the supervising power by
the settlor is another problem than that of the beneciary, one should consider this
problem independently of the benecial right irrelevant to the theory concerning the
fundamental structure of trust to be adopted.
If one takes also the relation between the attainment of trust purpose and the will
4.4. POWER OF SETTLOR 151
of the settlor into consideration, it will become still more complicated to determine the
resolution policy. A trust purpose is surely determined by the settlor at the settlement
time of the trust relationship, but \the will of the settlor" in the case in which the
settlor exercises the supervising power over the trustee after the establishment of the
trust relationship and \ the purpose of the trust" in the trust relationship are not
necessarily congruent even in theory. Moreover, even if one could suppose that it is
the settlor who naturally attached the highest importance to the purpose of the trust,
\the purpose of the trust" there may be \the purpose of the trust" at the settlement
time, so, that may not be able to respond exibly to the changes of the conditions
after the settlement.
Therefore, we should note that even if one thinks that the supervising power over
the trustee should be made use of for the sake of the accomplishment of the purpose
of the trust, one cannot always easily reach to the conclusion for the question, which
of the settlor and the beneciary is more suitable to exercise that supervising power.
(2) The Status of Settlor in Trust Act
As described above, concerning the status of settlor, the opinions splits depending
on the answer to the question, who is suitable for exercising the supervising power
in order to attain the trust purpose. So, also in the legislation, the contents of the
provisions may greatly vary depending on the fundamental stance of the legislation.
The former Trust Act was giving a settlor rather wide ranged supervising power
even after the establishment of the trust40and positioned the settlor a suitable super-
40Article 16 of the former statute [excerpt] ...
­ A settlor or the successor, beneciary or trustee may assert an objection to the execution,
provisional seizure, provisional disposition or exercise of a security interest, or auction that is being
commenced in violation of the provision of the last paragraph.
Article 23 of the former statute [excerpt] ¬ When, due to the special circumstances that were
unforeseeable at the time of an act of trust, the method of trust administration no longer conforms
to the interests of the beneciary, the settlor or the successor, the beneciary or the trustee can le
a petition of a modication of the trust to the court.
Article 27 of the former statute When any loss to the trust property occurred by an inappropriate
administration action by the trustee or when the trustee disposed of the trust property in violation
of the terms of trust, the settlor or the successor, the beneciary or the other trustee may claim the
compensation of the loss or the restoration of the trust property against that trustee.
Article 40 of the former statute [excerpt] ...
­ The settlor or the successor or the beneciary may make the requests to inspect the documents
concerning the trust administration and ask the questions on the actions for the trust administration
to a trustee.
Article 47 of the former statute When a trustee violated the duty or performed other serious wrong
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vising power holder equal, or, in some cases, superior to the beneciary. The reason
could be explained as follows. The denition of trust relationship in the former put
an importance on the assignment of certain property by the settlor to the trustee41.
Since the denition put the focus on the action of the settlor to set up the trust pur-
pose and to settle the trust relationship, it would be theoretically most consistent to
make the settlor play the part to act for the sake of the attainment of the purpose of
the trust. Additionally, a settlor never gets the benet from the trust property as far
as the trust relationship continues to exist unless the settlor is the beneciary at the
same time. So, a settlor is readily thought to be a suitable supervising power holder
in roder to attain the trust purpose compared with the beneciary whose exercise
of the supervising power always arouses a suspicion of the pursuit of the personal
interest. In fact, if one places the supervising power of settlor like above, it becomes
possible to allow a beneciary to make use of the supervising power for her/his own
personal interest. To allow a beneciary such a way of exercise of the supervising
power would lead to the reinforcement of the thought that a benecial right is the
beneciary's own right or property.
Contrary to that, the current statute has adoptes the thought that the status of
settlor is only a party to settle a trust relationship, so that it has provisions by which
the terms of trust can exclude the settlor from the trust parties after the establish-
ment of that trust relationship42. Th ground of these provisions can be interpreted
doings, a court may dismiss the trustee at the request of the settlor or the successors or the bene-
ciary.
41Article 1 of the former statute Trust in this statute means to do transfer or the other disposition
of certain property rights so as to have the other person administer or dispose of the property in
accordance with a certain purpose.
42(Settlors' Rights, etc.)
Article 145 ¬ Terms of trust may provide for a settlor not to have all or part of the rights under the
provisions of this Act.
­ Terms of trust may provide for the settlor also to have all or part of the following rights:
1. the right to assert an objection under the provisions of Article 23, paragraph ° or paragraph
±;
2. the right to rescind under the provisions of Article 27, paragraph ¬ or paragraph ­ (including
cases where these provisions are applied mutatis mutandis pursuant to Article 75, paragraph ¯);
3. the right to rescind under the provisions of Article 31, paragraph ± or paragraph ²;
4. the right under the provisions of Article 32, paragraph ¯;
5. the right to request to inspect or copy materials under the provisions of Article 38, paragraph
¬;
6. the right to request the disclosure under the provisions of Article 39, paragraph ¬;
7. the right to demand compensation for a loss or restoration of the trust property under the
provisions of Article 40;
8. the right to demand compensation for a loss or restoration of the trust property under the
provisions of Article 41;
9. the right to demand a cessation under the provisions of Article 44;
10. the right to le a petition for the appointment of an inspector under the provisions of Article
4.4. POWER OF SETTLOR 153
as following. The denition of trust in the current statute put an importance on
the property administration after the establishment of trust, according to which the
trustee assumes the duty to administer the trust property obeying the purpose of
trust for the beneciary43. Inferring practically reasonably from that standpoint, the
trust parties who are to play the key part in order to accomplish the trust purpose
will be the trustee who actually performs the administration of the trust property and
the beneciary who enjoys the benet from the administration. However, under this
thought, as we have already seen, it is inevitable that the theoretical characteristic
of the supervising power of beneciary becomes considerably complicated. So, we
cannot easily judge which is better of the former and current statutes concerning the
positioning of the status of settlor.
46, paragraph ¬;
11. the right to demand a cessation under the provisions of Article 59, paragraph °;
12. the right to demand a cessation under the provisions of Article 60, paragraph® or paragraph
°;
13. the right to demand compensation or payment of monies under the provisions of Article
226, paragraph ¬;
14. the right to demand compensation or payment of monies under the provisions of Article
228, paragraph ¬; and
15. the right to demand compensation for a loss under the provisions of Article 254, paragraph
¬.
® For the purpose of the application of the provisions of Article 24, Article 45 (including cases
where applied mutatis mutandis pursuant to Article 226, paragraph ±, Article 228, paragraph ±,
and Article 254, paragraph ®), or Article 61 in cases where the provisions of an terms of trust are
established as set forth in the preceding paragraph with regard to the rights listed in item 1, item
7 to item 9, or item 11 to item 15 of said paragraph, the term \beneciary" shall be deemed to be
replaced with \settlor or beneciary."
¯ Terms of trust may provide for a trustee to have the following duties:
1. the duty to notify the settlor of the matters of which the trustee should notify the beneciary
(if there is a trust caretaker at the time in question, the matters of which the trustee should notify
the trust caretaker; the same shall apply in the following item) pursuant to the provisions of this
Act;
2. the duty to report to the settlor the matters which the trustee should report to the beneciary
pursuant to the provisions of this Act; and
3. the duty to request that the settlor give an approval for the settlement of accounts for which
the trustee is to give approval pursuant to the provisions of Article 77, paragraph ¬ or Article 184,
paragraph ¬.
° For the purpose of the application of the provisions of paragraph ¬, paragraph ­ and the
preceding paragraph in the case of a trust with two or more settlors, the term \settlor" in these
provisions shall be deemed to be replaced with \all or some of the settlors."
43(Denitions) [excerpt]
Article 2 ¬ The term \trust" as used in this Act means an arrangement in which a specic person,
by employing any of the methods listed in the items of the following Article, administers or disposes
of property in accordance with a certain purpose (excluding the purpose of exclusively promoting
the person's own interests; the same shall apply in said Article) and conducts any other acts that
are necessary to achieve such purpose.
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4.5 Powers of Supervising Authorities
(1) Supervising Power of Courts
The legal position of a court concerning the supervising power over trust relationships
has been considerably shifted between the former and the current statutes.
Under the former statute, a court had non only the general supervising power
over administration of trust property by a trustee44, but also, in some cases, the
authority to give a trustee an exemption from the liability from the breach of the
duty of loyalty etc., as the substitution of the approval by the beneciary45. In sum,
the court had the authority to intercept administration activities of the trust property
by the trustee based on its own judgement concerning the concrete situations of the
interests on the beneciary in each trust relationship as the representative on behalf
of the beneciary, as well as the general supervising power over the administration
actions by the trustee.
However, typical examples that had been thought as the situation in which a
trustee may get the permission of the court as the substitution of the beneciary's
approval were the case non-existence or the lack of the capacity to give the approval of
the beneciary and the case in which the beneciary unreasonably rejected to give the
approval and insists unfairly the liability of the trustee. Viewing from such examples,
the role of the court there was rather to help the trustee for securing the legitimate
administration in concrete cases so as to protect the trustee's legitimate interest. So,
although the court represent the interest of the beneciary, what essential the court
does is nothing but to seek for the best alternative for the attainment of the trust
purpose from the stand point of the public interest. In this meaning, the court is not
an agent of an of the trust parties but a third party who stands on the public interest
view point.
By the way, the supervising power of court exercised from the public interest view
point can be seen in may other places like that of family court over the administration
of family property or other various family management areas. However, that respect
of the role of court has actually not been studied enough. The development of the
study in this area is sincerely desired.
By contrast, the current statute dropped the provisions concerning the general
supervising power of court over the administration of the trust property by a trustee,
44Article 41 of the former staute ¬ Trust aairs shall be supervised by a court unless the trust
relationship is accepted as the commercial business of the trustee.
­ The court may, based on the request by parties concerned or on its own authority, inspect the
disposition process of the trust aairs, assign the inspector or do the other necessary dispositions.
45Article 22 of the former statute [excerpt] ¬ A trustee shall not, in any name, make a trust
property its own property or get some right on a trust property. Provided, where there was some
reason which make it inevitable to do the act set forth above, the provision set forth shall not apply
to that act by the trustee with the permission of the court to do so.
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instead, put the provisions on each problems in which the judgement by a subject
other than the trustee may be required, to allow the court, based on the request from
the parties concerned, to appoint or dismiss an property administrator or a supervisor
over the property administration restrictively to the concrete problem area. The
cases in which the current statute allows the court to exercise a direct supervising
power concerning the continuation of a trust relationship are really exceptional46.
46(Appointment of a Trustee by the Court in the Case of a Testamentary Trust) [excerpt]
Article 6 ¬Where a trust is created by the method set forth in Article 3, item 2, if the will contains
no provision concerning the designation of a trustee or if the person designated as the one who is
to be the trustee does not undertake or is unable to undertake the trust, the court may appoint a
trustee on the petition of an interested party.
...
(Appointment of an Inspector) [excerpt]
Article 46 ¬ When there are sucient grounds to suspect misconduct or material facts in violation
of laws and regulations or the provisions of the terms of trust in connection with the trust admin-
istration by a trustee, the beneciary may le a petition with the court for the appointment of an
inspector in order to have the inspector investigate the status of the trust administration as well as
the status of property that belongs to the trust property and the obligation covered by the trust
property.
...
(Resignation of the Trustee) [excerpt]
Article 57 ...
­ The trustee may resign from the oce as trustee with the permission of the court when there
is a compelling reason.
...
(Dismissal of the Trustee) [excerpt]
Article 58 ...
¯ When the trustee has caused a substantial detriment to the trust property through a breach of
the duties or where there are other material grounds, the court may, upon the petition of a settlor
or a beneciary, dismiss the trustee.
...
Article 62 [excerpt] ¬ Where a trustee's duty as trustee has been terminated on any of the grounds
listed in the items of Article 56, paragraph 1, if the terms of trust contains no provisions concerning
a new trustee, or where the person designated by the provisions of the terms of trust as a person
who is to be the new trustee does not undertake or is unable to undertake the trust, the settlor and
the beneciary may, based on an agreement between them, appoint a new trustee.
...
¯ In the case referred to in paragraph ¬, the court may, at the petition of an interested party,
appoint a new trustee when it nds it necessary in light of the status of discussions pertaining to
the agreement set forth in said paragraph and any other circumstances. ...
(Trust Property Administration Orders) [excerpt]
Article 63 ¬ Where a trustee's duty as trustee has been terminated on any of the grounds listed
in the items of Article 56, paragraph (1), at the petition of an interested party, the court may,
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when a new trustee has not yet been appointed and when it nds it to be necessary, make a
disposition ordering administration by a trust property administrator (hereinafter referred to as a
\trust property administration order" in this Subsection) until a new trustee is appointed.
...
(Appointment of Trust Property Administrators, etc.) [excerpt]
Article 64 ¬ When the court issues a trust property administration order, it shall appoint a trust
property administrator therein.
...
(Trust Property Administrator's Powers) [excerpt]
Article 66
...
­ When there are two or more trust property administrators, they shall act within the scope of
their power jointly; provided, however, that with the permission of the court, they may perform
their duties severally or divide their duties among themselves.
...
(Ownership, etc. of Trust Property Upon Termination of Trustee's Duty as Trustee Due to Death
of the Trustee) [excerpt]
Article 74 ¬When a trustee' duty as trustee has been terminated on the grounds set forth in Article
56, paragraph ¬, item 1, the trust property shall be incorporated as a juridical person.
­ In the case prescribed in the preceding paragraph, at the petition of an interested party, the
court may, when it nds it to be necessary, make a disposition ordering administration of the trust
by an incorporated trust property administrator (hereinafter referred to as an \incorporated trust
property administration order" in paragraph ±).
...
(Determination of the Price of a Benecial Interest, etc.) [excerpt]
Article 104 ...
­ If no agreement is reached on the determination of the price of the benecial interest within
30 days from the date of the beneciary's demand that the trustee acquire the benecial interest,
the trustee or the beneciary may le a petition with the court for the determination of the price
within 30 days after said 30-day period has elapsed.
...
(Appointment of a Trust Caretaker) [excerpt]
Article 123 ...
¯Where there is no beneciary at the time in question, if the terms of trust contains no provisions
concerning a trust caretaker or if the person designated by the provisions of the terms of trust as
the one who is to be the trust caretaker does not accept or is unable to accept the oce, the court
may appoint a trust caretaker at the petition of an interested party.
...
Appointment of a Trust Supervisor) [excerpt]
Article 131 ...
¯ When there are special circumstances wherein a beneciary is unable to supervise a trustee
appropriately, if the terms of trust contains no provisions concerning a trust supervisor or if the
person designated by provisions of the terms of trust as the one who is to be the trust supervisor
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does not accept or is unable to accept the oce, the court may appoint a trust supervisor at the
petition of an interested party.
...
(Judicial Decision Ordering the Modication of a Trust Due to Special Circumstances) [excerpt]
Article 150 ¬ When, due to the special circumstances that were unforeseeable at the time of an
act of trust, the provisions of the terms of trust concerning the method of trust administration no
longer conforms to the interests of the beneciary in light of the purpose of the trust, the status of
the trust property, and any other relevant circumstances, the court may order a modication of the
trust at the petition of the settlor, the trustee or the beneciary.
...
(Judicial Decisions Ordering the Termination of a Trust Due to Special Circumstances) [excerpt]
Article 165 ¬ When it has become clear that, due to the special circumstances that were unforesee-
able at the time of the terms of trust, the termination of a trust has come to be in the best interest
of the beneciary in light of the purpose of the trust, the status of the trust property, and any other
relevant circumstances, the court may, at the petition of the settlor, the trustee, or the beneciary,
order the termination of the trust.
...
(Judicial Decisions Ordering the Termination of a Trust to Ensure the Public Interest) [excerpt]
Article 166 ¬ In the following cases, when the court nds the existence of a trust to be unallowable
from the perspective of ensuring the public interest, it may, at the petition of the Minister of Justice,
the settlor, the beneciary, a trust creditor, or any other interested party, order the termination of
the trust:
1. where the trust was created for an unlawful purpose; or
2. where the trustee has committed an act that goes beyond or abuses the trustee's power as
prescribed by laws and regulations or the terms of trust or has committed an act in violation of
criminal laws and regulations, and where the trustee continuously or repeatedly commits said act
despite having received a written warning from the Minister of Justice.
...
(Temporary Restraining Order on Trust Property) [excerpt]
Article 169 ¬ Where a petition set forth in Article 166, paragraph ¬ has been led, the court
may, at the petition of the Minister of Justice, the settlor, the beneciary, a trust creditor, or any
other interested party or on its own authority, render a disposition ordering administration by an
administrator (referred to as an \administration order" in the following Article) or may issue any
other temporary restraining order that is necessary with regard to the trust property.
...
Article 170 [excerpt] ¬ When the court issues an administration order, it shall appoint an adminis-
trator therein.
­ The administrator set forth in the preceding paragraph shall be supervised by the court.
® The court may order the administrator set forth in paragraph ¬ to make a report on the status
of property that belongs to the trust property and the obligation covered by the trust property, and
to settle the administrative accounting thereof.
...
(Appointment of a New Trustee) [excerpt]
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In sum, the current statute stands on the negative position in having a court who
is not necessarily an expert of property administration judge the problems directly
concerning the administration of the trust property by its own responsibility so as to
avoid possible perplexities in practical business caused by interceptions of a court.
However, as described above, to give a court the supervising power aimed at
promoting the attainment of the trust purpose from the viewpoint of the public
interest by making use of the intervention of the judgement by a court as a third party
standing on the neutral standpoint. So, this does not necessarily cause a disadvantage
to the trust administration in the trust relationship. Moreover, as also described
above, in the case in which the administration of family property becomes necessary,
although the actual results have been accumulated through the case by case eorts
of courts, there are not still enough studies and considerations on the meaning of the
supervising power of the court in the respect. We should study the very nature of the
role and function of the court in this respect more. By the way, the public interest
or the neutral standpoint on which a court exercises the supervising power has the
peculiar meaning compared with a governmental supervision over trust relationships,
which will be, as we will discuss later, performed from the viewpoint of a governmental
policy concerning whole the trading relationships making use of some form of a trust
administration or of a trust relationship. Where there is no explicit provision in Trust
Act to allow a court to supervise generally over the trustee or to authorize a court to
give the permission to an act of the trustee as the substitution for the beneciary's
approval, it is very dicult to insist as an interpretation of the statute that a court
should have such authorities.
Such being the case, the supervising power of court which had a certain signicance
practically and theoretically under the former statute has been made defunct by the
Article 173 ¬ Where the court has ordered the termination of a trust pursuant to the provisions
of Article 166, paragraph ¬, it may, at the petition of the Minister of Justice, the settlor, the
beneciary, a trust creditor, or any other interested party or on its own authority, appoint a new
trustee for the liquidation of the trust.
...
(Performance of Obligations Pertaining to Conditional Claims, etc.) [excerpt]
Article 180 ¬ The liquidation trustee may perform obligations pertaining to conditional claims,
claims with indenite durations, or any other unliquidated claims. In this case, the liquidation
trustee shall le a petition with the court for the appointment of an appraiser in order to have these
claims appraised.
...
(Special Rules on the Duty to Prepare, Report on, and Preserve Books, etc.) [excerpt]
Article 222 ¬ Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 37 and Article 38, the preparation of books
and other documents or electromagnetic records pertaining to a limited liability trust, reporting on
their content, and preservation of these materials, as well as the inspection and copying of the same
shall be governed by the provisions of the following paragraph to paragraph ´.
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provisions in the current Trust Act. It is hard to evaluate such a way of legislation
solely positively. Although it is dicult to base the supervising power of court on the
provisions of the current Trust Act, serious reconsiderations of the role of courts will
become necessary in the future from the viewpoint of the public interest concerning
the supervising power over general property administrations including not only trust
law but also civil code cases.
(2) Supervising Power of Governmental Authorities
Since the introduction of the concept of Trust into Japanese law, what has been
kept at the center of the trust business especially after the enforcement of the former
statute is, so called, \commercial trust" in which a nancial institution, especially a
trust bank assumes the position of trustee and administers the trust property so as to
pursue the prots. By that reason, the supervising power of governmental authorities
over trustees has the nature of the business regulation on trust in relation to other
nancial commodities with economically similar purpose to that of commercial trust
as a part of nancial policy over the various nancial organizations in Japan.
There may be theoretically various possible ways of thinking on how the supervis-
ing power of governmental entities with such a nature as the national nancial policy
should be exercised.
If one thinks that the regulations or interventions by governmental authorities
to the actions of trustees should be minimal, the supervising power of governmental
authorities should be restricted to the really necessary range explicitly prescribed
in statutes, such as issuing of the ministerial ordinances, giving permissions or ap-
provals of the business entity or issuing a business improvement order to the business
entity who violated some rule or regulation concerning the property administration.
Therefore, a governmental authority shouldn't intervene the interpretation or promote
certain type of interpretation of concrete trust acts, whose interpretation should be
left entrusted to the trust business entity.
Instead, if one evaluate positively the maximum regulations or interventions of
governmental authorities into the trust business, a governmental authority should
control the interpretational policy of the terms of trust in a trust relationship in
which a trust bank administers the trust property by making eective use of the
power of the permissions and approvals to the concrete business acts, especially to
the production of the new nancial commodity, so that the interpretation of the
statutory provisions and of the actual rights and duties in trust relationships will be
unied through all the trust business carried out by trust banks. On the other hand,
under this way of thinking, a legal relationship other than a trust relationship will
be treated strictly dierently from a trust relationship when the business category of
the agency is dierent from a trust bank even if the economic purpose of that legal
relationship is quite similar to that of a commercial trust relationship.
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The mode of the exercises of the supervising power of governmental authorities
naturally reects the general tendency of the nancial policy of the country. In Japan,
the regulations and interventions of the governmental authorities to the trust business
had been massive up to recent. But, at present, the tendency is changed toward the
direction that the interpretation of the terms of trust or the statutory provisions
are basically entrusted to the voluntary judgement of the business entities. This
tendency means, on the one hand, that the possibility of creative activities based
on the voluntary judgement is secured for the trust banks or other trust business
entities and, on the other hand, that the responsibilities associated with voluntary
judgements may be held by the trust business entities when some dispute about the
property administration has occurred. So, the times are owing toward the direction
in which the \true ability" as a business entity is tried in various meanings.
4.6 Public Notice of Trust Relationship
(1) Theoretical Signicance of Public Notice of a Trust Re-
lationship
A \public notice of a trust relationship" means to indicate the fact that certain
property belongs to a trust property, by a method with which the trust parties or a
third party can objectively recognize the fact. A public notice of a trust relationship
can be theoretically divided into two parts, the one which obeys the general principle
of the public notice of the right and duty relation on a property and the other which
indicates the contents peculiar to trust relationships. Of which, what provides more
interpretational problems is, of course, the latter, trust proper part. However, those
two parts are often closely related, so we need to be conscious of the dividing point up
to which the scope of the general principle of the notice concerning a property right
reaches and from which the scope of the trust peculiar problem concerning public
notice begins.
By the way, even if we concentrate our attention to the trust peculiar problematic,
various ways of thinking are possible based on by what reason one thinks the public
notice of a trust relationship is required.
First, one may explain that a public notice of a trust relationship is an institution
to notify the distinction between the trust property and the private property of the
trustee to a third party like the other party of the trading with the trust property.
Since trust property is administered in the name of the trustee, the trustee looks
outwardly the owner of the trust property. But, since the trustee assumes the duty
to administer the trust property according to the purpose of the trust on behalf of
the beneciary, so that the trustee doesn't manage the trust property as her/his own
property, the economic gains or losses on the trust property belongs to the dier-
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ent subject from the outward appearance. Such being the case, viewing from the
standpoint of a third party who will enter into the trading relationship with the trust
property, some unexpected result may happen because even the range of the respon-
sibility to be caused by the trading may be quite dierent from the range expected
from the outward appearance if the object property of the trading belongs to the trust
property. Therefore, as for the trust property, it should be made distinguishable from
the private property of the trustee by publicly notifying the fact of the existence of
the trust relationship on it.
However, according to this thought, where a third party can recognize from the
outward appearance that a property belongs to trust property, the public notice of
the trust relationship on it is not necessary. So, for example, where there is some
method to indicate explicitly that the property belongs to trust property, even if there
are other methods for the public notice like the registration of the trust relationship
on the property, it is not always required to register the trust relationship one by one
on the trust property. Also as for the content to be publicly notied, if it is publicly
recognizable at least that the property is a trust property, since a third party can
investigate what contents the trust relationship has, the detailed contents of the terms
of trust are theoretically not required to be publicly notied.
Secondly, one may think that the purpose of the public notice of a trust relation-
ship is to let the beneciary clearly know the range of the trust property to enjoy the
benet from, so as to make the benetting the trust property and the exercising of
the supervising power over the trustee eective. As we have discussed concerning the
right or power of beneciary, the limit of the property on which a beneciary has the
benecial right and the supervising power is within the trust property. And since the
title of the trust property is held by the trustee and the trust property administered
by the trustee in the trust relationship, in order for the beneciary to make use of
the benecial right eectively, it is not enough that the range of the trust property is
clear only in relation to the trustee, so the existence of the trust relationship, namely,
the existence of the benecial right on the trust property should be clear to a third
party who may enter into trade with the trust property.
According to this thought, a public notice of a trust relationship means nothing
but to notify publicly the existence of the benecial right. So it will be required not
only to notify the fact that the property belongs to the trust property, but also to
attach the materials with the le of the registration from which the existence and
the content of the benecial right prescribed in the terms of trust could be inferred.
Moreover, under this thought, since it is enough as the public notice of the trust
relationship for the existence and content of the benecial right to be notied to
general third parties, even if, for instance, the very fact that a trust property belongs
to the trust property was not made clear in the public notice, where the beneciary
is indicated as the title holder of the property right and the content of the indication
is congruent to that of the benecial right, it may be possibly considered valid as the
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public notice of the trust relationship. However, it is another problem that \a trust
relationship" itself can be admitted by interpretation on the property with such an
anomalous way of the public notice.
Thirdly, one may think that a public notice of a trust relationship explicitly indi-
cates the scope of the power of the trustee publicly including third parties so as to
express internally and externally the legitimate eectuation of the trust relationship.
Although a trustee is generally vested the power to administer the trust property,
it is not allowed for a trustee to administer the property for her/his own interest,
and a trustee should assume the heavy liability including an obligation to restore the
original state of the trust property at the failure in the administration. In addition,
the act by the trustee which deviates the power may be avoidable by the beneciary.
However, since the contents of the trustee's power in a trust relationship can be freely
prescribed in the terms of the trust, the actual contents of the trustee's power may
become rather complicated. Therefore, not only a trustee but also a third party who
is going to trade with the trustee should always pay attention to whether the juristic
act is within the power of the trustee so as to secure the transfer of the property
right. The institution of public notice of a trust relationship is contributing to the
reliability of such a trading relationship.
By the way, under this thought, since a public notice of a trust relationship means,
in eect, the public notice concerning the scope of the trustee's power, it will required
not only to publicly notify the fact that the property belongs to the trust property
but also to attach the materials including the terms of trust with the le of the
registration from which the range of the power given to the trustee could be inferred.
In addition, according to this thought, compared with the second thought described
above, it is not important to indicate who is the beneciary in the public notice of
the trust relationship, so the contents of the materials to be attached with the le of
the registration are dierent.
The answers for the question, who will be get what convenience from the public
notice of a trust are mutually dierent among these three thoughts described above.
But any one of them does not logically contradict with the other two. Therefore,
the practically sound institution for the public notice of trust relationships should
be planed to satisfy the demands from all the three thoughts. So, what a public
notice of a trust relationship should do will be to make clear the range of the trust
property, the existence of the benecial right and its content and the scope of the
trustee's power through the materials attached to the le of the registration from
which parties concerned including third parties could make appropriate judgements.
The most suitable materials for such an attachment will be, needless to say, the terms
of the trust.
By the way, the discussions above are supposing that the trust parties or a third
party who is going to be the other party of trading with the trust property can appro-
priately defend its own interest thanks to the public notice of the trust relationship.
4.6. PUBLIC NOTICE OF TRUST RELATIONSHIP 163
However, there actually exists the case in which some economic prots can be secured
substantially more when the existence of the trust relationship is not made publicly
clear than when it is made clear, in some special state of interests of the parties.
Trust parties have a choice of to do or not to do the public notice of the trust rela-
tionship. But the general principles in doing such a choice should be that the trust
parties must take also the possible disadvantage by not doting the public notice of
the trust relationship together into consideration and accept that. We might say, un-
fortunately, the methods for public notice concerning the segregated administration
of the trust property, which we discuss next, have been legislated without sucient
considerations on that general principle.
(2) Segregated Administration of Trust Property and Public
Notice of Trust Relationship
The provision of the former statute required the registration of trust relationship
where the trust property was of the type equipped with the registration system or
the description of the trust relationship on the the face where the trust property
was security47. But this provision was strongly criticized from the practical business
that it hindered the ecient trading in practice. The practical needs under such a
situation led to the occurrence of the opinion that the segregated administration of
the trust property may be admitted as the substitute for the public notice.
As we have discussed concerning the trustee's duty of the segregated administra-
tion, it should be possible to distinguish a trust property from the trustee's private
property or the other trust properties where the trust property is administered in
segregation from the other properties. So, among the three thoughts concerning the
meaning of the public notice of a trust relationship, at least to the thought that
emphasizes the foreseeability of the legal eect by a third party, the segregated ad-
ministration of the trust property might be thought enough as the public notice in
the meaning that the fact that the property belongs to the trust property and the
range of the trust property by which the scope of the trustee's power is delimited are
made clear. However, as we will discuss in detail below, the opinion at the era of
the former statute that the segregated administration could be a substitution for the
public notice of the trust relationship which is required by the statutory provision
involved too much theoretical and practical diculties. For, rst of all, it did not
47Article 3 of the former statute [excerpt]
...
­ A trust relationship shall not be duly asserted against third parties unless, as for securities,
pursuant to the Cabinet Order, it is described on the face that the security belongs to the trust
property, or unless, as for share certicates or bonds, it is annotated on the shareholder registry
or on the bond registry respectively that the share certicates or the bonds belong to the trust
property.
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suciently consider the costs and risks of not completing the public notice of a trust
relationship which is the requirement for the assertion of the trust relationship on the
property. Moreover,　 it neglected the general principle of the requirement for the
assertion of property right which it had been already long since its establishment in
Japanese legal system. In addition, it insisted without giving any theoretical ground
that the trust relationship should be able to be asserted against a third party irre-
spective of the good faith or bad faith of the third party with the existence of the
trust relationship.
In practical trust business under the former statute, it is usual that the terms of
trust excluded the requirement of the inscription of the trust relationship on the face
of the security. So it was quite rare that the inscription of the trust relationship was
actually done. As the result, there had been actually no detailed investigation into
how much it took the cost to register actually the trust relationship on the face of the
securities or, on the other hand, to what extent the damages by not completing the
statutory required public notice of a trust relationship may spread and, still less, the
comparative consideration of the economic advantages and disadvantages of the public
notice of a trust relationship. So, the opinion mentioned above was presented without
any realistic calculation of the cost of the procedure to inscribe a trust relationship
and the foreseeable damages caused by saving the public notice, and simply insisted
on the exception of the established principle of the public notice as the requirement
for assertion, so as to relief the actual practice that didn't carry out the inscription of
a trust relationship on the face of securities etc.. That is, that opinion was dubious
from the outset.
Since the Trust Act itself prescribed that the inscription on the face was the
requirement for assertion of a trust relationship, the result of not completing the
required procedure should have been clear. That is, the existence of the trust rela-
tionship on the trust property cannot be duly asserted against third parties whether
the third party is in good faith of in bad faith with the trust relationship. The choice
to complete or not to complete the procedure for the public notice of the trust rela-
tionship is entrusted to the judgement of trust parties. Since the almost only reason
in practice for not completing the public notice procedure was \it takes the cost",
it should have been a matter of course from the general principle of the requirement
for assertion that the trust relationship on the trust property on which the procedure
for the public notice of the trust relationship wasn't carried out couldn't be asserted
against any third parties.
Although from the side of the opinion that the segregated administration can
be a substitution for the public notice some refutations to the quite natural criti-
cism described above were provided, it cannot present any denitive ground for it's
own insistence. The main refutations were that trust property was a kind of special
property which should be qualitatively distinguished from the private property of the
trustee so that it from the nature should not belong to the property to support the
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trustee's liability, that it should be publicly known that trust banks as professional
trustees hold many trust properties, or that, analogically applying the general rule of
the supreme court judgement Showa 43 (1968) July 11 MH vol.22 no.7 1462 page in
which the take back claim from a consigner was approved on the bankruptcy of the
factor, the beneciary could take back the trust property from the bankruptcy assets
of the trustee.
However, if one insists that the trust property is substantially independent from
the private property of the trustee, the very fact of the independence should be
the ground for the requirement of the public notice of the existence of the trust
relationship on the property. Even if it is clear that a trust bank holds considerable
amount of trust properties, since such a trust bank holds also considerable amount
of the private properties, it is simply illogical to deduce from only the fact that the
party is a trust bank that the public notice of the trust relationship on the trust
property is unnecessary to distinguish the trust property from the private property
of the trust bank, unless the trust bank accepts not holding any private properties.
Further, in the the case of the Showa 43 (1968) the supreme court judgement in which
the take back claim from a consigner was approved on the bankruptcy of the factor,
for the type of the properties consigned it was actually quite dicult to notify publicly
the fact of their consignment and, moreover, both parties of the litigation admitted
that the properties were consigned from the consigner. Viewing from those facts,
the precedent of the supreme court judgement should be deemed as limited to rather
special case, so, even though the judgement approved the claim of the taking back
of the consigned property by the consigner, one can never reason from the precedent
that the established general principle of the public notice of a trust relationship as
the requirement for assertion may be opportunistically avoided.
Such being the case, the opinion that the segregated administration of the trust
property can be a substitution for the explicit indication of the trust relationship con-
tained serious problems both in the practical motivations and the theoretical ground.
In spite of all those, Amendment of Trust Business Act Heisei 10 (1998) provided that
the segregated administration by the trustee of the trust property from the private
property should have the eect of the explicit indication of the trust relationship un-
der the former Trust Act48, although without any eective response to the criticisms
from the view point of the general principle of the requirement for assertion described
above. Should we say the problem has been solved by the legislation?
However, this amendment of Trust Business Act only required the segregation
48Amendment of Trust Business Act Trust Business Act amendment in Heisei 10 (1998) Article
10 [excerpt]
¬ As for the securities a trust corporation holds as the trust property, notwithstanding the provision
of Article 3 paragraph ­ of the Trust Act, when those securities have been administered in segrega-
tion from the securities the trust company holds as the private property, the trust relationship on
the former securities may be asserted against a third party.
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between the trust property and the trustee's private property but didn't mention
to the segregation among trust properties. Moreover, the provisions didn't any care
for the fact that in order for a beneciary to execute the right of segregation of the
trust property from the bankruptcy procedure the beneciary must prove that the
property belongs to the trust property. As the result, those provisions, in eect, might
be essentially no use for protecting the interest of the beneciary but, on the other
hand, might help the trustee who neglected the formal procedure to indicate explicitly
the trust relationship on the trust property to avoid the duty or the liability caused
from the failure of the public notice. Such a result would be really inappropriate from
the view point of the equity among the parties concerned and from the view point
of the protection of the interest of the beneciary in case of the bankruptcy of the
trustee. Fortunately, under those provisions, there had occurred no case in which a
trustee went into bankruptcy and the beneciary needed to claim the taking back of
the trust property from the bankruptcy assets of the trustee based on the provision.
So, while the provisions were problematic in themselves, the problems had been left
out of considerations.
The opinion that the segregated administration of the trust property lacked any
basic consideration on the theoretical ground for the public notice of a trust rela-
tionship. For example, to make inferable the existence of a trust relationship from
outward, to make the scope of the benecial right clear or to indicate the legiti-
mateness of the act of the trustee, all these require to make the content of the trust
relationship publicly noticeable, as well as the existence itself of the trust relationship.
However, in a segregated administration of trust property, the information concerning
the trust property is structurally concentrated on the trustee. So, if one intends to
make a segregated administration have the functionality of the public notice of the
trust relationship, the \information disclosure" to quite wide range including third
parties would become necessary. But it will require the change of the principle of the
information disclosure concerning trust property according to which the information
concerning the trust property is shared only within the trust parties. In this meaning,
that opinion had diculties not only practically but also theoretically as a policy for
administration of trust property.
Under the current statute, the provision concerning the public notice of a trust
relationship prescribes only that with regard to the property equipped with the reg-
istration system for the public notice of the rights on it, the trust relationship on it
cannot be duly asserted against a third party unless the trust relationship is regis-
tered49. As for the other types of property including securities etc., there is no special
49(Requirements for Perfection Concerning Property that Belongs to Trust Property)
Article 14 With regard to any property for which the acquisition, loss, and modication of any right
may not be duly asserted against a third party unless it is registered, the fact that such property
belongs to the trust property may not be duly asserted against a third party unless the fact that
the property is under the trust is registered.
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provision provided. So, the same opinion we have refuted above will not be insisted
anymore. But we should remember that aair as a food of reection, which symboli-
cally represents the tendency of the trust law area to lack theoretical contemplations.
4.7 Tax on Trust
(1) Tax on Trust Viewed from the Fundamental Structure of
Trust
Taxation on a trust relationship is generally based on the substantive legal relation
like usual taxations on other legal relationships. But, since the legal theoretical
constructions of trust relationship are variously insisted, the interpretational problems
may occur in the taxation.
First, when certain property is transferred from the settlor to the trustee at the
settlement of a trust relationship or when the settlor declares to make certain prop-
erty the trust property in the case of the declaration of trust, the income tax by
transfer, the consumption tax or other taxations based on a \transfer of a property"
may become relevant. The problem is , in eect, whether the settlement of a trust
relationship will fall under \the transfer" of the property. The arguments around
this problem will be involved including the problems of the fundamental structure of
trust, the purpose of trust and the species of the properties actually converted to the
trust property.
Second, after the establishment of a trust relationship, the problem is when and
to whom belong or are assigned the prots from the administration of the trust
property according to the trust purpose. This is a typical and traditional problem
of the taxation on the trust relationship. The main issue for interpretation is the
relation between the questions, to what degree the trust relationship is independent
of the trust parties and whether the taxation on the trust property could be allowed
separately from the taxations on the trust parties.
Third, it may become a problem how the nature of the beneciary as the legal
subject should be taken into account in a taxation on the benets the beneciary en-
joys from the administration of the trust property. This problem is quite dicult to
establish some clear standard to solve it. For it includes various complicated and sub-
tle issues like the balance of taxations on one beneciary between the incomes from
the trust administration and the other legal relationship, the balance of taxations
on beneciaries between trust relationships with mutually equal or similar purposes,
the possible discrepancy of the interpretational policies between those balance con-
siderations above, whether the beneciary holds the legal personality, whether it is
domestic or foreign etc.,
However, the deepest source of those problems is the fact that there is no uni-
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ed theoretical construction of the fundamental structure of trust and actual trust
relationships with similar or equal purposes can be created on the supposition of any
legal theoretical construction. Then, practically desirable taxation system on a trust
relationship should have the consistent standard for various types of trust relationship
as well as take the taxation balances among trust relationships with similar purposes
or between trust relationships and other protable legal relationships into considera-
tion. There may be various ways of thinking concerning the taxation system on trust
relationships. We will put the possible thoughts in order from the theoretical view
point concerning fundamental structure of trust in following.
First of all, if one thinks that a trustee is the owner of the trust property, the
taxation on a trust relationship should be calculated on the basis of the attributions
of the trustee. So, the prot from the administration of the trust property should
be taken generally as the income of the trustee and the tax should be imposed on
the trustee. However, since the benets the beneciary has gotten according to the
terms of trust have been transferred from the trustee to the beneciary, the income
tax with respect to the transferred value will be imposed on the beneciary and the
value will be subtracted from the basis of income tax on the trustee. As for the
taxation on the trustee, since it belongs to the cost of the administration of the trust
property to the trustee, the trustee can claim the value against the trust property as
the reimbursement of the expense for the trust administration, so that the value will
be charged to the trust property in the end. The advantage of this way of thought
is that since the trustee is the title holder of the trust property, the taxpayer can be
clearly xed. While a beneciary is liable to pay the tax within the actual benets
the beneciary has got from the trust administration, the trustee is liable to the
tax on the prots which is still reserved in the trust property. In this meaning, the
correspondence between the person who actually has the prot under control and the
person who should pay the tax on the prot is quite exact in this theory.
However, since this theory takes, rst of all, the trustee as the taxpayer, if a trust
relationship select as the trustee an entity who could not be a taxpayer, it could made
the taxation on the trust administration impossible. Such an entity would not have,
in most cases, the capacity or ability to manage the trust property so that it lacks
the qualication for the trustee, in eect. But where a person who is not a taxpayer
is actually assigned as the trustee formally according to the terms of the trust and
the actual administration activities are performed by some other person but not the
trustee, then, since the person who actually administer the trust property and the
trustee is not a taxpayer, the taxation at the stage of the trust administration loses
the target viewing from the stand point of this theory. Then, the taxation on the
trust relationship must be concentrated at the stage of the enjoyment of the benet
by the beneciary. But since a beneciary can adjust the timing of the exercise
of the benecial right if it is allowed in the terms of trust, a beneciary may be
able to manipulate the timing to set o the benets against some loss from the
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other account so as to substantially avoid the taxation on the income from the trust
administration. Anyway, this theory has the apparent weak point in that it cannot
prevent the trust parties from so manipulating the terms of trust as to entrust the
administrative activity to other party and to allow the adjustment of the timing of
the actual benetting in order to obstruct the taxation at the appropriate timing.
Instead, if one thinks that a beneciary is the substantial owner of the trust
property, as for the prots generated from the administration of the trust property,
all are considered to belong to the beneciary who is the substantial owner of the
trust property, so that the tax is imposed on the beneciary but not on the trustee. In
addition, under this theory, the acquisition of the benecial right by the beneciary is
identied with the acquisition of the additional trust property in the taxation, so that
the time of the occurrence of the cause of the taxation is when the benecial right was
acquired. This theory focuses on the point that the economic prots from the trust
relationship nally belong to the beneciary. This thought fundamentally conforms
to the sense of equity for the taxation from the economic point of view. Additionally,
under this way of thinking, the manipulations of the positioning of the administration
power or the timing of the exercise of the benecial right through the terms of the
trust are not eective for avoiding the taxation. In this meaning, the conclusion of
this theory has the advantage in the equitability of the taxation in connected with
other legal relationships.
However, under this theory, the tax is imposed on the beneciary at the stage in
which the income of the beneciary is not still realized but abstractly attributed to the
administration of the trust property. Then, this theory must be able to explain the
eect that the tax is imposed on the beneciary in advance based on the prots the
beneciary doesn't control or grasp yet. Moreover, where a trust relationship provides
the benecial rights of various types and constitutions so that the legal relationships
among beneciaries are complexed, rathe complicated problems may occur under this
theory, for instance, which beneciary would be the actual taxpayer or what part of
the prots would be the source of the taxation, etc.. One possible practical solution in
such a case may be to impose the tax on each beneciary according to the ratio in the
whole prot from the trust administration which could be categorized and calculated
from the concrete contents of individual benecial rights as the sources of the taxation.
However, although depending on the actual contents of the benecial rights, the total
sum of the contents of the benecial rights may not be equal to \the substantial
ownership" of the trust property. To reconstruct the mutually qualitatively dierent
contents of the benecial rights so as to reduce those to the simple ratio may be quite
dicult in some cases. In sum, the problem this theory has is that certain diculties
or confusions may be inevitable where the contents of the benecial rights are very
complexed.
On the other hand, if one thinks that trust property is an independent entity of
the trust parties, the taxation with respect to the prots from the administration of
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the trust property is imposed on the trust property itself and the trustee in person or
the beneciary has no relation to that taxation. Since the enjoyment of the benet
from the trust property through a benecial right is an income independent from
the prots by the trust administration, the tax with respect to the enjoyment of the
benet as the income of the beneciary is separately imposed on the beneciary. The
value transferred to the beneciary through the benecial right is discounted from the
source of the tax on the trust property since the trust property pays it as a necessary
cost. This theory separates the prots from the trust administration from the trust
parties themselves and the taxation on the beneciary is based on the actual income
of the beneciary through the benecial right. In this respect, under this theory, the
taxation corresponds to the actual situation of the controls or grasps of the prots,
so the conclusion of this theory has the advantage in the equitability of the taxation.
However, since to specify the scope of the trust property which should be the
source of taxation is the most important subject for this theory, the very specica-
tion may be dicult in some cases. For the scope of the trust property can be freely
determined in the terms of trust and the contents or the locations of the properties
are also involved in the judgement on the taxability. For example, consider the case in
which a part of the trust property is located in a foreign country but the administra-
tion action of whole the trust property and the benetting through the benecial right
are done domestically. It may be certain to be able to impose the tax with respect
to the benetting on the beneciary. But it may require some complicated consider-
ations to judge in relation to the taxation power in the location country of the trust
property whether the taxation with respect to the prots directly from the adminis-
tration of the trust property may be possible. Even if whole the trust property and
all the trust parties are domestically located, where the scope of the trust property is
complicatedly determined in the terms of trust, or where the administrative powers
and benecial rights in plural trust relationships are complicatedly intertwined, the
distribution relation of the prots from the trust administration may be complicated
and the sources of the incomes which should be the tax base may be so dispersed as
for the calculation of the tax amount to be dicult. In sum, the problem this theory
has is that the adjustment of the scope or the contents of the trust property in terms
of trust may cause confusions in the interpretation of the tax base so that some heavy
extra works may fall on the shoulders of the tax practitioners.
As we have seen, some kind of interpretational diculty is always accompanied
with taxation on the trust relationship whether one adopts any theory for that. The
diculties in planning the tax system on the trust relationship would be augmented
by the requirement of the equitability in relation to the other legal relationship with
similar economic purpose to that of trust.
4.7. TAX ON TRUST 171
(2) How Should Be the Tax System with Respect to a Trust
Relationship at Present and in the Future
The current Japanese tax system on the trust relationship considers a beneciary as
the owner of the trust property and all the gains and losses from the administration of
the trust property as the gains and losses of the beneciary 50. Therefore, under the
current tax system, there is surely no risk of avoiding the taxation by manipulating
the content of the power of the trustee or the timing of the exercise of the benetting
right in the perms of trust. But where the terms of trust dene the contents of
the benecial right very intricately or where the timings of the payment from the
prots through the benecial right are determined in detail in the terms of trust, how
to interpret the provisions in relation to taxation should cause entanglement to the
taxation practice.
However, compared with general interpretational problems in Trust law, the tax-
ation problem on a trust relationship has a little dierent characteristic. In general
interpretation problem of the terms of trust, the principle is that the interpretation
of the terms should be in accordance with to the expression of the intentions of the
trust parties concerning the rights and duties relations since the terms of trust is
determined by the free will of the trust parties. While, in the interpretation of terms
of trust on the occasion of taxation on the trust relationship, the taxation authority
doesn't necessarily strictly bound with the expression of the rights and duties relations
the trust parties have settled in the act of trust viewing from the fact that a taxation
should be planed from the stand point of the public interest, so that the authority
could impose a tax based on the interpretation of the terms of trust corresponding to
the economically substantial distribution of the prots.
Anyway, the tax system on the trust relationship should be oriented to the taxation
plan to minimize the confusions of the interpretations for the trust parties or for the
taxation authority. However, as we have discuss up to here, the clearer the standard or
50(Attribution of Assets and Liabilities in Trust Property and Prot and Expenses to Be Attributed
to Trust Property) [excerpt]
Article 13 of Income Tax Act ¬ Beneciaries of a trust (limited to the beneciaries who actually
have the benecial right) shall be considered to hold the properties and debts belonging to the
trust property of that trust and the prots and costs to be attributed to the trust property shall
be considered as the beneciaries' prots and costs respectively so as to apply the provisions of this
Act.
(Attribution of Assets and Liabilities in Trust Property and Prot and Expenses to Be Attributed
to Trust Property) [excerpt]
Article 12 of Corporation Tax Act ¬ Beneciaries of a trust (limited to the beneciaries who actually
have the benecial right) shall be considered to hold the properties and debts belonging to the trust
property of that trust and the prots and costs to be attributed to the trust property shall be
considered as the beneciaries' prots and costs respectively so as to apply the provisions of this
Act.
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criterions for the taxation becomes, the easier it becomes to manipulate the contents
of the act of trust so that the inequitable taxation tends to occur compared with the
other legal relationship with similar economic purpose to that of trust.
However, such a complication of the taxation might be the fate of a trust rela-
tionship. For a trust relationship could be seen historically to be developed as a kind
of a method of tax evasion. Anyway, taking the inherent diculties of the taxation
on trust relationships into consideration, the current tax system is not bad. While
it supposes that the beneciary basically owns the trust property, it also provides a
special treatment for the case in which the actual content of the benecial right is
limited to getting a share of the prots51. In addition, the current provision considers
a future beneciary who has the power to change the terms of trust as the beneciary
in taxation52, and, moreover, treats a certain type of the trust relationship equally
51(Attribution of Assets and Liabilities in Trust Property and Prot and Expenses to Be Attributed
to Trust Property) [excerpt]
Article 13 of Income Tax Act ¬ Beneciaries of a trust (limited to the beneciaries who actually have
the benecial right) shall be considered to hold the assets and debts belonging to the trust property
of that trust and the prots and costs to be attributed to the trust property shall be considered as
the beneciaries' prots and costs respectively so as to apply the provisions of this Act. Provided,
however, that this shall not apply to the assets and debts or the prots and costs which belong to
or are attributed to the trust property of a group investment trust, a retirement pension trust or a
trust subject to corporation taxation.
(Attribution of Assets and Liabilities in Trust Property and Prot and Expenses to Be Attributed
to Trust Property) [excerpt]
Article 12 of Corporation Tax Act ¬ Beneciaries of a trust (limited to the beneciaries who actually
have the benecial right) shall be considered to hold the assets and debts belonging to the trust
property of that trust and the prots and costs to be attributed to the trust property shall be
considered as the beneciaries' prots and costs respectively so as to apply the provisions of this
Act. Provided, however, that this shall not apply to the assets and debts or the prots and costs
which belong to or are attributed to the trust property of a group investment trust, a retirement
pension trust, a trust for specied public interest etc. or a trust subject to corporation taxation.
52(Attribution of Assets and Liabilities in Trust Property and Prot and Expenses to Be Attributed
to Trust Property) [excerpt]
Article 13 of Income Tax Act ...
­ A person who is actually given the power to change the trust (except for the power to make
a trivial change to be prescribed in a Cabinet Order) and prescribed to get the benet from the
trust property (except for a beneciary) shall be deemed as the beneciary set forth in the previous
paragraph so that the provision of the previous paragraph shall be applied.
(Attribution of Assets and Liabilities in Trust Property and Prot and Expenses to Be Attributed
to Trust Property) [excerpt]
Article 12 of Corporate Tax Act ...
­ A person who is actually given the power to change the trust (except for the power to make
a trivial change to be prescribed in a Cabinet Order) and prescribed to get the benet from the
trust property (except for a beneciary) shall be deemed as the beneciary set forth in the previous
paragraph so that the provision of the previous paragraph shall be applied.
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to a corporation so as to impose the tax on the trustee53. Those provisions can be
53(Denitions)[excerpt]
Article 2 of Income Tax Act ¬ In this Act, the meanings of the terms listed in following items shall
be dened by the provisions of respective items.
...
8-3. Trust subject to corporation taxation A trust for corporate taxation prescribed in Cor-
porate Tax Act (Showa 40 (1965) Act No.34) Article 2 item 29-2 (Denitions)
...
(Application of this Act to Beneciary of a Trust Subject to Corporation Taxation)
Article 6-2 ¬ The provisions of this Act (except for the previous Chapter (Tax Liability), Chapter
5 (The Place for Tax Payment) and the Part 6 (Penal Provisions). The same shall be applied to
the next Article) shall apply to a trustee of a trust subject to corporate taxation with regarding the
persons as deferent persons by trust property, etc. (meaning assets and debts belonging to trust
property and prots and costs attributable to such trust property; hereinafter the same applies in
this Chapter) of each corporate taxation trust and personal asset, etc. (meaning assets and debts
and prots and costs other than trust asset, etc. of a trust subject to corporate taxation; hereinafter
the same applies in the next paragraph).
­ In the case referred to in the preceding paragraph, the trust assets and the personal assets of
each trust subject to corporate taxation shall be deemed to belong to each person regarded dierent
in the previous paragraph.
(Denitions)[excerpt]
Article 2 of Corporate Tax Act In this Act, the meanings of the terms listed in following items shall
be dened by the provisions of respective items.
...
29-2. Trust subject to corporate taxation Trust listed in following (except for group investment
trust, retirement pension trust prescribed in Article 12 paragraph ¯ item 1 (Attribution of asset
and debt belonging to trust property and prot and cost to be attributed to trust property) and a
trust for specied public interest prescribed in the item 2 of the same paragraph);
(a) A trust with a provision which prescribes the issue of a certicate of benecial right.
(b) A trust without beneciary prescribed in Article 12 paragraph ¬ (including a person to
be regarded as the beneciary prescribed in the paragraph ¬ pursuant to paragraph ­ of the same
Article).
(c) A trust (except a trust which is entrusted the assets belonging to a trust property) whose
settlor is a corporation (except for a public corporation and a public interest corporation) and which
fall under at least one of the following conditions;
(1) All or important part of the business (limited to the matter on which a resolution of
the shareholders' meeting of that corporation prescribed in Companies Act (Heisei 17 (2005) Act
No. 86) Article 467 paragraph ¬ (limited to the part concerning the items 1 and 2) (Approvals
of Assignment of Business) is required concerning the assignment) of that corporation is entrusted
and it was estimated at the time of the eectuation of the trust that the ratio of the share in the
benecial right which the shareholders etc. would get would fall under the case prescribed in Cabinet
Order as exceeding fty hundredths (except the case prescribed in Cabinet Order as that the species
of the assets except for money belonging to the trust property are generally equal).
(2) At the time of the eectuation of the trust or when the prescription of the duration
(meaning the duration provided in the act of trust. The same shall apply in (2)) has been eectuated
(referred to as \the eectuation time etc." in (2)), the corporation or a person prescribed by Cabinet
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interpreted as seeking for the theoretical clearness and the practical appropriateness
at the same time by setting the theoretically mixed standard. This basic policy can
be evaluated positively. If there occur in the future such tax evasions as to be socially
evaluated as abusing of trust relationships, some exible change or new establishment
of the tax system should be supported from the stand point of the public interest.
However, anyway, struggles in \creativity" between the tax system planners and trust
parties will continue, in eect, for ever.
Order as having special relationship with the corporation is the trustee and at the eectuation time
etc., the duration period was prescribed to exceed twenty years after the eectuation time etc.
(including the case in which neither the corporation nor a person having special relationship with
the corporation had been the trustee but after that the corporation or a person having special
relationship with the corporation was assigned as the trustee and at the time of the assignment
the duration period was to exceed twenty years after the time, but except the case in which it is
prescribed by Cabinet Order to need long time for managing or disposing of the trust property
because of the nature of the trust property).
(3) At the time of the eectuation of the trust, the corporation or a person having special
relationship with the corporation was the trustee and a person having special relationship with the
corporation was the beneciary and it falls under the case which Cabinet Order prescribes is the
case in which at that time the ratio of the share of that person having special relationship with the
corporation in the benet could be changed.
(d) An investment trust prescribed in Article 2 paragraph ® of Act on Investment Trusts and
Investment Corporations
(e) A specic purpose trust prescribed in Article 2 paragraph ⑬ (Denition) of Act on Secu-
ritization of Assets (Heisei 10 (1998) Act no.105)
(Application of this Act concerning trustee of corporate taxation trust)
Article 4-6 ¬ The provisions of this Act (except Article 2 item 29-2 (Denitions), Article 4 (Tax-
payer) and Article 12 (Assets and debts belonging to trust property and prot and cost attributable
to trust property) and Chapter 6 (The place for tax payment) and Book 5 (Penal provisions; here-
inafter the same shall apply in this Chapter)) shall apply to a trustee of corporate taxation trust
with regarding the persons as deferent persons by trust property, etc. (meaning assets and debts
belonging to trust property and prot and cost attributable to such trust property; hereinafter the
same applies in this Chapter) of each corporate taxation trust and personal asset, etc. (meaning
assets and debts and prots and costs other than trust asset, etc. of a trust subject to corporate
taxation; hereinafter the same shall apply in the next paragraph).
­ In the case referred to in the previous paragraph, trust asset, etc. and personal asset, etc.
of each corporate taxation trust shall belong respectively to each person regarded dierent in that
paragraph.
Chapter 5
Relation between Trust and Third
Parties
The administration activities of trust property are rarely completed within the trust
parties and usually involve third parties. Therefore, the possibility of some conict
of interests between one of trust parties, especially a beneciary, and a third party
is inevitable and the interpretational problems in such a case of conict of interests
occupy the important part of the trust law problems. In this chapter, at rst, we dis-
cuss generally the structure of the conict of interests between trust parties and third
parties. Then, we pick up, as typical situations in which such a conict of interests
tends to be serious, the case in which the interests crashes between a beneciary and
a third party because of a disposition of the trust property in breach of trust by the
trustee and the case in which a third party claims the liability of the trustee concern-
ing the administration action of the trust property. In the course of the discussion,
we will see how the way of the argument is inuenced by the theoretical construction
concerning the fundamental structure of trust and by the thought on the nature of
benecial right.
5.1 The Status of a Third Party against Trust Re-
lationship
(1) Relationships between Trust Parties and Third Parties
A trustee generally holds the power of administration of the trust property. A settlor
or a beneciary doesn't take part directly in the administration activity of the trust
property unless some special provision to allow it is provided in the terms of trust.
Therefore, viewing from the stand point of a third party who entered into a trading
relationship with a trust property, the other party of the dealing is the trustee and the
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beneciary is behind the scene as one of the trust parties. As far as the administration
of the trust property is normally performed, the beneciary will not stand in any legal
relationship with the third party. So, if a legal relation between the beneciary and a
third party is mentioned, it indicates some unusual happening in the administration
of the trust property.
As such an unusual happening, two situations can be imagined. The rst situation
is that the act of disposition of trust property by the trustee violates the trust purpose
or exceeds the administration power of the trustee, through which a property that
is indispensable for the attainment of the purpose of the trust is assigned to a third
party. In such a case, the admissibility of the claim against third party from the
beneciary is the problem. The second situation is that in the course of the trust
administration some damages are caused to a third party but the trust property is
insucient to fulll the claim of the compensation of the damages of the third party.
In such a case, the damaged third party may also claim the compensation against
the beneciary who has enjoyed the benet from the trust property. The problem is
whether such a claim by the third party against the beneciary could be armed.
Of those two, as for the rst situation, Trust Act provides a standard for interest
adjustment of the rights between the beneciary and the third party. But the inter-
pretation may greatly vary depending on the theoretical construction concerning the
fundamental structure of trust or the way of understanding of the nature of the bene-
cial right. If one theoretically analyzes the standard for interest adjustment between
a beneciary and a third party tracing back to the historical origin of trust institute,
one will see the fact that the changes or dierences of the conceptual structures of
the right or the property, and, moreover, the dierence of the role in the legal system
in the ages have had subtle inuences over the actual content of the standard for
the interest adjustment at respective ages. Therefore, it will be unsatisfactory as an
investigation only to trace the verbal face of the provisions concerning the standard
for the interest adjustment provided in Trust Act. We need further to consider how
the interest adjustment standard provided in Trust Act would be theoretically posi-
tioned in relation to the various theoretical constructions concerning the fundamental
structure of trust.
On the other hand, as for the second situation, there is an opinion insisting that
the third party cannot pursue the liability directly against the beneciary since there
is no provision to allow such a claim provided in Trust Act. In fact, since a beneciary
and a third party would not enter into a legal relationship as far as the management
of the trust property is appropriately performed, if a third party can duly claim
directly against a beneciary without any provision to allow it, it should be theoreti-
cally explainable from the fundamental legal structure of trust. However, as we have
discussed in many respects, there are several possible theoretical constructions con-
cerning the fundamental structure of trust, and the provisions in the current statute
are designed to avoid any serious inconsistency with any theories. As the result, the
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foundational theory to be adopted has, in eect, a great inuence on the orientation
of the argument concerning the liability of a beneciary to a third party.
In the interpretation of legal relation between trust parties and third parties, es-
pecially concerning the interest adjustment between the beneciary and a third party,
the dierence in the theoretical construction concerning the fundamental structure of
trust may lead to a signicant dierence in the conclusion. What is important in or-
der to secure the theoretical legitimacy and practical appropriateness of the standard
for that interest adjustment is to be able clearly to explain why a third party who
did not take part in the agreement to create the trust relationship should be bound
by the trust relationship which stands on the agreement between the trust party.
(2) Clarication of Trust Relationship and Its Relation to
Third Party
Another factor which may cause a trouble in the interest adjustment between trust
parties and third parties is the situation that the existence of the trust relationship
is not clear viewing from the side of third parties. In such a case a third party
would believe at rst that the other party of the juristic act of the third party is the
trustee in person but later she/he realizes the existence of the trust relationship. The
problem is how such a change of the recognition of the third party may aect the
interest adjustment between that third party and the trust parties, especially, the
beneciary. By the way, where a beneciary pursues the liability of a third party on
the ground of the breach of trust, as referred to above, or where a third party pursues
the liability of a beneciary, the third party usually have a recognition of, if not the
fact of the breach, the existence itself of the trust relationship, then the foreseeability
of the claim from the side of third parties becomes an important issue.
One opinion takes the subjective foreseeability of the legal relationship from the
side of the third party as the fundamental criterion to judge the allowability of the
pursuit of the liability. Another takes the objective state of the legal relationship
around the parties as the fundamental ground.
If one takes the subjective foreseeability of the legal relationship from the side of
the third party as the fundamental criterion to judge the allowability of the pursuit
of the liability, then, at the stage where the existence of the trust relationship is
unknown by the third party, the third party recognize only the trustee in person as
the other party of the dealing, so she/he should also recognize her/his right is secured,
after all, only within the trustee's own asset. If so, even if the third party found later
that the trust relationship had been established and the beneciary might be involved
in the legal relationship between the trustee and the third party, it may give the third
party the security of the claim which exceeds the third party's own expectation that
the third party is allowed to pursue the liability of the beneciary directly. So one
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may think it should be inappropriate, as a general rule. Since this way of thinking
puts an importance of the actual recognitions of the parties concerned, where, to
the contrary, the third party recognized, or believed with reasonable ground in the
existence of the trust relationship, one tends to think the insistence of the right by
the third party should be armed along the recognition of the third party, even if
the trust relationship is actually void.
Instead, If one takes the objective state of the legal relationship among the parties,
even if a third party did not recognize a part of the her/his own right, since the right
itself actually existed, there should be no reason for the wrong recognition of the third
party to aect the content of the right. So, since now the third party has gotten to
the correct recognition, there should be no problem for the third party to execute
its own right, so it should be, of course, allowed for the third party to pursue the
liability of any of the trust parties. This thought attaches greater importance to
the objective legal relationship than to the recognition of the state by the parties,
so where the trust relationship which the third party believed in did, however, not
actually exist, on would thought the third party's claim which doesn't follow the
actual legal relation should not be allowed, unless it is evaluated violating the good
faith rule for the side of the supposed trust parties to insist non-existence of the trust
relationship, for example, where the believe of the third party was based on the words
of the supposed trust parties.
On the other hand, where such a legal state is not clear for a third party, one may
treat the problem as that of the requirement for assertion. Especially where the trust
parties are intentionally making the existence of the trust relationship unclear by, for
example, not explicitly indicating the trust relationship in administrating the trust
property, the trust parties cannot duly assert the trust relationship against a third
party who is the other party of the act for the trust administration, and the third
party, in turn, can insist the right supposing the existence or non-existence of the trust
relationship at the third party's choice. Such a conclusion may be understandable at
rst sight. However, the requirements for assertion of a trust property the provisions
of the current statute explicitly prescribe are concerning only the case where the
trust property falls under the type requiring the registration for the assignment of
the right on it. So, since there is provided no special requirement for assertion for the
trust property of the other type, the case in which the trust relation on the property
\cannot be asserted" against third parties should be essentially restricted to the case
in which the registration of a trust relationship is not done on a real estate belonging
to trust property.
Viewing from the stand point of the court which retrospectively judges on the
dispute between parties, it is desirable for a legal relationship generally to be made
explicit and clear, of course, not only for a trust relationship. In this meaning, such
an opinion makes sense that a court should give a negative evaluation to the behavior
of the party who intentionally didn't the true legal relationship explicit. However, the
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state of interests among the parties of a legal relationship is not necessarily simple.
As for a trust relationship, whether the existence of the trust relationship is made
explicit in a juristic action may subtly and complicatedly aect the state of interests
between the parties. So, it may be inevitable that there are the cases in which the
existence of the trust relationship is not made explicit in the trust administration.
Therefore, how to \protect" the interest of third parties as the other parties of the
act for trust administration will continue still to be an important problem under any
legal system.
5.2 Breach of Trust and Responsibility of a Third
Party
(1) Relation between Breach of Trust and a Third Party
Where a trustee acted deviating the power given by the therms of trust or assigned
a trust property in breach of trust, there are several possible situations in which the
third party may stand who was the other party of the violative act by the trustee.
Firstly, it may be the case that the third party didn't know the existence of the trust
relationship and was taking the property as the trustee's own property in entering the
trading relation which breached the trust. Secondly, it may be the case that the third
party knew the existence itself of the trust relationship but entered into a trading
relationship with the trust property without realizing that the act by the trustee was
in breach of the trust. Thirdly, it may be the case that the third party knew the
existence of the trust relationship and the fact that the act by the trustee is in breach
of the trust but entered into the trading relationship with the trust property. In
addition, it may be an actual problem which category the case where the third party
didn't know by gross or any negligence the existence of the trust relationship or the
fact of the breach of trust of the act would fall under.
In the rst case referred to above, that is, the case in which the third party didn't
know the existence itself of the trust relationship, the third party would have been
recognized the trustee as the owner of the trust property and believed trading with
the trustee in person. Therefore, the rst problem concerning the interest adjustment
between the beneciary and the third party in this case will be whether it is possible
to force the existence and the eect of the trust relationship on the third party in
spite of the content of the recognition of the third party. This problem is close to
that of the possibility of a due assertion of the trust property against the third party.
As we have already discussed concerning the public notice of a trust relationship,
under the current statute, since the registration of the trust relationship is the re-
quirement for the assertion against third parties, the allowability of the assertion of
a trust relationship against a third party is judged by the registration of the trust
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relationship whether the third party knew the existence of the trust relationship. On
the other hand, concerning properties with no registration system, there is no provi-
sion prescribing the requirement for assertion in the current Trust Act. So, the trust
relationship may be forceable on a third party only where the third party knew the
existence of the trust relationship or where the third party didn't know the trust rela-
tionship without any reasonable ground, that is, by light or gross negligence. By the
way, in explaining the standard for the interest adjustment, whether one supposes the
principle is the general assertibility over everyone of a trust relationship but the case
where the third party didn't know the existence of the trust relationship without any
negligence is the exception, or one thinks the assertibility of the trust relationship is
armed against only the third party who knew or didn't know by negligence the ex-
istence of the trust relationship will depend on the theory the one adopts concerning
the fundamental structure of trust.
In the second case referred to above, that is, the case in which a third party didn't
know the fact of the breach of the trust, the issue will be the evaluation of the fact that
the third party believed the act by the trustee was within the power of the trustee,
namely, whether the third party believed the legitimacy of the act by the trustee by
some legitimate reason. However, in the judgement on the legitimacy of the belief
of the third party, in contrast to the case of the recognition of the trust relationship
itself, since the third party had realized the existence of the trust relationship, the
third party could have research the content of the trustee's power given in the trust
relationship. So, where the third party didn't do a sucient research so that the
third party couldn't realize the breach of trust, the third party will be evaluated to
have behaved with light or gross negligence. While the third party may be required
to investigate the content of the power of the trustee when the existence of the trust
property had become clear for the third party, the trustee, in turn, should respond to
the question from the third party when the third party required the trustee to conrm
the act for trading is within the power of the trustee or compliant to the purpose of
the trust.
In the third case referred to above, that is, the case in which a third party knew
the fact of the breach of trust of the act by the trustee as well as the existence of
the trust relationship, there is no doubt both practically and theoretically in that
the eect of the existence of the trust relationship can be forced on the third party.
However, in this case, what content of the remedy should be given to the third party
based on what theoretical construction may vary in the basic principle depending on
the way of thinking concerning the fundamental structure of trust.
As we have explained up to here, the evaluation of the legal position of a third
party who was the other party of the trading act in breach of trust by the trustee would
vary depending on how is the content of the recognition of the third party concerning
the trust relationship and to what degree the third party could and should investigate
the existence of the trust property itself, the content of the power of the trustee or the
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purpose of the trust. We should consider, further more, the theoretical constructions
to give a conclusion to this problem and the content of the remedy the third party
could make use of in relation to the thoughts concerning the fundamental structure
of trust.
(2) The Fundamental Structure of Trust and Resale Right
of Beneciary
In the interest adjustment between a beneciary and a third party in the case of the
breach of trust by the trustee, a generally appropriate standard may be acquired ba-
sically from the judgement on the third party's knowing/not-knowing of the existence
of the trust relationship or the fact of the breach of trust by the trustee. Then, the
next problem is the theoretical construction for the standard of the interest adjust-
ment. This problem is closely related to the theories of the fundamental structure of
trust.
If one thinks that the trustee is the owner of the trust property and that the
benecial right is a right in person against the trustee, since the benecial right is a
right in person but not on the trust property, the person on whom the benecial right
can be forced is, as a general rule, restricted to the trustee. However, the third party
who knew the existence of the trust relationship and the fact of the breach of trust
of the act by the trustee can be seen as the partner of the trustee in the breach of
trust, so that the third party can be legally identied with the trustee. So, the eect
of the benecial right could be extended to the third party.
Under this theory, the remedy for the beneciary against the breach of trust
is basically that the the eect of the benecial right which is generally limited to
the trustee is extended over the third party, so that the third party should assume
the duties and responsibilities equal to the trustee concerning the transferred trust
property. In sum, under this theory, a third party who knew the fact of the breach
of trust by the trustee would enter into a constructive trust relationship with the
beneciary.
However, the duties and responsibilities in this constructive trust relationship are
created to correct the eect that a part of trust property was assigned to the third
party through the act in breach of trust by the trustee. So the contents of the duty
and responsibility of the third party would be not quite the same as that of the trustee
since \the purpose of the trust" related with the third party is dierent from that of
the original trust. Therefore, the third party doesn't have, for example, the power
to administer the assigned trust property in pursuit of the prot and, on the other
hand, does assume the obligation or liability to return the assigned property to the
trust property in response to the claim by the beneciary.
Instead, if one thinks that the beneciary is the substantial owner of the trust
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property so that the benecial right is the substantial ownership of the trust prop-
erty, then the eect of a benecial right as the substantial ownership should aect,
as a general rule, the third party who was the other party of the act in breach of
trust by the trustee. However, where the third party was condent of the legitimate
appearance of the trading act by the trustee and there was a reasonable ground for
the third party's not knowing of the trust relationship or the breach of the trust by
the trustee, the third party's interest should be protected so that the third party can
avoid the eect of the benecial right. In sum, the standard for the interest adjust-
ment between the beneciary and the third party under this theory tends to protect
the condence of the third party in the legitimate appearance of trade based on the
general eect of the fact that the benecial right is the substantial ownership of the
trust property.
Therefore, under this theory, in the interest adjustment the circumstances around
the trustee in acting in breach of trust are not generally taken into consideration and
only the situation on the side of the third party is considered to judge whether there
was a reasonable ground for the third party to conde in the legitimate appearance
of the trade. And, since the question is whether the eect of the benecial right as
the substantial ownership of the trust property is extended to the property assigned
to the third party, which is decided by whether the condence of the third party is
worth to be protected, the result of the interest adjustment between the beneciary
and the third party is either that the eect of the benecial right is armed so that
the third party loses the ownership of the assigned property or that the interest of
the third party is protected so that the eect of the benecial right was cut o from
the property assigned to the third party.
As the actual content of the benecial right the beneciary can exercise against the
third party, the claim to return the assigned property to the trust property should be
generally allowed since the assigned property was judged to be still within the scope
of the benecial right. As the theoretical construction for this case, one may think
that the juristic act in breach of trust is rescinded by the beneciary or that the third
party assumes the status of the trustee of the constructive trust the purpose of which
is to return the assigned property to the original trust property.
Instead, if one thinks that trust property is a substantial entity independent of
the trust parties and that the benecial right is a right in person against the trust
property, the eect of the benecial right should reach the property assigned to a third
party through an act in breach of trust by the trustee since the act in breach of trust
violates the scope of the power of the trustee. In addition, the third party also has
got the title on the assigned property since the third party was assigned it from the
outwardly legitimate title holder of the property. So, the interest adjustment between
the beneciary and the third party is done by weighing the right of the beneciary
against that of the third party so as to judge which should be given the priority to
another. The generally acceptable standard for the interest adjustment would be
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that the third party's right should be given the priority to the right of the beneciary
where the third party didn't know the existence of the trust relationship and/or the
fact of the breach of trust in the act by the trustee and there is some reasonable
ground for the third party's not knowing. Otherwise, namely, where the third party
knew the existence of the trust relationship and the fact of the breach of trust by
the trustee or where third party didn't know them without any legitimate reason, the
right of the beneciary should be given the priority to the right of the third party.
In sum, under this theory, in the case in which a trust property was assigned to a
third party through an act in breach of trust by the trustee, the third party and the
beneciary acquire the rights on the property at the same time, then the priority
relation between those rights would be judged by weighing one right against another.
Therefore, according to this way of thinking, since all the circumstances should
be considered in weighing the benecial right against the third party's right, not only
the circumstances on the side of the third party but also those on the side of the
beneciary should be taken into consideration in the interest adjustment between the
beneciary and the third party. An practical result of the interest adjustment may
be, not restricted to the conclusion that either the beneciary or the third party is
admitted the whole content of the right, various moderate conclusions, such that a
priority relation is set between the rights of the beneciary and the third party, or that
the beneciary is made assume the obligation to pay some compensation to the third
party in exchange for the return of the assigned property to the trust property by the
third party, etc.. In sum, this theory supposes as the fundamental view, unlike the
other theories described above, not the thought that a \person" like the trust parties
or third parties governs a \thing" like trust property but the thought that so and so
person has the right against the \property" independent of the parties concerned. In
addition, this theory doesn't put the ownership on the center of the argument on the
rights of the parties concerning the trust property. As the eect, it can consider some
results which would be impossible to deduce from the other theories.
By the way, in this theory, in the case in which the eect of the benecial right
should reach the third party, that is, where the right of the beneciary should be given
the priority to the right of the third party, since the assigned property still belongs
to the trust property, the general rule as the solution is to return that property to
the trust property. However, as the result of the ne interest adjustment between
the beneciary and the third party, it may become necessary to make the third party
administer the assigned property as the trustee of the constructive trust and to make
the beneciary enjoy the benet from the administration by the third party through
the benecial right. By the way, the constructive trust relationship in this last case is,
unlike in the other cases of constructive trust, not necessarily limited for the purpose
of the return of the property to the trust property but also for the realization of the
priority relation of the rights between the beneciary and the third party. Therefore,
the actual content of the administration power given to the third party as the trustee
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of the constructive trust in this case may include the administration of the assigned
property for pursuing the prots. There may be the case where the third party is
requested to administer the property to gain prots by the beneciary. As another
way of the resolution, it may be practically reasonable in some cases to adjust the
priority relation between the rights by taking also the right assigned to the third
party as a kind of benecial right.
(3) Historical Background for the Arguments Concerning
the Resale Right of Beneciary
As we have discussed, the theoretical construction of the fundamental structure of
trust and the arguments concerning the standard for the interest adjustment between
a beneciary and a third party in the case of the breach of trust are closely related with
each other. Although the results of the interest adjustment are not largely dierent
among the theories, since the ways of the theoretical construction are qualitatively
dierent, we need to understand also the historical background to generates those
arguments concerning the standard for interest adjustment between a beneciary
and a third party in order to have some clear view on this problem1.
The legal system we have been supposing up to here is, including Japanese legal
system, what stands on a basically coherent judgement of the values. So, we have not
taken into consideration a legal system in which several \justices" in several dimen-
sions socially or even legal theoretically rival each other. Besides, it is true that there
is still left an unclear part concerning what is the essence of a \trust relationship", but
there is no theoretical dispute concerning many of the basic concepts like \trust prop-
erty", \breach of trust" or \benecial right" which will constitute the foundation for
interpretational arguments. So, although some preparations from the practical view
point may be needed to discuss what type of trust relationship should be taken as
the most fundamental, historical arguments or theoretical reconsiderations on the
fundamental conceptual presuppositions may be not necessarily required in all cases.
However, the state in which interpretational doctrinal discussions are developed
without any radical consideration of the presuppositions for the arguments is a quite
typical phenomenon for whole the area of Trust Law Studies in Japan including the
arguments on the theoretical construction for the fundamental structure of trust as
well as the discussions around the standard of the interest adjustment between a
beneciary and a third party in the case of the breach of trust by the trustee. In fact,
compared with Trust Laws of England and the Unites States which is the mother
law of the Trust Act of Japan, the development of Trust law in Japan is peculiar
and ahistorical. For in England the trust institute has historically developed as a
case law fundamentally based on the high authority of Equity court but at the age
1For details of the following discussion, see Hoshino \Theories of Trust".
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of the judicial reform in the nineteenth century the reconstruction and legitimization
of the institutes were required, then the theoretical construction including the jus-
in-personam theory as the representative was proposed. On the other hand, in the
United States of America, the fundamental concepts \property" or \right" began to
be transformed at the beginning of the twentieth century so that the new theoretical
possibilities of the trust theory were pursued, which had, in eect, deviated from
that of England. However, in Japan, the arguments concerning the fundamental
structure of trust has been, since the import of the concept of trust up to the present,
performed over the problem of the consistent positioning of trust into the already-
existing contract institute presupposing in essence the uniformity of the Japanese
legal system.
Therefore, we can say that the arguments concerning the fundamentals structure
of trust in Japan has been targeting on the theoretical construction not to cause
theoretical contradiction with the other existing legal institutions, in other words, to
make it possible to get to a conclusion which keeps practically appropriate relation
with the other legal institutions. Since there has been a fundamental accordance
on the theoretical ground for the basic concepts in Japanese trust law and there is
no doctrinal opposition concerning the concept of legal \justice", it may have been
suitable to the state of practice in Japan to pursuit practical appropriateness of the
resolutions of concrete problems based on the basic concepts or the sense of justice
so as to investigate the theoretical construction to give the clearest explanation for
the conclusions setting fundamental considerations of the conceptual consistency of
the trust theory aside.
However, to consider various theoretical constructions in order to nd socially as
well as legally appropriate resolutions for actual concrete disputes is one problem,
but it is another problem to investigate the theoretical foundation of trust institute
up to the reconsiderations of the basic concepts or the structure of the legal system
which should constitute the common assumption for all the legal arguments. \Trust"
in Japan has been developed from the view point of how to make use of that property
administration technology as the main concern of the practical business of trust since
its import up to the present. As the result, discussions concerning trust law have been
attaching great importance to the concrete conclusions more than in the other areas
of legal studies. Still worse, recently to derive a conclusion from theoretical inter-
pretation tends to be slighted, so that there is even an opinion that newly appeared
problems could be wholly solved by new legislation, which is becoming inuential
in Japan. If all of us simply followed this tendency, the theoretical foundation of
the interpretation would be blurred so that the interpretation itself might lose its
meaning.
To take trust institute as a legal technology for property administration will be
reasonable in itself from the view point of the purpose of business enterprises. And
it is natural to attach an importance to the concrete conclusion for the question in
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practical business. But the use and eect of such a stand point should be carefully
examined.
(4) Resale Right of Beneciary in Trust Act
Trust Act provides, as the resale right of beneciary, the rescission right of a bene-
ciary against the juristic act in breach of trust by the trustee2. As for the rescission
right of beneciary, there were provisions also in the former statute3. But the current
statute have new provisions concerning matters not prescribed in the former statute.
That is, the current statute clearly distinguishes as the provisional conditions the
2(Rescission of Acts Conducted by Trustee Beyond the Powers)
Article 27 ¬ Where an act conducted by a trustee for the trust property does not fall within the
scope of the trustee's powers, a beneciary may rescind such act, if all of the following conditions
are met:
1. that the other party to the act knew, at the time of the act, that the act was conducted for
the trust property; and
2. that the other party to the act knew or was grossly negligent in failing to know, at the time
of the act, that the act did not fall within the scope of the trustee's powers.
­ Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding paragraph, where an act conducted by a trustee
to establish or transfer a right for property that belongs to the trust property (limited to such
property for which a trust registration as set forth in Article 14 may be made) does not fall within
the scope of trustee's powers, a beneciary may rescind such act, if all of the following conditions
are met:
1. that at the time of the act, the trust registration as set forth in Article 14 existed with regard
to the property that belongs to the trust property; and
2. that the other party to the act knew or was grossly negligent in failing to know, at the time
of the act, that the act did not fall within the scope of the trustee's powers.
® When any one of the two or more beneciaries has exercised the right to rescind under the
provisions of the preceding two paragraphs, the rescission shall also be eective for other beneciaries.
¯ The right to rescind under the provisions of paragraph ¬ or paragraph ­ shall be extinguished
by prescription if it is not exercised within three months from the time when the beneciary (if there
is a trust caretaker at the time in question, the trust caretaker) became aware of the existence of the
grounds for rescission. The same shall apply when one year has elapsed from the time of the act.
3Article 31 of the former statute When a trustee disposed of a trust property in breach of trust,
a beneciary may rescind the disposition against the other party of the disposition or the next
assignee. Provided that the provision set forth shall apply only when the registration of the trust
has been completed or, as for the property on which the registration of trust isn't possible, when
the other party of the disposition or the next assignee knew the fact that the disposition violated
the purpose of the trust or didn't know that fact by gross negligence.
Article 32 of the former statute Where there are several beneciaries, a rescission one of them
exercised shall have the eect on behalf of the other beneciaries.
Article 33 of the former statute A rescission right prescribed in Article 31 shall be extinguished by
the operation of the prescription if it is not executed within one month from the time when the
beneciary or the trust caretaker realized the existence of the cause of the rescission. The same shall
be apply when one year has elapsed from the time of the disposition.
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knowing/not-knowing of the existence of the trust relationship from that of the fact
of the breach of trust by a third party so as to adjust interests between a beneciary
and a third party.
Where a disposition in breach of trust was rescinded by the beneciary, the dis-
position is deemed void ad initio, so that the third party whose act was rescinded
assumes the liability to return the assigned property to the trust property. By the
way, The rescission by the beneciary of the disposition in breach of trust is inter-
preted to be done for the correction of the eect of the violative disposition so as to
promote the attainment of the trust purpose rather than for the pursuing the personal
interest. So, the beneciary who exercises the rescission right stands on the status
substantially to exercise a part of that administration power over the trust property
which the trustee originally has in the trust relationship. Therefore, the beneciary
who exercised the rescission right can demand the third party to return the assigned
property directly to the beneciary in person, not necessarily limited to demanding
to return it to the trustee.
However, contrary to the obligee's right to demand the rescission in Civil Code,
in which the obligee who exercised the rescission right can demand to return the
relevant property to the obligee in person, since the beneciary who are exercising the
rescission right is standing on the status equal to the trustee in the trust relationship,
the beneciary should assume also the substantial \duty" to deliver the property
returned from the third party to the trust property. So, the beneciary who exercised
the rescission right should not be allowed to enjoy the benet from the property
through the benecial right actually prior to the other beneciaries, if any, or to set
o the benecial right against the liability to deliver the property returned from the
third party to the trust property.
As we have seen, the current Trust Act provides rather clear provisions concerning
the interest adjustment between a beneciary and a third party in the case of the
breach of trust by the trustee. The next problem is in what relation the standard for
the interest adjustment prescribed in the current statute and that to be derived from
the theoretical construction concerning the fundamental structure of trust are.
First, if one thinks that a trustee is the owner of the trust property, the interest
adjustment between a beneciary and a third party would be based on the judgement
whether that third party can be substantially identied with the trustee. The remedy
given to the beneciary would be to admit the constructive trust relationship with
the third party so as to have the third party assume the duty as the trustee of the
constructive trust to return the assigned property to the trust property. Seeing from
this point of view, the rescission right of the beneciary prescribed in the current
statute would make the disposition in breach of trust void so that the third party
cannot hold the property any more on behalf of her/himself. The exercise of the
rescission right demands the third party to return the assigned property to the trust
assets but the legal construction to make the third party administer the assigned
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property as the trustee of a constructive trust is not adopted in the current statute.
So, the current statute would be interpreted to prescribe the right to rescind the
disposition in breach of trust explicitly as one of the theoretically possible remedies.
Second, if one thinks that a beneciary is the substantial owner of the trust
property, in the interest adjustment between a beneciary and a third party, it is
supposed that the disposition in breach of trust is void as the deviation of the power
of the trustee and the conclusion is determined by taking the condence of the third
party on the legitimate appearance of the dealing into consideration. The remedy
for the beneciary is, in principle, to demand the third party to return the assigned
property based on the substantial ownership of the beneciary. Seeing from this point
of view, the rescission right of the beneciary prescribed in the current statute would
make sure to the parties concerned the invalidness of the disposition so as to indicate
the legitimacy of the demand by the beneciary to return the assigned property. On
the other hand, the legal construction to make the third party to administer that
property as the trustee of a constructive trust is not adopted in the current statute.
So, the current Trust Act would be interpreted to prescribe explicitly only one of
theoretically possible remedies, namely, the rescission right of the beneciary from
the stand point of this theory, too.
Third, if one thinks trust property is an independent property from the trust
parties, the interest adjustment between a beneciary and a third party would be done
by weighing the rights one against another which the beneciary and the third party
respectively have on the trust property with taking comprehensive circumstances
synthetically into consideration so as to determine the priority relation between the
rights. Viewing from this perspective, the remedy to be given to the beneciary would,
although it may be vary depending on the nature of the third party's right, as a general
rule, include all the possible methods to make it possible to restore the enjoyment of
the benet on the property through the benecial right. So it may include to rescind
the disposition so as to demand the third party to return the assigned property to the
trust asset, to make the third party administer the assigned property as the trustee
of a constructive trust or to demand the third party to compensate for the damages
with taking the change of the value of the assigned property into account. Then, the
rescission right of the beneciary prescribed in the current statute is surely one of the
allowable remedies for the beneciary, but how to do with the other remedies which
should be naturally given to the beneciary? However those remedies are dicult
to be derived directly from the provisions of the current statute. Therefore, in the
end, also under this theory the current Trust Act would be interpreted to prescribe
explicitly only one of theoretically possibile remedies, namely, the rescission right of
the beneciary.
As being clear from what we saw above, as for the standard for the interest ad-
justment between a beneciary and a third party and the remedies for the beneciary
against the disposition in breach of trust, every theory of the fundamental structure
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of trust can give several theoretical possibilities, while the current Trust Act explicitly
prescribes only one of those several possible remedies, namely, the right to rescind
the disposition in breach of trust, but has no explicit provision concerning the other
remedies. The provision in the current Trust Act concerning the interest adjustment
between a beneciary and a third party and the remedy given to the beneciary
against the disposition in breach of trust by the trustee would surely not cause a
contradiction with any of the theories concerning the fundamental structure of trust
but, at the same time, is not completely compliant to any one of the theories. In this
meaning, the provisions in the current statute can be said to be keeping the neutral
stand point to the theoretical disputes concerning the fundamental structure of trust
also in this issue as well as in the issue of the denition of trust we referred to above.
Such a theoretically neutral nature of the current statute rejects to give an advan-
tage to any of those theoretical constructions, although this issue over the standard
for the interest adjustment between a beneciary and a third party in the case of
the disposition of the trust property in breach of trust is expected to be the critical
point of the theoretical conict among the theories of the fundamental structure of
trust. Seeing from this situation, the oppositions among the theoretical constructions
concerning the fundamental structure of trust could be, at least as far as the interest
adjustment between a beneciary and a third party on the disposition in breach of
trust is concerned, reduced to a mere \dierence of explanations". As the result, it
may be natural for some opinions to consider the oppositions among those theoretical
constructions as not worth discussing.
However, as we have seen in various respects, the oppositions among the theoret-
ical constructions concerning the fundamental structure of trust actually lead to the
dierence of the conclusions among those theories. The typical case in which such a
dierence appears most vividly is the argument on the liability of a beneciary to a
third party, on which we will discuss in the next section.
5.3 Liability of Beneciary to Third Parties
(1) Right of a Third Party Toward Beneciary
The problem whether a beneciary may be made to assume some liability to a third
party concerning the legal relationship created in the course of the administration
of the trust property had not been recognized as a problem up to recent. It may
be because, rstly, the trustee had been practically ready to assume the rst order
liability to a third party so that there had not occurred practical needs for a third
party to pursue directly the liability of a beneciary very much and because, secondly,
trust banks that assume the status of trustee as their own business have advertised,
as the \merit" or \characteristic" of the investment activities using trust institute,
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the fact that a beneciary doesn't stand in any legal relation with third parties by the
theoretical principle of trust relationship so that the existence of a trust relationship
functions as, so to speak, \barrier" against liabilities of a beneciary.
\The characteristic of trust relationship" referred to here means, in sum, that a
person who performs the investment activity as a beneciary will take the responsi-
bility for the result of the investment only within the trust property in relation to
a third party who is substantially the other party of the investment activity. Such
a way of thinking is problematic from the view point of the balance between risks
and returns in investment activities. However, the very principle that a beneciary
doesn't stand in a legal relationship with third parties could be, on behalf of the
attainment of the trust purpose, theoretically derived from the eect of the actual
legal relationship which has been formed among the trust parties. In addition, the
existence of such a legal relationship could be recognized by a third party who is going
to be the other party of a trade with the trust property. Therefore, one could argue
persuasively, although such a case is another problem as the third party has become
the other party of trade without knowing the existence of the trust relationship, where
the third party accepted the trading relation with knowing the existence of the trust
relationship, the third party should have realized that there is no legal relationship
between the beneciary and the third party so that the third party cannot generally
pursue the liability to the beneciary.
However, in order to allow a third party to pursue the liability of a beneciary,
some the theoretical constructions seems to be possible. For example, based on the
fact that the beneciary has got the benet from the trust property, one may insist
that the gain the beneciary has got was unjust enrichment at the cost of the damages
the third party got. Or, one may insist that the failure of the investment according to
the direction by the beneciary constitutes a tort against the third party who was the
other party of the trade. Or, one may insist that the gain of the beneciary constitutes
a fraudulent act against the third party as the obligee on the trust property. But it
is uncertain whether a court would accept any of them.
Such being the case, it is not easy to change the general principle of trust re-
lationship only on the ground of the requirement of the balance between the risks
and returns in investment activity. So, as far as a beneciary is taken to be a mere
\beneciary" of \a trust relationship", the probability for the beneciary to assume
a liability to a third party would be estimated rather low.
However, such an estimation stands as far as it is supposed that the legal rela-
tionship the parties created is interpreted to be a \trust relationship" by a court or
the like. Therefore, even if the parties recognized the legal relationship they formed
as a trust relationship or described it as a trust relationship, if it is interpreted as
some other legal relationship that trust, for instance, as \an agency relationship"
by interpreting \beneciary" as \principal" and \trustee" as \agent", a liability of
the \beneciary" to a third party could be quite easily armed as the liability of
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\the owner" of the trust property or the liability of \the principal" of the agency
relationship.
Moreover, even when the legal relationship the parties formed is interpreted as
a \trust relationship", such an interpretation is always possibility that an agency
relationship has been created at the same time between the parties. Then, the \ben-
eciary" is interpreted as the \beneciary and principal" and the \trustee" as the
\trustee and agent" so that both the trust and agency institutes may be applied to
the case4. According to the ordinary common opinion, since the person to whom
the ownership the property disposed of is attribute is dierent between a trust, in
which it is the trustee, and an agency, in which it is the principal, a trust relationship
and an agency relationship could never coexist in one legal relationship. However, in
Business Trust in which to pursue the prots as a business is set to be the purpose
and Illinois Land Trust in which the administration power of the real estate is essen-
tially held by the beneciary in the trust institute in the United States of America, if
the beneciary exercises the direction power over the trustee so that the beneciary
is considered to have the \control" by her/his own judgement, the coexistence of an
\agency relationship" with the \trust relationship" is armed. There is actually such
a case in which a court armed a liability of the beneciary to a third party by apply-
ing the agency institute to the relation of the beneciary with the third party. From
the considerations on the judgement which armed the liability of the beneciary to
the third party, the general rule the case has established could be interpreted that, as
a principle of trust relationship in general, where the beneciary has the control over
the trustee based on it's own judgement in the administration of the trust property,
the beneciary could be deemed to be the principal of an agency relationship with
the trustee so that the liability of the beneciary to third parties could be generally
admitted, rather than that the liability of the beneciary to the third party could be
armed only in the case of Business Trust or Illinois Land Trust.
Generally, whether a legal relationship can be interpreted as a trust relationship
should be judged from the view point of the essential nature of trust relationship,
and what is the most important nature of trust relationship is, as we have discussed
above, the eect that the trust parties or the trust administration is bound with \the
trust purpose". Seeing from this view point, if one thinks that the essential nature
of agency relationship is to make the legal eect of the agent's action attributed to
the principal, since such a nature of agency relationship would not contradict to that
of trust relationship, it may be theoretically allowable for legal relationships of trust
and agency to coexist in one legal relationship.
By the way, as for the theoretical construction to admit the liability of a beneciary
to a third party, in addition to the coexistence of an agency relationship with the
4As for details concerning such a case, see Yutaka Hoshino \ Liabilities of a `beneciary' in `trust
relationship' (1){(3・完)" NBL no.673-675 (1999).
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trust relationship as referred to above, a theory like following may be thinkable.
That is, a beneciary who has exercised the direction power over the trustee so as to
reect her/his own will to the administration of the trust property could be deemed
as a part of the trustee so that the \liability of beneciary" may be armed by
an analogy of that of the trustee. This way of thinking can be completed within
the general theory of trust and the scope of the liability of a beneciary can be
relatively easily determined in practice since it is determined through an analogy
with the liability of the trustee. However, this way of thinking may run up against
the diculty in the case in which several beneciaries are independently giving the
directions so that the beneciary to assume the liability can not be identied in
a simple way, especially when the third party determines against whom to le the
suit. By contrast, whether the \beneciary" is a \beneciary and principal" and the
\trustee" a \trustee and agent" could be determined in principle only by the nature
of the relationship between the specied beneciary and trustee, independently of the
interpretation of the relations with the other beneciaries, so that the resolution of
a dispute could be completed within the parties in a lawsuit. Taking those factors
into consideration, the theoretical construction of the coexistence of agency and trust
relationships has an advantage from the view point of the easiness of the judgement
in a lawsuit.
Anyway, the necessity of the deepening of the arguments for a exible method
of interpretation of actual legal relationships as described above will grow more and
more.
(2) The Fundamental Structure of Trust and Liability of
Beneciary
The argument concerning the liability of a beneciary to a third party described
above are based on the consideration of the balance between the risks and returns
in investment activities presupposing that the purpose of the trust is in the pursuit
of economic prots. In this meaning, the argument above is being developed based
on a certain interpretation of the purpose of the trust. As the result, while that
argument would be appropriate whether one stands on any theoretical construction
concerning the fundamental structure of trust as far as the purpose of the trust
relationship is the pursuit for the economic prots by the investment activity, where
the purpose of the trust is other than the pursuit for economic prots, one must
reconsider the rationality and appropriateness to impose the liability to a third party
on the beneciary in relation to each concrete trust purpose.
On the other hand, when one views the problem from the side of the theoretical
construction concerning the fundamental structure of trust, it can be concluded from
the theoretical considerations in some cases that the liability of the beneciary to a
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third party should be armed irrespective of the purpose of the trust.
If one thinks that the benecial right is the substantial ownership of the trust
property, although the obligations or liabilities generated in the course of the admin-
istration of the trust property would be charged with by the trust property at rst,
when the trust property is insucient for the fulllment of all the obligations and
liabilities, a third party may be able to insist that the beneciary as the substantial
owner of the trust property should nally assume the obligations and liabilities di-
rectly to the third party. Besides, when the trust property must be liquidated among
the parties concerned including the creditors and the trust parties because of, for ex-
ample, the termination of the trust property, as far as the benecial right is thought
to be the substantial ownership of the trust property, the right of the owner at the
time of the liquidation can be exercised only after the obligations and liabilities are
fully payed for the creditors. So the benecial right should be posterior to the claims
of ordinary creditors in the share.
Instead, if one thinks the benecial right is a claim against the trustee in per-
son, since the beneciary stands on the status of the obligee in relation to the trust
property, the beneciary and the creditors on the trust property should be treated
equally as a general rule. So, it is only when so prescribes some special agreement or
a statutory provision that the one should have the priority the others. By the way,
if one thinks that trust property is a property independent of the trust parties, the
benecial right is not a mere right in person but a kind of real right on the trust
property. However, the case in which a benecial right can be exercised toward a
third party is only where the supervising power of the beneciary is exercised in or-
der to attain the trust purpose like in the case of interest adjustment between the
beneciary and the third party concerning the trade in breach of trust by the trustee.
So, as far as one considers only the part to enjoy the benet from the benecial right,
it is dicult to give a benecial right any superior status as a right on the trust
property to other ordinary credits. Therefore, whether one takes a benecial right
as a claim against the trustee in person or as a claim against the trust property, the
status of a beneciary is an ordinary obligee in principle, although corresponding to
the content or the timing of the exercise of the benecial right the evaluation of the
right at the time of the liquidation may uctuate in practice. Generally speaking, the
case in which a liability or a responsibility problem brings about between co-obligees
is only where an obligee has acquired some unlawful prot by some fraudulent act
to other obligees. Then, the case in which a beneciary should assume a liability or
obligation to a third party would not happen, as a general rule, unless the exercise of
the benecial right by the beneciary unlawfully harmed some third party.
As we have just seen, corresponding to whether one thinks that the benecial
right is the substantial ownership of the trust property or that the benecial right
is a claim against the trustee or the trust property, the principle for the problem
whether a liability of a beneciary to a third party should be armed would change
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irrespective of the purpose of the trust relationship in the case. This argument also
requires some radical reconsideration on the practical nature of the status and the
right of a beneciary in a trust relationship. For, in traditional arguments, it has
been implicitly presupposed that the total sum of all the rights on a property is the
absolute title, namely, the ownership on the property, so that they have thought that
it is necessary and desirable to consider the nature of a right to be as close to the
ownership as possible in order to secure the right. In fact, as the background of the
rise of the opinion which insisted that a benecial right is the substantial ownership
of the trust property under the former statute in which the jus-in-personam theory
was explicitly adopted, there has generally prevailed the conviction that the right of a
beneciary could be more strongly protected when the benecial right is thought to be
the substantial ownership of the trust property than when it is thought to be a right
in person. However, as it should be clear from our argument above, in some states of
interests of a beneciary and a third party, even if one doesn't treat the benecial right
as the substantial ownership of the trust property, it is actually possible to protect
the benecial right equally and, conversely, viewing from the fact that if the benecial
right is considered as the substantial ownership of the trust property, a liability to a
third party may be charged to the beneciary as the substantial owner. If one takes
these facts into consideration, the necessity of the reconsideration of the theoretical
substance of the phrase \the protection of the interest of beneciary" should be said
to be urgent.
By the way, since the former statute had no explicit provision concerning the
priority order between the beneciary and third parties, the argument concerning
the nature of benecial right and the argument concerning the admissibility of an
obligation or a liability of a beneciary to a third party might have a great inuence
in theory and practice so that the handling of words \creditor" and \beneciary"
might become subtle in an interpretation of the terms of trust. By contrast, the
current statute prescribes concerning the general treatment of the claims against the
trust property that the claim by a beneciary based on the benecial right should be
subordinated to claims by ordinary creditors5. So, at least as for the actual conclusion
on the practical problem, no great dierence would be caused by the dierence in the
way of thinking concerning the fundamental structure of trust.
However, at the same time, we should note the provisions in the current statute
will not contradict to any theoretical standpoint concerning the fundamental structure
of trust.
The provision cited above only prescribes the eect that a benecial right would
be subordinated to the rights of ordinary creditors but doesn't refer to the nature of
the benecial right. If one emphasizes the phrase \claim as a beneciary", one may
5(Relationship between Distribution claim as a beneciary and Trust Claims)
Article 101 Distribution claim as a beneciary shall be subordinated to trust claims.
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interpret that the provision supposes the right of a beneciary, that is, the benecial
right is a kind of claim which may concur with the claims by ordinary creditors.
Conversely, viewing from the eect of the provision that the claim of a beneciary is
subordinated to the claims of the ordinary creditors, the conclusion itself is congruent
with that from the theory that a benecial right is the substantial ownership of
the trust property. But even if one thinks a benecial right is a right in person
against the trustee or the trust property, one may take the provision as specially
prescribing the priority order, so there causes no contradiction with the provision.
Moreover, it is not clear whether the provision prohibits any special agreement among
the interested persons. Anyway, that provision is logically never excluding the thought
that a benecial right is a kind of a right in person. So, it is not unreasonable to
interpret that to make a benecial right subordinated to ordinary credit rights is a
part of the interest adjustment between a beneciary and a third party. It should
be fruitful both theoretically and practically to consider the scope of the provision
referred to above with taking into consideration the consistency with the standard,
on which we discussed in Section2, for the interest adjustment between a beneciary
and a third party in the case of a trade in breach of trust by the trustee.
In sum, the provisions in the current Trust Act keeps on the neutral position
also in this problem area. So, the interpretation would be required to be exible
by taking the theoretical considerations on the fundamental structure of trust into
account. Practically, it may be useful to create special agreement concerning the
priority order among the beneciary and other creditors corresponding the situations
and the purpose of the trust.
(3) Exemption of Trustee from the Liability and Responsi-
bility of Beneciary
As an actual situation in which a liability of a beneciary to a third party becomes the
issue, we can provide the case in which a third party directly pursues the liability of
the beneciary where the terms of trust or some special agreement of the trust parties
prescribes that the liability or obligation the trustee assumed to a third party could
be claimed from the trustee against the beneciary as the right to reimbursement.
The time order up to the acquirement of the right against a beneciary will be,
in theory, like follows. At rst, the third party acquires a right in the course of the
administration of the trust property to the trustee who has the power to administer
the trust property. Then, the trustee fullls the obligation in relation to the third
party. After that, the trustee claims the reimbursement against the beneciary in-
sisting the eect of the exemption prescribed in the terms of trust or in a special
agreement. Since, whether it is in the terms of trust or a special agreement, who
should be directly bound with the eect of the provision are only the trust parties,
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so that a third party should be generally not bounded to the eect of the agreement
between the trust parties, even if the trust parties agreed in the exemption of the
trustee from the liability, a third party could claim its own right directly against the
trustee according to the general principle of the attribution of the obligations and
liabilities in a trust relationship.
However, in reality, there is a case in which, while the trustee or the trust property
is insucient to fulll the obligation to the third party, the beneciary holds sucient
assets to pay the debt. In such a case, for the third party it would be better to pursue
the claim directly directly to the beneciary than to the trustee or the trust property
for the certain and secure satisfaction of the claim right. However, the ground to
allow such a direct claim of a third party to the beneciary is various depending on
the theoretical construction concerning the fundamental structure of trust.
If one thinks that the trustee is the owner of the trust property, the obligations
or liabilities in the course of the administration of the trust property are all generally
assumed by the trustee. Then, the beneciary is a kind of obligee to the trustee, so it
is dicult to give a sound ground to allow a direct claim of a third party against the
beneciary from this fundamental structure of trust. However, under this theory, the
fact that the trustee is exempted from the obligations or liabilities generated in the
course of the administration of the trust property in relation to the beneciary would
mean that the beneciary has exclusively assumed all the obligations and liabilities
which the trustee should be generally assumed. If so, a third party may pursue
the liability directly against the beneciary base on the exclusive assumption by the
beneciary. On the other hand, however, the behavior of the third party to pursue the
liability directly to the beneciary could be interpreted as admitting the exemption
of the trustee from the liability, so that the third party could not pursue the liability
of the trustee at the same time with claiming the payment of the debt against the
beneciary.
Instead, if one thinks that a beneciary is the substantial owner of the trust
property, the theoretical ground for the direct claim from a third party against the
beneciary would be derived from the fundamental structure of trust itself, that is,
the very fact that the beneciary is the substantial owner of the trust property, so,
the fact that the trustee is exempted from the obligations and liabilities in relation
to the third party would be theoretically irrelevant to the allowability of the direct
claim of the third party against the beneciary.
On the other hand, if one thinks that trust property is a property independent the
trust parties, a little complicated argument would be required in order to arm the
direct claim of a trustee against the beneciary. Since a trustee is a mere administrator
of the trust property under this theory so that a trustee originally need not to assume
the nal liability brought about in the course of the administration of the trust
property, even if the beneciary agreed the exemption of the trustee, one cannot
easily conclude that such an agreement means the assumption by the beneciary of
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the direct liability or obligation. Moreover, since the beneciary is a kind of an obligee
on the trust property under this theory, whether it is possible for the third party as
an obligee to pursuit the liability to another co-obligee would depend on the approval
by the third party of the exemption of the trustee given by the beneciary. In this
respect, the argument for the direct claim against the beneciary in this case has a
theoretically dierent nature from that for the claim against the substantial owner of
the trust property.
As we have seen up to here, if one makes the \ownership" of trust property belong
to one of the trust parties, a direct pursuit of the liability to the trust party from
a third party would become easily admissible in theory. So, we should carefully
consider the eect or appropriateness of making the nature of benecial right closer
to the \ownership" in each concrete aspect of a problem.

Chapter 6
Modication and Termination of
Trust
In this chapter we discuss the case in which the circumstances around a trust rela-
tionship are changed by a modication of the purpose or the terms of the trust or by
the termination of the trust relationship. By the termination of a trust relationship,
the legal relationships which has been formed around the trust relationship are all
extinguished and the trust property enters into the liquidation. On the other hand,
by the modication of trust, since the existing trust relationship is theoretically not
terminated, the legal relationships around the trust relationship are not extinguished,
and the liquidation of the trust property isn't commenced as a rule. If one takes the
trust purpose as the essential nature of a trust relationship, the modication and the
termination of the trust relationship both cause a theoretically equal change in that
the already existing trust purpose has lapsed. However, depending on the theoretical
construction to be adopted, some dierent eects may be brought about concerning
the state of the legal relationships including those with third parties or the necessity
of liquidation of the trust property.
6.1 Modication of Trust
(1) Modication of Terms of Trust
The provisional terms provided in the act of trust, in short, the terms of trust pre-
scribe the basic matters concerning the administration of the trust property. Since the
creation of a trust relationship is based on the agreement between the trust parties by
the contract as its typical example, the terms of trust can be changed including the
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part of the trust purpose by the agreement among the trust related parties1. It would
be trivially clear that the \the trust related parties" referred to above include the
trustee and the beneciary, who will get legally inuenced directly by the modica-
tion. The settlor who has projected her/his own intention into the trust relationship
1(Agreement, etc. among the Relevant Parties)
Article 149 ¬ A trust may be modied at the agreement of the settlor, the trustee, and the bene-
ciary. In this case, in making such a modication, the contents of the terms of trust after modication
shall be specied.
­ Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding paragraph, in the cases listed in the following
items, a trust may be modied by the methods specied in the respective items. In this case, the
trustee shall, without delay, give notice of the contents of the terms of trust after modication, to
the settlor in the case set forth in item 1, or to the settlor and the beneciary in the case set forth
in item 2:
1. where it is clear that the modication is not contrary to the purpose of the trust: an
agreement between the trustee and the beneciary; or
2. where it is clear that the modication is not contrary to the purpose of the trust and that it
conforms to the interests of the beneciary: the trustee's manifestation of such intent in a document
or electromagnetic record.
® Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding two paragraphs, in the cases listed in the
following items, a trust may be modied by the persons specied in the respective items manifesting
their intent to do so to the trustee. In this case, in the case set forth in item 2, the trustee shall,
without delay, notify the settlor of the contents of the terms of trust after modication:
1. where it is clear that the modication will not harm the interests of the trustee: the settlor
and the beneciary; or
2. where it is clear that the modication is not contrary to the purpose of the trust and that it
will not harm the interests of the trustee: the beneciary.
¯ Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding three paragraphs, if the terms of trust otherwise
provides for, such provisions shall prevail.
°Where there is no settlor at the time in question, the provisions of paragraph ¬ and paragraph
®, item 1 shall not apply, and the phrase \to the settlor in the case set forth in item 1, or to the
settlor and the beneciary in the case set forth in item 2" in paragraph ­ shall be deemed to be
replaced with \to the beneciary in the case set forth in item 2."
(Judicial Decision Ordering the Modication of a Trust Due to Special Circumstances)
Article 150 ¬ When, due to the special circumstances that were unforeseeable at the time of an
act of trust, the provisions of the terms of trust concerning the method of trust administration no
longer conforms to the interests of the beneciary in light of the purpose of the trust, the status of
the trust property, and any other relevant circumstances, the court may order a modication of the
trust at the petition of the settlor, the trustee or the beneciary.
­ In ling the petition set forth in the preceding paragraph, the provisions of the terms of trust
after modication to which the petition pertains shall be specied.
® Before the court makes a judicial decision on the petition set forth in paragraph ¬, it shall hear
the statement of the trustee. ¯ A judicial decision on the petition set forth in paragraph ¬ shall
include a summary of the reasons for said decision.
° The settlor, the trustee, or the beneciary may le an immediate appeal against the judicial
decision on the petition set forth in paragraph ¬.
± The immediate appeal set forth in the preceding paragraph shall have the eect of a stay of
execution.
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may be able to be the party of the agreement of the modication unless the terms of
trust exclude the settlor from the qualied persons for the agreement for modication.
By the way, there is no doubt for that the beneciary in this case includes a
beneciary who is actually enjoying the benets and a future beneciary who is
planed to enjoy the benets in the future. But the questions that provide practically
serious problems are: whether a beneciary candidate who may possibly become the
beneciary should be included in the beneciary, whether a past beneciary whose
right to enjoy the benet was lapsed should be included in the beneciary and whether
the holder of a vested right should be included in the beneciary. In principle, as for
a beneciary candidate, since a beneciary candidate is not yet a beneciary at the
time of the agreement, a beneciary candidate cannot become one of the party of
the agreement for a modication of the terms of trust. As for a past beneciary,
the conclusion may depend on what one thinks is the essential part of the benecial
right, that is, whether one thinks that the part to enjoy the benet from the trust
property is essential or that the part of the supervising power over the administration
of the trust property is essential. On the other hand, a holder of a vested right enters
into the interested party concerning the trust property only after the termination of
the trust relationship. Since the institute of the modication of the terms of trust
isn't taking the terminated trust into account, we could say a holder of a vested right
cannot become one of the party of the agreement.
However, since a beneciary candidate cannot be a party of the agreement to mod-
ify the terms of trust as a general rule, it may be possible for the current beneciary
and the trustee to agree on the modication of the terms of trust so as to harm the
beneciary candidate in the future. However, on the other hand, it may be dicult
to legitimize to give a protection for the expectation of the beneciary candidate to
become a proper beneciary in the future at the equal level to the interest which
the current beneciary has. In fact, if one considers how to treat the eect of that
agreement to modify the terms of trust which involved a beneciary candidate as a
party while, however, the beneciary candidate has not been assigned as a beneciary
in the end, one would feel negative to allow a beneciary candidate to participate in
the agreement to modify the terms of trust. However, for example, in the case of a
trust relationship whose purpose is to pay the retirement pension, when there exist
the employees who can expect to become the beneciary to receive the pension with
high probability in the future, for example, those close to their retirement period,
if the terms of trust is modied actually with the intention to harm those bene-
ciary candidates, that may constitute a tort to harm the expectational interests of
the beneciary candidates. Therefore, even though a beneciary candidate in person
cannot take part in the agreement of the modication of the terms of trust, it would
be desirable in practice to protect the interests of beneciary candidates substantially
by appointing a trust caretaker who represents the beneciary candidates' interests.
Viewing from the stand point that being bound with the trust purpose is the
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essential nature of a trust relationship, the fact that the terms of trust including the
purpose of the trust can be modied by the agreement among the trust related parties
would cause a fear that the trust purpose might be made unstable. However, even
if the purpose of the trust was modied by the agreement between the trust related
parties, there has been no change in the situation that the trust administration or
the trust parties are bound with the, although new, purpose of the trust. Since the
very rst purpose of the trust was formed by the wills of the trust parties at the
settlement of the trust, it is theoretically a matter of course that a purpose of trust
can be freely changed by the agreement among all the trust related parties. By the
way, as a method to keep the purpose or the terms of the trust xed for certain period
in practice, the terms of trust can in itself restrict the range of the parties who can
modify the terms of trust with the agreement or exclude certain trust parties from
the parties of the agreement to modify the terms of trust. So, the fear described
above would be only theoretical one and it would not happen in practice for a trust
relationship to become particularly unstable by the free modication of the terms of
trust through the agreement among the trust parties.
(2) Consolidation of Trusts
\A modication of trust" has two theoretical meanings. The rst is to administer the
trust property with the scope of the trust property maintained but according to a
dierent way of thinking from the previous one through modication of the purpose
of the terms of the trust prescribed in the act of trust. By contrast, the second
is to consolidate properties in several trust relationships into one trust property or
to split one trust property into several trust relationships so as to administer the
trust properties according to a dierent way of thinking from the previous one with
corresponding adjustments of the purposes and the terms of the trusts. Those two
\modications of trust" have theoretically dierent dimensions one another but there
are many similar points between the two in the problem of the modications or
adjustments of the terms of trust including the purpose or in the state of the changes
of the legal states including the legal status of a third party. So, we should keep
paying the attention to the dierences and similarities between the two in following
discussion.
\A consolidation of trusts" means to modify a trust relationship by consolidating
properties in several trust relationships into one trust property. The former statute
had no explicit provision concerning consolidation of trusts, the common opinion at
that time took the consolidation, including the split we will describe below, of trusts as
a process to terminate the trust relationship once and then to settle a new trust with
consolidation or split of the properties. Under this way of thinking, the requirements
for the consolidation or split of trusts are virtually same as those of the termination
of the trusts and, as for a trust relationship after the consolidation or split, since it
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is simply a newly settled trust relationship, there is no room to conict with already
existing provisions. In the end, the view for the consolidation or split of trusts under
the former statute was theoretically very clear.
However, that thought had practical problems. When the existing trust relation-
ship once terminates, the trust property was required to be liquidated. In the liquida-
tion process, the gains or losses in the trust property must have been made explicit,
which was sometimes undesirable for the interest of the beneciary. In addition, the
fact that the trust relationship must be once terminated by the liquidation process
was disadvantageous also for the obligees on the trust property. So, in order to avoid
the liquidation process, which might be undesirable both for the beneciaries and the
obligees to the trust, a procedure of \consolidation of trusts" which doesn't include
the termination of the trust were theoretically sought for. There were following three
methods considered for that.
The rst method is to administer the properties in several trust relationships in
parallel according to one administration policy without the legal consolidation of
those trust relationships. By sharing the gains or losses from such a unied admin-
istration in some pre-xed ratio, essentially same eects as a consolidation of those
trusts will be expectable. By this method there is legally no \consolidation of trusts",
so problems associated with the consolidation process will not occur naturally. As
far as there happens no change in the inter-trust legal relationship among existing
trust relationships, there is no need to modify or adjust the terms of those trusts.
However, since each trust property will be administered according to the new ad-
ministration policy after the de facto \consolidation", where the new administration
policy is greatly dierent from one of the past administration policies of those trusts
or where the new way of administration includes the act prohibited or restricted in
one of the exiting trust relationships, certain modications of the terms of trust would
be required individually. Besides, under this method, the actual administration pro-
cess is practically quite similar to a combined administration of those several trusts.
Where the combined administration itself is unsuitable to the terms of trust in one
of those trust relationships or where one of those trust relationships is unsuitable to
the combined administration, the operation of that \consolidation" or \combined ad-
ministration" itself may constitute a violation of the ducial duty or the duty of care
of a good manager of the trustee. By the way, under this method, since existing legal
relationships concerning the administration of the trust property within each trust
relationship are not aected, there is no need to liquidate each trust relationship.
The second method is to exchange trust properties in several trust relationships
with benecial rights on the trust properties so as to concentrate those trust properties
into one trust property in one of those trust relationships. The trust properties in
all trust relationships except one are only the benecial rights in the exceptional one
trust relationship at which all material trust properties are concentrated. The gains
and losses in the course of the administration of the trust property are shared to the
204 CHAPTER 6. MODIFICATION AND TERMINATION OF TRUST
other trust relationships through the benecial rights, so that essentially equal eect
to a consolidation of those trusts can be expected. Under this method, when the
existing trust properties are exchanged with benecial rights on one trust property
the concrete value of each property is determined by some internal agreement, so, the
gain or loss in each trust administration up to the exchange time is not necessarily
made explicit. Besides, since the all except one trust relationships are not changed
except that the trust property is changed to be a benecial right, modications of
the terms of trust in each trust relationship would not be necessary in a usual case.
However, since the acquirements of the benecial rights in one trust relationship
by the other trust relationships are essentially \investments" to the trust property
from the other trust properties, such a \investment" action may be evaluated to be
unsuitable in relation to the propose of one of the trusts which acquire the benecial
rights in exchange of the investments. If that \investment" action generates some
losses on the trust property, the liability of the trustee may be pursued because of
the violation of the duty of care of a good manager. Since this method doesn't cause
any change of the legal relationships around each trust relationship, any adjustment
with the creditors to the trust or the liquidation process would usually not become
necessary. But viewing from the side of the creditors of the trust which acquired a
benecial right in exchange of the material trust property, whole the material trust
property is swapped with an abstract right, namely, a benecial right in another
trust relationship. If such an exchange is evaluated to diminish the value of the trust
property, the obligee's rescission right may be executed against the exchange.
The third method is to settle a new trust relationship so as to transfer all the trust
properties of the existing trusts to the new trust. All existing trust relationships ac-
quire the benecial rights in the new trust relationship in exchange of the transfer
of the trust properties. The gains and losses in the course of the administration of
the trust property in the new trust relationship are shared to each existing trust rela-
tionship through the benecial right so that essentially equal eect to a consolidation
of those existing trusts could be expected. Since this method settles a new trust
relationship independent of existing trust relationships so that the new trust accepts
all material trust properties of the preexisting trust relationships and the preexisting
trusts acquire the benecial rights of the new trust relationship in exchange, there is
no need to adjust the terms of trust between the new trust relationship which holds
all material trust properties and the preexisting trust relationships. In addition, a
modication of the terms of trust in each preexisting trust in accordance with the new
trust relationship would not be necessary unless the terms of trust of the preexisting
trust prohibit the investment of the trust property in the new trust relationship. Be-
sides, since the legal relationships associated with the preexisting trust relationships
will be basically not changed, the interest adjustments or the liquidation of the trust
property in relation to the creditors of the trusts may not be required unless the
transfer of the trust property from the preexisting trust in exchange of the benecial
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right in the new trust relationship is rescinded by a creditor of any of the preexisting
trust as a fraudulent transfer.
Although, in the second and third methods, even the continuity of the existence
of the preexisting trust relationships may be theoretically questioned. For, since
duplicated trust relationships would be formed after the \consolidation" of trusts,
where one same person is the trustee in all the existing trust relationships in the
second method or where one same person is the trustee in all the preexisting and the
newly created trust relationships, all the beneciaries and trustees in the duplicated
trust relationships concerning the preexisting trust relationships are reduced to only
one person. In addition, under the situation in which duplicated trust relationships
are established, the supervising power of a beneciary in an original trust relationship
would be limited to the administration of the trust property in the trust relationship,
that is, the management of a benecial right in the re-trust relationship. If so,
the details of the state of the administration in the new trust relationship may be
excluded from the object of the disclosure request by a beneciary in an original trust
relationship. Then, besides the problem of the duplicated trust relationships above,
where one trust relationship accepts all the material trust properties of the other trust
relationships in exchange of the benecial right, as for the re-trust relationship on the
one hand, the beneciary can request the disclosure of the information concerning
the individual administrations of all the trust property and for the creditors the asset
capable of attachment would be incremented but, as for the original trust relationships
on the other hand, the state of the administration of the trust property in the re-
trust relationship may not be the object of the disclosure request from the beneciary
and for the creditors the only asset capable of attachment is the benecial right in
the re-trust relationship. Viewing from these facts, a great gap would be generated
between the re-trust relationship and the original trust relationships by these second
and third methods.
The current statute prescribes the denition of consolidation of trusts as the con-
solidation of the trust properties of several trusts into the trust property of a single
new trust2 so as to make it explicit that a consolidation of trusts can be done by
the agreement among the trust related parties3. And, corresponding to the deni-
2(Denitions) [excerpt]
Article 2 ...
µ The term \consolidation of trusts" as used in this Act means the consolidation of the whole of
the trust properties of two or more trusts that have the same trustee into the trust property of a
single new trust.
3(Agreement, etc. among the Relevant Parties)
Article 151 ¬ Trusts may be consolidated by the agreement of the settlors, trustees, and beneciaries
of the former trusts. In this case, in eecting such a consolidation, the following matters shall be
specied:
1. the contents of the terms of trust after consolidation of the trusts;
2. if there is any change in the contents of the benecial interest provided for by the terms of
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tion provision, the current provision is prescribed that when a consolidation of trusts
is done, the existing trust relationships should terminate4. Moreover, the current
statute explicitly prescribes the relation of a consolidation of trusts with the creditors
to the trusts. That is, a creditor to the trust to be consolidated who may be harmed
by the consolidation can state the objection to the consolidation5, and obligations
trust, such contents and the reasons for the change;
3. if monies or any other property is delivered to a beneciary upon the consolidation of the
trusts, the content and value of such property;
4. the day on which the consolidation of the trusts becomes eective; and
5. other matters specied by Ordinance of the Ministry of Justice.
­ Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding paragraph, in the cases listed in the following
items, trusts may be consolidated by the methods specied in the respective items. In this case, the
trustee shall, without delay, give notice of the matters listed in the items of said paragraph, to the
settlor in the case set forth in item 1, or to the settlor and the beneciary in the case set forth in
item 2:
1. where it is clear that the consolidation is not contrary to the purpose of the trust: an
agreement between the trustee and the beneciary; or
2. where it is clear that the consolidation is not contrary to the purpose of the trust and that it
conforms to the interests of the beneciary: the trustee's manifestation of such intent in a document
or electromagnetic record.
® Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding two paragraphs, if each terms of trust otherwise
provides for, such provisions shall prevail.
¯Where there is no settlor at the time in question, the provisions of paragraph ¬ shall not apply,
and the phrase \to the settlor in the case set forth in item 1, or to the settlor and the beneciary in
the case set forth in item 2" in paragraph ­ shall be deemed to be replaced with \to the beneciary
in the case set forth in item 2."
4(Grounds for Termination of a Trust) [excerpt]
Article 163 In addition to cases under the provisions of the following Article, a trust shall terminate
in the following cases:
...
5. where the trust is consolidated with another trust;
5(Objections by the Creditors)
Article 152¬Where trusts are to be consolidated, creditors who hold claims pertaining to obligations
covered by the trust properties of the former trusts may state their objections to the trustees with
regard to the consolidation of the trusts; provided, however, that this shall not apply if there is no
risk of such creditors being harmed by the consolidation of the trusts.
­Where all or some of the creditors set forth in the preceding paragraph may state their objections
pursuant to the provisions of said paragraph, the trustee shall give public notice of the following
matters in the ocial gazette, and shall give notice of the same separately to each of the known
creditors as set forth in said paragraph; provided, however, that the period set forth in item 2 may
not be less than one month:
1. a statement to the eect that the trusts are to be consolidated;
2. a statement to the eect that the creditors set forth in the preceding paragraph may state
their objections within a certain period of time; and
3. other matters specied by Ordinance of the Ministry of Justice.
® Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding paragraph, a trustee who is a juridical person
may substitute public notice (limited to public notice given by the following methods) for the separate
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which have been existing to the former trust relations before the consolidation should
be succeeded by the trust after the consolidation6.
In sum, the current statute makes clear that a consolidation of trusts can be done
by the agreement among the trust related parties and adopts the way of thinking
to terminate the preexisting trust relationships once. So, the practical problems to
be associated with that way of thinking, for example, the inconvenience from the
fact that the gain or loss in preexisting trust relationships must be made clear at
the consolidation, would occur also under the current Trust Act, except for explicitly
prescribed problems like the legal relationship of a consolidation with the creditors to
the trusts. If a practitioner want to avoid those problems, the practitioner would be
obliged to make use of the other, non-statutory methods described above. Therefore,
we must say the the theoretical and practical problems we described above concerning
the methods to realize de facto consolidation of trusts under the former statute would
still continue to exist even under the current statute. However, as for the problem
that the state of duplicated trust relationships as a result of a consolidation may fall
under the cause of the termination of the trust relationship, it will not be a problem
under the current Trust Act. For, since who becomes the beneciary in the new
trust relationship is thought to be either the trust property itself of the preexisting
notice to each creditor under the provisions of said paragraph:
1. publication in a major daily newspaper which publishes matters on current events; or
2. electronic public notice (meaning, among methods of public notice, a method wherein mea-
sures are taken to make the information that should be given in a public notice available to many
and unspecied persons by electromagnetic means (meaning an electromagnetic means prescribed
in Article 2, item (xxxiv) of the Companies Act (Act No. 86 of 2005), which is prescribed in said
item; the same shall apply in the following Section)).
¯ If any creditors set forth in paragraph ¬ do not state any objections within the period set forth
in paragraph ­, item 2, such creditors shall be deemed to have accepted the consolidation of the
trusts.
°When any creditors set forth in paragraph ¬ state their objections within the period set forth in
paragraph ­, item 2, the trustee shall make payment or provide reasonable security to such creditors,
or shall entrust adequate property to a trust company, etc. (meaning a trust company or a nancial
institution engaging in the trust business (meaning a nancial institution authorized under Article 1,
paragraph ¬ of the Act on the Concurrent Undertaking of Trust Business by Financial Institutions
(Act No. 43 of 1943)); the same shall apply in the following Section) for the purpose of having such
creditors receive payment; provided, however, that this shall not apply if there is no risk of such
creditors being harmed by the consolidation of the trusts.
6(Scope of Obligations Covered by Trust Property After Consolidation of Trusts)
Article 153 Where trusts are consolidated, the obligations covered by the trust properties of the
former trusts shall become obligations covered by trust property after the consolidation.
Article 154 Where trusts are consolidated, the obligations covered only by the trust property (mean-
ing obligation covered by the trust property which may be paid only out of property belonging to
the trust property, hereinafter the same shall apply in this Chapter) among obligations covered by
the trust property with regard to the previous trusts referred to in the preceding Article, shall be
obligations covered only by the trust property after consolidation of trusts.
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trust relationship or its trustee as the administrator, the benecial right in the new
trust relationship is held clearly as the trust property of the preexisting trust. It is
true that the current statute still prescribes the case in which the beneciary and
the trustee are reduced to one same person as a cause of the termination of the trust
relationship, but the content of the case is prescribed as where the trustee holds all the
benecial rights as the trustee's own property7. Therefore, the state of duplicated
trust relationships to be generated by a de facto consolidation will not fall under
the cause of the termination of a trust, at least under the provision of the current
statute, so that the trust relationship will validly continue to exist even after the de
facto consolidation.
(3) Split of Trust
A \split of trust" means to split one trust relationship into several trust relationships
so as to administer those trust properties under mutually dierent thoughts. Also in a
split of trust, like in a consolidation of trusts we have discussed above, the adjustment
or modication of the terms of trust or the interest adjustment with creditors would
have to be considered. But among them, what is specially worth discussing concerning
the split of trust is the problem of interest adjustment with creditors.
In contrast to a consolidation of trusts, in a split of trust, since each trust property
after the split is originally a part of trust property of one trust and doesn't have been
administered in several dierent trust relationships, an adjustment or a modication
of the terms of trust would be almost unnecessary unless the nature of the trust
property has been so changed by the split that the administration of the trust property
cannot follow the former administration policy. However, as for an interest adjustment
with creditors, a split of trust, in contrast to a consolidation of trusts, always causes
the decrease of the material part of the trust property, so that a both practically
and theoretically important problem is in what legal relationship with the trust the
creditor would stand across the split of the trust or what claim or power the creditor
can exercise over the split of trust.
The former statute had no provision concerning a split of trust, too. So, like in
the case of a consolidation of trusts, an ordinary opinion insists that to split a trust
the trust should be terminated once and new trust relationships should be settled
after a split of the trust property. As practical problems under this method, one
7(Grounds for Termination of a Trust) [excerpt]
Article 163 In addition to cases under the provisions of the following Article, a trust shall terminate
in the following cases:
...
2. where the trustee has continuously held all benecial interests in the form of the trustee's
own property for one year;
...
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pointed out that the gain or loss in the trust relationship must be made clear at the
termination of the trust, which may be undesirable for the beneciary and that the
liquidation procedure in relation to the creditors must be actually operated, which
may be undesirable for the beneciary and/or the creditors. There are three methods
designed to split a trust without the termination of trust. The legal constructions of
those are quite parallel to the methods for consolidation of trusts. But the potential
problems in those methods have a little dierent nature from the case of consolidation,
so we will describe them one by one in following.
The rst method is to administer the trust property in being split under dierent
administration policies with each other in one trust relationship without terminating
the trust relationship so that essentially equal eect to a split of the trust could
be expected. Since this method legally doesn't split the trust, the diculties to be
associated with a split of a trust will never occur. But one may question whether it
is legally possible to administer a part of one trust property independently under the
dierent administration policy for that part. Under this method, the trust property
is, even if it is virtually split, legally one property, so that the scope of a disclosure
request will cover all the trust property and that the gains or losses from the split
administrations, apart from the inner trusts distribution, may be inevitably added
up as a whole in relation to the creditors. Moreover, in relation to the creditors, one
cannot help accepting that the responsibility to the creditors should be covered by
whole the trust property before the split administration. If one want to exempt some
parts of the trust property from the liability of the claim of certain creditors so as to
get the substantial eect of the internal split of the trust, one must obtain individually
the approval of the creditors. Even when such approvals of the creditors are obtained,
since the trustee must keep the property and the debts clearly distinguished according
to which debt is covered by which part of the trust property, the burden of the ocial
works on the trustee may be bloated.
The second method is to \re-trust" a part of trust property so as to create strat-
ied trust relationships. The original trust gets the benecial right in the re-trust
relationship in exchange but actually doesn't exercise or even does waive the bene-
cial right so that the essentially equal eect to a split of the trust could be expected.
This method avoids the interpretation that a part of the trust relationship \termi-
nated" by way of settling re-trust relationships while the actual split between the
preexisting trust and the newly settled re-trust relationships is intended by restraint
on the exercise or waiving of the benecial right in the re-trust relationship. Under
this method, since the re-trust relationship is newly settled, the adjustment of the
terms of trust between those of the preexisting trust would be already done, but only
when the creation of the re-trust relationship is prohibited in the terms of any of
the preexisting trusts, the modication of the term of the preexisting trust would
be required. However, under this method, rather complicated considerations may be
required on the relations with the creditors. For it may be allowable only within the
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trust related parties that although a benecial right is acquired to the newly settled
re-trust, its exercise is restrained or given up so as to get the eect of a split of the
trust. Viewing from the creditor's stand point, since a part of the preexisting trust
property is reduced by the settlement of the re-trust relationship, the benecial right
acquired in exchange of the part of the trust property should be incorporated into the
trust property as the complement of the transferred part of the trust property. Then,
the acquired benecial right is the important part of the trust property and if so, to
restrain or waive such a benecial right is nothing but a fraudulent action against
the creditors. Therefore, it is quite probable for a creditor to exercise the obligee's
subrogate right on the benecial right in the re-trust relationship or to rescind the
waiver of the benecial right as a fraudulent act. By the way, it may be possible to
admit the preexisting creditors of the original trusts to exercise the claim on also the
re-trusted trust property in order to protect the expected interests of those preexist-
ing creditors. In such a case, the newly settled trust by the re-trusting would assume
the obligations doubly with the original trust. But then, since the preexisting cred-
itor can exercise the claim against both the preexisting trust and the newly settled
trust, it would cause a next problem, that is, how to adjust the interests with new
creditors of the newly settled trust. In fact, in such a case, the preexisting creditor
could execute the claim both on the trust property and the benecial right in the
re-trust relationship. It is dicult to derive a clear-cut conclusion on how to consider
the relation between the trust property and the benecial right.
The third method is to create several re-trust relationships so as to get the ben-
ecial right in each trust relationship then to waive those benecial rights so that
the essentially equal eect to a split of trust could be attained. This method is a
radicalization of the second method described above. The terms of the newly settled
re-trusts would be freely determined independently of the preexisting trust relation-
ship. However, as for the relations with the creditors, the same problems as described
above concerning the second method would occur in more serious forms. So, it may
be practically dicult to completely avoid the risk of the exercise of the obligee's
subrogation right on a benecial right or the claim of the rescission of the re-trust as
a fraudulent act from a creditor.
As we have seen up to here, in a split of trust, while adjustments or modications
of the terms of trust will not be required in contrast to the case of a consolidation of
trusts, it is unavoidable to happen some dicult problem in the interest adjustment
with the creditors of the trusts. Therefore, from the practical point of view, it may
be necessary in order to split a trust to liquidate the trust property once in relation
to all the creditors or to acquire the individual agreements from all the creditors on
the scope of the assets to cover each obligation.
The current statute divides split of trust into two categories, \absorb-type trust
split" and \creation-type trust split" according to the form of the trust relationship
6.1. MODIFICATION OF TRUST 211
after the split8and explicitly prescrives on each type of split that it can be eected by
the agreement among the trust related parties as a general rule9. In addition, as for
8(Denitions) [excerpt]
Article 2 ...
⑪ As used in this Act: the term \absorption-type trust split" means the transfer of a part of
a trust's trust property into the trust property of another trust that has the same trustee; the
term \creation-type trust split" means the transfer of a part of a trust's trust property into the
trust property of a new trust that has the same trustee; and the term \split of trust" means an
absorption-type trust split or creation-type trust split.
9(Agreement, etc. among the Relevant Parties)
Article 155 ¬ An absorption-type trust split may be eected at the agreement of the settlor, the
trustee, and the beneciary of a trust. In this case, in eecting such a split, the following matters
shall be specied:
1. the contents of the terms of trust after the absorption-type trust split;
2. if there is a change in the contents of the benecial interest provided for by the terms of
trust, such contents and the reasons for the change;
3. if monies or any other property is delivered to a beneciary in the absorption-type trust
split, the contents and value of such property;
4. the day on which the absorption-type trust split becomes eective;
5. the contents of any property to be transferred; 6. if there is any obligation which will, as
a result of the absorption-type trust split, cease to be an obligation covered by the trust property
of a trust that transfers a part of its trust property to another trust (hereinafter referred to as the
\split trust" in this Subsection), and will become an obligation covered by the trust property of
the other trust to which said part of the trust property is transferred (hereinafter referred to as the
\succeeding trust"), the matters concerning such obligation; and
7. other matters specied by Ordinance of the Ministry of Justice.
­ Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding paragraph, in the cases listed in the following
items, an absorption-type trust split may be eected by the methods specied in the respective
items. In this case, the trustee shall, without delay, give notice of the matters listed in the items of
said paragraph, to the settlor in the case set forth in item 1, or to the settlor and the beneciary in
the case set forth in item 2:
1. where it is clear that the split is not contrary to the purpose of the trust: an agreement
between the trustee and the beneciary; or
2. where it is clear that the split is not contrary to the purpose of the trust and that it
conforms to the interests of the beneciary: the trustee's manifestation of such intent in a document
or electromagnetic record.
® Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding two paragraphs, if each terms of trust otherwise
provides for, such provisions shall prevail.
¯Where there is no settlor at the time in question, the provisions of paragraph ¬ shall not apply,
and the phrase \to the settlor in the case set forth in item 1, or to the settlor and the beneciary in
the case set forth in item 2" in paragraph ­ shall be deemed to be replaced with \to the beneciary
in the case set forth in item 2."
(Agreement, etc. among the Relevant Parties)
Article 159 ¬ A creation-type trust split may be eected at the agreement of the settlor, the trustee,
and the beneciary of a trust. In this case, in eecting such a split, the following matters shall be
specied:
1. the contents of the terms of trust after the creation-type trust split;
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the interest adjustment with the creditors, the current statute admits an objection
right of a creditor against a split of trust10, and prescribes the object and the scope
2. if there is a change in the contents of the benecial interest provided for by the terms of
trust, such contents and the reasons for the change;
3. if monies or any other property is delivered to the beneciary in the creation-type trust split,
the contents and value of such property;
4. the day on which the creation-type trust split becomes eective;
5. the contents of any property to be transferred;
6. if there is any obligation which will, as a result of the creation-type trust split, cease to be
an obligation covered by the trust property of the former trust and become an obligation covered
by the trust property of the new trust, matters concerning such obligation; and
7. other matters specied by Ordinance of the Ministry of Justice.
­ Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding paragraph, in the cases listed in the following
items, a creation-type trust split may be eected by the methods specied in the respective items.
In this case, the trustee shall, without delay, give notice of the matters listed in the items of said
paragraph, to the settlor in the case set forth in item 1, or to the settlor and the beneciary in the
case set forth in item 2:
1. where it is clear that the split is not contrary to the purpose of the trust: an agreement
between the trustee and the beneciary; or
2. where it is clear that the split is not contrary to the purpose of the trust and that it
conforms to the interests of the beneciary: the trustee's manifestation of intention in a document
or electromagnetic record.
® Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding two paragraphs, if each terms of trust otherwise
provides for, such provisions shall prevail.
¯Where there is no settlor at the time in question, the provision of paragraph ¬ shall not apply,
and the phrase \to the settlor in the case set forth in item 1, or to the settlor and the beneciary in
the case set forth in item 2" in paragraph ­ shall be deemed to be replaced with \to the beneciary
in the case set forth in item 2."
10(Objections by the Creditors)
Article 156 ¬ Where an absorption-type trust split is eected, creditors who hold claims pertaining
to obligations covered by the trust property of the split trust or the succeeding trust may state their
objections to the trustee with regard to the absorption-type trust split; provided, however, that this
shall not apply if there is no risk of such creditors being harmed by the absorption-type trust split.
­Where all or some of the creditors set forth in the preceding paragraph may state their objections
pursuant to the provisions of said paragraph, the trustee shall give public notice of the following
matters in the ocial gazette, and shall give notice of the same separately to each of the known
creditors set forth in said paragraph; provided, however, that the period set forth in item 2 may not
be less than one month:
1. a statement to the eect that the absorption-type trust split is to be eected;
2. a statement to the eect that the creditors set forth in the preceding paragraph may state
their objections within a certain period of time; and
3. other matters specied by Ordinance of the Ministry of Justice.
® Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding paragraph, a trustee who is a juridical person
may substitute public notice (limited to public notice given by the following methods) for the separate
notice to each creditor under the provisions of said paragraph:
1. publication in a major daily newspaper which publishes matters on current events; or
2. electronic public notice.
¯ If no creditors set forth in paragraph ¬ state any objections within the period set forth in
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of the assets to cover obligations to the creditors in several types11. However, those
paragraph ­, item 2, such creditors shall be deemed to have accepted the absorption-type trust
split.
° When any creditors set forth in paragraph ¬ state their objections within the period set forth
in paragraph ­, item 2, the trustee shall make payment or provide reasonable security to such
creditors, or shall entrust adequate property to a trust company, etc. for the purpose of having such
creditors receive payment; provided, however, that this shall not apply if there is no risk of such
creditors being harmed by the absorption-type trust split.
(Objections by the Creditors)
Article 160 ¬Where a creation-type trust split is to be eected, creditors who hold claims pertaining
to obligations covered by the trust property of the former trust may state their objections to the
creation-type trust split to the trustee; provided, however, that this shall not apply if there is no
risk of such creditors being harmed by the creation-type trust split.
­Where all or some of the creditors set forth in the preceding paragraph may state their objections
pursuant to the provisions of said paragraph, the trustee shall give public notice of the following
matters in an ocial gazette, and shall give notice of the same separately to each of the known
creditors set forth in said paragraph; provided, however, that the period set forth in item 2 may not
be less than one month:
1. a statement to the eect that the creation-type trust split is to be eected;
2. a statement to the eect that the creditors set forth in the preceding paragraph may state
their objections within a certain period of time; and
3. other matters specied by Ordinance of the Ministry of Justice.
® Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding paragraph, a trustee who is a juridical person
may substitute public notice (limited to public notice given by the following methods) for the separate
notice to each creditor under the provisions of said paragraph:
1. publication in a major daily newspaper which publishes matters on current events; or
2. electronic public notice.
¯ If creditors set forth in paragraph ¬ do not state any objections within the period set forth in
paragraph ­, item 2, such creditors shall be deemed to have accepted the creation-type trust split.
° When creditors set forth in paragraph ¬ state their objections within the period set forth in
paragraph ­, item 2, the trustee shall make payment or provide reasonable security to such creditors,
or shall entrust adequate property to a trust company, etc. for the purpose of having such creditors
receive payment; provided, however, that this shall not apply if there is no risk of such creditors
being harmed by the creation-type trust split.
11(Scope of Obligations Covered by the Trust Property of a Split Trust and That of a Succeeding
Trust After an Absorption-Type Trust Split)
Article 157 Where an absorption-type trust split is eected, the obligation set forth in Article 155,
paragraph ¬, item 6 shall cease to be an obligation covered by the trust property of the split trust
after the absorption-type trust split, and shall become an obligation covered by the trust property
of the succeeding trust after the absorption-type trust split. In this case, any obligation which was
an obligation covered only by the trust property of the split trust shall become an obligation covered
only by the trust property of the succeeding trust.
Article 158 Where a creditor who may state objections pursuant to the provisions of Article 156,
paragraph ¬ (limited to creditors to whom separate notice should be given pursuant to the provisions
of paragraph ­ of said Article) has not been given notice as set forth in paragraph ­ of said
Article, the creditor may also demand, based on the claim which the creditor has held since prior
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provisions in the current statute have been directly adopting a common opinion on
the split of trust under the former statute. So, the problems associated with that legal
construction are still unavoidable as in the era of the former statute. In addition to
that, we should still consider the theoretical and practical problems caused by the
very fact that there exist the methods to realize the essentially equal eect to a split
of trust with avoiding a formal split procedure.
to the absorption-type trust split and which falls under any of the following items, that the trustee
perform the obligation pertaining to said claim by using the property specied in the respective
items; provided, however, that such performance shall be limited, in the case of the property set
forth in item 1, to the value of the property to be transferred to the succeeding trust as of the day
on which the absorption-type trust split becomes eective, and in the case of the property set forth
in item 2, to the value of the trust property of the split trust as of said day:
1. a claim pertaining to an obligation covered by the trust property of the split trust (excluding
claims pertaining to the obligation set forth in Article 155, paragraph ¬, item 4): property that
belongs to the trust property of the succeeding trust after the absorption-type trust split; or
2. a claim pertaining to an obligation covered by the trust property of the succeeding trust
(limited to claims pertaining to the obligation set forth in Article 155, paragraph¬, item 6): property
that belongs to the trust property of the split trust after the absorption-type trust split.
(Scope of Obligations Covered by the Trust Property of the Former Trust and That of the New
Trust After a Creation-Type Trust Split)
Article 161 Where a creation-type trust split is eected, the obligation set forth in Article 159,
paragraph ¬, item 6 shall cease to be an obligation covered by the trust property of the former trust
after the creation-type trust split, and shall become an obligation covered by the trust property of
the new trust after the creation-type trust split. In this case, any obligation which was an obligation
covered only by the trust property of the former trust shall be an obligation covered only by the
trust property of the new trusty.
Article 162 Where a creditor who may state an objection pursuant to the provisions of Article 160,
paragraph ¬ (limited to such a creditor to whom a separate notice should be given pursuant to the
provisions of paragraph ­ of said Article) has not been given notice as set forth in paragraph ­ of
said Article, the creditor may also demand, based on a claim which the creditor has held since before
the creation-type trust split which falls under any of the following items, that the trustee perform the
obligation pertaining to said claim by using the property specied in the respective items; provided,
however, that such performance shall be limited, in the case of the property set forth in item 1,
to the value of the trust property of the new trust as of the day on which the creation-type trust
split becomes eective, and in the case of the property set forth in item 2, to the value of the trust
property of the former trust as of said day:
1. a claim pertaining to an obligation covered by the trust property of the former trust (ex-
cluding a claim pertaining to the obligation set forth in Article 159, paragraph ¬, item 4): property
that belongs to the trust property of the new trust after the creation-type trust split; or
2. a claim which has become a claim pertaining to an obligation covered by the trust property
of the new trust (limited to a claim pertaining to the obligation set forth in Article 159, paragraph
¬, item 4): property that belongs to the trust property of the former trust after the creation-type
trust split.
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6.2 Termination and Continuation of Trust
(1) Termination of Trust
A \termination of a trust" means that the trust parties and the trust property are
released from the binding power of the purpose of the trust. What are provided
as causes of termination of a trust are the case in which the trust related parties
agreed with the termination of the trust12, the case in which the cause of termination
prescribed in the act of trust occurred, the case in which the purpose of the trust has
been accomplished or its accomplishment turned out to be impossible, the case in
which the trust disappeared by a consolidation of trusts, the case in which the trust
fell into the bankruptcy13and the case in which some other special circumstance or
12(Termination of a Trust by Agreement Between the Settlor and the Beneciary)
Article 164 ¬ A settlor and a beneciary may terminate a trust at any time by an agreement between
them.
­ When a settlor and a beneciary have terminated a trust at a time that is detrimental to the
trustee, the settlor and the beneciary shall compensate the trustee for any damages; provided,
however, that this shall not apply if there was a compelling reason for the trust to be terminated at
that time.
® Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding two paragraphs, if the terms of trust otherwise
provides for, such provisions shall prevail.
¯ The provisions of paragraph ¬ and paragraph ­ shall not apply where there is no settlor at
the time in question.
13(Grounds for Termination of a Trust)
Article 163 In addition to cases under the provisions of the following Article, a trust shall terminate
in the following cases:
1. where the purpose of the trust has been achieved or where it has become impossible to
achieve the purpose of the trust;
2. where the trustee has continuously held all benecial interests in the form of the trustee's
own property for one year;
3. where the trust lacks a trustee and the oce has not been lled with a new trustee for one
year;
4. where the trustee has terminated the trust pursuant to the provisions of Article 52 (including
cases where applied mutatis mutandis pursuant to Article 53, paragraph ­ and Article 54, paragraph
¯);
5. where the trust is consolidated with another trust;
6. where a judicial decision ordering the termination of the trust has been rendered pursuant
to the provisions of Article 165 or Article 166;
7. where an order for the commencement of bankruptcy proceedings has been entered against
the trust property;
8. where the settlor is given an order for the commencement of bankruptcy proceedings, an
order for the commencement of rehabilitation proceedings, or an order for the commencement of
reorganization proceedings, and the trust agreement is cancelled under the provisions of Article
53, paragraph ¬ of the Bankruptcy Act, Article 49, paragraph ¬ of the Civil Rehabilitation Act or
Article 61, paragraph ¬ of the Corporate Reorganization Act (including cases where applied mutatis
mutandis pursuant to Article 41, paragraph ¬ and Article 206, paragraph ¬ of the Act on Special
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some public interest requires the trust to terminate14. However, the ground to justify
the termination of a trust is dierent in every case.
For example, the ground of a termination based on the cause prescribed in the act
Rules, etc. for Reorganization Proceedings for Financial Institutions, etc.); or
9. where any grounds specied by the terms of trust occur.
14(Judicial Decisions Ordering the Termination of a Trust Due to Special Circumstances)
Article 165 ¬ When it has become clear that, due to the special circumstances that were unforesee-
able at the time of the terms of trust, the termination of a trust has come to be in the best interest
of the beneciary in light of the purpose of the trust, the status of the trust property, and any other
relevant circumstances, the court may, at the petition of the settlor, the trustee, or the beneciary,
order the termination of the trust.
­ Before the court makes a judicial decision on the petition set forth in the preceding paragraph,
it shall hear the statement of the trustee.
® The judicial decision on the petition set forth in paragraph ¬ shall include the reasons for said
decision.
¯ The settlor, the trustee, or the beneciary may le an immediate appeal against a judicial
decision on the petition set forth in paragraph ¬.
° The immediate appeal set forth in the preceding paragraph shall have the eect of a stay of
execution.
(Judicial Decisions Ordering the Termination of a Trust to Ensure the Public Interest)
Article 166 ¬ In the following cases, when the court nds the existence of a trust to be unallowable
from the perspective of ensuring the public interest, it may, at the petition of the Minister of Justice,
the settlor, the beneciary, a trust creditor, or any other interested party, order the termination of
the trust:
1. where the trust was created for an unlawful purpose; or
2. where the trustee has committed an act that goes beyond or abuses the trustee's power as
prescribed by laws and regulations or the terms of trust or has committed an act in violation of
criminal laws and regulations, and where the trustee continuously or repeatedly commits said act
despite having received a written warning from the Minister of Justice.
­ Before the court makes a judicial decision on the petition set forth in the preceding paragraph,
it shall hear the statement of the trustee.
® The judicial decision on the petition set forth in paragraph ¬ shall include the reasons for said
decision.
¯ The person who has led the petition set forth in paragraph ¬ or the settlor, the trustee, or
the beneciary may le an immediate appeal against the judicial decision on the petition set forth
in said paragraph.
° The immediate appeal set forth in the preceding paragraph shall have the eect of a stay of
execution.
± When the settlor, the beneciary, a trust creditor, or any other interested party has led a
petition set forth in paragraph ¬, the court may, at the petition of the trustee, order the person
who has led the petition set forth in said paragraph to provide reasonable security.
² When ling a petition under the provisions of the preceding paragraph, the trustee shall make
a prima facie showing of the fact that the petition set forth in paragraph ¬ was led in bad faith.
³ The provisions of Article 75, paragraph ° and paragraph ² and Article 76 to Article 80 of
the Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 109 of 1996) shall apply mutatis mutandis to the security
to be provided upon the ling of a petition set forth in paragraph ¬ pursuant to the provisions of
paragraph ±.
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of trust or on the agreement of the trust parties is, of course, the respect of the wills
of the trust parties. The termination by the accomplishment or the impossibility of
the accomplishment of the purpose would be logically derived from the fact that the
essential nature of trust relationship is to be bound with the trust purpose. On the
other hand, the termination of a preexisting trust at the consolidation could be inter-
preted as a political concern to avoid unnecessary complications of trust relationships
by a consolidation of trusts. But it may be seen also as a simple adoption of the
common opinion for the legal construction of a consolidation in the former statute
era. Further, a termination of a trust by the bankruptcy of the trust would be a
socio-political decision to secure the economic and social condence for general trust
relationships and the trust institute.
Thus the ground of the legitimacy for the cause of termination of a trust is not
necessarily uniform, so also for the interpretation of the timing of each termination
some cause-wise interpretation may be required. For example, the termination based
on the termination reason prescribed in the terms of trust or by the agreement among
the trust related parties will be eectuated, as a rule, at the time determined in the
act of trust or the agreement respectively but where there is no explicit determination
of the termination time, the termination time will be decided by an interpretation
of the agreement among the trust parties. In the case of the termination by the
consolidation or the bankruptcy of the trust, the termination time would be the
eectuation time of the consolidation or the commencement time of the bankruptcy
proceeding, respectively. In the case of termination by a decision of a court, the period
of the termination would be recorded in the decision. In contrast to those above, in
the case of the termination caused by the accomplishment or the impossibility of
the accomplishment of the purpose of the trust, an interpretation of the purpose
would be indispensable and, in addition, the possibility of continuity of the trust
relationship with some similar purpose through a modication of the purpose would
be considered so as to get to the individually appropriate conclusion. So, we should
note that interpretations of the termination condition of a trust in this case may be
tangled.
(2) Liquidation of Trust
When a trust relationship terminates, the trust property is released from the pur-
pose of the trust and the legal relationships involving the trust related parties are
all liquidated including those with third parties. In this case the practically most
important problem is how to distribute the \rest of the property" among the trust
related parties. This problem is the core of the problem of the \liquidation of trust
property".
On the general standard of the judgement in the case of liquidation of a trust,
in contrast to the case of the running trust relationship, the interpretation cannot
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put the purpose of the trust on the center. Rather, the only purpose in the liqui-
dation of a trust is the reasonable and appropriate distribution of the rest or the
trust property after the redemption of the principal among the parties concerned.
Then, the power and duty of the trustee also can be understood to be maintained
only for that purpose. Further, the supervising power of the beneciary should be
exercised not for the attainment of the trust purpose before the liquidation but for
supervising the trustee's exercise of the power in order for the liquidation process to
be performed reasonably and appropriately. Then the status of the beneciary would
become essentially same as that of the third parties concerned. From this view point,
it would be theoretically more appropriate to think that a trust relationship is once
dissolved at the \termination of the trust" but resurrect as a new trust relationship
with the purpose of \the liquidation of the trust" and then completely vanished with
the completion of the liquidation than to think that a trust relationship is \ended"
only after the completion of liquidation. Both the former and current statute use a
ction that a trust relationship after the termination will continue to exist for the
purpose of the liquidation15. This could be interpreted as essentially following the
idea described just above.
The basic order of the liquidation process of a trust is, if there are some obligations
with priority, those obligations are fullled rst, then ordinary obligations are fullled.
After then, if there is left some of the trust property, the rest of the trust property is
transferred to the holder of a vested right. The theoretically most important problem
in this respect is how to treat the beneciary. How to think of the status of beneciary
varies depending on how to think of the fundamental structure of trust. If one thinks
that a beneciary is the substantial owner of the trust, the transfer of the rest of the
trust property becomes possible naturally only after the completion of the payments
for the creditors. From this stand point, a holder of a vested right can get only such a
part of the rest of the trust property that the substantial ownership of the beneciary
doesn't reach. By contrast, if one thinks that a benecial right is a right in person
to the trustee or the trust property, a beneciary is theoretically one of the creditors.
So, as a general rule, a beneciary could get the distribution at the equal status to
that of the ordinary creditors. There was no provision which explicitly prescribes this
problem in the former statute. However, the current statute has a provision which
prescribes that a beneciary should be subordinated to the ordinary creditors16. So,
15Article 63 of the former statute Where a trust has terminated, such trust shall be deemed to
continue to exist until the rest of the trust property has been transferred to the holder of a vested
rights.
(Constructive Existence of a Trust)
Article 176 Even where a trust has terminated, such trust shall be deemed to continue to exist until
the liquidation is completed.
16(Relationship between Distribution claim as a beneciary and Trust Claims)
Article 101 Distribution claim as a beneciary shall be subordinated to trust claims.
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the priority order of a benecial right will not change in practice whether one takes
the benecial right as a substantial ownership or as a right in person.
Another practically important problem concerning a liquidation of a trust is at
what time the payment or the transfer of property based on the liquidation process
is considered to be done where there are some intermediators other than the trust
parties in the dealing for the liquidation. This problem has the decisive inuence to
determining the time of the nish of a liquidation process in relation to each person
concerned, that is, to the answer for the question, up to what time the liquidation
trustee has been charged with the duty and responsibility to the person concerned
with the liquidation.
The criterion for the interpretation on this problem is relatively clear in theory,
which is, in sum, that the liquidation process is nished in relation to a person at the
time when the payment of the obligation or the transfer of the property is done to the
person her/himself or the agent of that person so that the property has reached within
the control area of the person. Therefore, while where there is a special agreement
or contract with the person concerned, the agreement or contract should prevail,
where there is no special agreement or contract concerning this problem, the time
would be determined by considering the status of the intermediator etc. through the
interpretation of the concrete legal relationship between the intermediator and the
person concerned with the liquidation. However, the nature of actual intermediator
as an entrepreneur or the roll to be played by the intermediator in the liquidation
process of the trust may be so various that it is not necessarily clear of whom the
intermediator is an \agent" or \related person". Then some disputes among the trust
related persons may occur over the interpretation of the status of the intermediator.
In fact, even if an intermediator or the like who has a capital relationship with the
trustee is dened as the agent of one of the beneciaries in the act of the trust, it
will be problematic simply to accept that the \trustee" trades with the intermediator
as \the agent of a beneciary" based on the literal interpretation of the act of the
trust concerning the status of the intermediator. More careful interpretation would
be required in such a case.
As for the problem whether a beneciary should assume direct liabilities to the
creditors of the trust where it turned out in the course of the liquidation that the
trust property is not enough to pay all the debts to the creditors, we already discussed
above in relation to the liability of a beneciary (Chapter 5 Section 3). Further, we
already discussed also the legal status of the holder of a vested right (Chapter 3
Section 2 (4)). However, what we need to interpret carefully in the provisions of the
current statute is that the current statute prescribes that the trustee can get the rest
of the trust property where a holder of a vested right cannot be determined according
to the provisions for the liquidation of a trust17. The theoretical principle in the
17(Vesting of Residual Assets)
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case in which a trust property has fallen into bona vacantia is that it belongs to the
National Treasury where it is a real property or it belongs to the possessor (Article
239 of Civil Code) otherwise. Since the possessor of the rest of the trust property in
the liquidation is usually the trustee, the disposition of the current Trust Act would
have the appropriateness to some degree also as the practical convention. However,
this provision explicitly admits that the trustee can own the trust property, although
after the completion of the liquidation process, so one should watch the activity of
the trustee in the course of the liquidation not for the trustee to manipulate unfairly
the decisions of the distribution of the trust property in the liquidation process for
the trustee's own interest.
(3) Continuation of Trust
In the case of the termination of a trust by the reason of the accomplishment of the
purpose or the impossibility of the accomplishment of the purpose, an interpretation
of the purpose would be required. In this interpretation, in what degree of abstraction
the purpose of the trust is interpreted would have a great inuence to the conclusion
on the question whether the purpose of the trust has been accomplished or whether
the purpose of the trust has turned out to be impossible to be accomplished. Fur-
ther, even if the purpose of the trust can be considered to have been accomplished,
according to a careful interpretation of the purpose of the trust and the intension of
the settlor of the trust relationship, there may be some case in which to retain the
trust relationship with the purpose similar to the previous one is better and socially
useful than to terminate the trust relationship so as to liquidate the trust property.
This is a problem area concerning \continuation of a trust", which often brings about
in practice concerning a public interest trust.
In a trust relationship for public interest, it is presupposed that even if a concrete
purpose is dened in the terms of each trust, the major purpose which would common
Article 182 ¬ Residual assets shall vest in the following persons:
1. the person designated by the terms of trust as the person who is to be the beneciary in
relation to distribution claim as a beneciary involving the distribution of residual assets (referred
to as the \beneciary for residual assets" in the following paragraph); and
2. the person designated by the terms of trust as a person in whom residual assets should be
vested (hereinafter referred to as the \holder of a vested right" in this Section).
­ Where the terms of trust contains no provisions concerning the designation of a beneciary
for residual assets or holder of a vested right (hereinafter collectively referred to as a \beneciary
etc. for residual assets." in this paragraph) or where all persons designated by the provisions of the
terms of trust as beneciaries for residual assets, etc. have waived their rights, it shall be deemed
as having been provided by the terms of trust that the settlor or settlor's heir or other universal
successor is to be designated as the holder of a vested right.
®When the vesting of residual assets is not determined pursuant to the provisions of the preceding
two paragraphs, residual assets shall vest in a liquidation trustee.
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in such trust relationships is \the attainment of the public interest". So, even if the
concrete purpose determined in the act of a trust has been accomplished or has become
impossible to be accomplished, there may be the case in which to make the trust
relationship continue to exist with some similar purpose would be suitable for \the
attainment of the public interest" as the major purpose than to make it terminate.
Further, as the intension of the settlor, it is may be rather few that a settlor who
settle a trust for public interest intended to attain only that concrete purpose of the
trust relationship. Instead, it is more reasonable and natural to think that such a
settlor created the concrete trust as a means to attain the realization of some more
general public interest. In fact, if the trust relationship terminates, the liquidation
of the trust relationship is performed, so that the rest of the trust property after the
liquidation belongs to either the holder of a vested right or the trustee in person.
Then, it will not be probable that a trust relation is settled again with the rest of the
property as the trust property. Considering those facts, the opinion that such a trust
relationship should not be easily terminated would have some actual legitimacy.
However, the argument above may look like a circular reasoning beginning with the
presupposition that a trust relationship should be retained as far as possible. Viewing
in other perspective, since a trust relationship is bound with the trust purpose, where
the purpose is accomplished or becomes impossible to accomplish, the termination
of the trust relationship should be the logical consequence and to settle a new trust
relationship with a similar purpose can not be derived at least directly from the
pursuit for the purpose of the preexisting trust relationship. Therefore, it would be
dicult to deduce the ground of the rationality or the legitimacy of continuation
of a trust from the theory of the nature of trust relationship. Besides, consider
also the termination by other reason than the accomplishment or impossibility of
accomplishment of the trust purpose. As for, for example, a termination of a trust
by a cause which is prescribed as the reason of the termination in the terms of the
trust, to make the trust relationship continue irrespective of the prescription in the
act of trust couldn't be evaluated to be appropriate or rational at least from the
view of the traditional principle concerning trust relationship and if one still needs
to do so, one must use a ction to suppose \the agreement" among the trust parties
for the retainment of the trust relationship but with a new trust purpose. Still less,
in the case of the bankruptcy of the trust or in the case in which a court issues a
termination order to the trust relationship from the view of public interest, since
there is no rational reason to retain the trust relationship, it is practically impossible
to argue the continuation of the trust relationship.
In sum, the rationality and appropriateness of continuation of a trust mean the
rationality and appropriateness to create a new trust relationship with a similar pur-
pose to that of a preexisting trust relationship to be terminated. Under the current
private law system in which it is the major principle that a private property right
can be freely exercised within the right of the title holder, it is dicult to legitimate
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continuation of a trust relationship against the will of the parties of the preexisting
trust or the terms of the trust which is an embodiment of the will. Therefore, unless
one supposes that the trust parties share the common major purpose \the public
interest", or unless the supervising authority over that public interest trust executes
the discretion power to retain the trust relationship, one couldn't theoretically give a
persuasive explanation of the fact that the continuation is preferred to the termination
of the trust.
Other thinkable major purpose than public interest will be the \pursuit for an
economic interest", as a means for which some concrete investment instruments or
objects for the investment are specied in \the trust purpose". However, in such a
case, since up to when the action of the pursuit for an economic interest would be
continued should be determined by the agreement among the parties, it couldn't be
said to be desirable to make the trust relationship continue by the judgement of the
other person than the trust parties even against the termination reason of the trust
relationship determined in the agreement among the trust parties or dened in the
terms of trust. If the trust parties want the continuation of the trust relationship,
the rational and appropriate way would be to settle a new trust relationship with a
new purpose again.
Chapter 7
Characteristics of Applied Trusts
In this chapter, we give overviews over, as examples of applied trusts, four types of
trusts, Public Interest Trust, Commercial Trust, International Trust and Intellectual
Property Trust and consider characteristics of them respectively with keeping what
we have discussed concerning the general characteristics and problems of trust up to
here in the mind. Those applied trust relationships are all very important in both
theory and practice, so that formally each one would require a full-scale investigation.
But according to the policy of this book, namely, to consider the characteristics of
the general theory of trust and the practical problems, we will restrict our discussion
to the minimal description of the characteristics and problems concerning those types
of trusts.
7.1 Public Interest Trust
(1) Meaning of Public Interest and Power of the Competent
Government Agency
Public interest trust is a trust relationship whose purpose is a realization of some
public interest. But the \public interest" here is far from univocal. Act on Public
Interest Trusts (Public Interest Trust Act Taisho 11 (1922) Act no.62), which is the
special statute for public interest trust, provides the denition of public interest trust
as a trust with no provision on the beneciary prescribed in Article 258 of the current
Trust Act the purpose of which belongs to science, arts, charity, ritual, religion or
other public interests and that has acquired the permission of the competent govern-
ment agency1. This provision concretely lists the purpose of trust which would be
1Article 1 of Act on Public Interest Trusts Of trust with no provision of the beneciary prescribed
in Article 258 of Trust Act (Act no. 108 of 2006 (Heisei 18)), a trust the purpose of which falls under
science, arts, charity, ritual, religion or other public interests and which has acquired the permission
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admitted as a public interest trust. But if one consider the items more rigidly, while
\science, arts and charity" are concrete actions to attain respective public interests,
\ritual and religion" are listed because of their historical and social rolls to support
various activities to promote public interests including science etc.. So, we should
note that from this theoretical point of view the subjects the provision lists belong
to mutually dierent spheres.
The current Trust Act doesn't have a provision which directly prescribes public
interest trust but, instead, the Act on Public Interest Trusts referred to above exists
as a special law for public interest trusts. However, this Act on Public Interest Trusts
consists of the provisions that originally constituted the part for public interest trust
in the former Trust Act. At the opportunity of the legislation of the current Trust Act,
that part was excerpted, given some provisions for minimal adjustments and legislated
as an independent statute with the new name \Act on Public Interest Trust". So, the
contents of the provisions of the Public Interest Trust Act is essentially same as the
Public Interest Trust part of the former Trust Act. Therefore, we should note that
the interpretation of public interest trusts is basically unchanged since the former
Trust Act until the Public Interest Trust Act will have been amended in the future.
Compared with an ordinary trust relationship, namely, a private interest trust, the
characteristic of a public interest trust is, in addition to the restriction on the trust
purpose to a realization of some public interest, that a trust relationship is established
only after the acquirement of permission from the competent government agency2.
Further, as the power of the competent government agency, the general supervising
power over public interest trusts3as well as the permission of a modication of a trust4,
set forth in the next article (hereinafter referred to as Public Interest Trust) shall be governed by
the provisions of this Act.
2Article 2 of Public Interest Trust Act ¬ Of trust with no provision of the beneciary prescribed
in Article 258 of Trust Act, a trust the purpose of which falls under science, arts, charity, ritual,
religion or other public interests shall not be eected unless the trustee has acquired the permission
of the competent government agency.
­ As for the duration of a public interest trust, Article 258 of Trust Act shall not apply.
3Article 3 of Public Interest Trust Act A public interest trust shall subordinate to the supervision
of the competent government agency.
Article 4 of Public Interest Trust Act ¬ The competent government agency may at any time inves-
tigate in the state of administration of a public interest trust or order a deposit of a property or
other necessary dispositions.
­ A trustee of a public interest trust shall perform a public notice on the state of the trust
administration and trust property one a year at a determined period.
4Article 5 of Public Interest Trust Act ¬ When there occurred on a public interest trust some
special circumstance which was not able to be foreseen at the time of the settlement time, the com-
petent government agency may order the modication of the trust unless the modication violates
the main aim.
­ The provisions of Article 150 of Trust Act shall not apply to a public interest trusts.
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consolidation or split of trusts5and resignation of a trustee6are prescribed respectively.
In addition, the powers of a court prescribed in Trust Act generally belong to the
power of the competent government agency for a public interest trust7. Still one more
characteristic of a public interest trust is that even after the termination of a public
interest trust, where there is no determination of a person to hold the vested right or
the vested right holder waived the right, the trust relationship can be retained with
the rest of the trust property as the trust property for the similar purpose based on
the judgement by the competent government agency according to the main aim of
trust8. The income of a public interest trust is generally exempted from the tax9,
which is an apparent dierence with a private interest trust.
In sum, in public interest trusts the supervising power of the competent govern-
ment agency is quite strong, so that the administration of a public interest trust is
performed virtually under the direction and supervision of the competent government
agency. In this meaning, in a public interest trust, by what means the \public in-
terest" will be realized is not necessarily entrusted on the free creativity of the trust
parties. In addition, in settling a public interest trust, which government agency is
competent in that public interest as the trust purpose must be clear in practice. See-
ing from this point of view, the fact that the provision of Public Interest Trust Act
is enumerating concrete public interest areas for a trust purpose as a public interest
trust may be interpreted as considering the convenience to determine the competent
5Article 6 of Public Interest Trust Act The permission of the competent government agency shall
be required in order to modify (except the modication prescribed in the previous Article) or to
consolidate or split public interest trusts.
6Article 7 of Public Interest Trust Act A trustee of a public interest trust may resign the trustee
only when there is a compelling reason, provided the permission the competent government agency
shall be required.
7Article 8 of Public Interest Trust Act [excerpt] ¬ As for a public interest trust, the power of a
court prescribed in Trust Act concerning a trust with no provision of the beneciary prescribed in
paragraph ¬ of Article 258 of that Act shall belong to the competent government agency.
8Article 9 of Public Interest Trust Act Where a public interest trust terminates, when there is no
provision to determine the holder of a vested right or when the holder of a vested right waived the
right, the competent government agency may make the trust relation ship continue for the similar
purpose to the previous one according to the main aim of trust.
9(Immunity concerning Pubic Corporations and Public Interest Trusts etc.) [excerpt]
Article 11 of Income Tax Act
...
­ As for the income which occurred on the trust property of a public interest trust prescribed
in Article 1 (Public Interest Trust) of Act on Public Interest Trust (Act no.62 of 1922) or of a
beneciary protection trust prescribed in Article 2 paragraph ⑪ (Denitions) of Act on Exchange of
Company Bonds and Shares etc. (provided, however, as for the interest etc. of public corporation
bonds etc., restricted to the part which is calculated according to Cabinet Order as the value of
the part corresponding to the period during which those public corporation bonds etc. belong to
the trust property of the public interest trust or of the beneciary protection trust) The income tax
shall not be imposed.
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government agency for the trust. Further a room of discretion of the trust parties
is narrow in determining the actual administration policy of the trust property, the
concrete contents of benecial right or the selection of a person to be beneciary from
beneciary candidates. In this meaning, an opinion that a public interest trust should
be argued separately from an ordinary trust would have some reason.
However, since a public interest trust is still a kind of a trust relationship, even if a
trust relationship failed to be settled as a public interest trust, it would be established
as a private interest trust, so that the current Trust Act would be applied to it. Trust
parties have the choice on whether the trust relationship would be established as a
\public interest trust" or not. In sum, we should think that the dierence between
a private interest trust and a public interest trust is based not on the theoretical
nature of the trust relationship but on the practical considerations, especially, on a
governmental policy. Therefore, also in public interest trusts the essential nature of
trust relationship is that the trust property and the trust parties are bound with the
purpose of the trust, like in a private interest trust. The paying the respect for that
nature should be put on the center of a legal interpretation also in exercising the
power of the competent government agency.
(2) The Nature of Benecial Right in a Public Interest Trust
As we have described above, as the \realization of a public interest" is set to be
the major objective in a public interest trust relationship, there are some dierences
also in the nature of a beneciary or benecial right from those in an ordinary trust
relationship. since to give maximum benets to a certain beneciary is not a purpose
in a public interest trust so that a predetermined benet from the trust property
is given to a \beneciary" who is selected according to a predetermined criterion in
order to realize eectively the public interest, a beneciary in a public interest trust
is usually not concretely specied at the beginning time of the settlement. Although
we have already explained above, it is supposed that the supervising power over a
public interest trust is exercised mainly by the competent government agency, so
that the exercise of the supervising power of the beneciary would be redundant.
So, in contrast to the case of a public interest trust, the beneciary's exercise of the
supervising power will not be the center of the institution of the public interest trust.
Therefore, the nature of benecial right in public interest trusts is in that the
content of a benecial right for the beneciary is concentrated at the enjoyment of
the benet from the trust property according to the act of trust so that the exercise
of the supervising power over the administration of the trust property is entrusted to
the competent government agency. Thus, a benecial right in a public interest trust
cannot be said to be the substantial ownership of the trust property and, since the
trust relationship cannot be said to be based on the condential relationship with the
trustee, it cannot be interpreted as a claim right to the trustee in person. In the end,
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as for a public interest trust, it would be most reasonable to think that a benecial
right is a right in person against the trust property as an independent property for
the realization of the public interest. If one considers the nature of a benecial right
in a public interest trust intimately associated with the main aim of the institution,
as for the right of a beneciary candidate who is not yet a beneciary, it would be
more consistent to expect an appropriate exercise of the supervising power by the
competent government agency than to interpret the right of a beneciary candidate
who is not yet a beneciary as an independent right of the beneciary candidate.
However, the argument like above clearly presupposes the reliability of the insti-
tution according to which the supervising power is always appropriately exercised by
the competent government agency for the purpose of the realization of the public in-
terest. Then, the next problem will be how to secure the reliability of the institution
or how to correct the eect of the inappropriate exercise of the power where some
inappropriate exercise of the power by the trustee or by the competent government
agency harmed the reliability. In such a case, although some complicated legal rela-
tionships may be inevitably generated, it should be better to allow also a beneciary
or a beneciary candidate in a public interest trust relationship to exercise the super-
vising power from a little dierent view point than the competent government agency
in order to keep the appropriateness of the operation of the institution through an
analogy with the supervising power of a beneciary or a beneciary candidate in
private interest trust relationships.
(3) Modern Applications of Public Interest Trusts
According to the traditional common opinion, while Public Interest Trust and Incor-
porate Foundation are essentially same property administration institutions with the
realization of some public interest as the purpose, an incorporated foundation has its
independent legal personality but, on the other hand, a public interest trust doesn't.
Such being the case, the choice between those institutions has been determined vir-
tually according to the scale of the assets. Seeing from the similarity between them,
the \accomplishment of public interest" in the purpose of a public interest trust is
supposing the duration of the trust relationship for some time like in an incorporated
foundation and the arguments over the continuation of a trust described above can
be seen to have some connection with such circumstances. Further, candidates of a
person who can get the benet from a public interest trust may range over rather
wide area like in the case of incorporated foundation and the objectivity and fairness
in some social meaning would be required in the selection of a beneciary taking the
purpose, \the accomplishment of public interest", into consideration. Under such a
traditional common opinion, what is not so much dierent from the case of a incor-
porated foundation would be required to settle a public interest trust in the scale of
the asset or in the legally required procedure for the settling.
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However, under the traditional common opinion like above, it will be actually
dicult within the property disposable by an individual to settle a public interest
trust with a concrete purpose which should be useful to realize the ultimate public
interest. Let's imagine a public interest trust for supporting revival from disaster of
great earthquake. Suppose, for example, that someone is intending to settle a public
interest trust by providing its private property to support economically the residents
of the area which has been suered by a great earthquake and the enterprises doing
businesses in such an area. Since, even if only within the private property only for
persons residing in a limited area, for an individual to do some supporting activities
would be useful not only for the support of that disaster area but, ultimately, also for
the promotion of the revival of whole the society, so that it can be said clearly to lead
to \a realization of a public interest". It is true that, since the scale of the property
which an individual can provide as the trust property is naturally not very huge,
it would be impossible to support all the residents and enterprises in all damaged
areas, so that the residents and enterprises actually supportable by that asset would
be regionally and personally limited to the range which the individual actually has
known of.
Such, so to speak, \an individual type public interest trust" has in reality some in-
compatible characteristic with the presuppositions of the traditional view concerning
public interest trust. So, according to the traditional opinion, it may be dicult in
some degree to acquire the permission for such a trust relationship as a public interest
trust. However, if the will of individual which clearly leads to the realization of the
public interest doesn't fall under the category for a public interest trust, it will be
theoretically and practically a failure of the institution. In fact, the greater was the
damages by an earthquake, the more cost and time it takes to grasp all the details of
the state of the damages. So, if one must wait for the activities of the public interest
groups or public agencies whose objects to support are all the damaged residents and
enterprises in all the disaster areas, swift and exible supporting activities would not
be expectable, for such a group or organization would be required to act objectively
and impartially. Therefore, as a general policy for activities for the public interest
for the purpose of supporting the damaged areas, it will be necessary and useful to
prepare some complex system, with which, while some part of the support activities
is entrusted to the accumulation of the activities of \individual type public interest
trusts" which target at support within the range personally known to those active
persons, orthodox public interest groups or public agencies complement the support
activities with the comprehensive perspective, for instance, by supporting the areas
where the supporting activities or funds are insucient. By the way, a method to
make the private property of an individual donate to a public interest group does
not make a swift support action possible. Moreover, since the usage of the donated
asset is administered generally based on the judgement by the donee organization,
the actual will of the donator is not necessarily reected on the usage of the asset,
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which is a serious failure of this method.
Such being the case, it is not appropriate both in theory and practice to interpret
the main aim of the institution of public interest trust close to that of incorporated
foundation. Rather, the public interest trust institution in the future should have
more exibility in the operation so as to allow an individual to settle a public in-
terest trust for \the realization of the public interest" as far as possible within the
asset that individual can disposed of. Rational exercises of the discretion power by
the competent government agency in each relevant eld and the preparation of the
rational provisions for the public interest trust institution are waited for.
7.2 Commercial Trust
(1) Denition and Characteristic of Commercial Trust
Of the denitions of commercial trust there are two qualitatively dierent ones. The
rst is that a \commercial trust" is a trust relationship in which the trustee is a
merchant, who is a prot-making businessman10. The second is that a \commercial
trust" is a trust relationship the purpose of which is a pursuit for prots on a regular
basis. The latter denition is commonly accepted in present arguments concerning
the commercial trust.
However, the trustee of a trust relationship the purpose of which is a pursuit for
prots on a regular basis is in most cases a merchant. Moreover, in reality, whether
the purpose of a trust relationship is \a pursuit for prots on the regular basis" is
dicult to judge based on the appearance in many cases, so that whether the trustee
is a merchant is, in eect, the practical criterion to judge from the outward appearance
whether a trust relationship is a commercial trust.
Since the legislation of the former Trust Act up to the present, there is no Act
named \Commercial Trust Act" in Japan. the arguments on Civil Trusts and on
Commercial Trusts have been performed side by side based on the same provisions
of Trust Act. The overwhelming majority of the actual trust relationships has been
commercial trusts in which the trustees are trust banks. Therefore, a \trust" in
Japan means a \commercial trust" at the core, so that the distinction between a civil
and commercial trusts has not be thought to be necessary very much. By the way,
the amendment of the former Trust Act and the legislation of the current Trust Act
was motivated by the strong criticism from the trust business that the former Trust
Act lacked the practical rationality. But, needless to say, this \practical rationality"
meant in reality a \practical rationality as the commercial trust institution".
10Article 6 of the former Trust Act An assumption of a trust relationship is deemed to be a
commercial transaction where it is performed as a business.
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Therefore, we should note that the arguments concerning practical or theoretical
problems on the current Trust Act should be interpreted as actually supposing a com-
mercial trust relationship, on which the discussion in this book is not the exception.
Theoretically, how to think about the characteristic of \the commercial trust"
compared with \the civil trust" is a quite important problem but it is dicult to give
a clear-cut conclusion. This problem is, in the end, reduced to the problem to abstract
the theoretical view point to distinguish between \commercial" and \civil" in general
trades not limited to trust relationships. But on this problem, since the modern
Japanese legal system was established, in spite of the long history of the disciplinal
discussions, the most persuasive conclusion concerning the dierence between \civil"
and \commercial" transactions is from the commercial legal study merely that a
commercial transaction is a transaction an enterprise performs for the purpose of
prots on a regular basis.
Such being the case, if one considers the theoretical nature of a commercial trust
based on the traditional argument concerning the characteristics of general trades, the
one must rely, in the end, on the attribution of the trustee who actually administer
the trust property. However, while we acknowledge insuciency of our argument, if
we dare to try to argue the characteristic of the commercial trust from the side of the
trust purpose, the argument will be as follows.
First, if one supposes that there is the major aim \a pursuit for prots" in com-
mercial trusts, the concrete trust purpose of a concrete commercial trust relationship
would be positioned as a concrete measure to attain the major aim. Therefore, in
interpreting the consistency of the administration of the trust property with the trust
purpose, not only the consistency with the concrete purpose in that trust relationship
but also whether the administration action is reasonable from the view of \the pursuit
for prots" would be taken into consideration. Such a way of thinking will aect the
interpretations concerning the evaluation of the exercise of the power by the trustee,
the duties and responsibilities of the trustee or even the evaluation of the exercise of
the supervising power by the beneciary.
Second, in a commercial trust, although the conception of its theoretical char-
acteristic may be controversial, the trust property is understood as consisting of an
accumulation of economic values rather than of concrete physical properties. It is
true that the existences of the concrete properties are sometimes indispensable in
order to attain the purpose of the trust, for example, to secure the control power
over a certain enterprise. But even in such a case its rationality will be explained by
the nature as a concrete measure for some ecient incrementation of the economic
value in the end. Thus, the way of thinking that the trust property is grasped as
an accumulation of economic values in commercial trust relationships would have a
great inuence on the judgement on the rationality of the administration action on
a concrete trust property or the interpretation of the action's suitability to the trust
purpose.
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The argument above is, surely, no better than an essay. In addition the conclusion
may look mediocre. But the deepening the argument on this problem in the future
is clearly necessary and useful.
(2) Commercial Trust and the Current Trust Act
As described above, the current Trust Act is an amendment of the former statute from
the view point of the practical rationality as commercial trusts. So, the provisions of
the current statute are basically suitable to the characteristic of commercial trusts.
By comparing the provisions of the current statute with those of the former
statute, the general characteristics of the current Trust Act are, rstly, that a trust
relationship is constructed by putting the agreement of the trust parties on the cen-
ter, so that the concrete contents can be determined freely by the trust parties, and
secondly, that an importance is not necessarily put on the status of the settlor but
rather on the condential relationship between the trustee and the beneciary after
the establishment of the trust relationship, and thirdly, that the duty and responsibil-
ity of the trustee is reasonably limited, so some exible adjustment with the interest
of the beneciary is intended. All of those characteristics have the rationality and
appropriateness in relation to the pursuit for prots in a commercial trust.
In addition to the general characteristics above, the provisions for the securitiza-
tion of benecial rights and the provisions for the limitation of the liability of the
trustee could be enumerated as the characteristic provisions in the current Trust Act.
We could say that all those provisions are designed from the angle of the rationality
of the administration in a commercial trust for the purpose of the pursuit for prots
rather than from the consideration on all over the trust relationships.
(a) Securitization of Benecial Right
As for the method to securitize a benecial right so as to put it on the circulation in
the nancial market, there was no provision in the former statute. But the current
Trust Act explicitly provides the settlement of a \trust with certicates of benecial
interests"11. As a general argument, where benecial rights are securitized, the legal
relationship among the trust parties may be changed as follows.
11(Provisions of The Terms of trust on the Issuance of Certicate of Benecial Interest)
Article 185 ¬ The terms of trust may provide for a certicate(s) indicating one, two, or more
benecial interests (hereinafter referred to as a \certicate of benecial interest") to be issued as
provided for in this Chapter.
­ The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall not preclude the terms of trust from providing
that no certicate of benecial interest shall be issued for a benecial interest of specic content.
® In the case of a trust with provisions as set forth in paragraph ¬ (hereinafter referred to as a
\trust with certicate of benecial interest"), the provisions set forth in the preceding two paragraphs
may not be changed by making modications to the trust.
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First, since the status of a beneciary can be easily transferred with the certicate,
it may be more dicult for the trustee to grasp who is the beneciary, than before
the securitization. It means that, for example, the possibility of the act in conict of
interests for the trustee becomes dicult to be realized, so such circumstances may
have some eects on the interpretation of the violation against the duty of loyalty by
the trustee.
Second, where the assignment of the status of a beneciary becomes relatively
easy, since concrete beneciaries may possibly be changed at any time, the eect of
the agreement between the trustee and a concrete beneciary would be questioned.
An agreement between the trustee and the beneciary at a certain time is usually
done on behalf of that beneciary in person and it would be rare that an agreement is
made exclusively for the sake of the future beneciary who may acquire the certicate
of the benecial interest. So, if it is allowed to modify the terms of trust by the
agreement between the present trustee and beneciary, such a modication may harm
a future beneciary. Therefore, in a trust relationship in which the benecial interest
is securitized, the eect of the agreement between the trustee and the beneciary
should be basically restrained and, as an institution design, it would be better for the
stability of the circulation of the benecial rights to prohibit the modication of the
terms of trust by an agreement between the trustee and the beneciary.
Concerning the rst problem described above, the current Trust Act requires
the preparation of the benecial interest registry12and the trustee can treat as a
beneciary the parson who is registered as a beneciary in the registry at a certain
date13. In a trust with certicate of benecial interest, the benecial right is not
¯ In the case of a trust with no provisions as set forth in paragraph ¬, the provisions set forth in
said paragraph or paragraph ­ may not be established by making modications to the trust.
12Article 186 A trustee of a trust with certicate of benecial interest shall, without delay, prepare
a benecial interest registry, and state or record therein the following matters (hereinafter referred
to as the \matters to be stated in the benecial interest registry" in this Chapter):
1. the content of the distribution claim as a beneciary pertaining to each benecial interest
and other matters specied by Ordinance of the Ministry of Justice as matters that specify the
content of the benecial interest;
2. the serial number of the certicate of benecial interest pertaining to each benecial interest,
the date of issue, whether each certicate of benecial interest is a registered certicate or bearer
certicate, and the number of bearer benecial interests;
3. the name and address of the beneciary pertaining to each benecial interest (excluding
beneciaries of bearer benecial interests);
4. the day on which the beneciary set forth in the preceding item acquired each benecial
interest; and
5. in addition to what is listed in the preceding items, the matters specied by Ordinance of
the Ministry of Justice.
13(Record Date)
Article 189 ¬ The trustee of trust with certicate of benecial interest may specify a certain date
(hereinafter referred to as the \record date" in this Article), and designate the beneciaries who
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eectuated unless the certicate is delivered14and the assignee of the certicate of
benecial interest cannot duly assert the status of the beneciary against the trustee
unless the assignee's required information is recorded in the registry15. In sum, the
current statute is making the information on the beneciary and benecial right
as well as the issuance of the certicate of benecial interest concentrated at the
trustee. Therefore, the trustee can systematically grasp who is the beneciary so
that the trustee can easily recognize the scope of the duty and responsibility to the
beneciary.
Next, as for the second problem above, in issuing the certicate of benecial
interest the current statute prohibits lightening the duty of a good manager of the
trustee or modifying the duty of the notication, through the terms of trust16. On the
have been stated or recorded in the benecial interest registry as of the record date (hereinafter
referred to as the \beneciaries as of the record date" in this Article) as the persons who are entitled
to exercise their rights.
­ The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall not apply to any beneciaries of bearer benecial
interests.
® When designating the record date, the trustee of a trust with certicate of benecial interest
shall specify the content of the rights that the beneciaries as of the record date are entitled to
exercise (limited to such rights to be exercised within three months from the record date).
¯ When the trustee of a trust with certicate of benecial interest has designated the record
date, the trustee shall give public notice in an ocial gazette, no later than two weeks prior to the
record date, with regard to the record date and the matters specied pursuant to the provisions of
the preceding paragraph; provided, however, that this shall not apply if the terms of trust contains
provisions on the record date and the content of the rights that the beneciaries as of the record
date are entitled to exercise.
° Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph ¬, paragraph ®, and the main clause of the
preceding paragraph, if the terms of trust otherwise provides, such provisions shall prevail.
14(Assignment of a Benecial Interest for Which a Certicate of Benecial Interest Has Been
Issued)
Article 194 The assignment of a benecial interest in a trust with certicate of benecial interest
(excluding a benecial interest subject to the provisions set forth in Article 185, paragraph ­) shall
not be eective unless the certicate of benecial interest pertaining to such assigned benecial
interest is delivered.
15(Requirements for the Perfection of an Assignment of a Benecial Interest in a Trust With
Certicate of Benecial Interest)
Article 195 ¬ The assignment of a benecial interest in a trust with certicate of benecial interest
may not be duly asserted against the trustee of the trust with certicate of benecial interest unless
the name and address of the person who has acquired the benecial interest has been stated or
recorded in the benecial interest registry.
­ For the purpose of the application of the provisions of the preceding paragraph with regard
to a benecial interest subject to the provisions set forth in Article 185, paragraph ­, the phrase
\trustee" of the same paragraph shall be deemed to be replaced with \trustee or any third party."
® The provisions of paragraph ¬ shall not apply to bearer benecial interests.
16(Special Rules on the Duties of the Trustee of a Trust With Certicates of Benecial Interests)
Article 212 ¬ In the case of a trust with certicates of benecial interest, notwithstanding the
provisions of the proviso to Article 29, paragraph ­, no provision of the terms of trust may mitigate
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other hand, the current statute allows the terms of trust to prescribe that a certain
range of the beneciary's power including the rescission right against the act in breach
of trust can be exercised by only the beneciary whose share over the whole benecial
right exceeds a certain ratio17. Those provisions are intending, in sum, to make the
administration policy of the trust property stable so as to prevent, to some degree,
the confusion by the discrepancies of individual judgements among the beneciaries.
However, viewing from a general principle, since the beneciary may change relatively
easily in a trust with a certication of benecial interest, some modication of the
the duty set forth in the main clause of said paragraph.
­ The provisions of Article 35, paragraph ¯ shall not apply to a trust with certicate of benecial
interests.
17(Special Rules on The Terms of trust Providing for Restrictions on the Exercise of Rights by a
Beneciary)
Article 213 ¬ In the case of a trust with beneciary certicates, notwithstanding the provisions of
Article 92, item 1, item 5, item 6, and item 8, provisions may be established in the terms of trust to
the eect that, with regard to all or part of the following rights, such rights may be exercised only
by a beneciary who holds a benecial interest which represents not less than three-hundredths of
the voting rights of all beneciaries (or any smaller proportion provided for by the terms of trust;
hereinafter the same shall apply in this paragraph) or a beneciary who holds benecial interest
which represents not less than three-hundredths of the total number of existing benecial interests:
1. the right to rescind under the provisions of Article 27, paragraph ¬ or paragraph ­ (including
cases where these provisions are applied mutatis mutandis pursuant to Article 75, paragraph ¯);
2. the right to rescind under the provisions of Article 31, paragraph (6) or paragraph (7);
3. the right to request to inspect or copy materials under the provisions of Article 38, paragraph
¬; and
4. the right to le a petition for the appointment of an inspector under the provisions of Article
46, paragraph ¬.
­ In the case of a trust with certicate of benecial interests, notwithstanding the provisions of
Article 92, item 1, provisions may be established in the terms of trust to the eect that, with regard
to all or part of the following rights, such rights may be exercised only by a beneciary who holds a
benecial interest which represents not less than one-tenth of the voting rights of all beneciaries (or
any smaller proportion provided for by the terms of trust; hereinafter the same shall apply in this
paragraph) or a beneciary who holds a benecial interest which represents not less than one-tenth
of the total number of existing benecial interests:
1. the right to le a petition for a judicial decision to order the modication of the trust under
the provisions of Article 150, paragraph ¬; and
2. the right to le a petition for a judicial decision to order the termination of the trust under
the provisions of Article 165, paragraph ¬.
® The provisions of the preceding two paragraphs shall not apply to a trust with certicate of
benecial interests if disclosure under the provisions of Article 39, paragraph ¬ is restricted by the
provisions of the terms of trust as set forth in paragraph ® of said Article.
¯ In the case of a trust with beneciary certicates, notwithstanding the provisions of Article 92,
item 11, provisions may be established in the terms of trust to the eect that the right to demand
a cessation under the provisions of Article 44, paragraph ¬ may be exercised only by a beneciary
who has continually held a benecial interest during the preceding six months (or any shorter period
provided for by the terms of trust).
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administration policy of the trust property would be inevitable. As a institution, it
would be better for all the circumstances including such a condition to be left on the
judgement by the investors for determining the investment.
To what degree trusts with certicates of benecial interests will prosper in the
future trust business will largely depend on the judgement in the market on whether
certicates of benecial interests are worth investing in. Seeing from theoretical
view point, this institute may greatly change the present state of trust relationships.
But, in spite of its experimental nature, this institutionalization could be positively
evaluated.
(b) Limitation of Liability of Trustee
According to the traditional common opinion, since a trustee has the power to admin-
ister the trust property, a trustee should assume, at least at rst, all the obligations
or liabilities generated in the course of the administration. However, if one thinks
that the risk of the loss in the investment activity should be taken by the person who
can acquire the possible gain, then, since trust property as an independent property
performs an investment activity, it would be questionable that the conclusion that
the trustee should take all the risk with the trustee's own property is harmonious
with such a sense of equity in investment activities. In fact, there is an opinion that
actually casts strong doubt on the conclusion. Seeing from the stand point of a third
party who entered into a trade relationship with the trust property, especially in a
trust relationship the purpose of which is certain investment activity, concerning the
right which the third party has acquired in the course of the investment, it may be
more reasonable for the third party to grope for a way of a direct claim against the
beneciary who would have got the benet from the investment activity, rather than
having the trustee assume all the responsibility and liability for the loss. Under the
thought to limit the responsibility or liability of the trustee to the range covered by
the trust property, there is a presupposition that it is the beneciary and the trust
property but not the trustee who is performing the investment activity, which may
be the common feeling of the trustee and third parties.
The current Trust Act has explicit provisions which admit a \limited liability
trust" in which the terms of trust sets the limit on the range of the liability of
the trustee18. Where the terms of trust prescribes the liability of the trustee to be
18(Requirements for a Limited Liability Trust)
Article 216 ¬ A limited liability trust shall become eective as a limited liability trust when it is
provided by the terms of trust that the trustee is liable to perform all obligation covered by the trust
property only by using property that belongs to the trust property, and when a registration of such
provisions is made as provided for in Article 232.
­ The terms of trust set forth in the preceding paragraph shall provide for the following matters:
1. the purpose of the limited liability trust;
2. the name of the limited liability trust;
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limited, if the fact that it is a limited liability trust is registered19and clearly indicated
to the other party of the trade20, then the liability of the trustee concerning the
administration of the trust property is limited within the trust property and, except
for the case of the liability caused by the trustee's intention or gross negligence21, the
execution of the claim will not be enforced on the trustee's private property22. By
3. the names and addresses of the settlor(s) and the trustee(s);
4. the place where the principal trust aairs for the limited liability trust are to be administered
(referred to as the \place for the administration of aairs" in Section 3);
5. the method of administration or disposition of property that belongs to the trust property;
and
6. other matters specied by Ordinance of the Ministry of Justice.
19(Registration of the Provisions on Limited Liability Trust Status)
Article 232 When the terms of trust has provided as set forth in Article 216, paragraph ¬ the terms
of trust, a registration of its provisions on the limited liability trust status shall be made within two
weeks, by registering the following matters:
1. the purpose of the limited liability trust;
2. the name of the limited liability trust;
3. the name and address of the trustee;
4. the place of administration of aairs of the limited liability trust;
5. if a trust property administrator or incorporated trust property administrator has been
appointed under the provisions of Article 64, paragraph ¬ (including cases where applied mutatis
mutandis pursuant to Article 74, paragraph ±), the name and address thereof;
6. if the terms of trust contains provisions on the termination of the trust under the provisions
of Article 163, item 9, such provisions; and
7. if the trust is a trust with accounting auditors (meaning a trust with accounting auditors as
prescribed in Article 248, paragraph ®; the same shall apply in Article 240, item 3), a statement to
that eect and the names of the accounting auditors.
20(Duty of Clear Indication to the Counterparty)
Article 219 A trustee may not, in conducting a transaction as the trustee of a limited liability trust,
duly assert against the other party to the transaction as such unless the trustee has clearly indicated
to that eect to the other party.
21(Trustee Liability to Third Parties)
Article 224 ¬ In the case of a limited liability trust, if the trustee was willful or grossly negligent in
the course of administering trust aairs, the trustee shall be liable to compensate for any damages
suered by a third party arising therefrom.
­ The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall also apply when a trustee of a limited liability
trust has committed the following acts; provided, however, that this shall not apply if the trustee
proves that the trustee did not fail to exercise due care in committing said act:
1. making false statements or records on the matters that should be stated or recorded in the
balance sheet, etc.;
2. making a false registration; or
3. giving false public notice.
® In the cases referred to in the preceding two paragraphs, when there is another trustee who is
also liable to compensate for damages in addition to the trustee set forth in those paragraphs, these
trustees shall be joint and several obligors.
22(Restrictions on Execution, etc. Against Property That Belongs to Trustee's Own Property)
Article 217 ¬ In the case of a limited liability trust, no performance may be compelled nor may
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the way, in a limited liability trust, also the distribution to the beneciary will be
limited within a certain amount23.
Since a trade with trust property should be able to be done through the free agree-
ment with a third party, where the third party admitted the limitation of the trustee's
liability based on the registration and indication, the eect should, of course, bind the
third party. But, for example, where the liabilities by a tort and a contract concurred
on the trustee, since the limitation of the trustee's liability is clearly based on the
contractual agreement, we can't easily give a conclusion on the question whether the
limitation of the liability has the eect also on the liability by a tort. Then, it is
still unclear whether this institution for the limitation of the trustee's liability can
perfectly \protect" the trustee.
(3) The Present State of Commercial Trust Institution
As we described above, since the establishment of the former Trust Act up to the
present, special legislations concerning commercial trusts have been only for specic
species of the commercial trust relationships, so that the general interpretational the-
ory for commercial trust relationships has been developed together with that for civil
trust relationships wholly based on the Trust Act. This state is basically unchanged
under the current Trust Act and the Trust Act is applied to both civil and commercial
trusts.
The opinions may dier on the question whether \Commercial Trust Act" should
be legislated as a statute independent of Trust Act under the present situation. Ac-
tually, in the course of the amendment of the former Trust Act and the legislation of
the current Trust Act, such an opinion had been strongly insisted that the applica-
provisional seizure, provisional disposition, exercise of a security interest, auction, or proceedings for
collection of delinquent national taxes be carried out against property that belongs to the trustee's
own property, based on a claim pertaining to any obligations covered by trust property (excluding
obligations pertaining to the right set forth in Article 21, paragraph ¬, item 8).
­ The trustee may assert an objection to performance that was compelled or to, provisional
seizure, provisional disposition, exercise of a security interest, or an auction that was carried out in
violation of the provisions of the preceding paragraph. In this case, the provisions of Article 38 of
the Civil Execution Act and the provisions of Article 45 of the Civil Provisional Remedies Act shall
apply mutatis mutandis.
® The trustee may assert an objection to proceedings for collection of delinquent national taxes
that were carried out in violation of the provision of paragraph ¬. In this case, the assertion of the
objection shall be made by entering an appeal against the proceedings for collection of delinquent
national taxes.
23(Restriction on Distribution of Trust Property to the Beneciary)
Article 225 In the case of a limited liability trust, no distribution of trust property may be made
to the beneciary beyond the maximum distributable amount (meaning the maximum amount that
may be distributed to the beneciary, as calculated by the method specied by Ordinance of the
Ministry of Justice within the amount of net assets; hereinafter the same shall apply in this Section).
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tion of the provisions concerning commercial trust relationship in the former Trust
Act caused various problems on the practical business by trust banks. Taking into
account the fact that the study on the legal institute of commercial trusts had been
rather developed at that time, not only to amend the former Trust Act but also to
legislate a Commercial Trust Act separately should have been one of the alternatives
in theory at that time.
However, the current Trust Act which was legislated as the result of the amend-
ment of the former Trust Act has many provisions which are rather congruent with
the present mind of trust banks in practice. So the current Trust Act can be said to
possess the characteristics of \Commercial Trust Act". As we have already discussed
above, it is quite dicult to point out what theoretical characteristic the \commercial
trust" has compared with the \civil trust" although the dierence on the fundamental
philosophy concerning the trust purpose and the administration of the trust property
may be recognized at rst sight. On the other hand, although the current Trust Act
has been legislated supposing the application to commercial trust relationships, such
a provision that may immediately cause a trouble when applied to a civil trust rela-
tionship has never been recognized. Rather, also as for the theoretical construction
concerning the fundamental structure of trust, the current Trust Act sticks to the
neutral position to all the theories. Seeing from the stand point which supports the
diversication and exibility of trust, the current Trust Act will be evaluated to have
the sucient rationality and appropriateness also in the application to civil trust
relationships.
Thus, the needs to legislate another Commercial Trust Act than the current Trust
Act would be very small in the present circumstances. However, although the pro-
visions of the current Trust Act basically respect the agreement among trust parties
and tend to restrain the exercise of the supervising power by a court, since the role
of a family court is highly expected both legally and socially in the case of the family
property administration which is a typical example of civil trust, when we consider
the application of the provisions of Trust Act in this eld, some adjustment on the
discussion would become necessary, for example, by analogical interpretation of the
provisions of Civil Code which prescribe the supervising power of a court.
7.3 International Trust
(1) Characteristic of International Trust
\International Trust" means a trust relationship a part of which is located in a foreign
country. Concretely, the case in which a part of the trust property is administered
abroad, the case in which directions to the administration of the trust property are
given from abroad or, further, the case in which the nationality of the trust parties
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is of a foreign country would be included in international trust, for instance. So, the
instances of international trust have rich variety.
Where one considers the reason why an international trust is created, one should
clearly distinguish two cases, namely, the case in which a trust relationship is made
use of for international property administration and the case in which a part of a
trust relationship which could be domestic is intentionally located abroad.
In the case in which a trust relationship is used for an international property ad-
ministration, the trust parties usually try to give exibilities to the transfer of assets
or the acquirement of prots in the international property administration so that the
eectiveness at the equal level of a domestic trust relationship is aimed at. the reason
why a trust relationship of this form is created is in many cases that it is intended to
convert qualitatively various, internationally sporadically existing properties into the
one unied fund for a benecial right so as to secure the common traits through the
property. Therefore, the most important problem in the interpretation of an interna-
tional trust relationship of this type is the economic evaluation of the trust property
or the adjustment of the economic prots. As for these evaluation and adjustment,
since a trust relationship is created by the agreement among the trust parties, the
agreement among the trust parties concerning the evaluation and adjustment should
be respected in principle. But where the interpretations dier among the trust par-
ties, or where the trust parties agreed with making some unfair prots, from the view
point of the justice and equity it would be inevitable to reinterpret the agreement
among the trust parties. Then, the interpreter would come up against the dicult
problem not restricted within the trust law area but existing all over the legal studies,
namely, how to estimate the economic value of a legal property.
On the other hand, in the case in which a part of trust property is intension-
ally located abroad, the trust parties don't fear that the legal relationships may be
complicated. Rather, such trust parties are usually intending to complicate the legal
relationships so as to draw from which some economic prots. The \prots" here
include not only the prots from the administration of the trust property but also
the saving of the tax by making use of the country-wise dierent tax systems. In
this case, since the parties themselves intends to form a complicated legal relation-
ship, the most important problem in interpretation is up to where the interpretation
should follow the legal relationships the trust parties intensionally formed or to what
degree the interpretation should follow the reasonable consideration based on the ac-
tual transfer of economical prots in spite of the outward legal relationships. It is
true that this problem can occur in the case of a domestic trust relationship. But
in the case of an international trust relationship, since the legal relationships may
be internationally extended, the contents of the \substantial interpretation" may be
country-wise dierent so that the discrepancies of the substantial interpretations may
make the legal relationships still more complicated. However, it is inevitable that the
interpretation of an international trust relationship would become more complicated
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than of a domestically completed trust relationship since legal systems are formed
country-wise. Should we pursue for the internationally harmonious legal interpreta-
tion by excluding the each country-peculiar substantial interpretation? Or, should we
think that the interpretation should be performed on the ideas of justice and equity
of each country's because the legal order in each county should be protected by each
respective country since to create the unied theory of all the countries' interpreta-
tions is actually impossible. Which should be adopted as a way of thinking within a
legal system of one country, opinions may dier.
As we have seen, there are many problems left unresolved, or some of them even
impossible to completely resolve concerning international trusts. But we should note
that most of these problems are not limited to the case of international trusts but
concerning general legal interpretation. In the case of international trusts, applica-
ble legal provisions extend over several legal systems in several countries, as we will
see below concerning the conict of laws, so that a domestic legal provision which is
expected to function as the standard of the justice and equity in an ordinary case is
made relative, thus one cannot derive a clear-cut conclusion from it in most cases.
However, the thought that sees the current provisions in the domestic legal system as
the absolute standard of the justice and equity would be in itself questionable in the
appropriateness and, moreover, the ideal that all the basic concepts are unambigu-
ously made clear is far from being realizable in the discipline on the trust law as we
have seen again and again up to here. Therefore, there is no need to emphasize the
theoretical dierence between international trusts and ordinary domestic trusts. Also
in the legal interpretation for international trusts, to interpret exibly the content
of the agreement among the trust related parties with putting one the center the
thought that a trust relationship is a legal relationship bound with the trust purpose
would lead to the rational and appropriate resolution of concrete disputes.
(2) Choice of Applicable Law to Trust
The most symbolic problem to represent the complexity of international trust rela-
tionships will be the problem of the choice of applicable law. In the case in which
a trust relationship extends over plural countries, the law in each country would be
applicable to the trust relationship. Moreover, some party mat insist that laws in
several countries should be applied to the trust relationship at once. As the result,
the range of laws applicable to the trust relationship may grow endless. On this
problem, Act on General Rules for Application of Laws (Heisei 18 (2006) Act No. 78)
in Japan provides the general rules in every legal construction. But such a law for
conict of laws itself is legislated independently in each country, so one must consider
the problem to select the applicable law among laws for application of laws. Thus, it
is clearly dicult to nd a decisive resolution of a problem in an international trust
relationship.
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Since the current Trust Act is a domestic law, it implicitly supposes that a trust
relationship is completed in the home country, so that there is no concrete provision
provided especially for an international trust relationship. Besides, we should pay
attention to the fact that the basic legal concepts like \a right in person", \a right
in rem", \a property right", \a right" or \an interest" which are basic components
of the legal relationships among the trust related parties or the legal relationship be-
tween the trust parties and third parties, are dierently understood in every country.
Further, as we have seen up to here, as for a trust relationship, there are various the-
ories concerning even the nature of benecial right. As the result, for example, the
applicable law would be dierent depending on whether one thinks that a benecial
right is the substantial ownership of the trust property or that a benecial right is a
right in person.
So, we should admit that any denitive theoretical conclusion on the problem in
what range the Japanese Trust Act is applicable could not be found in the case of
an international trust. Even if one derives a conclusion by the application of the
Japanese Trust Act, the \rationality" or the \appropriateness" may be questionable
in the case of an international trust relationship. However, on the other hand, it
is clearly problematic if one thinks that all the provisions and all the arguments of
Japanese trust law should be excluded from the applicable laws to a trust relationship
merely because the trust relationship is an international trust and a part of the trust
relationship is located abroad.
Then, also in the interpretation of the choice of the applicable law in the case of an
international trust, we should, in the end, begin the argument with the presupposition
that the essential nature of a trust relationship is for the trust parties and the trust
property to be boud with the purpose of the trust. This stand point would respect the
outward appearance of the legal relationship which the trust parties created and, at
the same time, search for the most suitable law to be applied to the trust relationship
in relation to the purpose of the trust. This way of thinking could be rather highly
expected to get to a both theoretically and practically appropriate conclusion in many
cases although it is dicult to specify the applicable law in all cases uniformly by
that.
7.4 Intellectual Property Trust
(1) Characteristic of Intellectual Property Trust
An \intellectual property trust" means a trust relationship the trust property of which
is an intellectual property. The intension of an intellectual property trust is, in sum,
to make use of a trust relationship for the administration of the intellectual property,
which can be said one of the most attractive methods for the modern use of a trust
242 CHAPTER 7. CHARACTERISTICS OF APPLIED TRUSTS
relationship. However, setting such a practical characteristic aside, it is considerably
dicult problem to grasp clearly what theoretical characteristic intellectual property
trusts have. In considering such a theoretical problem, the fundamental policy of
the interpretation is directed by what characteristic the intellectual property which
constitutes the trust property has as a property.
For example, if one takes the characteristic of the intellectual property as an im-
material property right, an intellectual property trust could be interpreted similarly
to other trust relationship the trust property of which isn't material, that may be,
for instance, a trust relationship of the credits as the typical case. In fact, the oce
works for the administration of intellectual property should have many common fea-
tures with those for the administration in a credit trust relationship caused from the
common characteristic that the property is immaterial. Further, a typical intellectual
property that has high value as a property would be associated with the claim for the
royalty in exchange of setting the right of the use, so the some continuity between an
intellectual property trust and a credit trust cannot be negated. However, while a
credit is a claim relation between plural parties and the typical cause, a contract, is in
principle freely concluded between the parties, an intellectual property is dened as a
fruit of some intellectual eorts by each holder of the intellectual property, so that it
requires no \the other party" in the creation of the right and there still needs careful
considerations to judge whether freedom of the will of the parties at the same level
as in the case of a credit to agree with and to decide the content of the intellectual
property could be armed.
Instead, if one takes the characteristic of intellectual property as the fact it is
a fruit of the intellectual eorts of the title holder, intellectual property interest
is an institution to administer the result of the intellectual eorts of the title holder
according to the purpose of the trust, so that it would be understood rather dierently
from other trusts. In an ordinary trust relationship which we have considered above,
the trust property is a \thing" or an \economic value", so that it becomes naturally
an object of administration. By contrast, an intellectual property is not necessarily
crystallized as a \thing" and doesn't always represen any economic value, so, one
must reconsider the meaning of the administration of the fruit of intellectual eorts.
In fact, if one thinks that an intellectual property should include not only concrete
results of the intellectual eorts and the methods or means as the results but also the
intellectual eorts themselves, one should radically reconsider the problem whether
such an intellectual activity itself can be actually \bound with the purpose of the
trust".
At present, the practically attractive sphere of intellectual property trusts is to
make use of a trust relationship in order to administrate reasonably and intensively
a typical intellectual property which is clearly institutionalized in the statutes like a
patent right or a copy right. Since such a trust relationship will always fall under the
category of intellectual property trust however one considers the nature of intellec-
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tual property trusts in theory, the importance to make the theoretical characteristic
of intellectual property trusts clear is not realized in practice. However, when the
examples of intellectual property trust is augmented in the future, the number of
the cases in which some subtle interpretation is required would necessarily increase.
Then, we couldn't avoid answering the problem what is the theoretical characteristic
of intellectual property trusts. This problem is still unresolved at present and even
the future direction for the resolution is still uncertain. But it is surely necessary
to consider the theoretical characteristics of the intellectual property trust or the in-
tellectual property itself further. In considering that problem, it should be useful,
above all, to delve into the sphere of the intellectual property as the fruits of the title
holder's intellectual eorts as we referred to above.
(2) International Intellectual Property Trust
What is attracting the trust business most of all types of intellectual property trusts
at present is to make use of an international intellectual property trust relationship
as a method to manage the intellectual properties which have been created in several
countries in the course of the international activities of an international enterprise or
groups.
The traditional method for the management of international intellectual property
is to concentrate the intellectual properties which have been given or acquired in
various countries at the central oce which is located in the place where the main
business activities are performed, so that the central oce manages the intellectual
properties and distributes the power of the operation of the right to the other oces
in various countries. However, in this method, since the rights etc. based on the
intellectual properties created in various countries all belong to the central oce in
the place for the main business activity, the other business oces can enjoy only a
part of the benet from the right. Therefore, if the intellectual properties which has
been created individually in various oces in various countries are all incorporated
into a unied management, the rights based on those intellectual properties all belong
to one central oce in one country, so that each oce which individually create the
intellectual property in each country may feel negative to make the fruits subject to
the unied management.
On the other hand, another method is also rather widely used at present, which
is for all the relevant oces to share the intellectual property rights which are given
or acquired in various countries. In this method, contrary to the method described
above in which the central oce in the country for the main business activity manages
all the intellectual properties in unication, each oce holds the rights concerning
the relevant intellectual properties as its own rights, so as to prevent the actual
management of the intellectual properties from being one-way management in relation
to the central oce at the main business place. However, in this method, since one
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same legal relationship may belong to several oces in several countries, if the number
of the relevant countries is increased, the legal relationships may be so complicated
that, in case of some dispute, the cost of the eorts for the resolution may become
enormous.
Taking such situations of the practical business into consideration, the method to
settle a trust relationship for the administration of international intellectual proper-
ties may be able to provide the solutions to the problems of the ordinary methods
for international intellectual property management described above. Concerning a
unied management of intellectual properties, trust property would be administered
in unication based on the trust purpose, so that it is not permitted for a particular
party arbitrarily to administer the property. Further, as for the legal relationships
among the parties, if the contents of the benecial rights have been exibly adjusted
in the act of the trust, the trust relationship would cope with the peculiar state of the
practices and regulations in each country through the agreement among the relevant
parties. Moreover, in an intellectual property trust relationship, all the trust related
parties stand on the equal statuses under the trust purpose, so that legal or factual
priority order among the parties concerned should disappear. By this eect, the risk
of the occurrence of the mental oppositions among the oces would be largely got
rid of, which may be considerable merit for the enterprises engaged in international
business.
We have seen the practical usefulness and promise of international intellectual
property trusts. But if one considers the theoretical characteristics, the one will crash
the dicult problem: the feature of international trust relationship and the feature
of intellectual property trust relationship, both features should be taken into con-
sideration in order to grasp the theoretical characteristic of international intellectual
property trust. Even if we restrict ourselves to concrete interpretational problems,
piles of dicult problems with various aspects are left unsolved in the area of inter-
national intellectual property trusts, for example: ¬ the fundamental structure of
legal relationships among the trust related parties; ­ legal problems in conversion of
an intellectual property right into a benecial right; ® an interpretational policy for
choice of applicable law to the trust relationship; ¯ an interpretational policy on the
performance of the tax system and trust aairs; and so on.
As we have seen in discussions in various disciplines on trust relationship, if one
bases the interpretational argument on the \being bound with the trust purpose" as
the essential nature of trust, it should be expectable to a high degree that one can
perform a theoretically consistent and practically reasonable interpretation. However,
as for the conclusions on the left problems in various areas, typically in the area of
international intellectual property trusts, we should deepen the arguments further.
The necessity of the considerations on trust from the theoretical view point will not
be ceased by any legislation. I sincerely hope that discussions in this book contribute
to further development of the study of trust law.
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(End)
